











Orthodoxy in the Age of Nationalism:  
Agudat Yisrael and the Religious Zionist Movement in 
























Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree 
of Doctor of Philosophy  
























































Orthodoxy in the Age of Nationalism:  










While it is widely recognized that Zionism was inspired and shaped by modern European 
nationalism, Orthodox responses to Zionism (whether nationalist or anti-nationalist) are typically 
viewed as internal Jewish affairs. This dissertation argues that these responses, like Zionism itself, 
must be understood in their Eastern and Central European contexts. When appropriately 
contextualized, the anti-Zionist Agudat Yisrael and the Zionist Mizrahi movement take on a 
different meaning than that assigned them in the conventional narrative. In particular, I argue that 
these movements were not the natural and inevitable results of preexisting ideological differences 
but, rather, were a product of power struggles that shaped and consolidated differing ideological 
positions.  
Informed by the literature on social movements, this dissertation asks questions about the 
organizational structure of Orthodox parties, their mobilization of resources, their links to other 
groups, and their interaction with external authorities and governments. My approach to these 
movements complements recent scholarship on nationalist activism in East Central Europe, which 
looks at the activism of nationalist entrepreneurs and their role in creating and developing new 
group formations. I argue that the political contest between the religious Zionist movement 
(Mizrahi), established in 1902 in Vilna, and Agudat Yisrael, founded in 1912 in Kattowitz, played a 
 
crucial role in shaping two distinct Orthodox camps. My dissertation thus traces the formation 
today’s national-religious bloc on the one hand, and ultra-Orthodoxy on the other – back to the 
history of nationalist activism in early twentieth century East Central Europe.   
The structure of this dissertation reflects the trans- and international character of these struggles, 
in which the center of conflict slowly moved from the European strongholds of Orthodox Jewry to 
Palestine. The first chapters explore the character and composition of both the Mizrahi and Agudat 
Yisrael. Based on a critical analysis of roughly 1300 short activist biographies compiled in the 
Encyclopedia of Religious Zionism, Chapter I argues that the religious Zionist movement emerged 
out of a crisis within observant Jewry in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Once the 
Mizrahi was established in 1902, it became a vehicle to promote, channel and focus Zionist activism 
among Orthodox Jews. Religious Zionism not only embraced the building of a Jewish state, but 
aimed at creating and establishing new forms of leadership throughout the Jewish Diaspora as well 
as in Palestine. In this sense, the Mizrahi displayed many similarities to other European nationalist 
movements.  
My next chapter addresses the response to such activism by traditionalist leaders and spiritual 
authorities. Struggling to counter the impact of secularism and nationalism, these leaders aimed at 
uniting traditionalist Jews all over the world under the umbrella of one organization. This attempt 
itself was an essentially modern project. Notably, Agudat Yisrael aimed at enhancing and 
strengthening rabbinic authority to an unprecedented degree in order to counter the influences of 
nationalist activism and modern mass politics. Other conservative and religious forces in Europe, 
such as the Catholic Church in Poland, were engaged in similar elite struggles at the time. I hold 
that inner-Orthodox disputes and struggles shaped the movement in the early years of its existence. 
On this note, the chapter concludes by exploring the tensions and discussions between Agudat 
 
Yisrael and the Mizrahi in the first decade of the former’s existence. In the early years, the 
movements’ ideologies were not fully developed, and leaders from both repeatedly engaged in 
negotiations for cooperation – at times even pondering unification. Mutual polemics and political 
clashes, however, polarized the atmosphere, further clarifying the ideological lines separating the 
movements. The First World Congress of Agudat Yisrael in August 1923 marked the conclusion of 
the early stage of ideological and organizational consolidation of the two camps. 
The next two chapters explore the dynamics between Agudat Yisrael and the Mizrahi on two of 
the central stages of Jewish interwar politics - the Second Polish Republic and the Jewish 
settlements in Palestine. Interwar Poland, with its vast traditionalist Jewish communities, was fertile 
ground for developing and shaping modern Orthodox politics. Based on my research in Polish and 
Israeli archives, as well as my reading of the extensive party press, chapter three analyzes the 
interactions between the two organizations in the local Jewish communities and on the Polish 
national stage. Both parties struggled with tensions between political activism and spiritual 
authority. Their polemics and struggles helped leaders on both sides to resolve such tensions within 
their own movements.  
As the situation of European Jewry grew increasingly grim during the interwar period, the 
newly emerging settlements and political structures in Palestine gained more and more significance. 
Through political tensions and processes of polarization, Agudat Yisrael and the Mizrahi 
established themselves as the two pivotal Orthodox movements on site. I argue, based on protocols 
from party meetings and a great variety of other documents from Israeli and American archives, that 
heightened Orthodox involvement in Palestine throughout the 1920s did not lead to rapprochement, 
but rather further deepened their political antagonism. The tripartite relationship between Agudat 
Yisrael, Mizrahi, and the Zionist Organization (ZO) became an additional cause of tension, as 
 
negotiations about cooperation between Agudat Yisrael and the Zionists endangered the Mizrahi’s 
position within Zionist institutions, as well as its political influence. For Jewish Orthodoxy, 
Palestine had become a divisive land.  
Political and economic developments in Europe and Palestine eventually convinced leaders on 
both sides to renew negotiations on cooperation during the 1930s. These negotiations are the subject 
of my final two chapters. Chapter five deals with calls for the convening of a world congress of 
Orthodoxy in 1934-35, and chapter six explores negotiations between top-tier politicians from both 
sides in Paris and London in 1938-39. All of these attempts ultimately failed. Despite this failure, I 
argue that these negotiations constituted an important stage in the development of the two 
movements, and their mutual relations. Over the preceding decades, both Agudat Yisrael and the 
Mizrahi had developed distinguished platforms and ideologies. In the late 1930s cooperation 
seemed negotiable, but organizational affiliations and ideological lines were well defined, and 
neither side seriously revisited the idea of unification. The negotiations in Paris also helped to 
isolate the core religious demands vis-à-vis the Jewish state on which both sides would be able to 
settle. These areas of concordance would become essential to the agreement reached with the ZO 
that ultimately laid the foundation for the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948 – historical 
processes that I discuss in the conclusions of my dissertation.  
Ultimately, this dissertation offers a new look at the processes that shaped and formed two 
fundamental camps within Orthodox Jewry. By tracing the struggles between observant nationalist 
activists and established religious elites from Europe to Palestine, it sheds new light on the political 
dynamics, the processes of cultural transfer, and the transnational networks that played a central 
role in the formation and fostering of Orthodox group formations. Exploring the dynamics of 
Orthodox politics in different geographical centers allows me to uncover these contexts and 
 
contributes to our understanding of the relationship between Orthodoxy and Zionism – a 
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A NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION 
	  
The transliteration of Yiddish and Hebrew presents a linguistic Sisyphean struggle. While I 
have not succeeded in rolling the bolder entirely up the hill, I have nonetheless tried my best to be 
consistent and ease the reader’s task. I have largely followed the YIVO system of transliteration 
for Yiddish and the Encyclopaedia Judaica system of transliteration for Hebrew. I have generally 
indicated which Hebrew letter is being transliterated, but I have not used special characters (thus ח 
is transliterated as h and not as ḥ). In the text of my dissertation and the footnotes, Hebrew names 
appear in their English form, when it exists (Isaac instead of Yitzhaq), and with as few insertions 
as possible (thus no ’ and ‘ as indications for א or ע). When they appear in a reference, on the other 
hand, names are transliterated fully. If an author published in both Hebrew and English, I 
maintained one version of his or her name for both. 
  
Quite a number of the historical figures in this study altered their names during the period 
under consideration, mostly after immigrating to Palestine. So as not to confuse the reader, I have 
chosen one name for each figure and used it consistently throughout. I refer to geographical places 
by the name that was official at the time, despite the fact that many of the subjects of this 

















Grappling with the social and political upheavals sweeping the continent and torn by 
fierce struggles over the future of Jewish communal organization, Europe’s Orthodox 
Jews1 began to mobilize politically in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 
Over the course of these decades, two organizations emerged that would soon become the 
foremost Orthodox movements in Europe and Palestine. In Vilna, a hotspot of Jewish 
political activism in the Russian Empire, several activists founded the religious Zionist 
party Mizrahi in 1902.2 A product of conflicts within the Zionist movement concerning 
engagement with modern culture, the Mizrahi quickly became an important political 
venue for observant activists. Ten years later, rabbinic authorities and lay leaders from 
Central Europe and the Russian Empire gathered in Kattowitz to launch Agudat Yisrael.3 
The Agudah aimed at uniting traditionalist elites from Europe and Palestine within one 
overarching movement and at providing alternatives to the political activism of 
nationalist and socialist parties.  
Not long after their founding, both Mizrahi and Agudat Yisrael had established 
multiple branches throughout Europe and Palestine and had proven themselves influential 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 According to convention, English-language literature generally uses the term “Orthodoxy” to describe this 
group, despite the fact that it is insufficient and, in fact, inaccurate. The historical sources themselves 
mostly use the Hebrew term “haredi.” In its current usage, however, haredi would be translated as “ultra-
Orthodox” and thus limited to certain segments of Orthodox Jewry. A clear differentiation between modern 
and ultra Orthodoxy did not exist at the time, and the shaping of these two clearly defined camps is part of 
the process I am analyzing. 
2 The name Mizrahi is an acronym for Merkaz Ruhani (spiritual center). It can also refer to the Hebrew 
word for East (Mizrah), and as such alludes to Jerusalem in Jewish tradition and prayer.   
3 Agudat Yisrael means “Union of Israel,” a name that expresses the aim of its founders to form a new 




players in the arena of Jewish politics. Competing for the support of observant Jews, the 
two movements were soon enmeshed in bitter political and ideological struggles. Their 
adherents fought over rabbinic posts, power in local Jewish communities, and political 
representation in different countries and on the international level. Yet despite fierce 
disputes, frequent mutual slander, and occasionally violent quarrels, Agudah and Mizrahi 
also repeatedly attempted to cooperate in different national and international spheres. As 
the largest and most powerful Orthodox political movements during the first half of the 
twentieth century, Agudat Yisrael and Mizrahi deeply impacted Jewish communities in 
interwar Europe and became primary platforms for Orthodox engagement with the 
question of Jewish statehood in Palestine.  
This dissertation investigates the rise of the two movements, their political 
consolidation, their efforts to establish themselves respectively as the representatives of 
Orthodox Jewry, and their attempts to reach some kind of cooperation. Beginning with 
the origins of Agudat Yisrael and Mizrahi in Central Europe, it follows the progression of 
their mutual struggles to Palestine and to the international stage. This work deals 
primarily with the period leading up to the outbreak of World War II, but a short 
afterword will consider developments through the early 1950s, by which point the two 
Orthodox camps had developed fully and finally parted ways. While focused studies have 
been written on specific aspects of the history of Orthodox political organization, this is 
the first attempt to transcend local or national cases and to examine the phenomenon in a 
broad context over the first half of the twentieth century.4 From early on, both Agudah 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 The focus here is on Poland and Germany, the two most important European arenas for Mizrahi-Agudah 
contestation, and on Palestine. The US did not become a significant arena for these Orthodox political 
struggles until the 1940s. Developments in the US will be considered if they impacted Agudah-Mizrahi 




and Mizrahi functioned within an international framework, recruiting their members from 
a variety of backgrounds and operating in different political and organizational venues. 
Consequently, this dissertation highlights continuities and ruptures and stresses 
transnational impacts, such as the influence of immigration to Palestine on Jewish 
political struggles in Poland. 
Mizrahi and Agudat Yisrael are often perceived as two distinct Orthodox responses to 
secularization and modern nationalism, and their conflicts are usually depicted as 
ideological disagreements about Zionism and the Zionist movement. In contrast, my 
dissertation frames their interactions as wide-ranging social and political struggles within 
Jewish Orthodoxy and explores the ways in which Agudists and Mizrahists staked out 
their claims for leadership and power in observant Jewish communities across Europe 
and Palestine. Underlying the narrative I will present in the following pages is the 
hypothesis that mutual competition strongly influenced and shaped both groups, helping 
party leaders to develop and refine their political platforms and ideological outlooks, and 
ultimately producing two discrete camps. Thus, an analysis of the dynamics between the 
two movements lies at the heart of this dissertation. Informed by the literature on social 
movements, I will probe the organizational structure of the Orthodox parties, their 
mobilization of resources, their links to other social and political groups, and their 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
scope of this dissertation. The religious Zionist movement established its first branch in the US in 1913-
1914, and one of its foremost leaders, Meir Berlin, spent the years of World War I in New York. In 
contrast, Agudat Yisrael only started to gain a foothold in the US during the late 1930s. The branch gained 
in importance with the emigration of several leaders, in particular Jacob Rosenheim, to New York during 
World War II. Thorough historiographical works on the two movements in the US are still lacking. For an 
essay on the founding of the Mizrahi in the US, see Joseph Salmon, “The Mizrahi Movement in America: 
A Belated but Sturdy Offshoot,” American Jewish Archives 48/2 (1996): 161-175. On Meir Berlin and his 
work in the US, see his autobiography, Meir Bar-Ilan, Mi-Volozhin ad Yerushalayyim 2 vols., eds. 
Yeshayahu Bernstein/ Yosef Tirosh (Tel Aviv, 1970/71). For a preliminary history of the first years of 
Agudat Yisrael in the US, which was produced by the movement itself, see: Mosheh Sherer, ed., The 




interaction with external authorities and governments, in order to explore the ways in 
which both movements developed and honed their respective approaches through 
political contest and conflict.5 Investigation of these issues will enable me to reconsider 
whether the two were indeed the natural and inevitable results of preexisting ideological 
differences, as is often assumed, or rather a product of power struggles that shaped and 
consolidated differing ideological positions.  
To understand such dynamics in depth, this dissertation will reexamine the two 
organizations’ political alignments and affiliations. The Mizrahi is normally seen as an 
integral part of the Zionist Organization (ZO), and its attitudes towards Agudat Yisrael 
are depicted as akin to those of the secularist branches of the Zionist movement. Much of 
the secondary literature on Jewish Orthodoxy and Zionism implicitly – and sometimes 
explicitly – represents Zionist activism as diametrically opposed to Orthodoxy’s quietism 
and political passivity. Challenging such approaches, this dissertation carefully analyzes 
organizational differences and strategies. It attributes special significance to the tripartite 
relationship between Mizrahi, Agudat Yisrael, and the ZO, and considers the ways this 
relationship affected the two Orthodox movements and their rivalries. Looking at 
Mizrahi-Agudah disputes as struggles for leadership and authority within Orthodox 
Jewish communities ultimately helps to situate these organizations in their European 
environments and that of Mandatory Palestine. Rather than analyzing the idiosyncrasies 
and details of party ideologies, this dissertation probes the underlying conflicts that gave 
rise to particular inter-party dynamics. It traces the development of modern Orthodox 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Other Orthodox political parties appeared on the scene during the 1920s and 30s but remained confined to 
specific regions, and none of them were able to compete with Mizrahi and Agudat Yisrael in terms of size 
and influence. In Galicia, two hassidic courts that clashed with one of the most important supporters of the 
Agudah, the Gerer Rebbe, founded their own political parties. See Chapter III. In Palestine, different 




group formations and their division into two clearly distinct political camps as they 
transitioned from their European origins to Palestine and the founding of the Jewish state. 
In order to investigate the social and political issues behind the highly ideological 
tone of both the inner-party and inter-party discourse, I have analyzed the movements’ 
literature and press in Hebrew, Yiddish, German, Polish and English. Juxtaposing the 
writings of both movements has helped me to identify and highlight rhetorical motifs and 
their significance in the mutual polemics. Expanding on the corpus that has been 
examined thus far, I have woven together a wide variety of new materials from Israeli, 
Polish and American archives, such as protocols of party meetings, international 
correspondence, and petitions to the British Mandate government in Palestine. External 
sources, such as secret reports compiled by Polish officials about Jewish political 
activities, used for the first time to investigate Orthodox politics, allowed me too look 
beyond party polemics and assess inter-movement dynamics. 
The remainder of this introduction sets out the analytical framework of my study. 
First, I will demonstrate the advantages of conceptualizing Zionism as a social movement 
and of analyzing Agudah-Mizrahi encounters with the analytical toolkit provided by 
scholarly literature in this field. Next, I will discuss how the two movements grappled 
with processes of secularization and worked to reconcile tensions between rabbinic 
authority and modern political activism. Finally, I will situate my dissertation within the 







Social Movements and the Study of Inter-Movement Dynamics 
The historical study of political parties and movements has a long tradition. A 
multitude of works document the emergence and development of parties as diverse as the 
National Socialist movement in Germany, the Democratic Party in the US, and the 
Communist Party in China. Others investigate the success of political organizations at 
attracting adherents or analyze the specific socio-economic milieu from which parties 
arise. Studies on the relations or dynamics between different movements, on the other 
hand, are less prevalent.6 Scholars of Jewish history have also produced many valuable 
and insightful works on a range of political parties and movements, including the Jewish 
Labor Union (Bund) and the Folkists in interwar Poland, the Zionist parties in Argentina 
in the 1930s and 40s, and the Likud in Israel.7 Yet, the vast majority of these studies, too, 
focus exclusively on a single party or movement. Many of these works dedicate an 
individual chapter to the specific party’s relations with political rivals or ideological 
partners, but only a few focus systematically on party relations. One of the exceptions is 
Joshua Zimmerman’s study of the clashes between the Polish Socialist Party (PPS) and 
the Bund in in late Tsarist Russia. These clashes, Zimmerman argues, sharpened the 
division between the two parties and pushed both into taking more radical positions on 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 For some examples, see: Michael Melancon, The Socialist Revolutionaries and the Russian Anti-War 
Movement, 1914-1917 (Columbus, 1990); Idem., “‘Marching Together!:’ Left Bloc Activities in the 
Russian Revolutionary Movement, 1900 to February 1917,” Slavic Review 49/2 (1990): 239–52; Joachim 
Schröder, Internationalismus nach dem Krieg. Die Beziehungen zwischen deutschen und französischen 
Kommunisten 1918-1923 (Essen, 2008). 
7 Among many others: Gertrud Pickhan, Gegen den Strom: der Allgemeine Jüdische Arbeiterbund “Bund” 
in Polen 1918-1939 (Stuttgart, 2001); Sylvia Shenkolevski-Krol, Ha-Tenu‘ah ha-Tziyonit ve-ha-Miflagot 
ha-Tziyoniyot be-Argentina, 1935-1948 (Jerusalem, 1996); Colin Shindler, Israel, Likud and the Zionist 
Dream: Power, Politics, and Ideology from Begin to Netanyahu (London/New York, 1995); Kalman 




the question of Jewish nationalism.8 Joseph Gorny also dedicated a study to two Jewish 
political movements – the Bund and the Zionist Labor Movement (Poalei Tziyon) – but 
rather than investigating mutual influences and inter-movement relations, Gorny sought 
to establish the ideological superiority of the Zionist Labor Movement.9   
While historians have been reluctant to focus on inter-party dynamics, social-
scientists have long debated these phenomena. Consequently, the analytical framework 
for my investigation is provided by the vast and well-developed scholarship on social 
movements.10 This scholarship developed in several phases. In response to	  the plethora of 
non-governmental movements that mushroomed in the 1960s and 70s, scholars became 
interested in the reasons for the emergence of such organizations and the backgrounds to 
their rapid growth. In earlier decades, social psychology had been the predominant 
approach in research on collective behavior, and the success of social movements had 
been attributed to widespread grievances and frustrations. But by the 1970s scholars no 
longer took collective social grievances to be a sufficient explanation for the emergence 
and success of social movements, and they shifted their attention to structural theories of 
social processes. Rather than psychological explanations, scholars were now interested in 
the mechanisms deployed by social movements in order to attract potential supporters. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 To demonstrate this, Zimmerman depicts the parallel developments of Bund and PPS during this period at 
length and analyzes their relations. Joshua D. Zimmerman, Poles, Jews, and the Politics of Nationality: The 
Bund and the Polish Socialist Party in Late Tsarist Russia, 1892-1914 (Madison, Wisconsin, 2004). 
9 In his own words, Gorny aims to counter the tendencies of “today’s post-national and, of course, non-
Zionist academic climate,” that “treats the Bund, which was defeated by history, with understanding if not 
‘affection’ and subjects the Labor Movement, which defeated history, to merciless criticism.” Joseph 
Gorny, Converging Alternatives. The Bund and the Zionist Labor Movement 1897-1985 (New York, 2006), 
269. For studies on Mizrahi-Agudah relations, see below.  
10 Leaning on Sidney Tarrow, one of the leading scholars of the field, I define social movements as 
“collective challenges by people with common purposes and solidarity in sustained interaction with elites, 
opponents and authorities." Sindey Tarrow, Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action and 




They studied the dynamics and tactics of social movements during phases of growth, 
decline, and change and examined the variety of resources that social movements 
mobilize, links between social movements and other groups, and the interaction of such 
movements with authorities and governments.11   
The resource-mobilization approach came under criticism in the 1980s for neglecting 
processes of social construction. To counter this deficit, social movement scholars 
developed the concept of framing, which looks at the way activists couch or “frame” their 
demands in order to make them appealing to a wider audience. Frames are complex 
interpretative schemata that enable individuals to construe social reality. In contrast to 
ideology, the concept of framing does not describe fixed ideas and tenets, but focuses on 
processes. According to scholars, movements use such framing processes to try and 
mobilize sympathetic bystanders who do not necessarily share every aspect of the 
organization’s ideology. Frames are constantly debated within the movement and 
developed or changed in relation to competing frames either from within the movement 
itself or from rival movements. Frames can also be used to polarize interpretations of 
events and help activists within the movement mobilize and justify the investment of 
energy and resources for a specific cause.12   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Myra Marx Ferree/ Frederick D. Miller, “Mobilization and Meaning: Toward an Integration of Social 
Psychological and Resource Perspectives on Social Movements,” Sociological Inquiry 55 (1985): 8-51; 
William A. Gamson, The Strategy of Social Protest (Belmont, 1990); J. Craig Jenkins, “Sociopolitical 
Movements,” in The Handbook of Political Behavior vol. 4, ed. Samuel L. Long (New York, 1981), 81-
153; John D. McCarthy/ Mayer N. Zald, “Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial 
Theory,” American Journal of Sociology 82 (1977): 1212–41; Anthony Oberschall, Social Conflict and 
Social Movement (Englewood, 1973); Charles Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution (Reading, 1978); 
Ralph Turner, “Collective Behavior and Resource Mobilization as Approaches to Social Movement,” 
Research in Social Movements, Conflicts and Change 4 (1981): 1-24. 
12 The debate about framing processes in the social sciences is wide and abundant. For some of the central 
contributions and overviews see: William A. Gamson/ Davis S. Meyer, “Framing Political Opportunity,” in 
Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements. Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and 




Describing Zionism as social movement draws attention to its activist character and 
the challenges that it presented to traditional Jewish authorities and communities. Rather 
than asking which ideologies provided the best solution to the so-called ‘Jewish 
question,’ it allows us to focus on the conflicts between the different parties and on the 
mechanisms through which they tried to attract followers. To be sure, ideology was 
significant to many of the leaders and adherents of these groups. But far from being 
fixed, these tenets and outlooks were in constant flux and were repeatedly adapted to 
changing political structures and opportunities. Indeed, in their political platforms, 
Zionist leaders began by articulating and framing the societal problems they subsequently 
tried to solve. In so doing, they actively engaged in the construction of the social 
divisions and grievances that their parties rallied around.13  
In their debates about movement-countermovement relations, scholars have been 
interested in when, why, and how movements emerge that try to counter the effects and 
achievements of agents of social change.14  They have noted that when successful, social 
movements often create conditions for the mobilization of counter-movements. Social 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Dawn McCaffrey/ Jennifer Keys, “Competitive Framing Processes in the Abortion Debate: Polarization-
vilification, Frame Saving, and Frame Debunking,” The Sociological Quarterly 1/41 (2000): 41-61; Hank 
Johnston/ John A. Noakes, eds., Frames of Protest: Social Movements and the Framing Perspective 
(Lanham, 2005); David A. Snow/ Robert D. Benford, “Ideology, Frame Resonance, and Participant 
Mobilization,” International Social Movement Research 1 (1988): 197-217. 
13 Cihan Tuğal/ Manali Desai/ Cedric De Leon, “Political Articulation: Parties and the Constitution of 
Cleavages in the United States, India, and Turkey,” Sociological Theory 3/27 (2009): 194. 
14 For literature on movement-countermovement dynamics see: David S. Meyer/ Suzanne Staggenborg, 
“Movements, Countermovements, and the Structure of Political Opportunity,” The American Journal of 
Sociology 6/101 (May 1996): 1628-1660; Nelson A. Pichardo, “The Power Elite and Elite-Driven 
Countermovements: The Associated Farmers of California During the 1930s,” Sociological Forum 10 
(1995): 21–49; Bert Useem/ Mayer Zald, “Movement and Countermovement Interaction: Mobilization, 
Tactics, and State Involvement,” in Social Movements in an Organizational Society: Collected Essays, eds. 
John D. McCarthy/ Mayer Zald (New Brunswick, 1987), 247-272. For political contention and mutual 
influences see also: Doug McAdam/ Sidney Tarrow/ Charles Tilly, “To Map Contentious Politics,” 





movements lobby for change and challenge established interests, they co-opt traditional 
symbols for their cause, and they raise the political and social costs to others. In this 
process, they create political challenges and opportunities that help define 
countermovement issues and goals. Successful movements also inspire others by 
demonstrating that collective action can effect or resist change in particular aspects of 
society. The literature on counter-movements highlights the dynamics between groups: 
rather than analyzing the success or failure of any specific movement in contrast to 
others, it examines inter-movement dynamics, the mechanisms of contentious politics, 
and mutual impacts and enmeshments. 
It is from this perspective that my dissertation approaches the interactions between 
the religious Zionist movement and Agudat Yisrael. Conceptualizing the Mizrahi as a 
social movement does not disregard its political claims for Jewish sovereignty in 
Palestine.15 But it shifts the focus from the ideological aspects of the battle about Zionism 
to the struggles of the elite over the definition of authority and control of the Jewish 
communities in Europe and Palestine. In accordance with social movement theory, I will 
investigate the ways in which religious Zionists advanced their claims for leadership and 
power by challenging traditionalist elites, and how non-Zionist Orthodoxy took up such 
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Movements,” in The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements, eds. David A. Snow/ Sarah A. Soule/ 




Religious Authority and the Secularization Debate 
As noted, scholars have generally presented religious Zionism and Agudat Yisrael as 
two opposing Orthodox responses to processes of secularization and to modern 
nationalism. In his study of religious parties in Israel, Gary Schiff argued that religious 
Zionists created their own distinct synthesis of modernity and tradition. For Schiff, the 
emergence of mass political organizations was a critical marker of modernity, and in his 
estimation, Mizrahists aimed at creating a modern party with mass membership, as 
opposed to earlier forms of political representation that were not based on popular 
support. In contrast to the religious Zionist movement, Schiff contended, Agudah leaders 
did not aim to establish a popular support base but preferred to stay a cadre party. 
Therefore, he described the Agudah as “anti-modern in both ideology and 
organization.”16  
The problem with Schiff’s interpretation is that he deemed the Mizrahi “modern,” 
despite conceding that it remained a “party of notables” that lacked true mass support. 
(On the other hand, the workers’ branch of the party, Ha-Poel Ha-Mizrahi, which in the 
1940s surpassed the mother movement in electoral strength, was a trade-union based 
mass movement.)  Eliezer Don-Yehiya pointed to this apparent contradiction and also 
sharply criticized Schiff’s labeling of the Agudah as “anti-modern.” For Don-Yehiya the 
characterization of a movement as modern is linked to its identification with modern 
society and culture. He admitted that the Agudah’s Eastern European leadership was 
“extremely traditional” and held negative or indifferent attitudes towards modern culture. 
But he emphasized that some of the Agudah’s most outstanding leaders were Jews from 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




Western and Central Europe, who were highly integrated into contemporary European 
culture and adopted lifestyles that were modern in many ways. Don-Yehiya therefore 
rejected organizational structure as a meaningful criteria for determining a party’s 
acceptance or rejection of modernity. Instead, he located the essential distinction between 
the two movements in their attitudes towards secular society on the one hand, and 
Zionism and the State of Israel on the other.17 Building on Don-Yehiya’s approach, Zeev 
Bauer argued that the main differences between Mizrahi and Agudah were their divergent 
attitudes towards cooperation with secularist Jewish parties and with the Zionist 
movement in particular.18 
Cooperation with the secularist branches of the Zionist movement was indeed a 
primary focus of the debates between Orthodox leaders. But as I will emphasize, these 
debates did not simply pit advocates of cooperation with the secularists against opponents 
of such endeavors. Instead, disagreement between the factions centered on the nature of 
such cooperation. In fact, from the 1920s and on, Agudists repeatedly engaged in 
negotiations regarding the possibility of joining the Jewish Agency. While many in the 
Agudah were deeply suspicious of Zionist institutions, the basic point of contention 
between Mizrahi and Agudah was not cooperation with the Zionists per se, but rather the 
extent and form that such cooperation should take.19 Moreover, confrontations between 
the two parties over issues of secularism and modernization ran deeper than the question 
of cooperation with secularists. Alongside their consistent evocation of ancient ideals and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Eliezer Don-Yehiya, “Origins and Development of Agudah and Mafdal Parties,” Jerusalem Quarterly 20 
(1981): 49-64. 
18 Zeev Bauer, “He-Hasit ha-Datit ha-Me’uhedet ve-ha-He‘arkhut ha-Ra‘ayonit ve-ha-Politit shel ha-Tzibur 
ha-Dati im Haqamat ha-Medinah” (MA thesis, Hebrew University, 2004), 5. 
19 During these years, there were raging debates within the Agudah itself about cooperation with Zionists. 
Agudists who objected to any cooperation eventually split off and founded the fiercely anti-Zionist Naturei 




traditions and their insistence on a timeless theocratic state as the great aspiration of 
traditional Judaism, both Mizrahists and Agudists had to come to terms with a host of 
phenomena often subsumed under the term modernity.  
In this dissertation I suggest that focusing on the tension between religious authority 
and modern political activism provides a concrete context for studying processes of 
modernization that is more illuminating than a discussion of abstract concepts. Mizrahists 
strongly promoted what secularization theorists would call “internal secularization,” that 
is, the modernization of the structures of religious organization. Fiercely attacking the 
inefficiency and unwieldiness of existing religious structures, Mizrahists worked to 
centralize, professionalize and rationalize religious concepts and institutions. Polish 
Mizrahists, for example, struggled to adapt Jewish communities to the needs of the 
modern state with a centralized bureaucracy and a professionalized administration. The 
modernization of religious studies and the rabbinate, which they hoped would help 
community dignitaries and rabbis represent their communities effectively, was one of the 
focuses of their efforts. 20  Thus, Mizrahists not only accommodated modernity but 
actively advanced the modernization of religious organization within their communities. 
Agudists, on the other hand, were reluctant to modernize the structures of religious 
organization and to incorporate the religious community into the centralized bureaucracy 
of the modern nation state. Instead, they labored to strengthen and even expand the 
traditional authority of religious leaders and institutions. But it is important not to brand 
the Agudah as sweepingly anti-modern. While displaying deep ambiguities towards many 
aspects of modernity, such as secularization and mass politics, Agudists did 
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accommodate some of its manifestations. In fact, the supra-regional organization of 
observant Jewry into one party was in itself an inherently modern project. What is more, 
debates about political organization and activism, both normally perceived as modern 
phenomena, featured prominently in Agudah discourse from the founding conference in 
Kattowitz and accompanied the movement’s leaders and adherents throughout the 
decades.21 In this regard, the Agudah, as well as the Mizrahi, was very much a product of 
its age.  
Yet in coming to terms with the different phenomena often subsumed under the term 
modernity, Agudah leaders grappled in particular with the process of secularization. 
Underlying Orthodox disputes on this subject was the critical question of authority, 
namely, who the leaders of the Jewish community should be and on which sources their 
authority rested. The sociologist Mark Chaves has, in fact, pointed to the state of 
religious authority as an important indicator of secularization, which he defines as the 
declining impact of religious authority, or “the declining influence of social structures 
whose legitimation rests on reference to the supernatural.” 22 Basing his analysis on Karel 
Dobbelaere’s well-known three-dimensional model of secularization, Chaves argues that 
the decreasing or increasing scope of religious authority should be examined at the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 The religious factions the Agudah comprised, were, in fact, themselves products of processes such as the 
differentiation between the public and private sphere, as Eliyahu Stern recently argued. See Eliyahu Stern, 
The Genius. Eliyah of Vilna and the Making of Modern Judaism (New Haven/ London, 2013).  
22 Mark Chaves, “Secularization as Declining Religious Authority,” Social Forces 3/72 (1994): 750. In his 
classic study on religion and political development, Donald Eugene Smith already pointed to conflicts 
between laymen and clerical elites in modern mass movements. For Smith, however, religious parties were 
a passing phenomenon, as secularization would in time triumph. See Donald Eugene Smith, Religion and 




societal level, at the level of religious organization, and at the level of individual 
religiosity.23  
For the Jewish context, Chaves’ argument has to be modified,24 in part because it is 
difficult to draw a clear-cut distinction between Dobbelaere’s societal level and the level 
of intra-religious organization. One of the main points of contention in Jewish 
communities in interwar Poland, for example, was the question of whether or not it was 
possible to distinguish between religious institutions on the one hand, and purely political 
or national-Jewish ones on the other. What is more, in the Jewish context it seems 
problematic to define religious authority simply as resting on the supernatural. Jewish 
religious or spiritual authority was often based on erudition in texts, tradition, and 
halakhic scholarship, and in other instances on charisma or on a combination of the two.25 
More generally, no simple equation can be made between the decrease or increase in the 
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(Bruxelles/ New York, 2002). 
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25 The nineteenth century witnessed the sharp decline of the local rabbinate. Through Hassidism and new 
institutions of religious studies among non-Hassidic Jews, new authorities rose, and the local rabbi lost 
much of his prestige and influence. A variety of issues like the struggle among different groups to install 
their own rabbi, the inheritance of rabbinic positions, and the weakening of community structures added to 
the misery of the local rabbinate. While these changes brought about a decline of the local rabbinate, they 
did not automatically lead to the decrease of rabbinic authority as such, but to the appearance of new 
leaders and creation of new institutions. By 1900, as Shaul Stampfer points out, most communities in 
Eastern Europe did not have an elected rabbi. See Shaul Stampfer, “The Missing Rabbis of Eastern 
Europe,” chapter in idem. Families, Rabbis and Education: Traditional Jewish Society in Nineteenth-
Century Eastern Europe (Oxford, 2010), 286f. For the crisis of the local rabbinate see also: idem., “The 
Inheritance of the Rabbinate in Eastern Europe,” in idem., 302-323; David Asaf, “Manhigut ve-Yerushat 
Manhigut be-Hasidut be-Me’ah ha-19,” in Aharav. Al Manhigut ve-Manhigim, ed. Hanna Amit (Tel Aviv, 
2000), 59-72; Menahem Friedman, “Mara de-Atra – Me-Manhig le-Paqid: Seqira Historit-Zotziologit,” in 
Ibid., 85-94. For the question of authority and leadership in Israel’s religious parties, see also Eliezer Don-





scope of such authority and the secularization of Jewish society. Reacting to these 
challenges, and to the threat of secularization, Agudists pleaded for the strengthening and 
increase of the scope of religious authority to a historically unprecedented degree. Yet 
despite all these limitations, Chaves’ argument can nonetheless stimulate the study of 
Jewish Orthodoxy. Focusing on conflicts concerning the significance and scope of 
religious authority allows scholars to study secularization in terms of concrete, 
differentiated social structure, rather than purely abstract concepts.  
 It is in this sense that Zionism played a major role in the battles between the two 
movements. To be sure, Jewish settlement in Palestine and the question of Jewish 
statehood figured prominently in their writings and mutual polemics. In contrast to 
Mizrahists, Agudah leaders did not work towards the building of a Jewish state and some 
of the fiercest opponents of such endeavors could be found within their ranks. In terms of 
the parties’ concrete involvement in settlement efforts and the emerging political 
structures, however, the picture was a bit more complicated. Both parties started to 
become active in Palestine around the same time, in the aftermath of the First World War. 
And while theological and ideological concerns figured in Agudist enmity towards 
Zionism, the central point of contention was the issue of leadership and authority. 
Leadership concerns colored even the movement’s pointedly anti-Zionist statements.26 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 By way of example, in 1919 the Mizrahi paper Ha-Ivri reminded its leaders of the anti-Zionist attitudes 
prevalent among Agudah leaders in Warsaw. Those, according to the paper, had come out in 1917 against a 
movement among Polish Jews, which shortly after the publication of the Balfour Declaration called on the 
British to grant Jews entry into Palestine. In their condemnation of the movement, Varsovian Agudists had 
invoked the three oaths that God adjured upon the Jews when exiling them, according to a midrash popular 
in anti-Zionist circles. In their statement against the movement, Agudah leaders had pointed at the second 
of these oaths that adjured the Jews not to rebel against other nations. Their choice to focus on the second 
oath is telling. The Agudists could have equally cited the first of the three oaths, which forbids Jews to 
immigrate to the Land of Yisrael26 en masse, or the third one urging Jews not “to force the end,” that is to 
bring about the Messiah. The leaders from Warsaw chose to invoke the second one instead, and thus rather 




Political activism of the type in which the Zionists engaged stood in tension with the idea 
of strong rabbinic authority that Agudists promoted. In this vein, this dissertation 
investigates in which ways the question of rabbinic authority fueled inter-movement 
struggles and helped to define party platforms and approaches.  
 
The Radicalization of Religion 
Since the worldwide appearance of militantly religious movements in the 1970s and 
80s, scholars have been revising earlier assumptions about the fading of religion and the 
irrepressible advance of secularization. In this context, they have been particularly 
interested in the ways in which the confrontation with modernity led to the 
transformation of traditional institutions and authorities as well as the emergence of new 
religious movements. Much of this scholarship subsumes these phenomena under the 
label “fundamentalism” and investigates the reasons for their radicalization.27 While 
comparative scholarship on religious movements is indeed a fruitful endeavor, and there 
is much to be said about commonalities across religious divides, the concept of 
fundamentalism and its application in this context is problematic. First and foremost, the 
term has a strong pejorative connotation and is analytically vague.28 While scholars have 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
movement of Polish Jews chose to accomplish its aim. Ha-Ivri, 13.2.1920, 3-4. I was not able to locate 
other sources on the incident. Scholars disagree as to how much influence this midrash had before the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, but it seems clear that it gained in rhetorical importance with the advent 
of Zionism. See Ehud Luz, Parallels Meet: Religion and Nationalism in the Early Zionist Movement 
(Philadelphia, 1988), 215-17; Aviezer Ravitzky, Messianism, Zionism, and Jewish Religious Radicalism 
(Chicago, 1996), 213.  
27 One of the most critical impulses for these debates about fundamentalism came from the multi-volume 
compilation published in the early 1990s by the University of Chicago: Martin E. Marty/ R. Scott Appleby, 
eds. The Fundamentalism Project vol. 1-5 (Chicago/ London, 1991-1995).  
28 The term “fundamentalist” was originally used as a self-description by adherents of an American 
Protestant movement in the early twentieth century, who sought to reaffirm what they saw as key or 
“fundamental” Christian tenets. For a detailed critique of the term see Mark Juergensmeyer, The New Cold 




tried to define a range of characteristics that typify fundamentalist movements, they do 
not agree on many basic features. What is more, numerous movements labeled 
“fundamentalist” fit these definitions only partially.  
The problematic inherent in scholars' use of the term "fundamentalist" to characterize 
religious movements is evident in its application to Jewish groups. In the case of Jewish 
Orthodoxy, Agudat Yisrael has been labeled fundamentalist by merit of its attempts to 
seclude Orthodox Jews from their secularist environments and its subsequent embrace of 
particularly severe interpretations of Jewish law and corresponding social practices.29 In 
the context of religious Zionism, the label is mainly applied to the settler movement of 
the 1970s and 80s (Gush Emunim) because of its political radicalization and, in 
particular, its uncompromising stances on land issues. 30  Scholars have been more 
reluctant, however, to apply the label to religious Zionism in the first half of the twentieth 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
that scholars have associated with fundamentalismis a particularly stringent (and sometimes literalist) 
interpretation of sacred texts and traditions. But the appearance of such contrasting movements among 
Orthodox Jews as ultra-Orthodox Judaism and the settler movement also illustrates that the strict 
interpretation of text can lead to diverging and sometimes opposing results, and that various fundamentalist 
groups chose to focus on different religious traditions and texts. For a similar point, see Sultan Tepe, 
Beyond Sacred and Secular. Politics of Religion in Israel and Turkey (Stanford, 2008), 52f. 
29 Samuel C. Heilman/ Menahem Friedman, “Religious Fundamentalism and Religious Jews: The Case of 
the Haredim,” in Fundamentalism Observed, eds. Martin E. Marty/ R. Scott Appleby (Chicago/ London, 
1991), 197-264. Heilman and Friedman express some unease with the term but nevertheless declare 
themselves “prepared to describe and analyze a segment of Jewry that has been denoted by many who are 
concerned with such categories and definitions as fundamentalist.” See Ibid., 197.  
30 See e.g. Gideon Aran, “Jewish Zionist Fundamentalism: the Bloc of the Faithful in Israel (Gush 
Emunim),” in Ibid., 265-344; Charles S. Liebman, “Jewish Fundamentalism and the Israeli Polity,” in 
Fundamentalism and the State. Remaking Polities, Economics and Militancy, eds. Martin E. Marty/ R. 
Scott Appleby (Chicago/ London, 1993), 68-87; Ehud Sprinzak, “Three Models of Religious Violence: The 
Case of Jewish Fundamentalism in Israel,” in Ibid., 462-490; Idem., “The Genesis of Zionist 
Fundamentalism: the Case of Gush Emunim,” Orim 3,1 (1987): 8-27; Michael Feige, Settling in the 
Hearts: Jewish Fundamentalism in the Occupied Territories (Detroit, 2009); Motti Inbari, Jewish 
Fundamentalism and the Temple Mount: Who will Build the Third Temple? (Albany, 2009); Ibid., 
Messianic Religious Zionism Confronts Israeli Territorial Compromises (New York, 2012). Alice Shalvi, 
on the other hand, subsumes all of Orthodox Judaism under fundamentalism, which leaves her reader 
wondering what analytical benefit can be derived from the use of the term. See Alice Shalvi, “‘Renew Our 
Days as of Old’: Religious Fundamentalism and Social Change in the Modern Jewish State,” in The 
Freedom to Do God’s Will. Religious Fundamentalism and Social Change, eds. Gerrie ter Haar/ James J. 




century, as embodied by the Mizrahi and its workers’ movement Ha-Poel Ha-Mizrahi. 
The reason for this reticence seems to be the early religious Zionist movement’s 
compromising attitudes towards secular society and knowledge, as well as other aspects 
of modernity. But this labeling does not capture the idiosyncrasies and contingencies of 
historical processes, such as the debates about the partition of Palestine in the 1930s, in 
which many Agudah leaders displayed surprising flexibility and moderation, while their 
religious Zionist counterparts adopted highly uncompromising attitudes that in many 
ways resembled the fundamentalism of their successors some decades later (see Chapter 
VI). A prominent feature of many movements labeled “fundamentalist” is their 
innovative social and political activism, which was indeed a significant facet of the 
religious Zionist movement in the first half of the twentieth century.31 Applying the label 
to later manifestations of religious Zionism, while excluding the Mizrahi and its workers, 
thus runs the risk of obscuring more than it illuminates. In contrast to the scholarship on 
religious fundamentalism, my dissertation attempts to explain the formation of religious 
movements and their radicalization by focusing on inner-religious dynamics and the 
struggles between different religious players. 
 
Orthodox Politics and Modern Nationalism   
The scholarship on Jewish Orthodoxy owes its breakthrough in the 1970s and 80s to 
Jacob Katz, who pioneered crucial studies on Orthodoxy as a modern reaction to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 On Islamic activism, see, for example, Cihan Tuğal, “The Appeal of Islamic Politics: Ritual and 
Dialogue in a Poor District of Turkey,” The Sociological Quarterly 47 (2006): 245-73; Idem., 
“Transforming Everyday Life: Islamism and Social Movement Theory,” Theory and Society 38 (2009): 





weakening tradition.32 Since then, various scholars, many of whom were Katz’s disciples, 
have taken up his lead, documenting numerous and diverse cultural and intellectual 
aspects of this movement and vastly enhancing our knowledge of social, economic, and 
political processes in the world of observant Jewry. Scholars have also shown growing 
interest in the influences of modern nationalism on Jewish Orthodoxy. In a seminal study 
published in 1988, Ehud Luz explored the increasingly antagonistic interactions between 
traditionalists and secular Zionists in Eastern Europe and traced the emergence of the 
religious wing of the Zionist movement.33 Aviezer Ravitzky investigated the theological 
challenges that Jewish statehood posed to Orthodox thinkers,34 and Joseph Salmon also 
devoted much of his scholarly work to the encounter between Judaism and modern 
nationalism.35  
Against this backdrop, several studies document the emergence of Agudat Yisrael, its 
roots in communal German-Jewish politics, and its philosophical underpinnings.36 For the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 See e.g. his essay on Orthodoxy as modern phenomenon, Jacob Katz, “Orthodoxy in Historical 
Perspective,” Studies in Contemporary Jewry 2 (1986): 3-17. On Katz’s approach to the study of 
Orthodoxy, see Joseph Salmon, “Jacob Katz’s Approach to Orthodoxy – The Eastern European Case,” 
Modern Judaism 32/2 (2012): 129-154. 
33 Luz, Parallels Meet. 
34 Ravitzky, Messianism.  
35 Salmon’s wide-ranging contributions have been published in two compilations. Both books assemble 
important essays on various aspects of this encounter, on early religious Zionist thinkers as well as 
Orthodox opponents of the movement, on the challenges of the biblical prohibition to cultivate the Land of 
Israel every seventh year of a cycle, and even on Theodor Herzl’s (futile) attempts to enlist the religious 
leadership of his time to the Zionist cause. See Joseph Salmon, Religion and Zionism: First Encounters 
(Jerusalem, 2002); Ibid., Im Ta‘iru ṿe-im Te‘oreru: Ortodoqsiya bi-Metzarei ha-Le’umiyut (Jerusalem, 
2006). Another important compilation with essays on the topic is: Shmuel Almog/ Yehuda Reinharz/ Anita 
Shapira, eds., Zionism and Religion (Hanover, 1998). The prohibition to cultivate the land in the so-called 
“shmita” year presented a severe impediment to the participation of observant Jews in the settlement 
project and generated much debate. See also Menahem Friedman, “Le-Mashma‘uto ha-Hevratit shel 
Pulmus ha-Shemitah (5670-5694),” Shalem 1 (1973): 455-80. 
36 For the German-Jewish communal background see: Ya‘qov Tsur, Bein Ortodoqsiyah le-Tzyionut. Ha-
Tzyionut ha-Datit ve-Mitnagdeihah, Germanyiah 1896-1914 (Ramat Gan, 2001). On the early struggles 
concerning Zionism within Germany Orthodoxy see also Mordechai Breuer, Jüdische Orthodoxie im 
Deutschen Reich 1871-1918 (Frankfurt a. M., 1986), 317-50. Matthias Morgenstern explored German 




interwar period, the two most outstanding works are Gershon Bacon’s study of Agudat 
Yisrael in the Second Polish Republic and Menahem Friedman’s investigation of 
Palestinian Orthodoxy, in which he analyzed the grappling of Orthodox leaders with the 
emerging political structures in the 1920s and 30s and explored their strategies for 
dealing with their increasingly secular environments.37 Building on Friedman’s work, 
Joseph Fund explored Agudah leaders’ shifting attitude towards Zionism and Jewish 
statehood.38 Despite Ehud Luz’ pioneering efforts, the religious Zionist movement has 
not enjoyed as much scholarly attention as Agudat Yisrael and non-Zionist Orthodoxy. 
Nevertheless, scholars have continued to illuminate important aspects of the movement’s 
history and ideology, such as the religious kibbutz movement and the revolutionary ethos 
of early religious Zionist thinkers.39 Asaf Kaniel recently wrote about the development of 
Mizrahi in interwar Poland.40  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
the impact of the German secession dispute (Austrittsstreit) on Breuer’s thinking: Matthias Morgenstern, 
Von Frankfurt nach Jerusalem. Isaac Breuer und die Geschichte des "Austrittsstreits" in der deutsch-
jüdischen Orthodoxie (Tübingen, 1995). For the philosophical and theological underpinnings of the 
Agudah, and its grounding in traditional Jewish politics, see: Alan Mittleman, The Politics of Torah: The 
Jewish Political Tradition and the Founding of Agudat Israel (Albany, 1996). For important contributions 
to the development of Orthodox politics before the foundation of Agudat Yisrael, see Rachel Manekin, 
“Politics, Religion, and National Identity: The Galician Jewish Vote in the 1873 Parliamentary Elections,” 
Polin 12 (1999): 168-98; ChaeRan Y. Freeze, Jewish Marriage and Divorce in Imperial Russia (Hanover/ 
London, 2002), 243-79. 
37 Bacon investigated the emergence of the Polish Agudat Yisrael and studied its ideological basis and its 
organizational formation, as well as party politics in Jewish communities and the Polish Sejm. Importantly, 
Bacon highlighted the frictions between the mother movement and its workers’ and youth branches. 
Gershon C. Bacon, The Politics of Tradition: Agudat Yisrael in Poland, 1916-1939 (Jerusalem, 1996). In 
addition to his groundbreaking study on non-Zionist Orthodoxy in pre-state Palestine, Friedman has 
published widely on political and sociological topics concerning Jewish Orthodoxy in the twentieth 
century. See e.g., Menahem Friedman, Hevrah va-Dat: Ha-Ortodoqsiyah ha-lo-Tzyionit be-Eretz-Yisra’el, 
1918-1936  (Jerusalem, 1977).  
38 Joseph Fund especially highlighted the strong frictions within the Agudah and the diverging philosophies 
of its main leaders. Yosef Fund, Perud o-Hishtatfut: Agudat Yisraʾel mul ha-Tzyionut u-Medinat Yisra’el 
(Jerusalem, 1999). 
39 Aryeh Fishman studied the fusion of Orthodoxy with revolutionary ideologies in the religious workers’ 
movement and the kibbutz movement. See e.g. Aryeh Fishman, Judaism and Modernization on the 
Religious Kibbutz (Cambridge/ New York, 1992); Idem., “‘Torah and Labor:’ The Radicalization of 
Religion Within a National Framework,” Studies in Zionism 3/2 (1982): 255-271; Idem., “The Religious 




While many of these works touch upon aspects of the relations between Mizrahi and 
Agudat Yisrael, most of the authors hold these interactions to be of minor importance and 
tend to depict them as a mere subdivision of Agudah’s relations with the ZO.41 Gary 
Schiff was the first to dedicate a whole study to the ideological and organizational 
differences between Agudat Yisrael and Mizrahi.42 Subsequently, Monty Penkower and 
Zeev Bauer both investigated aspects of the relations between the two Orthodox 
movements. In his article on negotiations between top-tier Agudah and Mizrahi leaders in 
the interwar period, Penkower bemoaned their eventual collapse as a “lost opportunity for 
Orthodoxy,” and held the Agudah accountable for this failure.43 Zeev Bauer advanced 
similar arguments in his dissertation on inner-Orthodox politics prior to the establishment 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Contemporary Jewry 2 (1986): 97-115. For the revolutionary aspects of early religious Zionist thought 
concerning the Land of Yisrael and messianism, see: Dov Schwartz, Eretz ha-Mamashut ve-ha-Dimyon: 
Ma‘amadah shel Eretz-Yisrael be-Hagut ha-Tzyionit ha-Datit (Tel Aviv, 1997); Idem., Ha-Tziyonut ha-
Datit bein Hegayon li-Meshihiyut (Tel Aviv, 1999); Idem., “The Revolutionary Consciousness of the 
Religious Zionist Movement Since 1902,” The Annual of Rabbinic Judaism 3 (2000): 175-184. 
40 In his meticulous study of a vast amount of sources from Israeli archives, Kaniel has assembled 
important data on social and political realities in interwar Poland and the pioneering activities of the 
movement’s youth branch. Asaf Kaniel, “Ha-Mizrahi be-Polin bein Shtei Milhamot ha-Olam,” PhD Diss, 
Bar-Ilan University, 2003. Kaniel published his dissertation in slightly revised form as: Idem., Yomra u-
Ma‘as. Ha-Mizrahi be-Polin bein Shtei Milhamot ha-Olam (Ramat-Gan, 2011). Kaniel’s study greatly 
advances the scholarship on Mizrahi, especially in comparison to two earlier studies with significant 
methodological problems. See Joseph Elihai, Tenu‘at ha-Mizrahi be-Polin ha-Qongresa’it 1916-1927 (Tel 
Aviv, 1993); Idem., Ha-Mizrahi u-Tenu‘at Torah ve-Avodah be-Polin 1928-39 (Jerusalem, 2001); 
Abraham Rubinstein, Tenu‘ah be-Idan shel Temurah. Pereq be-Reshit ha-Mizrahi be-Polin (Ramat-Gan, 
1981). 
41 Gershon Bacon highlighted this point in an article dedicated to Agudah-Zionist relations in interwar 
Poland. Gershon C. Bacon, “Reluctant Partners, Ideological Opponents: Reflections on the Relations 
Between Agudat Yisrael and the Zionist and Religious Zionist Movements in Interwar Poland,” Gal-Ed 14 
(1995), 67-90. Joseph Fund argued that Agudists’ willingness to cooperate with the Mizrahi grew in 
correlation to the consolidation of Zionist hegemony in Palestine. In his study about Agudat Yisrael and the 
Zionist camp, Fund devoted one subchapter of 10 pages to Agudah-Mizrahi relations. See Fund, Perud o-
Hishtatfut, 193-203. 
42 Schiff, however, depicts the emergence and development of the two parties separately. Schiff, Tradition 
and Politics. There is an additional account of Mizrahi-Agudah relations written by Moses Una. Unna was 
one of the central leaders of Ha-Poel Ha-Mizrahi, and his account is not a scholarly work. See Mosheh 
Una, “Bi-Derakhim Nifradot: Ha-Miflagot ha-Datiyot be-Yisra’el (Alon Shevut: Gush Etziyon 1983).  
43 Monty Penkower, “A Lost Opportunity: Pre-World War II Efforts Towards Mizrachi — Agudahs Israel 
Cooperation,” Journal of Israeli History 17/2 (1996): 221-61. The essay was later re-published in a 
compilation of Penkower’s essays, see idem., “A Lost Opportunity,” chapter in idem., Twentieth Century 




of the State of Israel and the creation of a “United Religious Front” in the first Israeli 
parliament.44 Joseph Fund also wrote about the Agudah-Mizrahi negotiations, but he did 
not want to see them as a complete failure. Instead, he depicted these negotiations as an 
integral aspect of the movement’s general turn to rapprochement with Zionism during 
these years. 
But is it in fact accurate to depict the Agudah as gradually becoming more Zionist 
and to claim that its willingness to cooperate with the Mizrahi grew in correlation to the 
consolidation of Zionist hegemony in Palestine?45 In order to carefully weigh such 
questions, it is necessary to widen our focus from the depiction of a single movement to 
an analysis of the relations between different movements. Rather than analyzing these 
relations from the perspective of either Mizrahi or Agudah,46 or depicting the unilateral 
decisions and developments of one side, this dissertation focuses on inter-movement 
dynamics and political competition.  
This approach helps in locating the Mizrahi-Agudah contestations within the context 
of broader nationalizing processes in East Central Europe. Recent scholarship regards 
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national loyalties as fundamentally dynamic phenomena that individuals and groups 
construct under specific historical circumstances. Such loyalties can be transformed or 
exchanged and may be held in flexible relation to other allegiances. Historians studying 
the indifference of various populations in the Habsburg Empire towards modern national 
affiliations oppose assumptions about the inevitability of nationalizing programs. Rather 
than assume that increasing national polarization pitted different ethnic groups against 
one another, scholars argue that indifference among the target population provoked much 
of the nationalist activism in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. They focus 
on the mechanisms of nationalization and examine how nationhood is institutionalized. 
 This scholarship has done much to dispel notions of nationalism as a monolithic 
ideology or movement. Nationalism was only one of various ideologies and group 
affiliations at the disposal of the population of the Habsburg Empire and could be 
adopted as a means for various ends. As such, nationalism meant different things to 
different people, and its aims and significances were constantly being renegotiated. 
Refusing to understand nationality as a stable source of identity, these studies examine 
the overlap of national affiliations with loyalties to family, local community, and social 
classes.47 In this context, scholars have also begun to probe the interplay between 
national and religious loyalties.48 
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Building upon such scholarship, this dissertation investigates the interplay of national 
affiliations with religious group formations in Orthodox debates about Zionist activism. 
With the advent of modern Jewish nationalism in its diverse manifestations – such as 
territorialist, Bundist and, in particular, Zionist group formations – older religious 
affiliations were not simply dismissed and replaced. Mizrahi and Agudah leaders 
acknowledged the importance of both loyalties, yet differed in their prioritization of these 
allegiances. In the Zionist ideology of the Mizrahi, national loyalty trumped any other 
group affiliation. In contrast, Agudists saw the formation of a united Orthodox camp as 
their priority and thus claimed religious loyalties to be of primary significance. But these 
hierarchies were far from being set in stone. For both Mizrahi and Agudah leaders and 
activists, national and religious affiliations stood in constant tension with each other. This 
dissertation examines the ways these tensions impacted on intra-movement dynamics and 
the function that nationalism served in Orthodox leadership struggles. Fundamentally, 
then, this dissertation investigates how religious elites struggled to adapt to changing 
social and political realities in the age of nationalism.   
 
Chapters 
The structure of my dissertation reflects the trans-national and international character 
of these struggles between the Agudah and Mizrahi, in which the center of conflict 
slowly moved from the European strongholds of Orthodox Jewry to Palestine. Chapter I 
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explores the emergence of religious Zionist activism in late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century Europe. Based on a critical analysis of roughly 1300 short activist 
biographies compiled in the Encyclopedia of Religious Zionism,49 it analyzes the way in 
which nationalist activism among observant Jews emerged out of a crisis of the 
traditional Jewish community and the institution of the rabbinate. Young men, who were 
well-educated and professionally trained but unable to obtain appropriate jobs as rabbis 
or communal functionaries, found in such activism an alternative to service in traditional 
community institutions. Religious Zionists not only embraced the building of a Jewish 
state, but aimed to create and establish new forms of leadership throughout the Jewish 
Diaspora as well as in Palestine.  
Chapter II addresses the response to this type of activism by traditional leaders and 
spiritual authorities. Struggling to counter the impact of secularism and nationalism, these 
leaders sought to unite traditionalist Jews worldwide under the umbrella of one 
organization. Notably, Agudat Yisrael aspired to enhance and strengthen rabbinic 
authority to an unprecedented degree in order to counter the influences of nationalist 
activism and modern mass politics. Thus, inner-Orthodox disputes and struggles formed 
and shaped the movement significantly in the early years of its existence. On this note, 
the chapter concludes by examining the tensions and debates between Agudat Yisrael and 
the Mizrahi in the first decade of the former’s existence. In these early years, the 
movements’ ideologies were not fully developed, and leaders from both parties 
repeatedly engaged in negotiations for cooperation – at times even considering 
unification. Mutual polemics and political clashes, however, polarized the atmosphere, 
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further clarifying the ideological lines that divided the movements. The First World 
Congress of Agudat Yisrael in August 1923 marked the conclusion of this early stage of 
ideological and organizational consolidation of the two camps. 
The next two chapters explore the dynamics between Agudat Yisrael and the Mizrahi 
on two of the central stages of Jewish interwar politics – the Second Polish Republic and 
the Jewish settlements in Palestine – as well as their mutual influences. Interwar Poland, 
with its massive traditionalist Jewish communities, was fertile ground for developing and 
shaping modern Orthodox politics. Based on research in Polish and Israeli archives, as 
well as on wide reading of the extensive party presses, Chapter III analyzes the 
interactions between the two organizations in the local Jewish communities and on the 
Polish national stage. Both parties contended with the challenges that political activism 
posed to notions of spiritual authority. Their mutual polemics and struggles helped 
leaders on both sides to resolve such tensions within their own movements.  
Chapter IV investigates the Orthodox political arena in 1920s Palestine. As the 
situation of European Jewry grew increasingly grim during the interwar period, the newly 
emerging settlements and political structures in Palestine gained more and more 
significance. During these years, Agudat Yisrael and the Mizrahi established themselves 
as the two pivotal Orthodox movements on site. Based on protocols from party meetings 
and a range of other documents from Israeli and American archives, this chapter 
examines the reasons why heightened Orthodox involvement in Palestine throughout the 
1920s did not lead to rapprochement between the parties, but, instead, further deepened 
their political antagonism. The tripartite relationship between Agudat Yisrael, Mizrahi, 




cooperation between Agudat Yisrael and the Zionists threatened the Mizrahi’s position 
within Zionist institutions, as well as its political influence. For Jewish Orthodoxy, 
Palestine had become a divisive land.  
Political and economic developments in Europe and Palestine eventually convinced 
leaders on both sides to renew negotiations regarding cooperation during the 1930s. 
These negotiations are the subject of my final two chapters. Chapter V deals with calls 
for the convening of a World Congress of Orthodoxy in 1934-35. The chapter looks at the 
debates about the possibility of an Orthodox World Congress and their significance in the 
wider framework of Jewish politics concerning Palestine. These debates were an 
important stage in the development of two clearly-defined Orthodox political camps. 
They concluded a decade during which the two parties had solidified their outlooks and 
platforms through mutual polemics and struggles. The religious Zionist movement 
underwent a deep organizational and ideological crisis at this time. The debates 
concerning the World Orthodox Congress and the strict insistence of Agudists that the 
Mizrahi leave the ZO helped the religious Zionist movement overcome this crisis and 
reposition itself within the changing landscape of Zionist politics. 
Chapter VI examines a series of negotiations between top-tier politicians from both 
parties that took place in Paris and London in 1938-39. None of these attempts ultimately 
led to cooperation. But despite their collapse, these negotiations constituted another 
important stage in the development of the two movements and their mutual relations. 
Over the preceding decades, both Agudat Yisrael and Mizrahi had developed definitive 
platforms and ideologies. By the late 1930s cooperation still seemed feasible, but 




neither side seriously revisited the idea of unification. The negotiations in Paris also 
helped to delineate the core religious demands vis-à-vis the Jewish state on which both 
movements would be willing to settle. These areas of accord would become essential to 
the agreement reached with the ZO that ultimately laid the foundation for the 
establishment of the State of Israel in 1948. A short afterword considers developments 
through the early 1950s, by which point the two Orthodox camps had developed fully and 







Religious Zionist Activism:  




Orthodox Jews took part in the Zionist activism that emerged in Europe during the 
second half of the nineteenth century. Many of these activists joined the Zionist 
institutions established at the end of the century. With time, however, tensions arose 
between those in favor of advancing a secular Jewish culture and those committed to 
preserving Orthodoxy within the Zionist Movement. A growing opposition to Zionism 
among traditionalist leaders fueled further conflicts. When, in 1902, the Fifth Zionist 
Congress decided to include cultural activities in its program, some religious activists 
under the leadership of Rabbi Isaac Jacob Reines founded the Mizrahi movement as the 
Orthodox wing of the Zionist Federation in the Russian Empire.1 Only few years later 
Mizrahists transferred their political executive to Frankfurt in 1904, due to adversarial 
political conditions. The political executive remained in the German Empire until the end 
of the First World War, when it was transferred to Jerusalem. Because of its great Jewish 
community, Poland became the most important center of religious Zionist activism in the 
interwar period. 
The clash between Jewish Orthodoxy and modern nationalism has often been 
portrayed as an ideological struggle. Religious Zionism, as the Israeli scholar Dov 
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Schwartz and others have pointed out, was a revolutionary movement among European 
Orthodox Jews. “For the first time,” Schwartz writes, “human initiative took direct and 
surprisingly forceful action, explicitly rebelling against the passivity of the exiled Jewish 
people, refusing to await redemption by divine means.”2 Religious Zionism, in such a 
view, set out to end political quietism among Orthodox Jews, and to engage them in the 
activities to build up a Jewish state as an important step in the process of divine 
redemption. Traditionalist leaders rejected these attempts out of hand, and the two sides 
entered into prolonged and fierce ideological struggles. Central to these conflicts were 
disputes about the theological significance of Jewish settlements in Palestine, and the 
definition of Jews as a religious group or nation. Despite a shared commitment to the 
perseverance of Jewish Orthodoxy, the two camps were not able to overcome their 
theological and ideological quarrels.  
True, the debates among observant Jews about Zionism were strongly ideologically 
colored. But behind such ideological statements stood political struggles for authority and 
leadership among Orthodox Jews. Therefore, this chapter investigates the emergence of 
the religious Zionist movement and its activism beyond the scope of its ideology. It looks 
at the emergence of the religious Zionist movement through an analysis of the Mizrahi’s 
members and their activism, discusses the nature of this activism and traces the role 
nationalism played in the movement. Its argument is based on the analysis of 1,308 short 
biographies of Zionist activists collected in the encyclopedia of religious Zionism.3 
Mizrahi leaders underpinned their aspirations to become the leaders of Jewish 
communities through their political and social activism. Part of this was a biographical 
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activism emerging in the Mizrahi press during the interwar period. This biographical 
activism was both a reflection and a at the same time construction of religious Zionists’ 
life trajectories. A careful evaluation of these sources thus helps broadening our 
understanding of the backgrounds of the founders of religious Zionism and consequently, 
the reasons behind the emergence of their activism.  
The bulk of sources that can tell us about the emergence of Jewish parties in East-
Central Europe are strongly ideologically tinged, as these sources were crafted by the 
very activists who were involved in the parties. The encyclopedia is no exception to this 
rule and therefore poses various methodological problems in its analysis. But the 
encyclopedia is also the most expansive collection of short biographies of men involved 
in the religious Zionist project. As such, the opus is an invaluable resource that allows us 
to go beyond the analysis of intellectual debates and investigate social and economic 
factors connected to the emergence of religious Zionist activism. To be sure, this analysis 
does not serve as a social history of the movement as such, but as a quantitative 
investigation of its self-depiction. There are no membership lists of the religious Zionist 
movement for this period. However, even if such lists existed, it is questionable how 
accurately they would reflect the movement’s social structure, as one did not have to be a 
member of the Mizrahi in order to be active for its cause. The movement’s self-depiction, 
reflected in the encyclopedia’s entries and the interwar biographical activism they are 
based on, had to be grounded in the common experiences and goals of potential adherents 
if it was to cater to those sympathetic to its cause. A quantitative analysis of the 
movement’s self-depiction therefore allows us to draw conclusions about the background 




 As sources about East-Central European Jewry are scarce, such an analysis is all the 
more important. Ordinary Jews did not leave much written evidence, and much of what 
they did produce was destroyed during the two world wars. Autobiographical works, 
often used by historians to trace historical processes, are an additional genre of sources. 
However, autobiographies of religious Jews in the first half of the twentieth century are 
extremely rare, as Marcus Moseley in his work about the origins of Jewish autobiography 
reminds us: “Autobiographers, in any culture, are a minority. And in Jewish society in 
Eastern Europe, from the mid-nineteenth to the early decades of the twentieth century, 
they are minority within a minority; for autobiography in Jewish Eastern Europe remains 
almost exclusive of those who have broken with religion entirely or whose faith in the 
verities of revealed religion has become considerably eroded.”4 Using the encyclopedia 
as a database can help to expand this sparse source base and provide fresh insight into 
social and political developments among early twentieth century European Jews.  
The ideological bent of the encyclopedia poses various challenges that I will address 
throughout my analysis. But the problems one confronts when utilizing this text also 
present opportunities for the historian by offering a glimpse into the ideology and 
function of the movement beyond the mere descriptive intent of its authors. The very 
existence of an extensive five-volume encyclopedia about a comparatively small 
movement, in fact, corroborates the importance of understanding the religious Zionist 
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movement within its own context. The encyclopedia is based on a genre of short 
biographies that emerged in the party press throughout the interwar period. Political 
activism, as promoted by the Mizrahi movement, was in a way conducive to such a 
biographical project, as this helped support its specific claims for leadership. Activism, in 
this context, should be understood as a collective, goal-oriented activity, in which the act 
is never isolated, but embedded in a series of similar acts. The act itself is not the only 
purpose, but is always related to political agendas and claims to leadership -- claims that 
compete with those of traditional authorities. In this sense, activists aimed to build up 
alternative or counter cultures. Nationalist entrepreneurs, for example, aimed to foster 
national loyalties above others, such as religious, regional, or gender-related loyalties, 
through their community work and political endeavors. These leaders based their 
authority on such activism.  
Their claims to leadership came into conflict with other sources of authority, such as 
ones based on scholarly expertise or on a personal cult. The non-Zionist opponent of the 
Mizrahi, Agudat Yisrael, did not attempt any comparable project. The lack of such a 
project can be attributed to the deep-seated differences between the two movements 
concerning the significance of political and social activism.5 An intellectual historical 
approach describing the ideological development of the movements is not able to fully 
carve out these differences. My analysis of the encyclopedia, on the other hand, focuses 
on the activist nature of the religious Zionist movement and thus can serve as starting 
point for an exploration of the mutual dynamics between the Mizrahi and Agudat Yisrael. 
The following chapter starts out with a discussion of the encyclopedia itself. In a next 
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step, I will discuss which data can be derived from an analysis of this work, and finally I 
draw conclusions from this data about the nature of religious Zionist activism.  
 
The Encyclopedia of Religious Zionism and Interwar Biographic Activism 
The encyclopedia of religious Zionism is a five-volume opus published by the Rabbi 
Kook Institute in Jerusalem between 1958 and 1983. The aim of this work, as its 
publishers point out in the first volume, is to gather all the relevant information about the 
activities of the religious Zionist movement, to summarize “Torah Judaism’s” 
contribution to the “movement of national rebirth,” and “to create an eternal monument 
(yad olam)” to all those who “dedicated their time and skills, and gave their lives for the 
movement.”6 In outlook and scope the encyclopedia is similar to projects by other Jewish 
movements of the time.7 Driven by the cruel losses of European Jewry during the 
Holocaust, its authors intended to commemorate those who contributed to the foundation 
and perseverance of the movement. In addition, the encyclopedia establishes the 
Mizrahi’s contribution to the Zionist project. The fact that the editors published the first 
volume of their opus only a mere decade after the founding of the State of Israel suggests 
an intention to stress the legitimacy of the party’s political claims within the young state. 
This is illustrated by the fact that its publishers, Isaac Raphael and his wife, Geula Bat-
Yehuda, were important religious Zionist leaders in their own right.8 The Rabbi Kook 
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Institute served many functions; among them was its role as the most important 
publishing house for literature from and about the movement.  
The encyclopedia is a valuable source for the history of religious Zionism during the 
first decades of the existence of the State of Israel. In addition, it also contributes to the 
understanding of the movement’s character prior to the 1950s. Its five volumes are 
comprised of 1,308 biographies, ranging in size from short stubs to considerable articles 
twenty to thirty pages in length.9 Both in style and in content these biographies are 
strongly based on articles that appeared in the movement’s media many years earlier.10 
This genre of short biographies and obituaries authored by journalists evolved in the 
Mizrahi press during the first half of the twentieth century. From its earliest days, the 
party’s newspapers printed short texts about rabbis and other leaders who lived and 
labored in the spirit of religious Zionism. In the early 1920s, the Jerusalem-based paper 
Ha-Tor, edited by the central Mizrahi leader Yehuda Leib Maimon, 11  started to 
complement these accounts of the lives of spiritual authorities and party dignitaries with 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
party. Bat-Yehuda, the co-editor, was not only Raphael’s wife, but also the daughter of Yehuda Maimon, 
the foremost party politician of the Palestinian wing during the first half of the twentieth century. She 
authored many publications about the religious Zionist movement, most of which were published by the 
Rabbi Kook Institute.  
9 The editors of the encyclopedia dedicate 155 pages to Rabbi Abraham Isaac Hakohen Kook, widely held 
to be the spiritual father of religious Zionism. Rabbi Kook, however, is an exception. Other major leaders 
do not receive more than 20-30 pages. For Kook’s entry see Rapha’el, Entziqlopedia, vol. 5, 89-422. 
10 In addition to newspaper stubs and media reports, the articles are also based on other encyclopedias and 
secondary literature. While the opus is also part of the general genre of encyclopedias and could be 
interpreted in this context, its highly ideological outlook and the flowery and often religious language 
suggest a strong connection to the bibliographical activism of the Mizrahi press.  
11 Yehuda Leib Maimon (Fishman) (1875-1962), was born in Bessarabia, studied in various Eastern 
European yeshivot and received rabbinic ordination. Maimon was among the founders of the Mizrahi, and 
one of the movement’s most important leaders throughout the next six decades. He was involved in the 
foundation of the US branch during WWI and moved to Palestine in 1919, where he became the eminent 
party leader. He held many positions, among others Maimon became an elected board member of the 
Jewish Agency in 1935. He was involved in drafting the Israeli Declaration of Independence, and served in 
the first Israeli government. On Maimon and his leadership position within the Mizrahi, see Eliezer Don-
Yehiya, “Manhigut Politit be-Tziyonut ha-Datit: Ha-Rav Yehuda Leib Maimon, Manhig ‘ha-Mizrahi,’” 




obituaries and biographies of young activists, particularly those who had given their lives 
for the religious settlement project in Palestine. The Polish party press followed suit and 
started to include reports about the lives of rank and file activists during the 1930s.12 
Through these biographical stubs, the party commemorated dead activists and honored 
their contribution to the Zionist cause. Concurrently, the accounts presented both activists 
and bystanders with exemplars of dedication and commitment to the movement. By 
telling the stories of young local activists, they invited their readers to emulate such 
models and shape their own lives accordingly. In this way, the biographies and obituaries 
constituted an important tool for shaping the movement’s self-presentation and self-
understanding.  
Scholars focusing on workers and nationalist movements have pointed out the ways 
in which such organizations used autobiographical writings as a means of creating and 
fostering group formations. Writing short autobiographies gave laborers the opportunity 
to inscribe their own lives into the history of the socialist movement, and to contribute to 
the molding of a specific workers’ group consciousness. Such writings ranged from small 
autobiographical stubs scattered throughout the movement’s press to full-fledged books.13 
Unlike these workers’ autobiographies, the texts in the Mizrahi media and the 
encyclopedia of religious Zionism lack personal contributions from individual activists. 
In many ways, these entries more closely resemble hagiographic writings.  
Hagiographic approaches have a long tradition in Jewish culture. Life stories of great 
scholars and sages, and legends about Biblical or Talmudic heroes, often served 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 By 1920, Ha-Tor had begun printing obituaries of non-rabbinic leaders and would later include rank and 
file activists. The Polish press of the movement printed mostly obituaries of rabbis in the early twenties, but 
would later include lay leaders. In 1932, Di Yudish Shtime started to commemorate rank and file members. 




educational purposes. In modernity, this genre grew to be closely connected with the 
hasidic movement. Collections about the founder of the movement (Shivhkei habesht) 
circulated among pious Hasidim beginning in the eighteenth century. Similar to these 
stories of saints and sages, many of the accounts in the party media and the encyclopedia 
glorify the lives of great authorities. Their authors stress the outstanding moral conduct 
and other positive character traits of these figures along with their learnedness and 
wisdom.  
These biographical stubs, however, go beyond a hagiographical approach. They not 
only itemize individual authorities whose outstanding behavior is worth imitating, but 
also form a collective of persons who have in one way or another contributed to the 
struggle for the religious Zionist cause. Adding to general histories of the movement, 
they form a part of the larger Mizrahi historiography.14 In this respect, the biographies 
can be read in the context of the above-mentioned approaches. Similar to many 
nationalist and socialist publications of the time, the Mizrahi biographies helped to 
establish and foster community. The individual life trajectories of those depicted may 
have been diverse, but they were all united in their efforts to support and sustain the 
religious Zionist cause. By printing edited biographies rather than autobiographical 
contributions, the Mizrahi press left less room for individual activists to inscribe 
themselves in the movement, thereby actively defining and redefining the religious 
Zionist community. The short biographies of local activists that entered the Mizrahi press 
in the 1920s and 30s, and became frequent in the Palestinian press of the movement 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  





during the 1940s,15 focused on the deep commitment of rank and file members, their 
devotion to the movement and how they labored for community affairs despite personal 
economic and social hardships. Similar to the writers of the labor movement, the 
Mizrahist authors provided their readers with points of reference and familiar situations 
and problems.  
Autobiographical activism in the labor movement often presented a coming-of-age 
narrative, depicting activists as rebelling against their parents and accepted authorities. 
The Mizrahi literature, in contrast, tends to downplay the rebellious and controversial 
character of many of the figures it portrays. Quite a few portraits of the movements’ 
rabbis mention their unique siding with the movement and the hardships and attacks from 
their peers that they had to suffer due to their ideological commitment. Meshulem Kliger, 
for example, rabbi at a study house in Krakow, was not allowed admission to the local 
rabbinate due to his membership in the Mizrahi. The Jewish town council of Krakow, 
according to the encyclopedia, “had been taken hostage by assimiliationists and 
extremists.”16 But by and large the accounts tend to minimize the innovative and 
revolutionary character of their subjects. Countercultural experiences and the significance 
of mass demonstrations, elements that are highly prominent in the biographies and 
autobiographies of the workers’ movement, are mostly absent in the encyclopedia.  
Another important component of socialist literature is the narration of a drastic 
“conversion experience.”  In this trope, a single outstanding event is credited with having 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Accordingly, many of the articles are based on obituaries that had been published in the Palestinian 
movement’s press and especially the paper Ha-Tzofe. 
16 Rapha’el, Entziqlopedia, vol. 5, 451. Similar martyr examples appeared in the Mizrahi press in the 1920s 




convinced or “converted” the worker to the socialist cause.17 Religious Zionist writings, 
in contrast, do not prominently feature such a powerful “conversion” experience. One of 
the few exceptions is the biography of Jacob Aryeh Feuchtunger (1873-1955), a German 
physician, who “converted” to Zionism after attending, “by chance,” the First Zionist 
Congress in Basel. The debates at the congress, and especially the personality of Theodor 
Herzl, fascinated him so much that he joined the Zionist Organization and became a 
committed activist.18 Feuchtunger’s case, however, is not characteristic. Descriptions of 
dramatic experiences or life-changing encounters are mostly absent from the biographies, 
both in the encyclopedia as well as in its interwar precursors. Instead, the authors appear 
to emphasize continuity and stability. Further promoting the impression of historical 
continuity, the encyclopedia introduces an additional element not present in the interwar 
press: each entry starts by listing important ancestors of the person portrayed. Its editors, 
it seems, did not want the religious Zionist movement to exude much revolutionary ethos. 
The encyclopedia can be seen as a culmination of the interwar biographic activism, 
compiling and documenting the efforts of the founding fathers and first generations of the 
movement. The opus, indeed, became a monument to this community in more profound 
ways than its editors could have imagined. During the decades of the creation of the 
encyclopedia, the religious Zionist movement underwent serious upheavals and 
transformed into a very different venture than it had been during the first half of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 For an analysis of this phenomenon, see: Mary Jo Maynes, Taking the Hard Road: Life Course in French 
and German Workers' Autobiographies in the Era of Industrialization (Chapel Hill, 1995), 38-39. A similar 
motive can be found in the narratives of people who joined fundamentalist movements. See Wayne C. 
Booth, “The Rhetoric of Fundamentalist Conversion Narratives,” in Fundamentalism Comprehended eds. 
Martin E. Mart/ Scott Appleby (Chicago/ London, 1991), 367-398. 
18 Rapha’el, Entziqlopedia, vol. 4, 257. An additional exception is the case of Salomon Poliaczek, who 





twentieth century.19 The style and sources of the encyclopedia remained consistent 
through to its last volume.  In stark contrast to the drastic changes occurring during the 
period of its publication, its authors paint a rather harmonious picture of the movement, 
ultimately revealing more about their own ideological outlook than about the period they 
are depicting. This attempt at portraying the movement as unified and without discord 
continues earlier trends. Many of the biographical stubs in the Mizrahi press of the 
twenties and thirties display a similar attempt at concord. They tend to downplay the 
tensions within the movement itself, between the Mizrahi and its workers’ and youth 
branches,20 and sometimes even the Mizrahi’s struggle with other organizations. The 
message being transmitted was that the religious Zionist community transcended narrow 
party affiliations. Only 851 of the activists listed in the encyclopedia are explicitly noted 
to have been members of one of the Mizrahi organizations. 269 entries do not mention 
any membership, and in 88 cases the authors specifically point out that the depicted 
persons were not Mizrahists.21 Such entries extend the religious Zionist community 
beyond party affiliation and claim historical continuity beyond the Mizrahi’s foundation. 
The Mizrahi press, at times, additionally commemorated leading secular Zionists, as well 
as major rabbinic authorities, who did not join the movement, and in some cases 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 During the 1960s, the religious Zionist movement went through major transformations, turning into a 
highly messianic and politically assertive movement, with a strong focus on settling the areas that fell under 
Israeli occupation during the Six-Day-War. For these upheavals see, among others, Eliezer Don-Yehiya, 
“Jewish Messianism, Religious Zionism and Israeli Politics: The Impact and Origins of Gush Emunim,” 
Middle Eastern Studies 23/2 (1987): 215-34; Ravitzky, Messianism, 79-144; Idith Zertal and Akiva Eldar, 
Lords of the Land: The War over Israel’s Settlements in the Occupied Territories, 1967-2007 (New York, 
2007). Both Raphael and Bat-Yehuda, however, belonged to the older generation of religious Zionists, and 
did not follow the messianic shift. For example, until his retirement, Raphael clung to the old alliance of his 
movement with the labor party. The volumes published after this shift toward messianism do not reflect the 
changed atmosphere and do not alter the narrative of the earlier biographies. 
20 For the tensions between Mizrahi and its workers’ movement see Yosef Elihai, Ha-Mizrahi u-Tenu‘at 
Torah ve-Avodahh be-Polin 1928-39 (Jerusalem, 2001), 75-90.  
21 In 101 of the cases, the question of membership is not applicable, because the portrayed died before the 




vehemently opposed it. In the latter case, such articles were kept short and tended to omit 
any mention of the rabbi’s rejection of the Mizrahi. The encyclopedia, in contrast, does 
not list these leaders. While contemporary media coverage of such figures as the Zionist 
poet Haim Nahman Bialik or the rabbinic giant Yisrael Meir Kagan helped contextualize 
the movement in the wider Jewish world, they did not find their way into the later 
encyclopedic enterprise.22 
The inclusion of quite a large number of entries on activists who never formally 
joined the religious Zionist movement highlights the methodological challenges of my 
analysis. How do its editors define the religious Zionist community, and in which ways 
does their definition challenge the validity of such an analysis? The examples above 
make clear that the ideological outlook of the editors led them to create a work that was 
as expansive as possible. Through their inclusion of men who lived before the foundation 
of the Mizrahi, the editors placed the movement within a larger historical context, and 
helped smooth over rough transitions and conflicts. The encyclopedia also included 
individuals who had the option to join the Mizrahi, but chose not to do so. Thus, the 
editors inserted these historical actors into an ideological framework with which they 
might not have aligned themselves so closely, or perhaps at all. In other words, when 
analyzing the biographies, we have to be aware that the editors expanded their movement 
and turned men into Zionists who may never have identified themselves as such.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 For obituaries commemorating Bialik see Ha-Tor 6.7.34, 13; 13.7.34, 1, 5-6. Ha-Tor commemorated also 
other secular Zionists, like Max Nordau. See Ha-Tor 26.1.23, 13; Di Yudishe Shtime 10.1.35, 4-5. Rabbi 
Kagan, widely known as the Hofez Haim, was an influential Lithuanian decisor and rabbi. Rabbi Kagan 
died in 1933. Remarkable also is the commemoration of Asher Ginsburg (Ahad Ha’am) by the Palestinian 
Mizrahi media. Ginsburg is considered the founder of cultural Zionism and as such is in strong tension with 




In addition, the editors of the encyclopedia define religious Zionism in strictly 
Orthodox terms. Thus, activists who were both religious and Zionist, but not Orthodox 
(and did not join the Mizrahi), are not included. For example, Joshua Thon, an important 
leader of the General Zionists from Galicia and a reform rabbi, is not mentioned. Equally, 
notable figures like Martin Buber or Gershom Scholem do not have an entry.23 With 
regard to the analysis here, however, the editors’ inflation of the religious Zionist 
community presents the more significant methodological challenge. 
 
The Activists and their Backgrounds 
As argued above, the encyclopedia is ideologically tinged. A close analysis of this 
opus sheds light on modes of religious Zionist self-fashioning. Such an investigation can 
offer clues as to what religious Zionists held to be important values and in which ways 
they tried to shape and foster their movement. The encyclopedia is also the most 
extensive collection of short biographies of individuals who, in one way or another, were 
involved with the religious Zionist cause. As such, it can provide important insights 
beyond the mere self-fashioning of the movement. The vast quantity of biographies 
allows us to draw some statistical conclusions about the nature of the movements’ 
activism and the men it attracted.  
“Men” is to be taken literally, since the great majority of religious Zionist activists 
during the first half of the twentieth century – at least according to the encyclopedia - 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23  A prominent exception is Samuel Poznański (1864-1921), a progressive Polish rabbi, historian, 
orientalist and journalist. Together with his colleague Meir Bałaban, Poznański was involved in the 
foundation of the Tachkemoni Rabbinic Seminary in Warsaw, which was strongly aligned with the 




were male. Out of the 1,308 entries only 24 highlight female activists.24 A majority of 
these women were born in the 1920s and are mentioned in relation to their membership in 
one of the party’s youth movements. Fourteen of them died in 1948, and thus their 
reference can be read as part of an attempt to establish the movement’s vital contribution 
to the war for the establishment of the State of Israel. To be sure, women are present in 
the encyclopedia beyond the 24 articles dedicated to female activists. Nearly every entry 
mentions at least one female character, usually the wife of the portrayed activist. In some 
cases, the authors point out daughters or other women who played important roles in the 
activists’ life as well. Wives are often depicted as having played a role in broadening 
their husbands’ education. In 1871, Yehuda Leib Kovalski (1863-1925) “married the 
daughter of Rabbi Samuel Saynvill, the granddaughter of the judge from Linczyc, who 
graduated from a Russian Gymnasium, knew European languages and had great influence 
on her husband in broadening his secular education.” David Friedman (1828-1915) of 
Bialystok married a woman who exerted “enormous influence” on him. Not only did “she 
always appreciate his unlimited devotion to Torah learning,” but she herself was his 
teacher for “external knowledge” and European languages.25 Beyond such auxiliary 
functions, however, women are of little significance within the volumes. Quite tellingly, 
neither Saynvill’s nor Friedman’s wives are even mentioned by name; rather, both are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Doyres bundistn, the encyclopedia of the Bund, on the other hand, lists 96 female activists out of 600. 
While still a rather small number, women are not as drastically marginalized in Doyres bundistn as they are 
in the religious Zionist encyclopedia. On the female activists in the Bund encyclopedia see Rebekka Denz, 
Bundistinnen. Frauen im Allgemeinen Jüdischen Arbeiterbund (“Bund”) dargestellt anhand der jiddischen 
Biographiensammlung “Doires Bundisten” (Potsdam, 2009). Also in the obituaries of the interwar period 
women were commemorated very rarely. One of the few exceptions was an obituary for Rachel Berkman, 
the first female member of the Palestinian branch of the workers’ movement. See Di Yudishe Shtime 
30.10.36, 8. 




referred to as the wives and daughters of influential men.26 Marriage and family play 
important roles in these biographies. Strong and independent women, on the other hand, 
do not.27 
When looking at the geographical distribution of the activists (table 1) it becomes 
clear that the early religious Zionist movement had its overwhelming stronghold in East 
and Central Europe. 1,046, or about 80% of the biographies, depict men coming from 
areas east of the borders of the Weimar Republic.28 In Western Europe, Germany was the 
movement’s most important stronghold. Out of 101 Western Europeans, 76 were born on 
territories that would become part of the Weimar Republic in 1918. This number, on the 
other hand, nicely illustrates the fact that the country’s Mizrahi branch, which supplied 
just about 6% of the activists, gained its preeminence during the years leading up to the 
First World War mostly due to geopolitical factors. 103, or about 8% of the religious 
Zionists included in the encyclopedia, were born in Palestine. This figure demonstrates 
that these biographical entries focus on the early generations of religious Zionists. The 
age distribution of the men indeed confirms this fact. About 87% of those depicted were 
born before World War I.29 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Even in the case of Hanna Spitzer, who is one of the few women portrayed by the encyclopedia, men 
play a highly prominent role. About one third of the entry is about her father. Ibid. Vol. 5, 14-15. 
27 Ideology, however, seems ultimately more important than family, as demonstrated by the case of Isaac 
Zvi Rivlin. Rivlin, who, according to the encyclopedia, divorced his wife and left her with their five 
children in Europe because she was not willing to follow him to Palestine. Ibid. Vol. 5, 635-41. 
28 For reasons of comparability my remarks are based on the frontiers of interwar Europe, even though 
many, or even most of the men, were not born during this time. 
29 This is true for 86% if we count those born by 1913, and for 87% if we include those born in 1914. The 
youngest activists included in the encyclopedia were born in 1934. At this point it is important to mention 
one further constraint of the opus --it only included men who had already died when the respective volume 








An important part of most entries is the short description of the educational 
background of the activist. Needless to say, religious education was of much significance 
to the editors. The vast majority of entries note some kind of basic education, mostly at 
religious elementary schools or through local teachers. A majority of activists spent at 
least some time studying at a yeshiva, many in one or more of the prominent Lithuanian 
yeshivot, and thus can be said to have attained higher religious education. 652 of the 
activists, or nearly half, were ordained as rabbis. Religious studies, both in formal and 
informal settings, are highly valued. In countless cases the biographers point out that 
even at the height of their careers activists found time to study Torah. Similarly, the 
encyclopedia strongly stresses the religious devotion and personal piety of its activists.30 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Activists like Naphtali Tziyoni distinguished themselves through a strictly observant lifestyle and modest 




While religious education is depicted in an overwhelmingly positive light, the editors 
of the encyclopedia display some ambivalence in their attitude towards secular studies. In 
many cases, the acquisition of secular knowledge was painted as heroic, standing out 
against the ultra-conservative zeitgeist. Many of the men, according to their biographers, 
secretly started reading non-Jewish philosophical and other texts, and learned foreign 
languages at home or while studying at the yeshiva. By way of example, Abraham Moses 
Luntz, who at the age of fourteen immigrated to Jerusalem from Kovno, secretly studied 
enlightenment literature in Hebrew and foreign languages while attending Etz Haim 
Yeshiva, and prodded his fellow students to broaden their secular education as well. 
When founding an association for the improvement of the economic and spiritual 
situation of the citizens of Jerusalem, he clashed with the “fanatic religious 
establishment,” which opposed any such innovations. Later, Luntz lost a teaching post 
because he read works of the enlightenment. Despite this setback, he went on to become 
an influential editor and journalist.31 Others entered the world of secular knowledge 
through their wives, as seen in the case of Friedman and Saynvill. A great number 
became teachers at institutions distinguished by their approaches of bringing together 
secular and religious studies.  
In quite a few entries, on the other hand, the danger of secular knowledge is stressed, 
especially if its acquisition leads to a weakening of loyalties to Judaism. Men such as 
Rabbi Akiva Schlesinger were distinguished fighters against “enlightenment” and 
“assimilation.”32 For the most part, though, secular education is depicted in a positive 
light throughout the encyclopedia, if less prevalent than religious studies among the men. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Ibid. Vol. 3, 153-166. Luntz also coined the name for the Zionist anthem Hatikwah. 




765, or 58%, of the entries do not mention any obtaining of secular knowledge. Still, 410 
entries mention a formal secular education, while 122 biographies report on informal 
education that was acquired by reading secular literature or through other means. As 
could be expected, the level of formal secular education slowly increased over the years. 
Many members of the younger generations studied both religious and secular topics at 
Mizrahi institutions in Poland and Palestine. Those growing up in Germany and Western 
Europe attended Gymnasiums. In 171 entries, the encyclopedia mentions university 
attendance, and 100 activists earned some kind of doctoral degree. The level of both 
religious and secular education, however, appears to have suffered among immigrants to 
Palestine in the 1920s, 1930s, and 1940s. Many of the young men who arrived in 
Palestine with their parents during this time were forced to leave school early in order to 
support their families or join the military. These socio-economic changes certainly 
contributed to the enormous growth in the influence of the religious Zionist workers’ 
movement during the 1920 and 1930s.33 On average, however, the men depicted enjoyed 
quite a high standard of education, and were particularly well trained in the religious 
sphere.  
How does the ideological outlook of the encyclopedia influence these figures? As 
stated earlier, even membership lists of the Mizrahi would not allow us to investigate the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 The religious Zionist workers’ movement, Ha-Poel Ha-Mizrahi (Ha-Poel), emerged in Palestine and 
Poland during the 1920s. Ha-Poel Ha-Mizrahi was lead by a younger generation of activists, and in many 
aspects was more radical than the Mizrahi mother movement. Its leaders embraced close cooperation with 
the Zionist labor movement and the trade union (Histadrut). At the same time, they were in contact with the 
Agudah’s wokers’ movement (Poalei Agudat Yisrael) and initiated cooperation with PAY in the mid-
thirties. In the 1940s and 50s Ha-Poel became the leading power within the religious Zionist movement, 
much stronger than the Mizrahi itself. See Shabbetai Don-Yehiya, Ha-Mered ha-Qadosh: Shmu’el-Hayyim 
Landau u-Fe‘olo (Tel Aviv, 1960); Elihai, Ha-Mizrahi, 71-126; Aryeh Fishman, Ha-Po‘el ha-Mizrahi 
1921-35 (Tel Aviv, 1979); idem., ““Torah and labor:’ The radicalization of religion within a national 





social structure of religious Zionism, as activism within the framework of social 
movements is not restricted to official members. Such movements tend to have a larger 
environment of adherents and sympathizers who are not connected to its organizations 
through official channels. But by being vastly inclusive, the encyclopedia turns people 
into Zionists who would not necessarily have regarded themselves as such. Therefore it is 
worth investigating how this self-depiction changes when including only those who 
officially joined the movement. And indeed, when looking at the numbers of those who 
were explicitly mentioned to have been members of the Mizrahi, a slightly different 
picture emerges. Still, the overwhelming majority of these men received a basic religious 
education, with most studying at yeshivot. However, the ratio of individuals with rabbinic 
degrees drops from 49% to 41%. In terms of secular education, the picture is reversed. 
54% of those who officially joined the Mizrahi did not receive any formal education, as 
compared to 58% of the overall entries. 37% of the Mizrahists are mentioned to having 
enjoyed a formal secular education versus 31% out of all entries. These numbers seem to 
be influenced by the fact that the editors of the encyclopedia included quite a number of 
people whom they regarded as harbingers of the movement and who lived in a time in 
which secular education was less prevalent. The rise in the numbers of men who were 
ordained as rabbis is consonant with the general tendency among religious Zionists to 
stress rabbinic support for their movement.34 Taken together, however, these numbers 
still support the depiction of a comparatively well-educated elite, with a particularly 
strong background in the area of religious studies.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Already in the interwar press Mizrahists stressed any rabbinical support the movement received. This 
was an important factor in their struggle with other Orthodox movements, especially in interwar Poland. 




The main section of these biographies contains a description of the work and 
achievements of the person portrayed, as well as an account of his contribution to Jewish 
life in general and the religious Zionist community in particular. Commonly, this is the 
most extensive portion of the entry. After all, these activities are most likely the reason 
for the person’s inclusion in the encyclopedia. Although each life trajectory is different, 
as is the description of the individual’s activities, the data derived from this portion of the 
entries can be roughly divided into six different fields: community work, schooling, 
cause-focused activism, journalism, settlement, and scholarship (see table 2 and 3). With 
the exception of 18 entries that do not contain any information about the occupation or 
achievements of their subjects, all of the biographies mention activities in at least one of 
these categories, and most in several areas.  
The first of these categories is community work, in some form of which 577 of these 
men engaged. This involvement ranged from activities with youth, philanthropic 
enterprises, and organizing care for the social needs of the poor and the elderly, to 
organizing refugee shelters during World War I and participation in self-defense 
activities in times of distress and violence against Jewish communities. Some became 
community rabbis or took on official functions within the Jewish community. Rabbis like 
David Feuchtwanger, who was appointed community rabbi for the eighteenth and 
nineteenth district of Vienna in 1903, labored unflaggingly “to bring hearts closer 
together,” to “establish peace” in their communities, and “to obtain help for the needy 
and the persecuted.” 35  The second category is related to education. Among the 
individuals depicted, 294 were involved in projects related to schooling and education. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




Many of them were teachers, mostly at religious institutions or Mizrahi affiliated schools, 
but some taught at universities as well. No small number worked as itinerant preachers or 
lecturers who traveled through East Central Europe to lecture and teach in local 
communities. A few are mentioned to have been school principals or in other academic 
supervisory roles.  
While the first two categories - community work and schooling - tend to depict more 
traditional ways of caring for the community, the next categories comprise many 
innovative forms of social and political involvement. The category of “cause-focused 
activism” lists 669, or slightly more than half of the men depicted in the biographies, who 
have been active in an association or organization struggling for the implementation of a 
specific cause. These included groups with religious causes such as “Sabbath societies” 
struggling to raise the observance of the laws related to the holy day of rest among Jews, 
as well as Hovevei Zion branches,36 or other groups advancing and supporting Jewish 
settlement activities in Palestine. Also included in this category are those who are 
referred to as party activists (askan), as well as those who took on special tasks, such as 
propaganda trips throughout Europe, or others who worked for the Jewish National 
Fund.37 The next category, as well, is dedicated to modern activism. 166 persons were 
involved in (mostly party-affiliated) journalism or the creation of propaganda leaflets and 
related literature. In addition, 239 men are mentioned to have taken an active part in 
settlement projects as workers, farmers, or soldiers. They also organized emigration to 
Palestine, bought land, or founded new neighborhoods.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 Hovevei Zion, also known as Hibbat Zion, was an early movement promoting the settlement of Jews in 
Palestine. The movement, active in the 1880s and 1890s, had local societies throughout East Central 
Europe. See David Vital, The Origins of Zionism (Oxford, 1975), 135-186; Salmon, Religion and Zionism, 
96-278.  




Finally, the last category counts the number of men involved in the production of 
scholarship. 200 of the men were scholars of some kind. These included decisors of 
Jewish law (halakhah), judges at Jewish courts, and Talmud scholars. Quite a few of 
these erudite men are pointed out as having been involved in the adjustment of Jewish 
law to a regained national life in Palestine. For example, Rabbi Mordechai Gimpel Yaffe 
from Lithuania was not only “the first of his generation to urge Torah scholars to make 
aliyah38 to the Land of Yisrael,” but also the first to deal with questions of halakhah that 
concerned modern agriculture. Yaffe himself, in fact, immigrated to Palestine in 1888 
and became an important rabbinic figure for the new Jewish settlements.39 Others were 
researchers at secular institutions and professors at universities. As these numbers 
demonstrate, however, comparatively few were involved in the production of knowledge 
or legal scholarship. 
When examining the presence of activism, the overall picture that emerges does not 
change drastically if we narrow the scope of the inquiry to those men who were 
specifically mentioned as members of the Mizrahi. Looking solely at Mizrahists, the most 
drastic differences are found in the numbers of men who participated in some kind of 
cause activism on the one hand, and community work on the other. While the numbers of 
men involved in cause activism rise from 51% among the overall entries to 66% among 
Mizrahi members, community work drops from 44% to 39%. Once again, this difference 
can be ascribed to the tendency of the editors to include harbingers of the movement. The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Similar to the term Eretz Yisrael, the Hebrew term aliyah is derived from Jewish tradition and as such 
carries much symbolic meaning. Rather than analytically describing process of migration, it is a higly 
ideologically charged expression for Jewish immigration to Palestine. Thus, when referring to ideological 
aspects, I will use the term aliyah, while employing less ideological language when talking about actual 
processes of migration. See below. 




activities I included under the category of cause activism are mostly new and alternative 
forms of societal involvement, in contrast to more conventional forms of community 
work. In addition, the ratio of men who got involved in some kind of scholarship drops 
from 15% among the overall entries to 9% among the Mizrahists. This can be attributed 
to the tendency of the encyclopedia to include religious authorities whose intellectual 
work is deemed to have prepared later Zionist activities. Other differences in numbers did 
not prove to be statistically significant (see Table 4). 
 
Table 2 – Forms of Activism* 
Community Work Community work; community rabbi; 
philanthropist; youth work; self-defense. 
Schooling Teacher; schooling; education; university 
teacher; bet midrash; yeshiva dean; lectures 
throughout Poland; preacher. 
Cause-focused Activism Shabbat and Kashrut societies; party 
activism; youth groups; activist (askan); 
Hovevei Zion; touring Europe for Zionist 
cause; Jewish National Fund. 
Journalism Party propaganda; publishing house; 
periodicals. 
Settlement Settlement; agriculture; soldier; pioneer; 
practical problems and halakhah; workers; 
buys land for Jews; organization of 
immigration to Palestine; philanthropy for 
Jewish settlements. 
Scholarship Books; scholarship; Talmud scholar; 
decisor; bet din (religious court); dayan 
(judge at religious court). 
*The table lists different examples of information that I have found in the encyclopedia and used to categorize the different activities. 
In some cases the same piece of information prompted me to assign more than one field of activism to the person. For example: 
someone mentioned to have worked on halakhic problems concerning agriculture in Palestine will be included in both having 
participated in “settlement” and “scholarship.” However, this applies only if there was a question of precision, not if there was a 
qualitative difference in the categorization.. Thus, although “education” could be also categorized as “community work,” I only 
assigned it to “schooling.” The categories should be understood as ideal types in the sense of Max Weber, created for the purpose of 
















Table 4 – Comparison between Mizrahi Members and Overall Entries  
	   Mizrahists	  (850)	   Overall	  (1308)	  
Community	  Work	  	   328	  (39%	  of	  850)	   577	  (44%	  of	  1308)	  
Schooling	   200	  (24%)	   294	  (22%)	  
Cause	  Activism	   561	  (66%)	   669	  (51%)	  
Journalism	  	   123	  (14%)	   166	  (13%)	  
Scholarship	   75	  (9%)	   200	  (15%)	  
Settlement	  	   162	  (19%)	   239	  (18%)	  
 
 
Creating New Authorities  
What conclusions can we draw from this collection of data? These figures should be 
viewed with a certain amount of skepticism. In addition to the ideological factors and 
historical developments outlined earlier in this chapter, the data is often incomplete, and 




classifications. 40  Despite these methodological challenges, we can deduce some 
conclusions from this biographic database. First, a considerable number of young men 
from East Central Europe who became attracted to the religious Zionist movement in the 
early decades of the twentieth century had strong backgrounds in religious education; 
most of them attended yeshivot and received rabbinic ordination. Often, however, they 
experienced difficulty finding proper rabbinic positions after finishing their religious 
studies. Many of these men eked out a living through employment in lower teaching 
posts and community positions, and only years later succeeded in attaining an official 
appointment as a community rabbi or judge – if at all. Quite a few of these men 
immigrated to the United States and Canada, or to other countries. Often, it was only 
abroad that they succeeded in obtaining their first rabbinic position.  
In a different context, Shaul Stampfer has argued that urbanization led to a crisis in 
the rabbinic job market in late nineteenth and early twentieth century Eastern Europe. 
Distinct demographic developments generated fewer and fewer new communities, and 
hence posts for rabbis.41 Such developments might have engendered religious Zionist 
activism in these years. Young men who were well trained and had a vital interest in 
traditional Jewish life were unable to find appropriate jobs as rabbis or other community 
functionaries. Alternative careers in business, as Stampfer shows, were also harder to 
obtain for men from traditionalist environments because of an increased demand by 
employers for applicants with an advanced general education. My analysis of the 
encyclopedia confirms this claim. In 148 cases, or about 11%, the authors alluded to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 One problem is the term ‘רב’ (“master”), which can be used as a title (“Rabbi”), or simply as a respectful 
way of addressing a male person. 
41 Shaul Stampfer, “Inheritance of the Rabbinate in Eastern Europe in the Modern Period — Causes, 
Factors and Development Over Time,” Jewish History 13/1 (1999): 45-49. Compare also idem., Families, 




business activities in the banking sector and industry, or described involvement in 
merchandising. Stampfer argues that radically altered occupational prospects for young 
scholars led to the emergence of the kolel system – institutions of higher learning that 
provided income through fellowships to those men who in earlier generations would have 
become rabbis.42 In addition, I suggest, it also helped to generate nationalist activism. 
This activism offered an alternative to work organized through traditional community 
institutions, while at the same time allowing these men to remain in familiar 
environments. Often, they were active in local associations and clubs, became involved in 
causes like the promotion of kosher food among Jews, or wrote ideological pamphlets. 
Eventually they found their way into the Mizrahi, or one of its related organizations. In 
many cases, the next generations came into contact with religious Zionism through its 
emerging youth movements or through Mizrahi-related educational institutions. An 
evaluation of the database of biographical information strongly suggests that the major 
strength and focus of the movement was its social and political activism. The 
overwhelming majority of the men portrayed were involved in community work or 
political endeavors. These endeavors gradually became tied to wider ideological 
frameworks. Engaging in poor relief or the involvement in a society for the supply of 
Jewish soldiers with kosher meat no longer constituted just services to the Jewish 
community but rather were transformed into contributions to the religious Zionist 
struggle.  
The situation in the West, and in particular Germany, differed from East Central 
Europe. The average level of religious education of German-born Mizrahi activists in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




encyclopedia was significantly lower. In contrast, an exceedingly high percentage had a 
strong background in secular studies. 85% of the German-born Mizrahists enjoyed a 
formal secular education, mostly in Gymnasiums.43 Nearly half, or 40 out of 84, studied 
at universities (in comparison to 13% of the overall movement), and 28 held doctoral 
degrees. In other words, 33% of German-born Mizrahists held a doctoral degree, as 
compared to just 7% in the international movement. This percentage is even greater if we 
take into consideration that a high number of those who did not enjoy a university 
education were born after 1910, and immigrated to Palestine before reaching the age of 
graduate level education. The German members, then, like their East Central European 
fellows, belonged to a well-educated elite. In contrast to their East Central European 
fellows, however, this education was of a strongly secular bent. Among the German 
Mizrahists were many lawyers, physicians, and university teachers. Few of them held 
official positions in the Jewish communities.44 It might well be that this intellectual elite, 
similar to their counterparts in the secular branches of the movement, was drawn to 
Zionism in an attempt to strengthen their identification with the Jewish community in the 
face of the strong disintegrating process of Jewish group formations. While continuing to 
live an observant lifestyle, these men might have found their own values and ideas to be 
in firm disagreement with the disdain towards secular education prevalent in Eastern 
European Orthodox circles. With their background in liberal education, it is not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 10 out of the 13 men mentioned to not having enjoyed a formal secular education, were born in the first 
half of the nineteenth century, and are included for their general religious settlement activism, rather than 
formal membership in the Mizrahi movement.  
44 This is also stressed by Jacob Tsur in his comments about the top-leadership of the German Mizrahi 
during the first decade of the twentieth century. See Tsur, Bein Ortodoqsiyah le-Tzyionut, 213. For the 
German Mizrahi and its position within German Zionism prior to 1914, see Yehuda Eloni, Zionismus in 
Deutschland: Von Den Anfängen Bis 1914 (Gerlingen, 1987), 383-99; Hagit Lavsky, Before Catastrophe: 




surprising that these men found themselves in conflict with non-Zionist Orthodoxy who, 
during these years, displayed increasing support for strong rabbinic authority. The 
religious Zionist movement gave these men an opportunity to stay involved in the 
Orthodox community, maintain their commitment to Jewish group loyalties beyond the 
German context, and at the same time stay loyal to their liberal education.   
This activism of both German and Eastern European Mizrahists grew as the 
disintegration of traditional Jewish communities and their structures was slowly 
advancing.  For a variety of reasons, Jewish communities became less and less able to 
furnish the social services they had traditionally provided. These gaps in services were 
often filled by philanthropic organizations from abroad;45 however, they were also 
attended to by nationalist and socialist activists.46 This type of intervention was not 
unique to Jewish communities. Scholars of Czech, German, and Polish nationalism have 
written of similar processes. World War I was an important turning point for this type of 
service provision. The unexpected length and intensity of the war led to the collapse of 
central state authorities and local communal structures. Nationalist ethno-entrepreneurs 
stepped in and provided essential social services. Organizing food for the poor and shelter 
for refugees were important social projects that also helped these nationalist ethno-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 On Jewish philanthropy in Eastern Europe, see e.g. Nahum Karlinsky, “Jewish Philanthropy and Jewish 
Credit Cooperatives in Eastern Europe and Palestine up to 1939: a Transnational Phenomenon?,” Journal 
of Israeli History 27/2 (2008): 149-170; Rebecca Kobrin, “Contested Contributions: Émigré Philanthropy, 
Jewish Communal Life, and Polish-Jewish Relations in Interwar Bialystok, 1919-1929,” Gal-Ed 20 (2006): 
43-62; Natan M. Meir, “From communal charity to national welfare: Jewish orphanages in Eastern Europe 
before and after World War I,” East European Jewish Affairs 39/1 (2009): 19-34; Steven Zipperstein, “The 
Politics of Relief: The Transformation of Russian Jewish Communal Life during the First World War,” 
Studies in Contemporary Jewry 4 (1988): 22-40. 
46 The outbreak of World War I often stunted socialist activism, but workers’ movements, like the Bund, 
recovered during the first year of the war, and from 1915 on their activism reached new heights. See Wolff, 
Neue Welten, 323-5. For a broader picture of Jewish experiences during World War I, see Frank M. 





entrepreneurs advance their own ideologies and nationalize European populations. People 
began to learn that it was no longer the administration of the Habsburg, Russian, or 
German Empires that could provide shelter in dire times, but rather the German, Czech, 
or Polish nationalists. As Jewish communities had been in dire straits long before the war, 
philanthropy and outside help were well established. Nevertheless, heightened relief 
efforts during the war gave Zionist activists a chance to challenge the established 
leadership.47 
The encyclopedia of religious Zionism has a similar story to tell. World War I served 
as springboard for the careers of several of the depicted activists. During these years of 
chaos and distress, activists became deeply involved in community work. Many helped to 
sustain their local communities, organized help for Jewish refugees, or involved 
themselves in projects of self-defense against anti-Jewish violence. For example, Rabbi 
Moses Rosin from the area of Grodno “proved himself during the years of the First 
World War to be a first rate activist (askan), and dedicated his time and his energy to help 
refugees and save the persecuted.” In contrast to many of his peers, Rabbi Rosin stayed in 
the Grodno area during the war years; because he remained, he was able to establish 
himself as a regional leader.48 The most prominent religious Zionist who advanced his 
career through community work during World War I was Isaac Rubinstein. Rubinstein 
became a government appointed rabbi in Vilna in 1911.49 During the war, he was 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 The most important literature advancing such claims is: Bjork, Neither German nor Pole; Judson, 
Guardians of the Nation; King, Budweisers Into Czechs and Germans; Zahra, Kidnapped Souls. Ezra 
Mendelsohn has argued that Zionism emerged in Poland mainly due to its strong involvement in World 
War I. Ezra Mendelsohn, Zionism in Poland: The Formative Years, 1915-1926 (New Haven, 1981). 
48 Rapha’el, Entziqlopedia, vol. 5,597-98 
49 The so called rav mita’am (“Crown Rabbi”) was appointed by the Russian bureaucracy in contrast to 




strongly involved in refugee issues and represented Jews vis-à-vis Russian, German and 
Polish officials. Through his work, Rubinstein distinguished himself as one of the most 
eminent public figures in the region. His care for the community was all the more 
significant, as many of the important rabbinic figures in the area were forced to leave.  
Among these rabbinic figures were scholars such as Rabbi Haim Ozer Grodzinski,50 who 
was not only one of Rubinstein’s mentors, but one of the most distinguished rabbinic 
authorities in the Jewish world. In the Second Polish Republic, Rubinstein became a 
popular politician and senator, and in 1928 was elected the Chief Rabbi of Vilna. His 
decision to take the post was a significant affront to the authority of Rabbi Grodzinski, as 
well as other first-rank spiritual leaders living in the area, and upset many Jews around 
the world. Many thought a position such as this one should be filled by a greater spiritual 
authority, not by a Zionist politician, not matter how accomplished he might be.  
The case of Rubinstein constitutes an extreme example. His appointment caused great 
turmoil even within the Mizrahi itself and provoked some to leave the party.51  This does, 
however, illustrate the tensions inherent in the movement. Similar to their counterparts in 
other nationalist movements, Mizrahists not only became deeply involved in social and 
political activism, but also derived from this activism claims for leadership and authority. 
These claims stood in tension with the authority of the rabbinic and spiritual elite. The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Gershon Bacon, “Warsaw-Radom-Vilna. Three Disputes Over Rabbinical Posts in Interwar Poland and 
Their Implications for the Change in Jewish Public Discourse,” Jewish History 13/1, 1999: 119.  
50 Haim Ozer Grodzinski (1863-1940) was recognized as the leading decisor and spiritual authority of his 
generation. He moved to Vilna in 1883 and became recognized as the eminent rabbinical authority of the 
city two years later. After the death of Rabbi Isaac Elhanan Spector in 1896, he was recognized as the 
undisputed rabbinical leader of European Jewry. 
51 Rapha’el, Entziqlopedia, vol. 5, 585-93. Those leaving the Mizrahi saw Rubinstein’s appointment as an 
offense to the spiritual authority of Grodzinski. See a letter from Mizrahi leader Teytelboym to his 





activist ethos of the movement implicitly contained a critique of those authorities. 
Nationalist activism was pitted against the political passivity of the mainstream Orthodox 
camp. Most spiritual leaders, as reflected in the movement’s propaganda, were so 
involved in their studies that they neglected their care for the Jewish community. The 
leadership, however, had to step out of its study houses and out of the “four cubits of 
halakhah.”52 This critique is echoed in many of the biographical entries. Religious 
Zionists, in contrast to the leaders of the mainstream Orthodox camp, were active in 
social and political matters and deeply cared for the Jewish community as a whole. 
Ruben Fahen, a Mizrahist from eastern Galicia, epitomized such an outlook through his 
own care for the community and in his journalistic work. In 1909, Fahen wrote an article 
about the essence of the religious Zionist movement. In his opinion, the movement 
incorporated “the spiritual-religious base of extremist Orthodoxy, which is passive on the 
national level, with the national political principles of secular Zionism, which is passive 
on the Jewish level, into one unity of active Judaism.” The Mizrahi, he was convinced, 
was the perfect synthesis of Orthodox Judaism and Zionist zest for action.53 This dictum, 
indeed, was reiterated over and over throughout the movement’s propaganda literature. 
Embodying the advantages of both traditional Orthodox Judaism and secular Zionism, 
this literature held, the Mizrahi was qualified to become the true representative of the 
Jewish people.  
Such an activist ethos was not unique to the Mizrahi, but a common theme of all 
nationalist movements. Religious Zionism was not as unambiguous and uncompromising 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 For a typical reproach of Orthodoxy shutting itself away and being oblivious to the problems of the time 
see Yehuda Leib Zlotnick, Religyezer natsyonalizm un tsienizm (Warsaw, 1917), 6. 
53 He published these words in an article in “Hamatzpe” in Krakow, which I cited here according to 




on this issue as most of its secularist counterparts. Within the ZO, Mizrahists were 
reproached repeatedly for their perceived passiveness and for sneaking clericalist 
elements into the movement. A strong duality of activist spirit and the grappling with 
traditionalist authority structures pervades the history of religious Zionism, consistently 
generating friction within the Mizrahi movement.  
Activism holds a highly prominent place in the biographies. At the same time, the 
encyclopedia also displays a deep commitment to legal and philosophical scholarship and 
religious ideals, such as learnedness and fluency in Torah and Talmud. Learnedness and 
scholarship, however, are not the only, or even the main source from which the self-
appointed leaders of the religious Zionist community derive their authority. These 
biographies put much stronger stress on political and social activism as legitimate 
expressions of care for the community. While, in comparison to other nationalist 
movements, Mizrahi activism might have seemed at times hesitant and reluctant, within 
the framework of traditional Jewish communities it posed a clear challenge to other elites. 
It is often assumed that the early religious Zionist movement struggled hard to win over 
the rabbinic leadership.54 True, Mizrahi propaganda contains a great number of appeals to 
the Orthodox world in general, and to its spiritual elite in particular, to join the 
movement. But except for a few extraordinary rabbis, such as the founder of the 
movement, Rabbi Reines, the great majority of the spiritual elite did not join the Mizrahi. 
Unwilling to support settlement work in Palestine, and refusing to cooperate with 
secularists, the spiritual elite remained steadfast to their Diaspora mentality of political 
quiescence and passiveness. And yet, my analysis of the encyclopedia suggests that there 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




was a deeper conflict at play. The movement’s activist ethos did not mesh well with the 
traditionalist understanding of authority.55 It was against the background of slowly 
dissolving traditional community structures that Jewish nationalists declared their claims 
for leadership and created new authority structures.56 Mizrahists carried this elite struggle 
into Orthodoxy Jewry itself. Seen from this perspective, they constituted an even more 
significant threat to traditionalists than their secularist counterparts. Many religious 
Zionist activists aimed to confine spiritual authority to the realm of ritual and to carve out 
a position of leadership for themselves. The religious Zionist movement opened ways for 
Jews to stay committed to religious observance, while at the same time allowing them to 
subscribe to new understandings of community and novel forms of authority. While 
within the Zionist Organization they might have seemed passive followers whose only 
task was to supervise religious matters, within the realm of Orthodoxy religious Zionist 
activists constituted a clear challenge.   
  
Diaspora Zionism  
The major focus of the Mizrahi’s activism was Jewish settlement work in Palestine. 
“Building up the Land of Yisrael for the People of Yisrael in the spirit of Torat 
Yisrael,”57: this was a mantra of the Mizrahi program, repeated over and over again 
during political speeches, in propaganda leaflets, and in the party press. But like in other 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 Dov Schwartz argues that religious Zionists did not rebel against rabbinic authority deliberately, but were 
forced to by the rejection of Zionism through the rabbinic elite. See Schwartz, Religious-Zionism, 5 
56 World War I was an extremely important catalyst for these processes. During the war, many community 
structures collapsed.   
57 With “Torat Yisrael,” the Mizrahi motto was referring to the laws traditionally believed to have been 
given to the Jews at Sinai, as described in the Hebrew Bible and elaborated by the rabbis in the Talmud. 
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Zionist organizations, at the same time there were fierce debates among Mizrahists about 
the importance of improving the social and political conditions and cultural development 
of Jews in their countries of residence, so called Gegenwartsarbeit, as opposed to an 
activism exclusively focused on settlement work in Palestine.  
The encyclopedia strongly emphasized the value of settling the Land of Yisrael. The 
great majority of the activists made it their life mission to work for Jewish emigration to 
Palestine and to help establish settlements and community structures there. This covered 
a large range of activities, from philanthropy and the education of Jews in Palestinian 
matters, to actual emigration. The encyclopedia’s emphasis on the importance of 
immigration to Palestine is illustrated through the entry of Rabbi Benjamin Friedman 
from Vilna. Friedman did not only “stand out in his love of the Land of Yisrael,” but in 
1870 founded his own association that sought to send one of its members to Palestine 
each year, to witness Jewish life there and to bring testimony of its spirit to the 
Diaspora.58 Another example is that of Joseph Manis from Podolia. Manis prepared to 
immigrate to Palestine in 1913-14. Due to the outbreak of World War I, he was forced to 
defer his plans. But despite the war and the Russian Revolution, Manis did not despair.  
He decided to organize a small group of Jews willing to immigrate to Palestine. He 
succeeded in gathering 24 families, who, in 1919, started their journey to Palestine. Other 
Ukrainian refugees joined them on their way through Romania and Bessarabia, and when 
they arrived in 1921-22 in Haifa, their number had grown to about 175 families. These 
families founded their own coopearative and lived together. When a few years later the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




corporative dissolved due to financial problems, Manis stayed in Haifa where he opened 
a small grocery store and became a local Mizrahi leader.59 
Not everyone, however, was as steadfast in his or her dedication and fortunate as 
Joseph Manis. Like Manis, Rabbi Samuel David Feinberg, a teacher and judge from 
Lithuania, was deeply committed to the Land of Yisrael and its colonization. He founded 
an organization for the support of Jewish settlements that was joined by many Jews in the 
area. In 1899, Feinberg published an article entitled “And Bring Us to Zion” in the Shivat 
Zion journal in Warsaw. In this article he emphasized the importance of Jewish life in 
Palestine and particularly stressed the spiritual value of Jewish farming in the area. 
Tackling one of the burning questions of the time, Rabbi Feinberg pondered whether 
Jews who planned to emigrate should opt for the US or for Palestine. For him, of course, 
there was no doubt: Only the Land of Yisrael could fulfill the spiritual needs of the Jews. 
“The Jewish people (Yisrael) and its land,” he wrote, “are like body and soul. The land 
needs Yisrael to redeem it from its wilderness, because no other nation (uma) has the 
ability to do so.” “The hour is ripe,” Rabbi Feinberg claimed, “for immigration to the 
Land of Yisrael.” Unfortunately, he himself was not granted this opportunity. Instead, 
Feinberg went to the US three years later, “for a family visit.” Once in New York, 
Feinberg accepted a position as community rabbi “in the hope to immigrate to the Land 
of Yisrael soon.” This hope, however, never materialized. Rabbi Feinberg spent the rest 
of his life in New York.60 
Quite a number of the biographies contain similar life stories. The authors of the 
encyclopedia go to great lengths to show how religious Zionists labored throughout their 
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lives to achieve their aspiration of making aliyah. Empathic accounts tell of life tragedies 
that prevented this goal from being actualized. Typically, these entries conclude: “but, it 
was not granted to him to fulfill his dream and to make aliyah to the Land of Yisrael.”61 
Palestine was the primary destination of religious Zionists. Nonetheless, at least 189 men, 
or almost 15 % of those depicted, did not only never make their way there, but actually 
migrated to other destinations. Despite the great emphasis on aliyah and settlement work, 
less than half of the activists actually immigrated to Palestine (47%). An additional 104 
individuals were born in Palestine, so that 720 of the men, or about 55%, spent at least 
some amount of their lives there.62 588, or about 45% of the activists, on the other hand, 
never fulfilled the commandment of settling the Land of Yisrael, a mitzvah central to 
observant Zionist ideologues. These 45% might have dreamed of moving to Palestine all 
their lives. Effectively, however, they lived in the Diaspora and contributed to the fight 
for rights and to the improvement of cultural developments of the Jews living there. The 
ideological outlook of the encyclopedia, of course, might skew these numbers. By 
including many men who were not actively involved in the religious Zionist movement, 
the editors may have over-emphasized activities outside of Palestine. Quite astonishingly, 
however, the rates of immigration to Palestine of those officially affiliated with the 
Mizrahi are only slightly higher. About 50% of the Mizrahi members immigrated, while 
42% did not. Willingly or not, Zionist Gegenwartsarbeit was an essential part of religious 
Zionist activism as well. 
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Stories like that of Rabbi Feinberg remind us that ideology can fulfill different 
functions in the lives of activists, even in highly ideological movements like the Mizrahi. 
Rabbi Feinberg might well have intended to make aliyah, as the encyclopedia claims. It is 
also possible, however, that religious Zionism held a different significance for him. He 
may have seen his role in the Diaspora as a champion of the Mizrahi among Jews living 
there. Perhaps religious Zionism was an outlet for activism within the Orthodox 
community, allowing him to combine different worlds and outlooks. Finally, he might 
have seen the movement as a means to install new forms of leadership in the Jewish 
community.63 Most likely, his decision to join the movement was motivated by a 
combination of many factors. Those Jews who did immigrate to Palestine, on the other 
hand, were not motivated solely by ideological factors, as Gur Alroey has convincingly 
argued.64  
German Mizrahi activists demonstrate particularly well the fact that ideology alone is 
not enough to explain the life decisions of historical actors. With 56 out of 84, the 
percentage of German activists who actually immigrated to Palestine (66%) lay well 
above the overall movement average. But out of these 56, 44 immigrated after the Nazi 
rise to power. In other words, for at least 78% of German Mizrahists, their decision to 
immigrate to Palestine was probably not the mere outcome of an intention to restore 
Torah in Zion, but had much to do with the political and societal circumstances in their 
home country.    
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Table 5 – Immigration to Palestine  	  
Immigration? Yes No Not applicable 
Overall  616 588 104 
Mizrahi Members 429 358 63 
 
Seen from this perspective, it is not enough to characterize religious Zionist activism 
by merely focusing on the movements’ ideological claims. Palestine played a central role 
in the Mizrahi’s platform, but it was not its only battlefield. Mizrahists also struggled for 
authority and leadership in the camp of observant Jews. Once formed as organization, it 
became a vehicle to promote, channel and focus such activism under one umbrella. 
United in one movement, these activists were not only struggling for the welfare of 
European Jewry, but also to establish themselves as the appropriate leaders of the Jewish 
communities. The movement, in this sense, served as medium to create and shape new 
forms of authority. To be sure, laypersons had always played important roles in the 
administration of Jewish communities. Men who distinguished themselves through their 
wealth and reputation fulfilled important functions both in the politics within the 
communities as well as in their representation towards Gentile authorities. In early 
modern Europe some of these men had gained supra-regional importance as intercessors 
(shtadlanim) for the needs and welfare of Jewish communities before the royal heads of 
different European states. Frequently, local lay-leaders and supra-regional intercessors 
got into conflicts and strife over authority and power with the rabbinic leadership.65 In 
contrast to religious Zionist activists, however, the shtadlanim and pre-modern lay-
leaders had been distinguished by their wealth and social prestige. What is more, these 
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leaders had been individuals and not advanced collective claims. Much like their 
secularist counterparts, religious Zionists strove to establish a new form of leadership 
within the Jewish communities. These new mass politics, as Eli Lederhendler has argued, 
did not emerge in a “big bang”, but developed throughout the nineteenth century.66  
Through their services to the Jewish community, such as relief work during the First 
World War and their political involvement in Eastern European communities, religious 
Zionists fashioned themselves as a new elite. Through their struggle for rabbinic posts, 
through the up-building of alternative structures, such as their own rabbinic assembly in 
Interwar Poland, a chief rabbinate in Palestine, and a great variety of national-religious 
educational institutions, Mizrahi activists situated themselves as leaders of Orthodox 
Jewry – both in Palestine and in the Diaspora.   
 
 
Table 6 – Yearly Number of Immigrants to Palestine  
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“Smallpox Vaccination Against the Zionist Pestilence”: 
The Emergence of Agudat Yisrael and the Shaping of 
Two Orthodox Political Movements 
 
 
How did non-Zionist Orthodoxy deal with the question of political activism and 
Zionist challenges to traditionalist authorities?1 From the early appearances of Zionist 
aspirations in the second half of the nineteenth century, Orthodox Jewry displayed 
ambivalences towards these activities. While some supported the idea of settlement 
efforts in Palestine, the bulk of Orthodox Jewry and of the leading rabbinic authorities 
distanced themselves from such endeavors. Over the years, when the secularist 
tendencies of most Zionists became more and more pronounced and a clear movement 
crystallized, their relations with Orthodox Jewry grew increasingly tense and at times 
outright hostile.  
This conflict, as chapter I has argued, was not merely an ideological one, but had 
much to do with basic questions of community structure and leadership. Modern mass 
movements, in both their nationalist and socialist molding, challenged traditional forms 
of community organization and struggled to replace established leaders. In the Jewish 
case, the struggle for power and leadership was carried out against the backdrop of 
dissolving traditional Jewish communities (kehillah). These communities had been 
characterized by their strong religious outlook and a balance of power between spiritual 
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authorities and lay leaders. During the nineteenth century, however, the traditional 
kehillot slowly disintegrated through the challenges of industrialization, secularization, 
and the development of modern bureaucracies, which grew increasingly hostile to 
intermediate structures standing between the state and its subjects. Nationalist and 
socialist movements offered ways to establish new forms of community structures. 
Jewish socialists tended to dismiss the old kehillot entirely. Nationalist movements, on 
the other hand, searched to transform these kehillot into the nucleus of the modern 
national community and centers of their popular support. This brought them into direct 
conflict with those forces that sought to protect and reinforce traditional community and 
authority structures.  
This chapter explores the emergence of the main political opponent of religious 
Zionism within the camp of Jewish Orthodoxy. Agudat Yisrael was a conservative 
movement that displayed highly ambiguous attitudes towards Zionist activism and the 
challenges of the Mizrahi. Agudists did not intend to establish a new elite, but claimed to 
merely restore the historical community leadership of rabbinic authority and wealthy lay 
leaders. While, contrary to their claims, they did transform traditional forms of 
community and created new authorities, these leaders did not advance collective claims 
in a similar manner to religious Zionists. Therefore, this chapter does not attempt to 
compile a collective biography, but rather explores the formation of Agudat Yisrael out 
of conservative leaders’ attempts to counter the influences of Zionist activism on 
European Orthodoxy. It starts with an analysis of the efforts to organize traditionalist 
leaders into one supra-regional movement. In a next step, the chapter looks at the 




and rabbinic authority. Finally, the chapter analyzes the ways in which the Agudah took 
shape through conflicts with Mizrahi leaders. Both sides tried to distinguish their 
movements from each other and thus forged agendas and ideologies.   
There are a number of studies about the emergence of Agudat Yisrael. But these 
studies tend not to look closely at its dynamics with the Mizrahi, and the influences of 
inner-Orthodox struggles on the shaping of the movements and their political platforms.2 
Most of these scholars take opposing ideologies as the origin of inner-Orthodox conflict. 
Rather than assuming preexisting ideological differences as the primary source of their 
quarrels, this chapter takes mutual polemics in the party press and political clashes 
between different leaders as instrumental in developing and shaping their respective party 
platforms and ideologies.   
 
Encountering Zion: Agudat Yisrael as Countermovement  
Orthodoxy, as Jacob Katz has convincingly argued, is a modern phenomenon.3 With 
the breakdown of traditional Jewish society, the defenders of such lifestyles had to 
develop new ways to ensure religious observance and to create novel mechanisms to cope 
with the challenges of changing environments. Among the challenges that Orthodox 
leaders faced were the impacts of the enlightenment and liberal thought, growing state 
interference with Jewish communal affairs, and also increasing political organization and 
“identity politics,” as most pronouncedly expressed in the emergence of Jewish 
nationalist and socialist movements. Orthodox Jewry only reluctantly entered the fray of 
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modern political organization. Recent scholarship has uncovered the beginnings of 
Orthodox Jewish politics in different areas and challenged simplistic notions of Orthodox 
passivity. Early attempts, however, stayed mostly local and rarely extended beyond local 
contexts. The regional differences that had developed out of different cultural contexts 
and influences were immense and at times seemed insurmountable. Hesitations and 
concerns about organization and modern mass politics were equally significant. 
Traditionalist Jews were deeply divided over questions of community organization, 
acculturation and secular education. 
By far not all of the observant Jews engaging in the social and political activism 
analyzed in the last chapter were ideologically committed Zionists. Quite a number of 
these men, in fact, never affiliated themselves with the Mizrahi, and some even joined its 
political opponents. The encounters between Orthodoxy and Zionist activism were 
manifold and multifaceted. Even the encyclopedia attests to such diversity, despite its 
strong ideological tinge. The activism it describes found outlet in many different 
organizations and associations. Not all of those coincided with the aims and policies of 
the Mizrahi; not everybody involved in the idea of settling Palestine supported the 
religious Zionist movement unequivocally. In accordance with general tendencies in 
Mizrahi propaganda the encyclopedia draws a direct line from an early involvement of 
religious Jews in the idea of Jewish settlement activities in Palestine, as it evolved 
throughout the nineteenth century, to the foundation of the religious Zionist movement in 
the early twentieth century. Organizations like Hovevei Zion are seen as immediate 
precursors of the movement. Some of the life stories depicted in the encyclopedia, 




Men like Ben Zion Zisling from Lithuania displayed a strong fondness for the idea of 
Jewish religious settlements in Palestine. Zisling indeed, became close to groups around 
Rabbi Samuel Mohilever4 and joined Hovevei Zion in the late nineteenth century. In 
subsequent years, however, Zisling came to reject the Zionist movement for its secularist 
character and objected to attempts of reviving Hebrew as vernacular language.5 Quite a 
few members of Hovevei Zion, indeed, with time got into conflict with the increasing 
secularist outlook of settlement activities. Some of them left the organization for these 
reasons and in later years joined the Orthodox opponent of religious Zionism, Agudat 
Yisrael.6   
Even after the foundation of the Zionist Organization and the Mizrahi, boundaries 
were not clearly defined immediately. The story the encyclopedia tells is rather one of a 
gradual crystallizing of religious Zionist activism and ideology. Over time, the tensions 
between non-Zionist Orthodoxy and religious Zionism heightened and helped channel 
forces and form them into two distinct movements. This process evolved slowly and left 
room for intermediate forms and groups, such as Rabbi Meir Lerner’s Moriah 
organization. Rabbi Lerner perceived of the Zionist Organization as a great threat for the 
religious youth. His aversion was not soothed by the existence of the Mizrahi. Due to the 
Mizrahi’s organizational affiliation with the ZO, Lerner doubted its ability to neutralize 
the secularist threat. Therefore, he decided to establish an independent organization for 
the perseverance of Jewish traditions and the religious settling of Palestine. In 1910, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Rabbi Samuel Mohilever (1824-1898) was the Rabbi of Białystok and an eraly supporter of Jewish mass 
immigration to Palestine. He was one of the funders of Hovevei Zion.  
5 Rapha’el, Entzyqlopedia Vol. 5, 25-26. 
6 Pinhas Rosenblit,  “Le-Darkah shel Tenu‘at ha-Mizrahi be-Germaniyah.” In Sefer ha-Tzyionut ha-Datit: 




Rabbi Lerner founded the organization Moriah in Hamburg-Altona. He reached out to 
rabbinic leaders in Hungary, where he hoped to find support for his idea. Two years later, 
in January 1912, Moriah held its first major conference, to which local leaders of both its 
Hungarian and German branches gathered in Altona. Lerner, as the encyclopedia tells us, 
had chosen to hold the conference in Altona deliberately. During these years, the Mizrahi 
was moving its headquarters to the city, and Lerner hoped to counter the influence of the 
movement. Indeed, members of the Mizrahi showed up at the conference and advertized 
the unification of the two organizations. But a majority of the attendees of the conference 
dismissed such a proposal. About a year later, Moriah leaders published their program for 
practical activities in Palestine as pamphlet entitled “Land Flowing with Milk and 
Honey.” In the meantime, however, Agudat Yisrael had been established and, in January 
1913 the leaders of Moriah announced their merger with the new organization. Shortly 
thereafter, Rabbi Lerner was chosen to serve on Agudah’s rabbinic assembly.7 
At first glance, Rabbi Lerner’s story seems to be an example of Orthodox resistance 
against the Zionist movement, prompting the question as to why the encyclopedia 
devotes a biography to him. Moriah, indeed, found its way into other religious Zionist 
publications as well.8 Despite Lerner’s open dismissal of the Mizrahi and his later joining 
of Agudat Yisrael, the organization is inscribed into the history of the movement. While 
being accused of not having understood the significance of the religious Zionist project in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Rapha’el, Entzyqlopedia Vol. 4, 266-70. The encyclopedia devotes 2 1/2 pages to Lerner, which is 
significantly more than the average activist. 
8 It figures prominently among the organizations included in an article about parallel organizations to the 
Mizrahi, written by a religious Zionist activist. See Shmuel Hakohen Veingarten, “Histadruyot Maqbilot le-
“ha-Mizrahi”.” In Sefer ha-Mizrahi. Qovetz le-Zekher ha-Ga’on Rabbi Yitzhaq  Ya‘aqov Rayynes Ztz”l le-
Mele’ut Sheloshim Shanah le-Fetirato, ed. Yehuda Leib Hakohen Maimon (Jerusalem, 1945), 102-32. On 
Moriah see also Eliezer Don-Yehiya, “Tefisot shel ha-Tzyionut be-Hagut ha-Yehudit ha-Ortodoqsit,” Ha-




all its depth, its organizers nevertheless are credited with the promotion and support for 
Jewish settlement activities in Palestine. And, in fact, the boundaries between the two 
organizations are not as definite as it might seem. Discussing the option of unification 
with the Mizrahi in 1912, representatives of Moriah – at least part of them - did not rest 
their refusal on principal enmity. They expressed hopes that by not becoming affiliated 
with the ZO they might be able to gain the support of the great rabbinic authorities and a 
majority of the Orthodox masses for the settlement project – support that the Mizrahi 
lacked.9 Personal ties and relations of mutual respect existed between members of both 
organizations, as in the case of Yehuda Meller, who was a active in Moriah, but 
acknowledged the significance of the Mizrahi idea and had many good friends in its 
ranks.10   
The case of Rabbi Lerner and his organization defies strict definitions. It is the story 
of heightened activism among young religious men, grappling with questions of Jewish 
traditions and their meaning in times of radical political and social changes. This activism 
found an outlet in many different causes and groups, such as help for refugees, care for 
the preservation of the Sabbath, or Jewish settlement activities in Palestine. This activism 
posed much difficulty to traditionalist Jewry, as it encouraged political initiative and 
implied a strong critique of established elites. Therefore, many rabbinic authorities and 
other Orthodox leaders became highly suspicious of such activism. In Galicia early 
Orthodox political approaches had already developed in the 1870s out of changing social 
and political environments. These attempts focused on the composition of the lay 
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Zionsm and Orthodoxy too clearly is the case of the “Zionist Hasid” Ahron Marcus, who was a great 
admirer of Herzl long after much of the other Orthodox support of Zionism had ceased. See Joshua Shanes, 




leadership and the significance of the rabbinate, as well as the question of education. 
Through these societal changes and conflicts, local Orthodox leaders developed their own 
modes of political struggle. They stopped fighting for the leadership over the whole 
Jewish community and concentrated on the control of their own sectors instead.11 In 
Imperial Russia, Orthodox leaders were able to stabilize their control over the 
traditionalist community through an alliance with the state in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries.12  
Attempts to replace communal solidarity with voluntary associations and new forms 
of group formations went the furthest in Hungary and Germany. Here, traditional Jewry 
had to give up hopes of being able to control communal institutions early on.13 In 
Germany, it was the struggle against the influence of the Jewish enlightenment itself, and 
especially against the Reform Movement that divided Orthodox Jews. Two approaches 
developed out of the struggles with Reform Jews over authority and financial means in 
German communities. So called Gemeindeorthodoxie opted to remain part of the official 
Jewish community and in this context work together with non-Orthodox streams. At the 
same time, a group of Orthodox Jews crystallized under the leadership of Samson 
Raphael Hirsch,14 who opted to leave existing Jewish communities and form their own, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Manekin, “Politics, Religion, and National Identity.” On this early Orthodox political organization in the 
form of local organizations called “Mahzikei Ha-Dat” and early anti-Zionist Orthodox activities, see also: 
Mendel Piekarz, Hasidut Polin. Megamot Re‘ayoniot bein Shtei ha-Milhamot ve-be-Gezerot 5700-5705 
(“ha-Sho’ah”) (Jerusalem, 1990), 23f; Luz, Parallels Meet, 203-226.  
12 Freeze, Jewish Marriage and Divorce, 243-79. 
13 On developments in Hungary, see in particular Michael K. Silber, “The Emergence of Ultra-Orthodoxy: 
the Invention of a Tradition,” in The Uses of Tradition: Jewish Continuity in the Modern Era, ed. Jack 
Wertheimer (New York, 1992), 23-84; idem., “Alliance of the Hebrews, 1863-1875: the Diaspora Roots of 
an Ultra-Orthodox Proto-Zionist Utopia in Palestine,” Journal of Israeli History 27/2 (2008): 119-47. 
14 Samson Raphael Hirsch (1808-1888) was rabbi of Emden, and from 1851 he led the Frankfurt 
Austrittsgemeinde. His philosophy, grappling with the challenges of modern secular knowledge to 




separate ones. Austrittsorthodoxie had its strongholds in southern Germany and 
particularly in Hirsch’s own community in Frankfurt am Main. Gemeindeorthodoxie and 
Austritts-communities were enmeshed in bitter struggles fueled by ideological 
differences, personal enmity, and even geographical factors.  
Pressure toward centralized organization led Hirsch to strive for the unification of 
Orthodox Jewry on a national level. To this aim, he founded the Freie Vereinigung für 
die Interessen des orthodoxen Judentums (FV) in 1886. While involved in cultivating 
religious life in a narrow sense, for example through the distribution of phylacteries and 
mezuzot, the FV also developed a wider political activity and became eventually 
regarded as the premier advocate of Orthodox Jews.15 From the emergence of the Zionist 
movement, the FV disputed its significance for Judaism. Public declarations about this 
question afforded the organization an opportunity to set itself apart from both modern 
nationalism and an alliance of liberal and orthodox rabbis against it.16 In the early 1900s, 
Jacob Rosenheim17 took over the FV’s leadership. Rosenheim, who was a strong 
advocate for the unification of German Orthodoxy, worked hard to overcome 
geographical antagonisms and to expand the FV beyond southern Germany.18 From the 
very beginning, Rosenheim’s efforts were interwoven with attempts to reform traditional 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Breuer, Jüdische Orthodoxie im deutschen Reich, 275. 
16 In 1897, an alliance of liberal and orthodox rabbis caused furor when publishing a protest note against 
the convening of the First Zionist Congress. Its authors came to be known as Protestrabiner, a label given 
to them by Theodor Herzl. Later, the FV issued its own declaration, which criticized the Protestrabiner for 
claiming that Zionism stood in contradiction to Judaism. The FV declaration proclaimed that the Zionist 
aim of settling Palestine did not contradict traditional Judaism, but held that this settlement could only be 
religious (Jacob Tsur assumes that the FV was not yet aware of Zionist ambitions to found a Jewish state). 
See Tsur, Bein Ortodoqsiyah le-Tzyionut, 140-48.  
17 Jacob Rosenheim (1870-1965) was member of the Frankfurt Austrittsgemeinde. He wrote extensively on 
political topics, and published the Orthodox daily Der Israelit. He was among the most important founding 
figures of Agudat Yisrael, and later became the movement’s president.   




charity for the Jewish community in Palestine (haluka) and to renew support for 
traditionalist Jewish settlements in Palestine. For this reason, the FV established its own 
commission for Palestine (Palästinakommission). Rosenheim, indeed, saw his work in 
large parts motivated by concerns about Zionist activities.19 In his efforts, Rosenheim 
found a partner in Isaac Isaac Halevy.20 Halevy, a rabbi and historian who had grown up 
in Vilna, broadened Rosenheim’s focus on German Jewry by espousing the 
transformation of the FV into a supra-regional agency that would unify Western and 
Eastern European Orthodoxy and thus enable Orthodoxy to compete with the Zionist 
Organization on an international level.21  
In Eastern Europe, this proposition fell on the sympathetic ears of Rabbi Grodzinski 
and some other authorities. Since 1906 Rabbi Grodzinski had been trying to organize 
Orthodox Jewry and especially its spiritual leaders into one organization. In 1908 they 
had founded the organization “Knesset Yisrael.” 22  Because of adverse political 
conditions, however, this attempt did not have much impact.23 Owing to Rosenheim’s 
and Halevy’s efforts, representatives of Western and Eastern European Orthodoxy met in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Jacob Rosenheim, Erinnerungen 1870-1920 (Frankfurt a. M., 1970), 92f. 
20 Isaac Halevy (Rabinowitz) (1847-1914) was born in Ivyanets near Vilna, and studied at Volozhin 
Yeshiva. He became a rabbi and wrote historical works.  
21 Halevy is often credited as being the major link between Western and Eastern Europe. He himself was in 
active contact with a number of Eastern European spiritual authorities. See, for example, a commemoration 
in Der Israelit, 6.6.29, 1-2.  
22 For more information on Knesset Yisrael, which aimed to “unite all religious Jews under its banner,” see 
Bacon, Politics of Tradition, 31f.  
23 Grodzinski himself described these efforts in an open letter published in the central Agudah organ Ha-
Derekh in June 1913 in what reads as an attempt to establish the Eastern European contribution to the 
founding of Agudat Yisrael. The letter was reprinted in Iggerot R’ Hayyim Ozer, Qovetz Iggerotav shel 
Maran Rashkahbah”g, vol. 2. (Bnei Beraq, 1999), 121-26. Knesset Yisrael published its bylaws as: Sefer 
Taqqanot me-Agudat Knesset Yisra’el (Vilna, 1908). The letter was republished in Der Israelit in 1923, to 
rebut claims by the Mizrahi propaganda that important rabbinic authorities had been ambivalent about the 
founding of Agudat Yisrael. See Der Israelit, 9.8.1923, 5. According to Grodzinski, the idea to establish a 
rabbinical council came up for the first time in this context (and not, as Rosenheim stated, two years later in 




Bad Homburg in 1909. Among the participants were an impressive number of rabbinic 
leaders, as well as some distinguished laymen, due to Halevy’s contacts to Russian-Polish 
rabbis, and Rabbi Breuer’s ties with Hungarian Orthodoxy.24  All attendees of the 
conference strongly expressed the need for Orthodox unity. On the question of support 
for settlement efforts in Palestine, however, opinions differed. Most of the great rabbinic 
authorities from Eastern Europe disapproved of Halevy’s plans. This disapproval, it is 
worth noting, was in many cases not a rejection of Jewish settlements in Palestine per se, 
but expressed an intention to carefully distinguish Orthodox Judaism from Zionism. 
Showing strong support for such activities, they feared, would render the new 
organization too similar to the ZO.25 Hence, the strong desire to counter the influences of 
the ZO was a common denominator uniting different Orthodox currents, notwithstanding 
disagreement about the correct way to do so.  
After many discussions and diplomatic endeavors, a new organization was finally 
founded two years later. Fully aware of its symbolic significance, the organizers chose 
Kattowitz as the place of the founding conference. Situated in the Polish-German 
borderlands, Kattowitz emblematized a coming together of Western and Eastern 
European Jewry. What is more, Kattowitz had been the founding place of the Hovevei 
Zion movement 28 years earlier. The main issues debated during the conference were the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Among others Rabbis Haim Soloveitchik from Brisk, Eliezer Rabbinowitz from Minsk, Eliezer Gordeon 
from Tels, Haim Ozer Grodzinski from Vilna, Salomon Breuer from Frankfurt, the Gerer Rebbe, the 
president of the Hungarian Orthodox Jewish Council Adolf Frankl, a deputy of the Rebbe of Lubavitch, 
Joseph Isaac Schneersohn, as well as Rosenheim and Halevy. See Simon Finkelmann, Reb Haim Ozer: The 
Life and Ideals of Rabbi Haim Ozer Grodzinski of Vilna (Brooklyn, 1987), 66; Rosenheim, Erinnerungen, 
111f. 
25 Rosenheim, Erinnerungen, 112. In addition to Rosenheim and Halevy, for whom the question of the 
Jewish community in Palestine was central, Agudat Yisrael attracted also some who had been part of the 
Hovevei Zion movement, and were great enthusiasts of Jewish settlement in the holy land, for example 
Rabbi Lerner mentioned in Chapter I, as well as the “Zionist Hasid” Ahron Marcus. For Marcus see 




question of settlement in Palestine and attempts to unite Orthodox Jewry on an 
international, or rather national, Jewish level. Henceforth, the organizers of the 
conference hoped, Orthodoxy would be united in its new organization. The name they 
chose, “Union of Israel” (Agudat Yisrael) expressed their far-reaching goals. This was 
the message: Orthodox Jewry and not Zionism formed the true “Union of Israel,” and 
thus was the apt representative of the Jewish people. Its ultimate aim – countering 
Zionism – seemed to pervade every aspect of the conference.26  
And yet, Inner-Orthodox differences and struggles strongly impeded the organization 
of Agudat Yisrael. The new movement, as Jacob Rosenheim pointed out, had to come to 
terms with four central issues: the status of Palestine within the framework of the 
organization’s work, the significance of rabbinic authority, the immense cultural 
differences between the Jewish communities in East and Western Europe,27 and rivalries 
and strife between different religious groups.28 Because of the impossibility of fully 
bridging these gaps, the heads of the new organization decided to give each of the local 
branches as much autonomy as possible. Despite such tensions, Agudah leaders managed 
to put together a draft version of bylaws to be ratified by a constituent assembly. After 
much to and fro, this assembly was scheduled for late August 1914. Due to the outbreak 
of World War I, though, the assembly had to be canceled and the ratification of bylaws 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 On the conference see Rosenheim, Erinnerungen, 115-120; Bacon, Politics of Tradition, 29-37; Tsur, 
Bein Ortodoqsiyah le-Tzyionut, 225ff.  
27 One of the most strained aspects was the German-Eastern European encounter. For an analysis of these 
relations see e.g. Stephen E. Aschheim, Brothers and Strangers: The East European Jew in German and 
German Jewry Consciousness, 1800-1923 (Madison, Wis., 1982); Israel Bartal, “The Image of Germany 
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28 Rosenheim, Erinnerungen, 119. One of the main issues of contention was the question of separate 
Orthodox communities. Hungarian and German leaders demanded to form separate Orthodox communities 
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was delayed until nearly a decade later, when Agudah leaders finally convened in Vienna 
in 1923.29 During these nine years, Orthodox leaders struggled with the character and 
outlook of their organization.  
When the war started, communications between the different Agudah branches were 
cut off, and the central leadership in Germany concentrated its forces on providing social 
and religious services to Jewish soldiers and welfare for those suffering hardships.30 
World War I, with its manifold upheavals, severely impacted the outlook and constitution 
of the young movement. The reshaping of political landscapes brought new and 
unforeseen possibilities of political organization in East-Central Europe. Already during 
the war, Agudat Yisrael made great efforts to expand, especially in the Polish areas that 
had come under German military occupation. When the Polish state reemerged on the 
map of Europe, the local Agudat Yisrael, founded in 1916 by two German leaders, soon 
turned into the most important branch. In the Middle East, the Ottoman Empire collapsed, 
and left a political void, which was quickly filled by the British. The latter announced 
their support for Jewish aspirations to settle in Palestine in November 1917. The British 
Balfour declaration, expressing support for a “Jewish Home” in Palestine, was a major 
success for the Zionist movement and evoked great hopes and euphoria among European 
Jews. Both in Eastern Europe and Palestine Agudists competed with Zionists for political 
influence over the Jewish masses and alliances with the reigning governments.  
The Agudah leadership, which was located in Germany, had cast its lot with the 
Central Powers. This affiliation redounded to their advantage in the case of Poland, 
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where the German authorities granted Agudah politicians important influence. 31 
Regarding Jewish politics in the Middle East, on the other hand, their betting on the 
Central Powers turned out less beneficial. While Haim Weizmann32 reached major 
diplomatic successes on the British side, Rosenheim and his colleagues concentrated their 
efforts on negotiations with the Ottoman authorities regarding the Jewish community in 
Palestine.33 When Turkey lost Palestine to the British these negotiations forfeited their 
strategic significance.  
The Balfour Declaration and intensifying Zionist efforts to create political structures 
forced Agudah politicians to increase their engagement in Palestinian affairs. The 
postwar settlements in Europe and the emergence of the nation state system urged them 
to grapple with questions of minority rights and of Jewish nationhood.34 With their 
political efforts they attempted to form an alternative to the ZO. In this context, Agudah 
leaders increasingly stressed the commitment of their movement to Jewish settlements in 
Palestine. In February 1919, Agudists convened a great variety of Orthodox leaders in 
Zurich with the aim to unite all of Orthodoxy under their banner. The conference 
declared it the duty of “Torah-observant (thoratreu) Jewry to turn Palestine into the 
religious and spiritual center of the Jewish people.”35 This was clearly an attempt to 
counter what these leaders perceived as the Zionist monopoly on Palestinian matters. A 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 For the lobbying of Agudists and Zionist with the German government regarding the occupied Polish 
territories see Egmont Zechlin, Die Deutsche Politik und die Juden im Ersten Weltkrieg (Göttingen, 1969). 
See also Chapter III.  
32 Haim Weizmann (1874-1952) was a biochemist and Zionist leader. He became president of the British 
Zionist Federation in 1917, and served as president of the ZO during the years 1920-1931 and 1935-1946. 
In 1948 Weizmann became the first president of the State of Israel.  
33 For a report of these efforts see: Rosenheim, Erinnerungen, 149-57. 
34 For an analysis of the discussions about minority rights, see Chapter III.  




few months later, Agudah deputies contacted the ZO in attempt to negotiate a common 
approach for Jewish representation towards the British and in Versailles. In this 
correspondence, they depicted Agudat Yisrael as the representative of Orthodox Jewry 
and called on the Zionists to treat them as equal partners in all matters concerning Jewish 
emigration in general, and Palestinian issues in particular. But the ZO, not willing to 
yield its position as the main representative of Jewish interests in Palestine, was not 
responsive to such appeals. After a series of unsuccessful exchanges, Agudah politicians 
published the correspondence in their media.36 As they were aware of reproaches against 
Orthodoxy’s passiveness in Palestinian matters, this was certainly an attempt to turn the 
tables on the ZO and to publicly demonstrate the Zionists’ lack of willingness for 
cooperation.  
The following months did not bring the two organizations any closer. In late August 
1920, about 60 Agudah representatives from 15 different countries convened in 
Bratislava to decide on the pressing political and organizational issues.37 In Bratislava, 
conference participants heard a detailed report about the diplomatic endeavors of the 
previous months. They learned that due to the deadlock in its negotiations with the ZO, 
the Agudah leadership had issued its own independent memorandum to the British 
government in May 1920. After long debates about appropriate policies, the delegates 
called upon the Agudah leadership to abandon any attempts for cooperation with the ZO, 
and to focus on the consolidation and strengthening of their own organization instead. In 
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Schreiber had his rabbinate. Rabbi Moses Schreiber, the Hatam Sofer, was on the forefront of authorities 
struggling against changes in Judaism and coined the dictum “new is forbidden by the Torah.” Agudah 




addition to their clear support for Agudah politics to stand independent of the ZO, the 
delegates also voted to establish institutions paralleling Zionist ones.38 Over the next 
years, indeed, Agudists adopted many of the organizational forms of the ZO, such as a 
fund for the acquisition of land in Palestine (Keren Ha-Yishuv), training camps for 
immigrants (hakhshara), and even symbolic membership dues similar to the Zionist 
Shekel.39 These institutions, they hoped, would establish their organization as a viable 
Orthodox alternative to the ZO.  
It was Isaac Breuer40 who went the furthest in his attempts to form the Agudah as 
countermovement to the ZO and Agudism as an ideological alternative to modern 
nationalism. Deeply affected by the Balfour Declaration, Breuer tried to grapple with the 
historical significance of Zionism for Jewish Orthodoxy. In several articles and 
pamphlets, Breuer described the developments in Palestine as a major turning point in 
Jewish history and urged Orthodoxy to take the challenge of modern nationalism 
seriously. He acknowledged the success of the Zionist project to get the Jewish masses 
excited about immigration to Palestine, and its significance for world Jewry. At the same 
time, however, he saw secular Zionism as deeply misguided and dangerous. Zionism was 
the secularization of the Jewish national idea, and as such was a clear defection from its 
divine mission. Therefore, the movement simply led the Jewish nation into a new form of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 For a detailed report about the conference, see ibid, 2.9.1920, 3-5. 
39 The Keren Ha-Yishuv, as party propaganda stated, was “the financial tool of Agudat Yisrael for the 
religious and economic up building of the holy land.” See the leaflet Keren Hajischuw der Agudas Jisroel 
(Frankfurt a.M., 193?), 2. Gershon Bacon dealt with the topic of the extent of Agudah imitation of Zionist 
institutions, see Gershon C. Bacon, “Imitation, Rejection, Cooperation: Agudat Yisrael and the Zionist 
Movement in Interwar Poland,” in The Emergence of Modern Jewish Politics: Bundism and Zionism in 
Eastern Europe, ed. Zvi Gitelman (Pittsburg, 2003), 85-94. 
40 Isaac Breuer (1883-1946) was a son of Salomon Breuer, rabbi of the Frankfurt Austrittsgemeinde. He got 
involved in the work of Agudat Yisrael early on, and after moving from Frankfurt to Jerusalem in 1936, he 




Diaspora. “The National Home,” Breuer wrote in 1925, “is the story of the National 
Galut (Diaspora).”41  
Breuer contrasted the Zionist nation with Orthodox ideas about Jewish affiliations 
and nationhood. Zionism and Agudism, Breuer postulated, had much in common. For 
both, the national catastrophe of 70 CE was a constitutive event. Both perceived the 
Jewish Diaspora as national disaster and rejected any coming to terms with it. But 
Zionism distorted the character of the Jewish nation. The Jews, he held, were God’s 
nation and their historical task was to keep His law. This was the essence of their 
nationhood. Jews yearned for the return to Palestine. This return, however, could not be 
an end in itself, but only for the purpose of putting into practice all aspects of God’s law. 
World War I, for Breuer, had heralded a new epoch of Jewish history. God had assigned 
the most difficult and, he reckoned, maybe even the final mission to Diaspora Jewry: “the 
task of national emancipation!” Orthodoxy had to replace Zionism and fulfill this task. 
Only the idea of Agudism, Breuer held, could overcome Zionism. “Agudat Yisrael works 
to prepare the nation of God and the land of God for their reunification under the rule of 
God’s law in God’s state.”42  
Isaac Breuer published these words in a small pamphlet in 1921, in which he laid out 
the historical program of Agudat Yisrael. Using language strongly reminiscent of 
nationalist rhetoric, Breuer demanded that Agudat Yisrael had to bring the Jews to true 
national self-determination. To be sure, most leaders within the Agudah did not share his 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 Isaac Breuer, The Jewish National Home (Frankfurt am Main, 1926 (German Original: 1925)), 17. The 
idea that Zionism is not the final stage in the process of redemption, but in fact is just another stage of 
Diaspora history, was developed by different Orthodox thinkers and has become common among non-
Zionist Orthodox Jewry. See Ravitzky, Messianism, 145-80. 
42 Isaac Breuer, Die Idee des Agudismus (Frankfurt, 1921), 23,36. Breuer’s phrasing resembled the 
Mizrahi’s motto “Building up the Land of Yisrael for the People of Yisrael in the spirit of Torat Yisrael,” 




assertiveness and were far from comfortable with his unabashed nationalist rhetoric. Few 
would have subscribed to his claims that the Jews had been given the “task of national 
emancipation.”43 Breuer himself was seen by most as being too “Palestine-centric,” and 
ridiculed as “Zionist against his will.”44 And yet his idea that Orthodoxy had to overcome 
modern nationalism based on European ideas and replace it with an essentially Jewish 
one, was common in Agudah circles. Agudah leaders put a lot of effort into the creation 
of alternative group affiliations. To counter secularist nationalism, Agudists established 
and strengthened religious institutions, such as yeshivot for the training of young men, 
kolelim for male adult education and Beit Yaakov schools for girls.45 They attempted to 
position themselves at the forefront of the struggle for the observance of Shabbat and 
Jewish holidays, and against the banning of kosher slaughter. Zionists, they held, based 
their nationalism on ideas of Jewish land and state. While the Palestine was important, 
Agudists countered, this was not the only or even the most important component of 
Jewish group formations. Jewish nationhood, they claimed, was centered on the study of 
traditional texts and the observance of halakhah.  
Jewish tradition has strong ethnic components and Jews are said to form a “people” or 
“nation.” In this sense, modern nationalism could build on traditional understandings of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 Isaac Breuer himself underwent many ideological transformations in his life. For an analysis of Breuer’s 
philosophy, see: Matthias Morgenstern, Von Frankfurt nach Jerusalem. As late as 1936, Breuer pleaded for 
a greater Arab state with special rights for the Jewish minority, see his article in Der Israelit 29.10.1936, 
1,3; as well as comments about this article in Central Zionist Archives Jerusalem (Hereafter CZA), 
S25\9794.  
44 It was a Zionist opponent of Breuer, Friedrich Thieberger, who most poignantly made this claim by 
asserting that Breuer had moved to Zionist ideas “against his will.” See Asher D. Biemann, “Isaac Breuer: 
Zionist Against His Will?,” Modern Judaism, 20/2 (2000): 129-146. Breuer himself seemed resentful about 
such accusations even years later when writing his memoirs, see Isaac Breuer, Mein Weg (Jerusalem, 
1988), 121-122. 
45 Beit Yaakov was a movement promoting formalized education for Jewish girls, started by Sarah 
Schenirer 1917 in Krakow. The movement was taken under the wings of Agudat Yisrael. On these 
developments see Agnieszka Oleszak, “The Beit Ya’akov School in Krakow as an Encounter between East 




Jewish group formations. In traditional society, though, ethnic and religious components 
overlapped. The concept of secular Jewish group formations only emerged in the 
nineteenth century. Jewish nationalists, henceforth, claimed ethnic components of 
Judaism to be the only relevant ones for Jewish group formations. Orthodox Judaism, on 
the other hand, placed much importance on religious observance. Basing Jewish group 
affiliations on the Torah was not a new idea, of course. But Agudat Yisrael aimed to 
overcome regional and ideological separatism and to politically organize Orthodox Jewry 
on a national level. This was an essentially modern project, harshly condemned as such 
by some of the hardliners within the traditionalist camp.46  
The notion of Jewish nationalism centering on religious studies and observance was 
epitomized by a project initiated by Rabbi Yehuda Meir Shapiro and officially launched 
on the first plenary conference of the Agudat Yisrael World Movement in 1923. “Daf 
Yomi” (“daily page”) was the idea that every male Jew worldwide should study one page 
of Talmud a day. At this pace, the whole Talmud could be completed in seven-and-a-
half-year cycles. The project was not merely aimed at promoting the text study itself, but 
also at fostering Jewish group affiliations. The Daf Yomi, as the monitoring Polish 
government agency explained to its staff in an internal report, “is a characteristic form of 
solidarity between the members of the  ‘Agudah’ organization that expresses itself in the 
study of one page of Talmud a day.”47 By studying the same page on a daily basis, Rabbi 
Shapiro hoped, Jews would never stay strangers to each other (e.g. when randomly 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 Rabbi Haim Elazar Shapira, the Rebbe of Munkacz, attacked Agudat Yisrael as “a subversive cabal of 
crypto-Zionist heretics,” and tried to convince the Gerer Rebbe to stop supporting the movement, see: Allan 
L. Nadler, “The War on Modernity of R. Haim Elazar Shapira of Munkacz,” Modern Judaism 14/3 (1994): 
239. For a similar critique from Shapira and other hasidic rabbis, see Piekarz, Hasidut Polin, 23-30.  
47 The Polish authorities in charge of monitoring political activities of national minorities discussed Daf 
Yomi in their report on the First World Congress, see Sprawozdanie z życia mniejszości narodowych (Jul.-




meeting on a train ride), but always have an appropriate topic at hand to discuss and thus 
forge friendships and bonds. “Two Jews from different towns or even from different 
countries will meet. The knowledge they share in the Daf ha-Yomi, the pages of Talmud 
currently being studied, will give them a common interest, a common ground on which to 
become acquainted and form a bond of cordial friendship directly.”48 The Talmud, he 
held, was “the Jewish globe that unites Israel at all times and in all its parts.”49  
Rabbi Shapiro seems to have intended to start Daf Yomi as mainly a Polish project 
first, but the delegates on the conference enthusiastically embraced his idea and 
advocated for its immediate promotion worldwide. Daf Yomi, Agudah leaders realized 
early on, had great impact and was of formidable propagandistic value. Already one year 
later a meeting of the central council of Agudat Yisrael highlighted the project as one of 
the most important activities for the fostering of bonds of solidarity between Orthodox 
Jews, and a great opportunity for party propaganda.50 The next plenary conference of 
Agudat Yisrael in 1929 proudly announced that 150,000 Orthodox Jews in Poland had 
studied 2,260 pages of Talmud over the course of the previous six years. Jews from other 
European countries and from the United States, they claimed, joined as well. In February 
1931, Agudah adherents celebrated the completion of the first full cycle of Talmud 
studies in several cities in Europe and Palestine. According to the Agudah media, 2,000 
Jews came to celebrate together with Rabbi Shapiro at his yeshiva in Lublin, and he 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 Cited after Yehoshua Baumol, A Blaze in the Darkening Gloom. The Life of Rav Meir Shapiro 
(Jerusalem/New York, 1994), 163. 
49 At least according to an obituary in Der Israelit. See Der Israelit, 2.11.1933, 1-2. See also the 
appreciation of later party historians for Daf Yomi. Yisra’el Shpigel, Be-Derekh ha-Melekh. Peraqei Iyun 
ve-Historiah be-Masekhet Agudat Yisra’el (Jerusalem, 1982), 113-120. Eric Hobsbawm’s has described 
similar mechanisms among Free Masons as fraternity, which implies both “an ideal of society as a whole, 
and an ideal relationship between people for particular purposes: a programme and a technique.” See Eric 
Hobsbawsm, “Fraternity,” New Society 34 (27): 472. 




received more than one thousand telegrams from Western Europe and the United States. 
Additionaly to 6,000 participants in the official ceremonies in Jerusalem, Der Israelit 
listed major celebrations in Frankfurt, Warsaw, Vilna, Kovno, Lemberg and Krakow.51 
While the numbers probably were exaggerated, the project was successful enough that it 
had to be taken seriously outside of Agudah circles, and was even worth the attention of 
Polish government officials.52  
When looking at the ways in which Agudists thought and wrote about Orthodox 
group formations, their increasing usage of the vocabulary of modern nationalism in the 
interwar period is noticeable. At the same time, Agudists did not grow tired of stressing 
the crucial differences of their approach to nationalist group formations, and their need to 
keep strict boundaries between themselves and secular Jews. Religious Zionists, 
organized in the Mizrahi, generally agreed to cooperate with non-observant Jews by 
participating in the Zionist movement even with persons and parties with a distinct 
secularist ideology. They justified this cooperation with arguments about Jewish 
solidarity and claimed the commandment of settling Palestine to be more important than 
any of the other 613 commandments: mitzvat yishuv ha-aretz shekula ke-neged kol ha-
mitzvot – the commandment of returning to the Land has equal weight as all other 
commandments together. This statement from Jewish tradition was constantly repeated 
by Mizrahi activists in their struggle with non-Zionist Orthodoxy.53 The Agudah, in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 Der Israelit (Blätter) 12.2.1931, 4; Der Israelit 19.2.1931, 5.  
52  Even such pronounced Agudah opponents as the Mizrahi leader Yehuda Leib Maimon had to 
acknowledge of the Daf Yomi project. See his comments on the fifth Mizrahi conference in Palestine in 
1934. Ha-Tor 25.5.1934, 3-24. 
53 See for example Isaac Nissenbaum’s speech on the second Polish Mizrahi conference in 1919, Ha-
Mizrahi 14.5.1919, 21-25. See also a speech of Yehuda Leib Maimon about the differences between Aguda 





response, invoked a different tradition, most famously advanced by Saadia Gaon.54 
Saadia argued that the Jews constituted a nation only by virtue of keeping the 
commandments of the Hebrew bible. “There is no Jewish nation without Torah,” was his 
dictum that the Agudah press reiterated time and again.55  
Such statements could be dismissed as mere rhetoric, but they point to a crucial 
difference to nationalist movements. The latter hold ethnic affiliations to be the most 
important ones. Nationalists are not unaware of other group loyalties, such as gender, 
class, or religion. But they claim that all of these affiliations have to be subordinated to 
national solidarity.56 The Zionist movement, in this respect, was a typical representative 
of modern nationalism, by holding that Jews had to unite to build up Palestine, regardless 
of any political differences or other loyalties. Agudah leaders did not deny the 
significance of ethnic bonds. To them, however, religious affiliations had the highest 
priority. Agudists aimed first and foremost at fostering Orthodox group formations. Any 
relations with non-Orthodox Jews were judged from this vantage point. Cooperation with 
secular Jews was only possible under the condition that it did not endanger such 
formations. Ethnic affiliations were not irrelevant to Agudah leaders, as they frequently 
reiterated, but had to be subordinated to religious loyalties.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 Saadia Gaon was a Jewish sage from the tenth century who produced important works on Jewish 
philosophy, Hebrew linguistics, and Jewish Law. Saadia made this statement in his struggle against the 
Karaites, a Jewish sect that did not accept the “oral Torah,” the Talmud.   
55 See for example Der Israelit, 6.6.1929, 1-2. Rabbi Moses Avigdor Amiel, one of the Mizrahi leaders 
most supportive of cooperation with the Agudah, invoked this statement in the early 1930s, when he 
advocated for stricter alignment of the Mizrahi with the Orthodox world. Mosheh Avigdor Amiel, Al ha-
Yesodot ha-ideologiim shel ha-Mizrahi (Warsaw, 1934), 9-10. See also Chapter V.  
56 There exists an exceedingly extensive literature on nationalism and its theorization. For a good 
background on how I understand the phenomenon in this context, see Craig J. Calhoun, Nationalism 




“The notion that the national is subordinated to the religious,” an article in the 
German journal Jeschurun stated in 1917, “makes it relatively easy for Orthodox Jewry 
to adapt to all political situations.” This, the author argued, had ensured its existence until 
this very day. The striving for political sovereignty was not foreign to Jewish tradition. 
But in the absence of their own state, Jewish group formations had been preserved 
through the observance of Jewish law. This system had enabled Jews to adapt to many 
different environments without endangering strong group loyalties.57 The gathering of 
Jews in their own country, the author continued, was important for the completion of 
their national mission. Nevertheless, the ingathering of the exiles was the climax of this 
mission and not its precondition, and could only be an act of divine providence. All 
aspects of Jewish national life had to be governed by Sinaitic law. This, according to the 
author, was true “Agudah nationalism.”58 Agudists conceded increasing significance to 
national affiliations. In his programmatic speech at the Zurich convention in 1919, Jacob 
Rosenheim noticed that for the first time in its existence, the organization’s program 
spoke of Agudah’s responsibility for the “Jewish people” instead of using paraphrases 
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adaption caused fierce conflicts. The strong acculturation of German Orthodoxy was strongly rejected, for 
example, by parts of Hungarian Orthodoxy, who responded with the selective mobilization of extra-
halakhic traditions to condemn acculturation, and thereby, as Michael Silber has argued, created an early 
version of Ultra-Orthodoxy. Silber, “The Emergence of Ultra-Orthodoxy,” 124f. 
58 Abuha di Samuel (Adolf Frankel), “Jüdischer Nationalismus und gesetzestreues Judentum,” Jeschurun 
12, 1917, 625-32. While not denying the significance of ethnic bonds, Frankel asserted that a non-observant 
Jew could hardly be recognized as complete Jew (Volljude). For a later example of a similar argument, 
which also bares striking similarities to Isaac Breuer’s thinking, see Jacob Rosenheim, Die 3. Kenessio 




like “Jewish collective (klal yisrael).”59 But despite these changes they retained the 
fundamental hierarchy of religious and national group loyalties.60 
In their attempts to define Agudat Yisrael historians have wavered between the labels 
“anti-Zionist” and “non-Zionist.” Most commonly they have depicted a transformation of 
the organization’s strong anti-Zionist outlook towards less hostile attitudes and an 
eventual willingness to cooperate.61 It is true that opinions about cooperation with ZO 
and Mizrahi differed among Agudah leaders, ranging from outright rejection and 
demonization to more moderate outlooks. All different streams within the organization, 
however, were united in their aim to counter the secularizing impacts of the Zionist 
movement. Secularization, it should be stressed, in all of its aspects: the decline of ritual 
observance, but also the decline of traditional institutions and structures, and the removal 
of religious elites. Trying to meet Zionist challenges, Agudah leaders adopted many of 
the tactics and structures of the former. Scholars have described such processes as 
dynamics between social movements that are often launched from “below” and challenge 
established interests, and countermovements for the defense of such interests.62 The 
Agudah, in this sense, can be described as a countermovement, or counter-Zionist. Rather 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 His speech is reprinted in: Jacob Rosenheim, Agudistische Schriften (Frankfurt a. M., 1931), 30-37. This 
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60 On the question of Agudah attitudes towards nationalism in the context of its struggle with the Mizrahi, 
compare also Bacon, “Reluctant Partners, Ideological Opponents;” Yosef Elihai, “Ha-Imut bein “ha-
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61 For such a line see Tsur, Bein Ortodoqsiyah le-Tzyionut; Fund, Perud o-Hishtatfut.   




than becoming gradually more “Zionist,”63 its leaders adopted different strategies to take 
up Zionist challenges and assert their influence. 
In accordance with the aim to establish their organization as alternative to the ZO, 
and Agudism as counterpart to Zionism, propagandists time and again stressed that 
Agudat Yisrael was not merely a political party among others, but aimed at representing 
the Jewish people as a whole. The first decade of organizational formation came to an 
end with the First World Congress (Knessiah Gedolah) in Vienna in 1923. The Knessiah 
Gedolah, which was strongly modeled after the Zionist congresses, finalized many 
organizational decisions and institutional processes. Rabbi Lewenstein from Zurich 
solemnly marked the historical moment in which “for the first time since the beginnings 
of Jewish exile the elected representatives of Torah-observant Jewry” had convened.64 
Over the next few days, delegates from all over Europe and the United States discussed 
questions about the fundamental outlook of Agudat Yisrael and its institutions, as well as 
its policies. Jacob Rosenheim, in his programmatic speech, called Agudat Yisrael “the 
living organism of the people of the Torah,” its “living center.” The Jewish people, he 
claimed, had been dragged out of their ghetto and straight onto the world stage. Agudah, 
its legitimate representative, had to fulfill its historical mission and build up a viable, 
Torah-observant community; the Land of Yisrael had to be regained as spiritual center, as 
the place in which Jews calmly and silently worked towards the reconstruction of God’s 
kingdom on earth. The First World Congress was to establish the fundamental structures 
of this center. Henceforth, the conference announced, Agudat Yisrael would be an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 As Joseph Fund seems to suggest. Compare ibid. 
64 This, of course, was a gross overstatement. Representatives of the Mizrahi had not been invited, and 
hasidic leaders, who objected to the Agudah idea, were absent as well. None of the attendees had been 




important player both in inner-Jewish affairs and on the international stage. Independent 
of the ZO, in fact as its Orthodox counterpart, the Agudah would pursuit its own policies 
regarding Palestine and other pressing Jewish concerns. It would not take long, they 
hoped, until the last observant Jews had also joined the movement.65  
 
Between Shtadlanim and Sages? Agudah Leadership Struggles 
The First World Congress, mocked by its enemies as “shtreimel congress,” 66 
launched and approved many Agudist parallels to Zionist institutions. At the same time, 
the delegates did not grow tired of stressing the fundamental differences between their 
organization and the ZO. In contrast to Zionist congresses, rabbinic authorities took 
center stage in the orchestration of the conference. Among the highlights of the assembly 
was the speech of Rabbi Yisrael Meir Kagan. The Hofetz Haim,67 as he was widely 
known, applauded the founding of Agudat Yisrael and called on every Torah-observant 
Jew to join the organization. After listening to his solemn speech, the delegates 
enthusiastically cheered and applauded the 85-year-old rabbi.68 One of the institutions 
inaugurated by the First World Congress was the Rabbinic Council. This council, 
consisting of 50 rabbinic authorities, was to be the most authoritative body in the 
Agudah. Commentators heralded its launch as a seminal historical achievement that 
clearly distinguished Agudat Yisrael from other political movements. Jewish Orthodoxy 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 For detailed reports on the First World Congress and Rosenheim’s speech, see: Der Israelit 16.8.1923, 1-
5; 23.8.1923, 1-6. See also Max Landau, “Die Knessiah Gedola,” Jeschurun 9, 1923, 383-53. 
66 As claimed by one of the party historians: Joseph Friedenson, A History of Agudath Israel (NY, 1970), 
16. 
67 On Kagan see Chapter I.  




as represented by the Agudah, they claimed, was under strict supervision and guidance 
from the spiritual elite.  
With such a carefully orchestrated performance, Agudah leaders presented their 
organization as being deeply rooted in traditional leadership modes and Jewish law, in 
contrast to modern mass movements with their political innovations and disregard of 
long-established hierarchies. Agudists, indeed, were reluctant to fully embrace modern 
forms of political and social activism. Quite tellingly, no biographical activism 
comparable to the religious Zionist genre developed in the Agudah press, and no 
equivalent to the Encyclopedia of Religious Zionism exists. The only work with a 
comparable approach is a “History of Agudat Yisrael in Pictures and Documents. From 
Kattowitz to Jerusalem.” The book was published in 1953 by Moses Shneefeld and 
Ezekiel Rotenberg. With only one relatively thin volume, however, it does not come 
close to the scope of the encyclopedia.69 Similarly, the interwar Agudah press published 
biographical stubs and obituaries, but those differed significantly from Mizrahi 
approaches.  
The booklet and party media list mostly rabbinic authorities that supervised the 
movement. A few distinguished lay leaders are mentioned as well.70 Activist accounts of 
rank-and-file members similar to those in the Mizrahi press did not appear. Rather, 
Agudists stayed committed to hagiographic traditions, depicting outstanding figures 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 Mosheh Shneefeld/ Yehezqel Rotenberg, eds., Me-Qatovitz ad Yerushalayyim. Agudat Yisra’el be-
Temunot u-Mismahim (Tel Aviv, 1953). 
70 This holds true for the party media in Poland, Germany, and Palestine. In none of these countries did the 
Agudah press print obituaries for rank and file members comparable to its Mizrahi counterparts. Der 
Israelit informed its readers about the death of local Jews (mostly from the Frankfurt area) under a rubric 
called “Personalia.” This rubric listed all kinds of information about private persons, and its placement and 
size in the paper were quite unimposing. It was a regular component of the paper long before the 
foundation of Agudat Yisrael, and did not display the same activist character as obituaries placed 




whose stature was above reach. Agudah media portrayed its political leaders as 
distinguished men, who were not only learned and economically successful, but also of 
noble and impeccable character. Firmly entrenched in the tradition of early modern 
intercessors (shtadlanim), these men abandoned their own business in order to restlessly 
labor for the needs of the community, thereby transcending narrow party interests. 
Entirely devoted to the wellbeing of the community, they did not spare themselves any 
hardships.71 On behalf of the Jewish community as a whole, or sometimes to soothe the 
grievances of smaller groups and individual Jews, they intervened with gentile 
authorities. Eliyahu Kirshbraun, for example, one of the central Agudah politicians in 
interwar Poland, met personally with Prime Minister Władysław Sikorski in 1922 in 
order to advocate against the expulsion of Russian Jewish yeshiva students from his 
country.72  
The rabbinic elite itself could also pursue such endeavors. Despite his old age, the 
Hofetz Haim traveled to the ministry of education in the 1920s in order to override plans 
for the compulsory secular education of rabbinic students. The minister of education, an 
obituary in Der Israelit claimed in 1933, was so impressed by the noble appearance of the 
old rabbi that he abolished the decree. Rabbis represented Jewish tradition, but were also 
the ones to lead the Jewish community in the present and into the future. The Hofetz 
Haim, accordingly, was described as standing “above nature,” being “not from this world, 
not from this time.” In the spirit of Agudat Yisrael, he labored hard to overcome the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 Dos Yudishe Togblat 23.2.1931, 5, See also a later depiction in this vain: Isaac Levin, ed., “R. Ya‘akov 
Trokenheim,” in Eleh Ezkerah: Osef Toledot Qedoshei 5700–5705, vol. 1 (New York, 1956), 268–277.  
72 According to an obituary in Der Israelit, in 1922 the Polish government announced an expulsion of all 
Russian yeshiva students, who at the time studied at institutions located within the borders of the new 
Polish state. Kirshbraun, however, had averted this edict through his personal intervention. Der Israelit 




longstanding conflicts between various hasidic sects, and between Hasidim and their 
opponents (Mitnagdim). He was “a true high priest for the advent of the Messiah.”73 
Rabbi Abraham Tsevi Perlmutter, both a recognized rabbinic authority and Sejm deputy, 
fluent in Polish and Russian, was “the most beautiful and impressive prototype of 
historical shtadlanim.” Rabbi Perlmutter despised any party politics and, according to 
Dos Yudishe Togblat from Warsaw, saved the lives of twelve Jews during the Bolshevik 
invasion through shtadlanut.74  
Many of these obituaries commented highly negative on modern politics. In stark 
contrast to the political bullying of nationalist populists, Agudah politicians acted silently 
and modestly behind the stage, neither demanding any recognition, compliments, or even 
financial reward. In this regard, the biographies had to balance a depiction of these 
leaders in the spirit of religious ideals, emphasizing modesty, demure, and decency on the 
one hand, with the aim of battling accusations of political passivity and recreance on the 
other. This was not always an easy task, as the obituaries published after the death of 
Eliyahu Kirshbraun in 1932 demonstrate. Kirshbraun, these obituaries summarized, was a 
“fighting shtadlan,” who defied any reproaches of shtadlanut as “sycophantic and 
coward.” In his dealings with Gentile authorities, he advocated strongly for the interests 
of Polish Jewry. But in contrast to his Zionist counterparts, he did so through cooperation 
with Gentile authorities, not confrontation. This “proud and unfaltering, nearly dictatorial 
leader” was complemented by the private citizen Kirshbraun, “a simple Jew, deeply 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 Ibid, 20.9.1933, 1; 28.9.1933, 1-3.  




religious and pious, a true believer,” who devoted his life to the study of texts and the 
observance of Jewish law.75  
But the preeminent personification of the shtadlan ideal was Jacob Rosenheim. 
According to the obituaries published after his death, Rosenheim spent all his time and 
energy laboring for the great idea of politically organized Orthodoxy. These publications 
painted him as the helmsman, who firmly steered the Agudah ship even through the 
darkest of times. Rosenheim was a man of great spirit, but even more so he was a man of 
action, of impeccable character traits, God-fearing, and learned. "Any minute that he 
could take off from his duties towards the public, he sacrificed for his study of Torah." In 
this spirit, he never reached any decision without asking the rabbinic sages. In such 
obituaries, Rosenheim was not only depicted as the ideal shtadlan, but embodied the 
highest ideals of his movement. Rosenheim was the “living spirit” of his organization; or 
in fact, he “was Agudat Yisrael.”76 On the Second World Congress in 1929, the rabbinic 
elite decided to create the position of a movement president and appointed him for this 
post. In addition, they bestowed upon Rosenheim the honorary title Moreinu ha-Rav 
(“our teacher, the [great] rabbi”).77  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75 The journal of the Agudah youth dedicated a whole issue to Kirshbraun, see Ortodoksishe Yugentbleter 
4/1928, March 1932. Other obituaries were published in: DYT 23.2.31, 5; 24.2.1931, 1; Kol Yisrael 
19.3.1931, p.3; Der Israelit, 5.3.31, 3. These tensions, however, were present in many obituaries. See e.g. 
DYT 6.6.1930, 10; 18.5.1938, 1; Der Yud 27.4.21, 2-3 About the depiction of Kirshbraun as “fighting 
shtadlan,” see also Bacon, Politics of Tradition, 228-29. Mendelsohn, as well, mentions the Shtadlanut self-
depiction of Agudists. Ezra Mendelsohn, “The Politics of Agudas Yisroel in Inter-War Poland,” in East 
European Jewish Affairs 2/2 (1972): 48.  
76 The quotations are taken from Yitzhaq Meir Levin, “Rabbi Ya’aqov Rozenhayyim un Agudas Jisroel,” in 
Sefer ha-Zikaron le-Moreinu Rabbi Ya‘aqov Rosenhayyim Ztz”l, ed. Yosef Friedenson (New York, 1967), 
13-18; Yitzhaq Levin, “Der ‘Baal Mahsheva” un der “Ish ha-Ma-ase,” in ibid., 25-30.  
77 For the honors on the Second World Congress see Der Israelit, 19.9.1929, 2-8. Isaac Breuer also 
described Rosenheim as shtadlan in his autobiography. In Breuer’s account, however, this became a highly 
negative characterization. He harshly attacked the missing professionalization of Agudah politics and 




And yet, neither the festive staging of rabbinic authority nor the idealized depiction of 
noble shtadlanim in the press could conceal harsh leadership struggles within the 
movement. The rabbinic council and its statutes, in fact, had been the subject of much 
strife long before its inauguration on the first world congress in 1923. What was the right 
balance between rabbinic authority and the political leadership? What role should 
political activism play? These were the issues at stake.  
Disputes about political activism and its place within the traditionalist Jewish world 
had been at the heart of Orthodox attempts of organization since its early days. The 
activism of both the secularist and religious branches of the Zionist movement, as we 
have seen, quickly clashed with claims of other leaders, such as those resting their 
authority on spiritual notions or scholarly erudition. Early opposition to Zionism mostly 
employed traditional means: rabbinic sermons and declarations, prohibitions against 
Zionist activism, the barring of Zionists from synagogues and study halls, and even bans 
against the movement itself. Over time, Orthodoxy slowly adopted some of the 
techniques of modern mass politics. But attitudes towards such novelties as modern 
media, mass meetings, and party politics remained ambivalent. Famously, Rabbi 
Abraham Mordechai Alter, the Gerer Rebbe and central leader of Agudat Yisrael in 
Interwar Poland, initiated the foundation of the Yiddish newspaper “Der Yud” in 1919 
and requested his adherents to buy the newspaper. Afraid that these would neglect their 
Torah studies, however, he preferred them to not spend much time reading it. He also 
rejected including sermons and similar texts so that no one would mistake reading the 
newspaper for religious studies.78  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 About this “pragmatic” attitude of the Gerer Rebbe towards the modern press, see Fund, Yosef. Matvei 




In addition to the question of means, the ambivalence towards political activism had 
much to do with issues of leadership. In Eastern Europe, new authority structures 
emerged during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, first in the form of hasidic 
rabbis, then, in the non-hasidic world, in the form of the yeshiva and kolel deans. These 
new forms of community strengthened rabbinic authority. Boys and men studying in 
yeshivot and kolelim often lived on fellowships they obtained from such institutions. This 
system, as Shaul Stampfer argues, contributed to the polarization process between 
religious and secular Jews, as the new yeshivot and kolelim were largely self-contained 
worlds that rewarded religious rigor. In our context, it is worth adding that these 
institutions also transformed understandings of authority and leadership. In traditional 
European Jewish communities, rabbis had fulfilled important functions. The political 
leadership, however, had been mostly in the hands of laymen. In the kolel and yeshiva 
system, such a division of powers was abolished. The overall power lay in the hands of 
the dean. Thus, these institutions helped form an environment in which the authority of 
the spiritual elite grew significantly. Political activism, in such a society, raised deep 
suspicions.79 
At the same time, the range of these leaders’ influence was in most cases confined to 
rather small groups. When organizing on a national Jewish level, they had to come to 
some kind of cooperation. Such an organization, furthermore, could hardly be run by the 
rabbinic elite itself and thus required an increased involvement of lay leaders.80 In 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 Stampfer, Families, Rabbis and Education, 299. 
80 In this context laymen are understood as such leaders that gained their authority mostly on grounds of 
social and political activities, and not due to their erudition in texts, as accepted spiritual authorities, or for 
holding official rabbinic positions. Many leaders of both Agudat Yisrael and the Mizrahi were ordained 
rabbis, but acted mostly as political leaders and thus their public clout rested on such premises. This 




Germany, the situation was slightly different. Within Gemeindeorthodoxie, the 
cooperation between groups of different religious outlooks and standards prevented the 
development of such power structures. Austrittsorthodoxie, on the other hand, was led by 
charismatic rabbinic leaders: first by Rabbi Samson Raphael Hirsch himself, later by his 
son-in-law Rabbi Solomon Breuer.81 While both these men were strong and outspoken 
leaders far beyond the realm of religious ritual, the different political and social structure 
of German Jewry did not allow them to obtain positions of power comparable to those 
that some of their Eastern European colleagues had attained.82 Hirsch, indeed, did not 
support notions of unquestioned rabbinic power. Nevertheless, he believed that the rabbi 
was the appropriate spokesperson of his community.83  
Within the ranks of the Agudah, the question of rabbinic authority and the balance of 
power between rabbinic and lay leaders became a source of contention early on. These 
tensions significantly contributed to the shaping of the organization’s outlook. Hirsch’s 
successor, Solomon Breuer, was a strong-willed personality and a vociferous advocate 
for strong rabbinic power. During the debates preceding the inception of Agudat Yisrael, 
Breuer got into fierce conflicts with Jacob Rosenheim and Isaac Halevy. These conflicts 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
two movements as also between them. Nevertheless it is important for the understanding of their mutual 
dynamics.  
81 Solomon Breuer (1850-1926) was born in Pápa, Hungary, where he became rabbi in 1876. Married to the 
youngest daughter of Samson Raphael Hirsch, Sophie, he succeeded his father-in-law as leader of the 
Frankfurt Austrittsgemeinde in 1890.  
82 This had to do with the different size and position of the Orthodox community in Germany and the 
surrounding political system, as well as with cultural factors. For an analysis of the changing position of 
rabbis in Germany see Breuer, Jüdische Orthodoxie, 215-25. Hirsch intended to limit the scope of 
rabbinical authority. For this philosophy see Mittleman, The Politics of Torah, 83-91.   
83 The rabbi, he claimed, would merely voice the community consensus. Such a consensus, he thought, 




were not merely an expression of the different personalities of the three,84 but can best be 
understood from the background of their positions within the movement. Representing 
the rabbinic elite, Breuer pursued policies intended to strengthen its authority and 
influence. Rosenheim and Halevy, by contrast, were the main lay-leaders of the 
movement and reasoned as such. Both men supported a strong involvement of Agudat 
Yisrael in Palestine. Such activities, they argued, would not only help to counter the 
rising influence of secular Zionism, but also to unite Western and Eastern European 
Orthodoxy behind one cause. Both Rosenheim and Halevy were in favor of inclusive 
bylaws regarding the participation of adherents of Gemeindeorthodoxie on the one hand, 
and the Mizrahi on the other. Allowing these to become full-fledged members of Agudat 
Yisrael, they hoped, would strengthen the movement. In all of these issues, thus, 
Rosenheim’s and Halevy’s focus was on the question of how to gain the support of the 
masses.  
Breuer countered their arguments with concerns about the resistance of the Eastern 
European rabbinic elite. Promoting Orthodox involvement in Palestine, he feared, could 
deter rabbinic leaders from joining the organization. Breuer was also highly skeptical 
towards a full integration of Gemeindeorthodoxie and Mizrahi members. If separate 
communities existed, Breuer insisted, local Orthodox Jews had the duty to join them. 
Anyone who stayed a member of the official community violated important religious 
principles. Such persons, Breuer asserted, were welcome to join Agudat Yisrael as rank-
and-file members, but should be barred from taking up leadership positions.85 The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84 As Mittleman and Jacob Tsur seem to suggest. Compare ibid., 112; Yaa‘qov Tsur, “”Ha-Mizrahi” ve-
“Agudat Yisra’el” bein ha-Shanim 1911-1914.” In Bi-Shvilei ha-Tehiyyah: Mehqarim ba-Tzyionut ha-Datit 
vol.3, (Ramat-Gan, 1988), 59-78. 




attitude Breuer expressed was not only anchored in German Austrittsorthodoxie, but also 
a main concern of important Hungarian leaders. In Hungary, Orthodoxy had been 
involved in fierce political struggles with liberal Jews since the early days of the 
Enlightenment. Consequently, some leaders within Hungarian Orthodoxy had developed 
deeply reactionary and separatist tendencies and utterly rejected any cooperation with 
non-Orthodox Jews. These leaders, in fact, vociferously demanded to keep 
Gemeindeorthodox Jews out of the Agudah – so much so that their political enemies 
would soon term this issue the “Hungarian question.”86 In this context, Breuer and his 
Hungarian colleagues have been labeled “extremists” and “separatists,” and Breuer has 
been accused of sacrificing Orthodox unity for the advancement of his own power. While 
it is certainly true that Breuer strove to strengthen his own position, these conflicts should 
be understood as part of the wider negotiations about the balance of power within the 
leadership ranks of Agudat Yisrael. In all of these debates, Breuer consistently sought to 
establish the superiority of rabbinic authority over the lay leadership.87 His comments 
expressed deep suspicions towards modern mass movements and the political means 
embraced by Rosenheim and Halevy.  
The frictions between Breuer and the lay leadership grew as the organizational 
preparations progressed. The participants of the preliminary meeting in Bad Homburg in 
1909 appointed a provisional commission to prepare grounds for the founding of the new 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86 On the fierce separatism of Hungarian leaders see Silber, “The Emergence of Ultra-Orthodoxy.”  
87 In qualification it should be added that some spiritual leaders in Poland/Russia openly rejected the 
formation of separate Orthodox communities in these areas. It is sometimes argued that this was a 
“cultural” difference. It seems, however, that they could hold such opinions due rather to the strength of 
Orthodox Jewry in these areas. During the debates about separate communities in Palestine in the 1920s, 
these leaders openly embraced the withdrawal of Agudat Yisrael from Zionist communal structures. See 
Chapter IV. For an example of the rejection of separate Orthodox communities in Russia, see Iggerot R’ 




organization. Due to struggles between Breuer and his counterpart from the official 
Jewish community in Frankfurt, the lay leaders of the Western European division of this 
commission decided to exclude rabbinic authorities from the preparations.88 Rosenheim, 
in particular, opted to keep the rabbis out.89 Furious about the decision of the lay 
leadership, at the Kattowitz conference in 1912 Breuer pushed for strong rabbinic 
authority even more forcefully. In order to stress his authority, Breuer asserted that it was 
he himself who first had called for the unification of Orthodoxy many years earlier. 
Orthodox Jewry, he claimed in his speech to the plenary assembly, could not rely on 
others but had to act independently. Agudat Yisrael, to his mind, should not be a political 
but a religious organization. The movement, he held, does “…not intend to found some 
kind of Orthodox Zionism, any political tendencies are excluded from our program.”90 
Through such words Breuer expressed the need to sharply distinguish Agudat Yisrael 
from the ZO. Orthodox Jews, he made clear, had no own political aspirations, but were 
loyal citizens of their respective states. But his words carried an important message for 
Rosenheim, Halevy and their colleagues: This organization was to be headed by the 
religious elite, and lay leaders had to bow to their authority.  
These conflicts were also reflected in discussions about the bylaws of the new 
organization. Agudat Yisrael, the convention proclaimed, was to “solve all the day-to-day 
questions of the communality of the Jewish collective (klal yisrael) in the spirit of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88 Breuer’s counterpart was Rabbi Nehemiah Anton Nobel (1871-1922), a committed Zionist and important 
community leader. On Nobel, see Rachel Heuberger, Rabbiner Nehemias Anton Nobel: Die Jüdische 
Renaissance in Frankfurt am Main (Frankfurt a. M., 2005). 
89 See the comments in the letter of Jacob Feuchtwanger to Jacob Rosenheim, 24.6.1912, in CZA – A349/2. 
In retrospect, Rosenheim seems to have felt slightly uncomfortable and goes to great lengths to explain this 
“paradox” in his autobiography, see Rosenheim, Erinnerungen, 115. 




Hebrew bible and Jewish law.”91 To this end, the attendees decided to establish a rabbinic 
council consisting of the greatest Talmudic scholars of the generation. This council 
should become the highest governing body of the Agudah. Lay leaders were to execute 
the day-to-day business of the party, but they should be obliged to take directions from 
the rabbinic council. While the foundation of such a council was widely welcomed, the 
scope of its authority was controversial. The first draft of the Agudah bylaws stated that 
the rabbis should decide on “every question that will arise, (…) insofar as these questions 
bear upon Jewish law.”92 Phrased in this way, the bylaws confined rabbinic power to 
matters of religious law. This seemed to give ample scope to the lay leadership regarding 
policymaking and other issues. Many of the Eastern European rabbinic authorities did not 
agree to such leeway. In the aftermath of the convention, therefore, hasidic leaders 
submitted an additional draft of bylaws to the Agudah headquarters in Halberstadt. In this 
draft, rabbinic authority was not limited to questions of Jewish law. The council, 
according to the draft, should decide on “every question that will arise.” In addition, it 
omitted a stipulation of the earlier bylaws that had obliged the council to give detailed 
explanations for its decisions. This version of the statutes therefore considerably 
strengthened rabbinic authority. According to Breuer, both he and the lay leaders 
accepted the new version.93 Nevertheless, the issue at stake, namely the balance between 
rabbinic power and lay leadership, stayed contentious.  
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In the months after the Kattowitz conference, the struggles among Agudah leaders in 
Germany continued to grow yet more acrimonious. Breuer sought to prevent the 
provisional committee from convening in Frankfurt before the bylaws had been finalized. 
These attempts proved successful, due to his position as the local rabbinic authority 
(mara de’atra).94 Taking this line one step further, Breuer invoked his authority as 
rabbinic leader again shortly thereafter to ensure his influence over the provisional 
committee. “I certainly expect all those members of the provisional committee, who are 
members of my kehillah, to toe their rabbis decision (psak), as it befits all good Jews,” he 
announced in the German-Jewish press.95  
He also recruited his sons Isaac and Raphael for his struggles. Together, they edited a 
new monthly journal. This journal, the Jüdische Monatshefte, constituted competition for  
Der Israelit under Rosenheim’s editorship. Isaac Breuer, who had participated in the 
Kattowitz Conference merely in his “capacity as son,”96 ranted on its pages against the 
ensnaring characteristics of Western democracy and openly attacked the lay leadership. 
In an article from December 1913, he questioned the authority of any committee that was 
made up solely of laypersons, and charged those leaders with having lost all grasp of 
historical Judaism. Their only desire, Isaac Breuer suggested, was to attract the masses. 
Anything that was not popular with the masses of Western Europe, such as rabbinic 
authority and separate Orthodox Jewish communities, had to be sacrificed for the sake of 
this new Orthodox “Weltverein” (world association).97 Half a year later, he went even 
further by accusing the lay leadership of having fallen trap to “Antirabbinismus” and 
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“Demokratismus.” The lay leaders, he claimed, tried to sideline the rabbis and merely 
used them to embellish the movement. Neither the Russian, Polish, nor Hungarian 
rabbinic elite, however, would allow them to snatch away their authority. In the same 
issue of Jüdische Monatshefte, the Breuers published the revised bylaws.98 While these 
conflicts displayed certain personal aspects, the deeper tension between different types of 
authority continuously stood at the center of debate.   
After World War I, such discussions flared up again. The framework, now, had 
changed considerably. Radically altered political landscapes, and the expansion of 
Agudat Yisrael brought in new forces and qualified the strong German focus of the 
debates. Postwar negotiations and Zionist influences on the international stage forced 
Orthodoxy to organize and create viable institutions. The war had been a transformative 
experience not only for Mizrahi activists, but for European Orthodoxy as a whole. The 
German Agudah branch, similar to its Zionist counterparts, had concentrated its forces on 
questions of social welfare and help for refugees. In Vilna, as Andrew Koss has recently 
shown, the collapse of community structures had triggered new forms of social activities. 
The old alliance of wealthy notables and rabbinic authorities had not proven capable of 
providing social welfare for refugees. Orthodox rabbis, after realizing that their 
traditional means of dealing with crises had failed, responded by organizing relief work 
themselves. For the first time, they established a help network that was exclusively 
managed by rabbis, without the assistance of shtadlanim. These, as Koss points out, were 
not rabbis who had focused on communal work before the war, but were established 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




scholars.99 After the war, Agudat Yisrael attempted to gather these organizations under its 
umbrella, and to this aim found its Keren Ha-Torah (“Torah Foundation”) in 1923. 
In February 1919, the first Agudah conference taking place in Zurich, intended to 
consolidate the movement, close ranks, and smooth internal disparities. Agudat Yisrael 
was to be transformed from an association focused strongly on cultivating religious life in 
a narrow sense into an effective international organization struggling for the rights and 
political formation of Orthodox Jewry. 100  In the next years, Agudists worked on 
establishing a viable leadership for their organization. This included both spiritual elite 
and lay leadership. Some paid positions were created to professionalize the political 
leadership of the World Agudah. Political bodies were established and expanded to help 
increase Orthodox influences in the Jewish world and on the international level.  
At the same time, the institution of the Rabbinic Council was furthered and promoted. 
In 1923, the First World Congress laid the basis for establishing the council by passing 
essential bylaws. “The Rabbinic Council,” these statutes declared, “is the highest 
authority of Agudat Yisrael. It decides on all questions concerning the overall 
organization, which are directly or indirectly connected to the Torah.” In addition, the 
statues required the political leadership to keep the rabbinic council informed about any 
important developments so that it could intervene whenever it deemed necessary. This 
final version of the bylaws stressed the supremacy of rabbinic authority, and thus seemed 
to announce the victory of Breuer and his camp. But the imprecise wording left ample 
leeway for interpretation. In practice, one of the major obstacles to the implementation of 
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strong rabbinic authority turned out to be the nature of this authority itself. The time and 
effort it took the council to come to authoritative rulings in most cases did not meet 
urgent political needs and party politicians regularly demanded the council to work more 
effectively. The biggest problem, they urged, was getting the rabbinic authorities to 
actually convene and agree on workable policies. Ambivalence towards modern forms of 
activism and tensions between political and rabbinic authority continued to afflict Agudat 
Yisrael. Debates about the right political means and questions of professionalizing 
political activism within the Agudah ranks continued throughout the next decades.101  
Within these debates, critics repeatedly demanded the creation of paid party positions. 
On all three world congresses representatives discussed issues of professionalization and 
effective organization. In later years, it was especially Isaac Breuer together with his 
fellow workers’ and youth leaders, who fulminated against the “delusional belief in 
honorary offices” within the movement, and demanded the creation of paid offices. Other 
political leaders supported such demands. In this vein, the second world congress created 
the post of a party president, which was immediately conferred to Jacob Rosenheim. But 
the Agudah never established a full-blown professional party apparatus. Ambivalence 
towards professional organization and political activism certainly played an important 
role. What is more, the creation of professional offices failed because of the shortage of 
financial issues, as Rosenheim stressed on the same conference.102  
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Political realities hardly matched the harmonic press accounts of Agudah politicians 
and their relations to the movement’s spiritual authorities. Nevertheless, these depictions 
of cooperation between the rabbinic leadership and some noble lay leaders served 
important purposes as they helped to distinguish the Agudah from its political opponents, 
in particular the religious Zionist movement. The Agudah, such accounts suggested, 
represented the historical continuation of Jewish politics and community structures. The 
integration of outstanding rabbinic authorities supported this aim as well and helped to 
raise the prestige of the movement. In practical terms, the Rabbinic Council might not 
have achieved much. During the interwar period, the council was “more fiction than 
fact,” as Gershon Bacon pointedly phrased.103 Symbolically, however, its existence was 
of great importance, specifically in the Agudah struggle to set itself apart as the political 
representative of Jewish Orthodox.  
 
The Shaping of Agudat Yisrael and the Mizrahi Through Mutual Struggles  
What fueled the harsh leadership conflicts in Kattowitz and during the first years of 
the Agudah’s existence? Certainly, personal animosities between the Breuers and Jacob 
Rosenheim and other lay leaders were of importance. Cultural differences among 
Orthodox leaders from Hungary, Russia, and Germany further complicated matters. Due 
to strong tensions between the different groups, Agudists decided to keep the various 
organizational centers as independent as possible. Discord among numerous religious 
streams as well as fear of attacks from the most reactionary and anti-Zionist elements of 
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Orthodox Jewry contributed their share. But the most significant role can be assigned to 
the dynamics with the religious Zionist movement.  
 Mizrahi leaders, at the time, were involved in fierce struggles with their secularist 
fellows. The Tenth Zionist Congress in Basel in 1911 commissioned the ZO to organize 
cultural institutions in Palestine. Religious Zionists strongly opposed these decisions. But 
they were divided over the question whether to continue working within this framework 
or to leave the ZO and form an independent movement. The issue drove a deep wedge 
between those who first and foremost saw the Mizrahi as a religious fraction of the 
Zionist movement, and others for whom Jewish Orthodoxy was the primary reference 
group. After harsh disputes, the majority opted to continue working within the ZO. 
Having clarified their position, some hoped, the Mizrahi would now rise “to become not 
only the soul of Zionism, but of Judaism.”104 Others predicted the demise of religious 
Zionism and left the Mizrahi.105  
Such frictions subsequently gave new momentum to the organization of non-Zionist 
Orthodoxy. Rosenheim and others sensed an opportunity to detach the Mizrahi from its 
Zionist fellows and to integrate the party into a collective Orthodox movement.106 
Mizrahi leaders, for their part, displayed great interest in the new organization and the 
possibility of Orthodox support of settlement work in Palestine. But not everyone 
regarded such convergence of nationalist activism and Orthodox organization as a 
positive development. Rabbi Haim Ozer Grodzinski, the eminent rabbinic authority from 
Vilna, starkly rejected the idea of a joint conference with the Mizrahi, and condemned 
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such plans as halakhically forbidden crossbreeding (kilay’im).107 Zionist activism and 
Orthodoxy, Grodzinski insisted, should be strictly kept apart. By using a concept of 
religious law to reject cooperation between the two parties, Grodzinski asserted the 
significance of the spiritual realm for the political field. His harsh objection is particularly 
noteworthy, because Rabbi Grodzinski was widely seen as a moderate among spiritual 
leaders.108 
 Regardless of such objections, the provisional committee invited several Mizrahi 
leaders to the Kattowitz Convention. Meir Berlin, who subsequently would become the 
leader of the World Mizrahi Movement, enthusiastically heralded the convention in his 
Hebrew-language journal Ha-Ivri. While the ZO had stayed merely a party among others, 
Berlin held, Agudat Yisrael was capable of representing the Jewish people as a whole. In 
contrast to the former, it enjoyed the support of the great spiritual authorities. Later on, he 
reported about the conference, full of praise for Jacob Rosenheim and “his staff.” For 
him, Rosenheim, “whom many Zionists call the (Theodor) Herzl of Agudat Yisrael,” was 
the actual stimulating force behind the new movement.109 In addition to active Mizrahists 
like Berlin, those who had left the movement attended the conference in Kattowitz as 
well. This group, led by the former head of the Mizrahi, Jacob Feuchtwanger, now joined 
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the Agudah.110 Feuchtwanger and his colleagues belonged to those, who saw Orthodoxy 
as their primary group of reference. Nevertheless, in the past Feuchtwanger had come 
forward with harsh words against rabbinic authority. A few years earlier, he had openly 
confronted Rabbi Solomon Breuer on this issue. After an ardent anti-Zionist sermon of 
the latter, Feuchtwanger had publicly rejected any rabbinic interference in political 
questions. “We refuse to accept any orders from the pulpit that do not concern strictly 
halakhic matters,” he had proclaimed in October 1908 in the pages of one of the foremost 
German Orthodox newspapers.111  
The fact that such outspoken opponents of strong rabbinic authority joined the 
Agudah, as well as unclear boundaries with religious Zionism, must have worried not 
only Breuer but all those anxious about any kind of Orthodox nationalist “crossbreeding.” 
In Kattowitz, Breuer condemned the spiritual dangers of Zionism, and accused Mizrahi 
and Gemeindeorthodoxie of assisting sinners to sin. 112  His speech polarized the 
atmosphere and helped establish clear distinctions between the movements. Rosenheim 
and other lay leaders attemted to pour oil on troubled waters and convince Breuer to 
revoke his harsh attacks on the Mizrahi, but to no avail. Subsequently, Rosenheim 
announced in the pages of Der Israelit that Breuer had merely voiced his individual 
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opinion. Breuer’s words, he claimed, were not representative of Agudat Yisrael in 
general.113 But the rift between the sides had widened. The very foundation of the 
Agudah was an important step in the formation of two distinct camps. The leaders who 
had fought most forcefully to position the Mizrahi firmly within the Orthodox world left 
the movement and became active in the Agudah. The ones advocating an unequivocal 
alignment with secular Zionism grew stronger.  
Throughout the coming years, Agudists continued to clash over the character of their 
organization and its alignment within Jewish Orthodoxy. Many hoped to settle the 
conflicts at the first plenary conference of the world movement scheduled for May 1914. 
But the turmoil of the time frustrated such plans, and the convention had to be canceled. 
After the war, Mizrahi and Agudah politicians resumed negotiating possible forms of 
cooperation. Declarations of goodwill notwithstandig, both sides appeared more 
interested in demonstrating their ideological superiority than in reaching an agreement. 
Mizrahi politicians, who had gained new confidence through post-war Zionist successes, 
voiced hopes that the Agudah might soon dissolve and collectively join their 
organization. The developments in Palestine and the emergence of the European nation 
state system, they claimed, had confirmed their ideological positions and proven non-
Zionist Orthodoxy wrong. Mizrahi politicians announced their victory in the Orthodox 
media. The Agudah youth, they contended, openly demanded rapprochement with 
religious Zionism. Soon they would all join the Mizrahi.114  
Such efforts suffered a severe setback when, in January 1919, Agudah leaders 
organized their “World Conference for Jewish-Orthodox Organizations” in Zurich. The 
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conference, Agudists declared, was to help organize Orthodoxy politically and clarify its 
position towards the ZO. Mizrahi leaders were not invited to participate. At the 
conference, Jacob Rosenheim condemned both the Mizrahi and Gemeindeorthodoxie as 
undermining Orthodox unity. Individual members of the Mizrahi, he declared, would be 
welcome in the Agudah, but their organization had to be opposed as aberrant. Positions 
had hardened. A short time later Agudat Yisrael approached the ZO, suggesting 
cooperation of the two organizations on the basis of equal partnership. This initiative 
skirted the Mizrahi, whose leaders had been commissioned by the ZO to establish contact 
with non-Zionist Orthodoxy just a few months earlier.115 Pressured by the events of the 
war and heightened demand for emigration among European Jews, Agudists became 
more and more involved in Palestinian affairs. In their struggle to establish themselves as 
a valid alternative to the ZO, they had to draw the lines between the two organizations 
ever more distinctly. The existence of religious Zionism interfered with this project.  
For the ZO, on the other hand, the political contest increased the value of having 
Orthodox Jews in its own ranks, as these defied their opponent’s claims of representing 
all of Jewish Orthodoxy. In 1920, secular Zionists and Mizrahists reached a compromise 
on the issue of education, a question that had strained their relations for over a decade. 
Shortly after the war, the Mizrahi threatened to leave the ZO if the education issue stayed 
unresolved. Agudah leaders, in consequence, suggested forming a joint Orthodox 
education system. But in his discussions with Agudists Meir Berlin rejected the offer, 
claiming that it would not find a majority in Mizrahi ranks. An international Mizrahi 
conference in Amsterdam in January 1920, indeed, pointed to a change in the climate of 
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inner Orthodox relations. Even moderate delegates attacked non-Zionist Orthodoxy 
harshly. Rabbi Samuel Brodt116 launched a polemic attack against Orthodox passivity, 
charging the spiritual elite with not having understood the change of times. In this period, 
he claimed, rabbis could not just sit in the synagogues and wait, but had to step outside 
and become actively involved. “… not crying and weeping is our duty, but action.” Rabbi 
Brodt advocated for rapprochement between the Mizrahi and non-Zionist Orthodoxy. Yet 
such rapprochement could yield only one result: at the end of the process the Mizrahi 
would be the only existing Orthodox organization.117 A few weeks after the Amsterdam 
conference, ZO and Mizrahi reached their agreement. Education in Palestine, they 
arranged, should be funded centrally by the ZO. In order to ensure independent religious 
schooling, two separate education commissions were established.118 
Outraged about the reports on the educational policy compromise, Rosenheim ranted 
against religious Zionist leaders a few weeks later in Der Israelit. Gone were the times, 
he lamented, in which the Mizrahi had supported an exclusively political Zionism. Now 
its leaders had decided to support the transformation of the ZO into an organization that 
actively promoted atheist education. In his view, this development illustrated once more 
that Orthodoxy had to draw strong boundaries in its cooperation with secular Jews. 
Otherwise it would slowly dissolve. Forecasting such developments, the Mizrahi youth 
now demanded to proceed to the next step, namely the abolition of the separation 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
116 Samuel Brodt (1885-1963) was a community rabbi, and one of the most important leaders of the Mizrahi 
in interwar Poland. Among his many other activities, Rabbi Brodt served as a member of the central Polish 
association of rabbis. See Chapter III. 
117 See the conference report in Jüdische Presse Berlin, 30.1.1920, 37. 
118 For a detailed account of these discussions, see Rachel Elboim-Dror, Ha-Hinukh ha-Ivri be-Eretz 
Yisra’el vol. 2 (Jerusalem, 1989/90), 235-311. Proponents of Mizrahi-Aguda education had hoped that it 
might be possible to win over the Mizrahi for establishing an independent Orthodox education. See e.g 




between the education commissions. Keeping them separate, they insisted, would be an 
Agudist approach.119  
Having gained new self-confidence about their position within the ZO through the 
agreement, Mizrahi leaders now called on Orthodox Jewry to hold a joint convention, this 
time under their own aegis.120 Not surprisingly, Agudah leaders rejected this suggestion. 
In the beginning of August 1920, Isaac Meir Levin from Warsaw visited a general 
meeting of the German Agudah Youth in Nürnberg.121 At this meeting, he fiercely 
condemned Zionism as “collective assimilation” and accused the Mizrahi of weakening 
Orthodoxy. If the Mizrahi did not exist, he claimed, Zionists would not be able to exclude 
(non-Zionist) Orthodoxy from their negotiations with the British regarding Palestine. 
Having a wing of observant Jews within the ZO allowed the movement to depict itself as 
representative of Orthodox Jewry as well. This, in turn, weakened the position of non-
Zionist Orthodoxy. At their conference in Bratislava a few weeks later, Agudah leaders 
decided to reinforce the struggle against Zionism.  Delegates - especially those from the 
two biggest branches, Poland and Czechoslovakia - bitterly complained about the 
relentless political struggle in their countries. In Bratislava, Levin’s countrymen accused 
Mizrahists of being the most threatening and irreconcilable enemies of the Agudah, and 
of corroding any religious authority in Jewish communities in Poland. Rosenheim, 
responding to such outbursts, declared the “fight against the Mizrahi idea” as “the most 
sacred task (allerheiligste Aufgabe)” of the Agudah and its youth organizations. He 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
119 Der Israelit 26.2.1920, 2-3. 
120 Ha-Mizrahi 21.1.1920, 1f. 
121 Levin (1893-1971) was the preeminent political leader of Agudat Yisrael in interwar Poland, and the 
son-in-law of the Gerer Rebbe. He immigrated to Palestine in 1940, where he became the head of the local 
Agudah branch. He later was among the signers of the Declaration of Independence and became a member 




simultaneously stressed the importance of upholding close connections to individual 
Mizrahists and maintained that he would resist any attempt to curtail their membership 
rights within the Agudah, yet he seemed less determined than he had in earlier debates on 
the subject.122 In this context, Rosenheim reported on attempts that had been made to 
resume negotiations about cooperation of the two parties on various joint meetings in 
Berlin, Amsterdam, London, Jerusalem and Frankfurt during 1919 and 1920. None of 
these meetings had yielded any practical results. The ensuing debate, according to the 
report in Der Israelit, demonstrated unanimous rejection of the Mizrahi. Disagreement 
existed only on the question of how distinctly the contrasts between the two parties 
should be highlighted. Concluding the debates, the delegates adopted a resolution calling 
on the political leaders of the Agudah to abandon their efforts for cooperation and to 
focus on independent politics instead.123   
Mizrahi leaders, for their part, perceived the resolution as a declaration of war against 
their organization. Condemning what they saw as a serious mistake of Agudah leaders, 
they responded by turning up their own rhetorical attacks in the press.124 The conference 
in Bratislava and its aftermath officially ended any top-level negotiations about 
cooperation between Mizrahi and Agudah leaders. Only in the mid-1930s, when the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
122 For a detailed report on the youth meeting in Nürnberg see Blätter, 13.10.1920, 19-37. For reports and 
comments on the conference in Bratislava see e.g. Der Israelit 2.9.1920, 3-5; 14.10.1920, 3-5; 
Familienblatt 10.9.1920, 1; 19.11.1920, 1. Rosenheim’s speech and parts of the discussions about 
cooperation with the Mizrahi were published in a booklet about the conference. See Pressburger Konferenz 
der Agudas Jisroel vom 10. bis 13. Elul 5680 (Frankfurt a. M., 1920).  
123 Der Israelit, 2.9.20, 3-5. 
124 E.g. Ha-Mizrahi 25.11.1920, 1f; 2.12.1925, 2f. Agudah leaders complained at following conventions 
about a strong increase in attacks on their organization in the Zionist and especially Mizrahi press, Der Yud 
8.5.1921, 2. Mizrahists, in turn, felt under attack by the Aguda. In 1923 Berlin wrote to his German 
colleague Aharon Barth. In this letter he advocated for an additional attempt to cooperate with Agudists. 
While he did not believe that any cooperation was possible, Berlin hoped that negotiations would mitigate 
Agudah attacks. Approaching Agudists in such concerns was a win-win situation, he reasoned, as the blame 
for failure would be on the Agudah. See Meir Berlin to Aharon Barth 17.4.1923, re-printed in Meir Bar-




situation of Jews in Europe grew ever more bleak, did they resume such negotiations. At 
the constituting conference in 1923, Agudah leaders ultimately adopted bylaws limiting 
the rights of party members who were also simultaneously in the Mizrahi or part of 
Gemeindeorthodox communities. The contentious fourth paragraph of the bylaws held 
that members of these institutions would not be allowed to run for leadership positions in 
the Agudah. Its adoption signalized the victory of those who advocated strict separation 
between Zionist activism and non-Zionist Orthodoxy.125   
During the 1920s and 1930s Poland became the most important battleground for 
Agudah-Mizrahi contestations. At the same time the question of cooperation gained 
renewed importance through the growing significance of Jewish settlements in Palestine. 
Increasing Agudah involvement in Palestinian affairs seemed to have the potential of 
bringing the two sides closer together. Declaring themselves the ideological victors, 
Mizrahi politicians saw their chance to settle the struggle for leadership among 
Orthodoxy in their favor. While clearly in the advantage when it came to questions of 
political organization and activism, Mizrahists were still missing the approval of the 
spiritual leaders of Orthodoxy. Any cooperation with Agudat Yisrael would have granted 
them such approval indirectly, if not directly. Agudah leaders, on the other hand, tried to 
gain the upper hand in these struggles by transforming their organization into an 
Orthodox alternative to the ZO. Orthodoxy, their message ran, was laboring to solve the 
pressing social and political issues of European Jewry, and was committed to supporting 
Jewish settlement in Palestine. Modern nationalism and its self-proclaimed leaders, 
however, had to be opposed. Agudists intended to counter Zionist activism through an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
125 “Paragraph 4,” however, stayed controversial, and led to harsh debates on the Second World Congress 




organization that would adopt elements of its ideological enemies, but at the same time 
redefine and reshape these elements and integrate them into the struggle against the ZO. 
“You should understand the nationalization of Orthodoxy […],” Raphael Breuer, the 
brother of Isaac and son of Rabbi Solomon Breuer, commented in 1918 on the Agudah 
postwar project, “as a sort of smallpox vaccination, with the sole aim to immunize the 
easily contaminated youth against the Zionist pestilence.”126 Mizrahi and Agudat Yisrael 
had established themselves as important players in the Jewish arena during the first two 
decades of the twentieth century. Their mutual relations and the tri-partite relationship 
with the ZO would also continue to shape their policies and outlooks throughout the 
interwar period. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  






Formative Competition:  
Orthodox Politics in Interwar Poland 
 
 
After World War One, Poland became the foremost stage for Agudah-Mizrahi 
contestations. The second Polish republic was home to the largest Jewish community in 
the interwar period.1 Many of the most important religious and educational institutions 
were located within Poland, some of the highest spiritual authorities lived in areas that 
after WWI became part of the new nation state. 528, or about 40% of the activists listed 
in the Encyclopedia for Religious Zionism were born in areas that belonged to the Second 
Polish Republic during the interwar period, a far higher number than in any other area. 
What is more, during the interwar period the country provided relatively far-reaching 
political rights to its Jewish citizens, while at the same time being hostile to a social and 
cultural integration of this population. These circumstances turned the Second Republic 
into an important experimental laboratory for modern Jewish politics in general, and a 
crucial place for Orthodox and Zionist contestation. If certainly not a paradise for Jews, 
interwar Poland was “a paradise for modern Jewish politics,” as Ezra Mendelsohn put it.2 
It was in Poland that Jewish leaders could test and develop their political and ideological 
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Joseph Rothschild, East Central Europe Between The Two World Wars (Washington, 1977), 34-36. 




platforms and concepts, and that the struggles for power and authority within the Jewish 
communities played out.3  
Yet at the same time, the politicization of the Jewish masses was one of the most 
challenging tasks of Polish interwar leaders. Representatives of Jewish integration into 
Polish national group formations, Zionists of all shades, Bundists, territorialists, and other 
political activists competed for the hearts and minds of Polish Jewry. But indifference 
among Jews towards the great political ideologies, and strong regional differences 
impeded intentions to create coherent Polish movements.4 Only a minority of Polish Jews 
were committed adherents of specific party ideologies. Many changed their leanings and 
affiliations over time; most were not affiliated at all. In elections, Polish Jews gave their 
votes to varying parties, depending if it were elections on the community or national 
levels.5 Among the youth in particular, ideological and even religious differences played 
a lesser role than our often highly ideologically colored sources would like us to believe.6  
These difficulties have to be taken into account when analyzing the inter-party 
dynamics of Mizrahi and Agudat Yisrael in the Second Polish Republic. Therefore, rather 
than assuming ideological platforms as the driving force in the conflicts between the two 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Idem., “Interwar Poland: Good for the Jews or Bad for the Jews?,” in The Jews in Poland, ed. Chimen 
Abramsky/ Maciej Jachimczyk/ Antony Polonsky (Oxford, 1986), 130-39. 
4 The vast majority of the Jews in Russia and Poland, as Michael Stanislawski put it, “were not politicized 
in the sense of actively belonging to or even identifying with any political party or ideology.” Michael 
Stanislawski, For Whom Do I toil?: Judah Leib Gordon and the Crisis of Russian Jewry (New York, 
1988), 5. The regional differences were so significant, as Mendelsohn already pointed out in 1983, that one 
cannot speak of a single “Polish Jewry.” Ezra Mendelsohn, The Jews of East Central Europe between the 
World Wars (Bloomington, 1983), 17-23.  For the strong regionalism among Mizrahi pioneers and the 
inability to establish national unity, see Asaf Kaniel, “Ha-Mizrahi be-Polin,” 119. This is not to say that 
Polish Jews were not politically interested. Quite the opposite, they were highly politicized through 
informal political activism in the Czarist period and World War One. But such politicization did not 
express itself necessarily in clear ideologies and party affiliations. For the strong politicization of the youth, 
for example, see Kamil Kijek, Świadomość i socjalizacja polityczna ostatniego pokolenia Żydów Polskich 
w II Rzeczypospolitej (PhD dissertation, Polish Academy of Science, Warsaw 2013). 
5 Mendeslohn, On Modern Jewish Politics, 71-2. 




adversaries, in the following chapter I will analyze their mutual struggles on the 
background of the lack of ideological zeal among the Jewish masses. In which ways did 
their competition for the hearts and support of the Jewish traditionalist masses influence 
mutual relations and spur ideological conflicts? In how far did their struggle within the 
Polish-Jewish communities help shaping and refining their political platforms and 
programs?7 To answer these questions, this chapter focuses on the mechanisms of inter-
party struggles on various levels. After a short discussion of the movements’ 
establishment in the Second Republic, the chapter investigates the Orthodox positions in 
debates about the structures of the Jewish communities. It then turns to the question of 
rabbinic authority, which stood in the center of their mutual struggle for leadership and 
authority. Tensions between different types of authorities and inter-party rivalries came to 
the forefront the contest for emigration certificates to Palestine, which are discussed in 
the following section. The chapter concludes with an analysis of the significance of inter-
party polemics and public offers for cooperation.  
The struggle between nationalists and religious elites was not a uniquely Jewish 
phenomenon in interwar Poland. Catholic clergymen, for example, were highly 
suspicious of the nationalizing activities of Polish activists. Similar to the Zionists, Polish 
nationalists accused the clergy of national betrayal and of neglecting the “needs of the 
people.”8 Catholic elites, in turn, entered the political arena and the two elites got 
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with the dominant General Zionist factions were the key issue, and rivalries with the Mizrahi played less of 
a role. Both Joseph Elihai and Asaf Kaniel have looked at the relations between the two Orthodox parties 
“from the point of view of the Mizrahi.” Kaniel explicitly states that he describes these relations “from the 
point of view of the Mizrahi.” Elihai’s contribution comes out of his work on the history of the religious 
Zionist movement in Poland. See Kaniel, “Politiqa Ortodoqsit;” Elichai, “Ha-Imut bein ‘ha-Mizrahi’ le-
vein ‘Agudat Yisra’el,’” 96-117. 
8 This holds especially true in the case of borderlands, such as Upper-Silesia. Here, Polish nationalists 




involved into fierce competition for authority over the masses. In the Polish case, 
scholars highlight the stark differences between pre-modern notions of Polishness and 
modern national formations. They point out that a Polish national consciousness was 
neither widely present among local peasants prior to the nineteenth century, nor was its 
development during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries an inevitable development. 
Recent studies have challenged the idea of strong ethnic bonds even during the first half 
of the twentieth century, and stressed the existence of large groups that were largely 
“nationally unconcerned.”9  
While historians of East European Jewry also acknowledge the novelty of modern 
nationalism, they tend to stress that Jews kept strong ethnic bonds throughout the ages 
and by way of their cultural and religious practices set themselves apart from their 
environments. But Jewish society as well was highly socially stratified, and strong 
regional affiliations and religious differences impeded the aim of nationalist activists to 
foster national group loyalties. Like their Polish counterparts, Jewish nationalists had to 
define their group of reference.10 In addition, Jewish leaders had to cope with fluidity and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 For the coping of Catholics with new forms of political participation and the significance of Polish 
nationalism, see Porter-Szucs, Faith and Fatherland. For the transformation of the early-modern Polish 
nation into modern group formations, see Tomasz Kizwalter, O nowoczesności narodu: Przypadek Polski 
(Warsaw, 1999); Bohdan Cywiński, Rodowody niepokornych (Paris, 1985); Brian Porter, When 
Nationalism Began to Hate: Imagining Modern Politics in Nineteenth Century Poland (New York, 2000); 
Snyder, The Reconstruction of Nations; Andrzej Walicki, The Enlightenment and the Birth of Modern 
Nationhood. Polish Political Thought from Noble Republicanism to Tadeusz Kościuszko (Notre Dame, 
1989); idem., Poland Between East and West. The Controversies over Self-Definition and Modernization in 
Partitioned Poland (Cambridge, 1994). For studies on the ways in which nationalist entrepreneurs 
attempted to spread a national consciousness among local peasants, see Keely Stauter-Halsted, The Nation 
in the Village: The Genesis of Peasant National Identity in Austrian Poland, 1848-1914 (Chapel Hill, NC, 
1997); Patrice M. Dabrowski, Commemorations and the Shaping of Modern Poland (Blomington, 2004). 
For studies on the influence of ‘nationally unconcerned’ groups, see Bjork, Neither German nor Pole. 
10 Jewish nationalists, for example, disagreed among themselves, on which criteria to base the Jewish 
nation. Jewish folklorists and territorialists often advocated for Yiddish as basis of national affiliations, 
while Zionists preferred ethnic criteria. On such reinventing of community, see e.g. David E. Maimon, The 
Rise of Modern Yiddish Culture (Pittsburgh, 2005), 62-82; Isaac Nakhman Gottesman, Defining the Yiddish 




fragility of Jewish group formations. Disaggregating processes among European Jews 
(often derogatively termed “assimilation”) incited not only nationalist activism, but also 
the new Orthodox political formations. If not struggling against “national indifference” in 
the same sense as other European nationalists did, such activists certainly encountered 
indifference towards their new political ideologies and fought the declining of Jewish 
group formations.11   
 
Beginnings 
The organization of Orthodox mass movements in interwar Poland began with the 
German occupation during WWI.12 Both German Zionists and Agudists worked closely 
together with the army administration to build up local party structures. Pinchas Kohn 
and Emmanuel Carlebach, the two Agudah representatives in charge of the newly 
occupied areas, were particular successfully in ensuring German support for their 
movement.13 The German endeavors to organize political life were greeted with local 
support. Even though political organization had been difficult to impossible under the 
Czarist regime, first attempts of non-Zionist Orthodox organization had been made 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Rogers Brubaker, on whose theoretical framework much of the literature on “national indifference” is 
based, coined the term “ethno-entrepreneurs” for nationalist activists. Brubakers argues that group 
formations are not stable and cohesive phenomena, but rather might grow or decline, and urges scholars to 
study declining curves of groupness. Rogers Brubaker, Ethnicity without Groups (Cambridge/London, 
2004), 19. 
12 For the German occupation and its policies towards the multiple ethnic groups in the area, see Aviel 
Roshwald, Ethnic Nationalism and the Fall of Empires: Central Europe, Russia and the Middle East, 1914-
1923 (London/New York, 2001), 116ff. 
13 The role of Kohn and Carlebach for the creation of the Polish Agudah, their influence on statutes of 
Jewish communities under German occupation, and tensions in the German Agudah leadership regarding 
their work, have drawn some scholarly attention. See Alexander Carlebach, “A German Rabbi Goes East,” 
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during the early years of the twentieth century.14 Zionists, as well, had been active in the 
area in various forms. And with the city of Vilna, the founding place of the Mizrahi 
movement became part of the Second Polish Republic.   
The Polish branch of Agudat Yisrael (called at the time “Agudat Ha’ortodoksim”) 
had its first meeting in November 1916. Kohn and Carlebach helped organize the 
conference, and left their imprint in other ways. They assisted, for example, in obtaining 
the license for an own party newspaper. But the Polish Agudah was far from being purely 
a German import, as which it was often denounced by its Zionist opponents.15 It strongly 
built on the institutions and support of the Gerer Hasidim on the one hand, and on the 
organizational work of Rabbi Haim Ozer Grodzinsky, on the other. In addition to the 
fostering of organizational structures, the focus during these years lay on the help for 
refugees and victims of anti-Jewish violence, as well as on the rescue of religious 
institutions affected by the war. From the beginnings, Polish Agudah leaders tried to 
establish their organization as the only accepted representative of Jewish Orthodoxy.  
The success of this project, however, was endangered by the existence of the Mizrahi. 
The local branch of the religious Zionist movement was taking shape during this time 
through discussions about the best ideological and organizational alignments. The harsh 
anti-religious rhetoric of the General Zionist movement at large, and its main Polish 
leader, Isaac Gruenbaum, in particular, increasingly alienated observant activists and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 See Chapter II. 
15 E.g. Di Yudishe Shtime 11.2.1932, 1. In 1920 the Zionist leader Haim Weizman stirred the Agudah’s 
wrath when he claimed that its Polish branch served “German interests.” See letter of Herman Piek to 
International Mizrahi ? 1920, in ARK MO94. The Polish Agudah in many aspects stood in tensions with its 
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leaders.16 In 1919, several General Zionists quit their party and joined the Mizrahi– most 
prominent among them were Isaac Nissenbaum and Joshua Heshel Farbstein.17 Soon after 
joining the religious Zionists, Nissenbaum and Farbstein became key figures within 
Polish-Jewish politics, and on the international stage.18  
The central issue of contestation was the question whether or not Jewish nationalism 
was dependent on religious aspects. General Zionist leaders fiercely denied religion any 
role in the shaping of Zionism and accused the Mizrahi of infiltrating the ZO with 
clericalist elements. Polish Mizrahists, on the other hand, harshly condemned such 
statements.19 Nissenbaum, for example, published several articles, in which he tried to 
distinguish Zionism from other European nationalist movements, and stressed the crucial 
role of religion for Jewish nationalism. “Do we not witness today,” Nissenbaum wrote in 
April 1920, “the destruction of the world through the guilt of the nationalism of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 The General Zionist was formed out of several non-alligned groups in 1922 as the ideological split within 
the ZO between Labor Zionists and Revisionists became more and more pronounced. Over time they came 
to be identified with the liberal European middle class. 
Isaac Gruenbaum (1879-1970) was the eminent leader of Polish Zionism during the 1920s, and a member 
of the Polish Sejm. Gruenbaum moved to Palestine in 1933, and became a member of the Board of 
Directors of the Jewish Agency and the ZO.   
17 In December 1918 the Zionists organized a national council to debate Jewish demands vis-à-vis the 
Polish state. The Agudah, whose inclusion in the invitation was anyway contested, rejected to participate. 
On the conference, harsh conflicts broke out between Gruenbaum and Joshua Thon on the one side, and 
Mizrahi leaders on the other. Gruenbaum and Thon denied religion any significance for the structures and 
institutions of Jewish life in Poland, and wanted the conference to merely stress the national foundations of 
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guarantees of religious needs. Agudists, however, interpreted the compromise as backing down of the 
Mizrahi, and abolishing of the religious foundations of Jewish group formations. See Mendelsohn, Zionism 
in Poland, 91f; Elihai, Tenu‘at ha-Mizrahi be-Polin, 58-62. 
18 Isaac Nissenbaum (1868-1942) was a rabbi and Zionist leader. Early on, he got involved in the Hovevei 
Zion movement and later a committed Zionist. After joining the Mizrahi, he became one of its most 
prominent leaders, and in 1937 the president of the Polish branch. He was murdered in the Warsaw Ghetto. 
Joshua Heshel Farbstein (1870-1948) also was involved both in Hovevei Zion and early Zionist activities. 
In the interwar period he became the president of the Polish Mizrahi, a deputy of the Polish Sejm, and 
served as chairman of the Warsaw Jewish community between 1926 and 1931. In 1931 he immigrated to 
Palestine, where he served on the executive of the Jewish Agency, as chairman of the Mizrahi Bank, and 
president of the Jewish community in Jerusalem. On Nissenbaum see Yisra’el Shapiro, Ha-Rav Nisenboim: 
Hayyiav u-Fe‘olo. Li-Mele’at Me’ah Shanah le-Huladeto (Jerusalem, 1969). 




supposedly free, whose building is founded upon an uprooting that brings ruin, 
destruction, and a deluge of fire and blood to the world? We, the people of the book, 
cannot and do not want to live according to a nationalism like this, one of whose basics 
is: to build on the destruction of others [...]”20  
Simultaneously, the party debated its position within the camp of traditionalist Jewry, 
and its relations to non-Zionist Orthodoxy.21 The movement’s rhetoric of embodying 
Judaism in its full meaning through the perfect synthesis of Zionism and Orthodoxy 
could hardly disguise inner tensions and frictions about ideological platforms and 
political alignments. Some of its leaders wanted the party to leave the Zionist 
Organization and to work together with Agudat Yisrael. Attempts to unite Orthodox 
leaders in one movement failed, however, and the proponents of cooperation were soon 
outvoted. From then on Mizrahists clearly aligned themselves with the General Zionist 
movement.22 Agudah insistence on a strict detachment of religious Zionists from the ZO 
as precondition for any cooperation between the two parties helped further solidifying the 
boundaries and differences between the two. 23  After Mizrahists and Agudists had 
established themselves as major players on the stage of Polish-Jewish politics in the early 
1920s, attempts of mediation and rapprochement ceased.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Ha-Mizrahi, 15.4.1920, 2-3. For similar statements by other Polish Mizrahi leaders, see e.g. Shimon 
Federbush, Shlemut ha-Yahadut (Jerusalem, 1921). 
21 Ibid. 6, 23.1.1919, 3-5. The main discussions on these topics took place on the first two congresses in 
Warsaw. See Ha-Tzefira 12.7.1917, 14-16; 1.5.1919, 13. For these discussion see also Elihai, Tenu‘at ha-
Mizrahi be-Polin, 48-58; idem., “Ha-Imut bein ‘ha-Mizrahi’ le-vein ‘Agudat Yisra’el,’” 111-117. To 
Elihai, however, these discussions are proof for the great ideological differences between the two parties 
that existed from the beginning and later prevented any cooperation. In contrast, I see these discussions as 
part of the processes of shaping and honing ideological platforms by distinguishing each other from their 
main opponent within the Orthodox field. 
22 See also Mendelssohn, Zionism in Poland, 58. 




In the early postwar period Mizrahists made much progress in organizing their 
movement in different parts of the newly established state.24 Documenting such efforts, 
the party newspaper Ha-Mizrahi published a large number of short reports about the 
founding of local branches of the movement all over Poland during 1918-1919.25 Beyond 
informational purposes, the accounts served an exemplary function to promote the 
establishment of additional branches. In a similar vain, several years later the Yudishe 
Shtime praised the most outstanding Mizrahi branch in the small town of Kosów in 
central Poland, and published its bylaws as instruction for local activists on how to found 
their own party offices.26 Accordingly, the reports paint an overwhelmingly positive 
picture.  
Despite their ideological outlook, however, they grant a glimpse into the early days of 
postwar religious Zionist activism beyond the centers. While many of these stories report 
a positive response of local rabbinic figures, in most cases the initiative seems to have 
come from lay people. In a great number of cases, local branches were established during 
or after the visit of one of the regional or national Mizrahi leaders. These leaders made 
strong use of religious infrastructure to promote their cause. They spoke in local 
synagogues and study halls, and “did not miss any holiday or event to arouse Jews for the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 For details on the regional strength of the movement see Kaniel, Yomra u-Ma‘as, 31-63. For its general 
organizing efforts in Poland, see also Wojciech Jaworski, Struktura i wpływy syjonistycznych organizacji 
politycznych w Polsce w latach 1918-1939 (Warsaw, 1996), 291-99. See also the information and 
documents on early activities in YIVO Archives, RG 28.  
25 A compilation of these articles under the title “chronicle” can be found in the Archives for the Research 
of Religious Zionism at Bar-Ilan University (following: AIRRZ) 007–199 II. In addition, the Polish 
Mizrahi published several brochures during the early years, in which party leaders tried to publicize the 
idea of the movement, and different aspects of its program. See e.g. Der Mizrahi (Warsaw, 1919); Tsi zenen 
yidn a folk? Tsi darfn yidn a land? (Warsaw, 1917); Vi azoy broykht organisirt vern undzer shulvezn? 
(Warsaw, 1919); Yehuda Leib Zlotnick, Program-redes (Warsaw, 1919); Idem., Unzere flikhten (Warsaw, 
1917); Unzer kehille program (Krakow, 1919). 




ideas of their movement.”27 Once established, these branches got involved in local 
politics. An important part of their work was on the educational plane. In several cases 
the articles report on the establishment of Mizrahi heders, and on local activists initiating 
classes on various religious and secular subjects. In addition, activists started fundraising 
for the benefit of their movement, and for Zionist settlement in Palestine.  
With their educational efforts as well as fundraising activities, they frequently ran 
into opposition from religious “extremists” (sometimes the rabbinic authority itself), and 
local branches of Shlomei Emunei Yisrael, the Polish offshoot of Agudat Yisrael.28 
Funding issues, in fact, seem to have been the most common occasions for clashes 
between the two groups. With their attempts to collect money for settlement in Palestine 
(Rabbi Akiva Fund), Mizrahi activists entered competition with traditional fund raising 
efforts for religious institutions in the holy land. Furthermore, local Mizrahi and Agudah 
adherents competed for education funds from the United States. Agudah leaders 
repeatedly attempted to prevent the distribution of such funds to Mizrahi institutions, but 
without much success - at least if we are to believe the reports in the religious Zionist 
press. Fundraising was of importance far beyond its mere financial aspects. While 
building on traditional notions of a Jewish “culture of giving,” philanthropy and 
fundraising became strongly politicized during the nineteenth century, and in the 
nationalist context often assumed proto-state functions.29 In addition, fundraising played 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 As in the case of the Galician town Busk, Chronicle, 5, in AIRRZ 007-199 II. 
28 The party was officially founded in 1916 as “Agudat Haortodoksim,” but renamed to “Shlomey Emuney 
Yisrael” in 1918. In the newspapers of the interwar period, the names Shlomey Emuney Yisrael, or simply 
Shelumim, and Agudat Yisrael were used interchangeably. See Referat Wydzialu Narodowościowego 
MSW pt. “Żydowskie ugrupowanie w Polsce w dniu 1 maja 1927,” in AAN MSW I/1062. 
29 Wolff, Neue Welten, 499; Samuel Halperin, “Ideology or Philanthropy? The Politics of Zionist Fund-
Raising,” The Western Political Quarterly (1960): 950–973; Derek Penslar, Shylock’s Children: Economic 




an important role in creating and fostering attachments to socialist and nationalist 
projects.30 In this sense, the fundraising activities of local Mizrahi branches fostered 
processes of politicization and nationalization of Polish Jewry.  
Many of the articles in the Mizrahi press hint at these processes. “Until 1918,” the 
report about the north-eastern Polish town Ostrołęka among others states, “the religious 
community was not attentive to the questions of the time. But during the period under 
discussion, a change occurred and many started to get interested in what is going on.”31 
While the accounts depict these as rather intangible changes in the general atmosphere, 
the very foundation of local Mizrahi branches stimulated such processes. The war and 
concurrent upheavals had created fertile ground for an increased interest in political and 
social questions, but activists had to provide meaning and solutions for the grievances of 
the time in order to translate them into political commitment. Encouraged by emissaries 
from the centers of Polish-Jewish life, locals began to get involved in different forms of 
activism.  
This activism encountered support among some, and met with the opposition of 
others. Importantly, the resistance described in these articles emanated exclusively from 
conservative religious circles, and in particular from figures associated with Agudat 
Yisrael. This indicates the mutual significance of the two movements, as political and 
socio-economic initiative of one spurred the resistance of the other. These battles were 
carried out in part via traditional means, such as bans, but also included new forms of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
relationship between voluntary charity activities and the state, see Geoffrey Finlayson, Citizen, State and 
Social Welfare in Britain 1830-1990 (Oxford, 1994). See also the essays collected in Peter Mandler, The 
Use of Charity. The Poor on Relief in the Nineteenth-Century Metropolis (Philadephia, 1990). 
30 As recent scholarship argues. See Dan Lainer-Vos, Sinews of the Nation. Constructing Irish and Zionist 
Bonds in the United States (Cambridge, 2013), 1-17; Wolff, Neue Welten, 491-540. 




activism and at times the involvement of gentiles, and state institutions. In the southern-
central Polish town of Nowy Korczyn, for example, some Agudah adherents tried to 
prevent a Mizrahi emissary from visiting their town in 1919 by denouncing him before 
the local army commander as Bolshevist propagandist.32   
No comparable articles appeared in the Agudah press of these years. This is 
unfortunate, but testifies to the ambivalent attitude of the movement towards such 
activism. Some information about the foundation of local Agudah branches can be found 
in community memorial books (Yizkor Books), mostly created after World War II to 
commemorate the lost world. These books are not less problematic a source than reports 
in the Mizrahi press, as they were often written by persons who themselves had been 
involved in local politics, and in most cases decades after the events. Nevertheless, we 
can derive some basic information from these memory books. Gershon Bacon uses these 
reports to demonstrate the close connection between Agudah activities and local Gerer 
Hasids.33  
The Agudah, similar to the Mizrahi, took advantage of local religious infrastructure. 
Emissaries spoke in study halls and synagogues, and set up party headquarters in hasidic 
prayer houses. In contrast to the Mizrahi, however, the initiative seems to have come 
mostly from religious dignitaries. In Kotsk, for example, the local rabbi signed up as 
member of Agudat Yisrael, and only thereafter “all Gerer Hasids joined.”34 The Gerer 
Rebbe himself, in fact, was involved in these activities, as various letters demonstrate, in 
which he communicated with confidants about issues concerning the advertising of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Ibid., 27, in ibid. 007-199 II. 
33 Bacon, Politics of Tradition, 74. 




Agudat Yisrael in different places.35  In addition, the Agudah newspaper Der Yud 
published in the early 1920s several reports about services that the party helped providing 
for local communities. Supporting religious institutions such as heders and yeshivot, 
sustaining ritual baths, and collecting funds for victims of pogroms and rabbis, as Bacon 
argues, allowed the Agudah to align itself with traditional patterns of community work 
and helped attenuating the revolutionary idea of a political orthodox movement.36  
In our context, it is worth adding that fundraising and philanthropy played important 
roles in the fostering of group attachments, as already mentioned. What is more, these 
institutions advanced philanthropical conceptions of social welfare, as opposed to activist 
approaches based on modern ideas of social justice and civil society that many nationalist 
movements promoted. As such, they supported hierarchical structures of Jewish society.37 
In addition, being in charge of public means, such as the traditional interest-free loan 
funds (Kupat Gemilut Hasadim), ensured the party its political power. Scholars interested 
in social welfare policies, in fact, have pointed out the significance of charity institutions 
for the struggle between different elites for prestige and influence.38 Similarly, Polish-
Jewish activists got into harsh struggles with established elites over social welfare 
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36 Bacon, Politics of Tradition, 75-76. 
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created different results. The adoption of the Zionist “Shekel,” for example, fostered very different group 
affiliations and understandings of the structure of Jewish society. For the Agudah imitation of Zionist 
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38 Sandra Cavallo, for example, has ascribed the reform of hospitals in eighteenth-century Turin to a 
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policies. Lastly, the Agudah systematically worked to bring voluntarily associations, such 
as “Shomer Shabbat” organizations under its control, in order to absorb this activism.39 
Social and economic inequality, and severe poverty were the foremost problems of 
many Polish Jews. 40  Mizrahi and Agudah leaders articulated and formulated the 
grievances of observant Jews living in the different regions of the newly founded Polish 
state, and offered solutions they deemed fit to solve these problems. Both movements 
tried to get the observant parts of Polish Jewry involved in their respective causes. 
Community elections and battles for distinct causes were opportunities to raise these 
issues to public awareness, and unite Orthodox Jewry behind their movements. By way 
of example, in 1919 Isaac Nissenbaum called on Mizrahists to use the struggle against 
compulsory Sunday rest in Poland as an opportunity to nationalize the Jewish masses.41 
As early as 1916 Pinchas Kohn victoriously proclaimed to the German authorities that he 
alone had successfully politicized the Jewish conservative masses.42 It is true that both 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Observed also by Aleks Jonish in his leaflet, Aleks. H. Jonish, Żydzi w Polsce (Warsaw,1930), 42, in 
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various towns in the area of Lublin, Archiwum Państwowe w Lublinie (following: APL) 35/403/0/468. 
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41 Ha-Mizrahi 26.11.1919, 1-2. 
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sense.” Unsurprisingly, this statement stirred the anger of the Zionists, as did most of Kohn’s activities in 
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Jewish masses would not cause trouble to the German war aims by stirring up Polish ire. He continued by 
pointing out that for the Jewish masses the most important issue was the religious question. This issue, 
Kohn argued, was the easiest one for the German administration to solve. For parts of the memorandum see 
Familienblatt 21.12.1917, 1-2. For critique see Jeschurun 1-2 (January 1918), 1-31; 2-3 (March 1918), 
133-173; 5-6 (May 1918), 257-88; 8-9 (July 1918), 437-75. He himself found it still in 1936 necessary to 
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movements made strong progress during the late war and early postwar years, founding a 
great number of local branches.43 Kohn’s statement, however, seems vastly exaggerated. 
 The question of how to get the masses involved in their political struggles continued 
to be one of the major concerns of both movements during the interwar period. 
Indifference among the observant masses to party platforms, and consequently 
difficulties in winning over Orthodox Jews to their ideological causes kept haunting both 
organizations. These difficulties were regularly stressed in Polish government reports. 
Polish authorities, afraid of insurgencies and political unrest among the Polish citizens 
not considered to be ethnic Poles, carefully monitored activities of political parties and 
movements. “The Institute for the Research on Nationality Affairs,” a research institution 
of the Polish administration quarterly issued secret reports to the government. 
Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, these reports time and again point at the difficulties of 
Agudat Yisrael in particular in mobilizing potential adherents. “The aspiration of the 
Agudah in Poland at the current moment is to activate the religious Jewish masses and to 
deepen its political influences among the whole of Jewish Orthodoxy,” a report from 
1931 stated and immediately stressed the overwhelming difficulties that the party 
encountered in this endeavor.44 Despite the pro-Zionist atmosphere among Polish Jews 
and strong successes within the Zionist movement in the early 1920s, the Mizrahi was 
even further from winning over the majority of hearts to its cause. The goal to politicize 
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the Jewish masses and to fight their indifference for politics and ideology constituted a 
crucial part of the two movements’ mutual struggle. Educational initiatives, fundraising 
activities, and mutual clashes were important mechanisms that helped promoting such 
agendas.  
The aim to gain the support of Orthodox Jews for their respective cause was the 
central driving force behind the harsh struggles between Agudat Yisrael and Mizrahi in 
the Second Polish Republic. The stakes were high, and the mutual struggle harsh and 
often unconciliatory. But in the early postwar years, ideological positions and formations 
were still greatly in flux. While international movement leaders debated mutual 
cooperation, Polish party activists tried to position themselves and their organizations in 
the emerging political system of the young state. Both sides witnessed debates about 
ideological outlooks and the question whether and to what extent cooperation with other 
Jewish parties in general, and their main Orthodox opponent in particular was possible. 
Throughout the 1920s positions slowly crystalized and became more pronounced through 
the political struggle and debates about leadership in the Jewish communities.  
In the early 1920s Mizrahists turned into an important force within Polish Zionism 
(with up to 40% of the shekel payers), and with the Palestine enthusiasm on the Polish 
street could hope to develop and increase their rather meager results in many kehillah 
elections.45 The problems and confinements of Zionist politics in the late 1920s and early 
30s, however, ruined such dreams. The Agudah, on the other hand, made a respectable 
showing in the 1919 elections in Congress Poland, and was able to at least partially 
capitalize on Zionist debacles in the late 1920s. But it did not succeed in overriding the 
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Orthodox-Zionist stalemate in Jewish kehillot. When the Bund finally decided to compete 
in kehillah elections in 1936, the Jewish socialists became another important force on this 
field.46 What is more, some hasidic courts in strife with the Gerer Rebbe founded their 
own political parties and challenged Agudist claims of representing non-Zionist 
Orthodoxy. Still, Agudat Yisrael could establish itself as the strongest and most 
influential Orthodox party in interwar Poland. Mizrahists were not able to gain equal 
standing, neither on the political field, nor among Polish rabbis. But this did not render 
them insignificant. As Orthodox-Zionist party, they posed a severe challenge. They put 
into question Agudah depictions of a clear divide between Orthodoxy and Zionism. What 
is more, Mizrahists opened ways for observant Jews to participate in nationalist activism, 
and extended Orthodox-Zionist struggles to the field of rabbinic positions and religious 
education. Their youth organizations became dangerous competitors to their Agudah 
counterparts and forced the latter to deal more actively with questions of emigration and 
settlement in Palestine, particularly in the 1930s.47 
 
Between Religious Structures and Modern Institutions –  
The Struggle for the Kehillah 
During the immediate postwar years, when the Second Republic was taking shape as 
one of the new members of the emerging European nation state system, Mizrahists, 
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together with their secularist fellows in the ZO, demanded that Jews be granted special 
group rights. The idea of special group rights based on ethnic belongings, subsumed 
under the label ‘national-cultural autonomy,’ had been formulated first by the two 
Austro-Marxists Karl Renner and Otto Bauer at the turn of the century, then adopted and 
developed by the Bund, and was eventually also taken up by different Zionist parties.48 
Participants of the peace conference in Versailles discussed such concepts fiercely. 
Poland, together with other newly established states, was obliged to grant certain group 
rights to its ethnic minorities.49 Requests for ‘national autonomy’ in Poland ranged from 
demands to establish Jewish schools and education, to the use of Jewish languages, the 
promotion of Jewish culture, and the right to politically organize along national-cultural 
lines.  
Agudists struggled for Jewish group rights as well but displayed much more 
ambivalent attitudes towards claims for national autonomy. In this context the question 
whether the Jews formed a religious or a national group had less to do with the essential 
character of Jewish group formations, but primarily with the labeling of demands towards 
the state. Often boisterously reprimanding Zionists for their aggressive promotion of 
national rights, much of what Agudists demanded nevertheless fell along similar lines. 
Some in the top Agudah leadership, in fact, did not categorically dismiss claims for 
national autonomy. Jacob Rosenheim, in an article from 1918, grappled with the question 
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the Bund, see Roni Gechtman, “Conceptualizing National-Cultural Autonomy: “From the Austro-Marxists 
to the Jewish Labor Bund,”” Jahrbuch des Simon-Dubnow Instituts 4 (2005): 17-49. About the demands of 
Polish Zionists for national autonomy, see Mendelsohn, Zionism in Poland, 32f. 
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of Orthodoxy’s attitude towards such questions. He insisted that neither the definition of 
Jews as religious nor as national group would do justice to the character of their group 
formations. But in the current situation, Rosenheim insisted, European Jews had to deal 
with imperfect realities, and therefore should decide pragmatically. In Lithuania and the 
Ukraine, he held, demanding rights under the heading “national autonomy” was a viable 
option. In Poland, in contrast, the “delirium of […] national unity” was too 
overwhelming. Forcing Jewish national autonomy onto the Poles with the help of 
international pressure, he warned, could only harm the Jews and breed desire for 
vengeance. Therefore, he suggested that in the Polish case Jews should opt to demand 
religious rights, complemented with claims for an autonomous educational system and 
social institutions.50 Resolutions adopted by the Agudah conference in Zurich in 1919 
that laid down the organization’s basic demands to the peace conference in Versailles 
widely followed this line.51  
In the young Polish state, the debate concerning these issues displayed many 
similarities. In contrast to General Zionists, Bundists, and Folkists, who denied religious 
affiliations any significance, both Mizrahi and Agudah leaders agreed that Judaism could 
not be accurately captured by characterizing it either as religion or as nationality. 
Judaism, they typically held, encompassed both elements. “Judaism comprises what is 
normally referred to as religion, but it is an indefinitely broader concept than that,” Jacob 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 Jacob Rosenheim, “Die nationale Autonomie und das gesetzestreue Judentum (März 1918),” in idem., 
Ohalei Yaakov. Ausgewählte Aufsätze und Ansprachen vol. II (Frankfurt a. M., 1930), 125-139. 
51 Interestingly enough, Rosenheim noted in the general discussion about these resolutions that Agudat 
Yisrael would be willing to demand national autonomy for Polish Jewry, if the Polish Landmannschaft 
wanted this. Rosenheim’sessay and statements defy the depiction of the German Agudah as insisting on 




Rosenheim stated in the previously mentioned article. “Israel is a people, not merely a 
religious denomination.”52  
Yet the critical question was, under which label Polish Jews could receive the group 
rights they demanded. While Agudists labeled their demands as “religious rights,” 
Mizrahi politicians held this to be insufficient. Much of what Orthodox Jewry demanded, 
they argued, such as the right for Jewish schools, could simply not be contained in the 
term “religious rights.” Non-Jews, the national Polish Mizrahi conference in 1919 
postulated, would be unable to understand that Judaism was not comparable to 
Catholicism in this respect. Thus, labeling Jews as religious or linguistic minority would 
not help advancing the full scale of their claims. “We have religious and linguistic 
rights,” Isaac Nissenbaum wrote a few months later in Ha-Mizrahi, “but we need national 
ones.” Otherwise, he feared, the ethnic aspects of Judaism were doomed to degenerate.53 
Polish Jews had to unite in one national unit in order to obtain the whole range of 
demanded rights. To this aim, Mizrahists proclaimed, they should establish a national 
Jewish committee. “The Poles,” Nissenbaum concluded, “must first acknowledge us as 
people (am), then we can arrange our inner affairs independently.”54 These discussions, 
of course, were not limited to the religious leaders, but occupied all Jewish parties. The 
struggle to achieve support for Jewish schools and Yiddish and Hebrew cultural 
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arguments, claiming that only nations could demand full rights in the international arena, Dos Yudishe Lebn 
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institutions as assured by Polish authorities in Versailles, for example, continued to be a 
major issue for Jewish activists of all shades throughout the interwar period.55  
Many of these debates focused on the question of the best label for group demands 
towards the non-Jewish environment. In this sense, they reflected the problem of adapting 
Jewish group formations to changing societal realities, in which modern state institutions 
developed that despite their secular character were strongly influenced by Christian 
concepts and structures.56 Not less important, nonetheless, was a second layer of the 
debate, revealing itself first and foremost on the level of local Jewish community 
structures. Here, questions about outlook and composition of the kehillah were at the 
center of many debates. The local Jewish community structures were the most important 
arenas for the political competition between the different Jewish parties.57 
Processes of secularization and of modern state formation constituted the background 
to such struggles. The Jewish kehillah had suffered severe curtailing throughout the 
nineteenth century. This was true for Jewish communities in Germany, and the Habsburg 
Empire, but especially for the Jews living in Czarist Russia. Here, the Jewish kehillah had 
been officially abolished in 1844.58 This development led to great problems regarding the 
maintenance of communal structures and authority, and left the Jewish community 
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56 See Introduction. 
57 For comprehensive works on the two most important Polish-Jewish kehillot, Warsaw and Lodz, see 
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without an institution legally recognized by the authorities. In many cases ad-hoc 
solutions developed that gradually turned into permanent structures. When the Second 
Republic emerged, the question of status and scope of Jewish community structures 
arose. What functions should the Jewish community fulfill? Should the kehillah 
constitute a religious or a national institution? In communities like Warsaw and Lodz a 
coalition of assimilationists and some wealthy hasidic leaders governed the Jewish 
kehillot until 1914.59 The early Zionist movement, opposed to their regime, proclaimed 
its aim to “conquer” the Jewish communities (kibush ha’kehillot) and to transform those 
into a nucleus for modern nation building. The Agudah, in contrast, fought against the 
erosion of traditional structures and spiritual authority, and promoted a strongly religious 
outlook of the communities.  
Mizrahists, according to their Orthodox Zionist ideology, called for national-religious 
kehillot. But the notion of national-religious community, and the question of how it 
differed from other models, stayed cloudy. The Mizrahi platform, as Robert Moses 
Shapiro has argued, strongly resembled the one of General Zionists.60 In practice, it 
seems, Mizrahi politicians alternatively stressed the religious or the national aspect of 
Jewish communities, depending on the particular context. Vis-à-vis the state, as has 
become clear in the debate about national autonomy, Mizrahists emphasized the national 
outlook of Jewish communities. This holds especially true for the early years of the 
Second Polish Republic. German authorities, when establishing a Polish protectorate 
during the war years, had created official Jewish communities, and defined them mainly 
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as religious and charitable institutions. In 1919, the government of Joseph Pilsudski 
introduced new regulations for the kehillah. The new decree strongly resembled its 
German forerunner, but extended the area of application to all kehillot in former 
Congress Poland.61 Mizrahists, responding to these processes, vociferously advocated 
that the kehillot be defined on a national basis and demanded that these be assigned as 
expansive a function as possible. At the same time, however, Mizrahists held that one of 
the central functions of Polish kehillot was to strengthen religious structures and 
institutions, especially when debating with secularist Zionists. “The Jewish kehillah is 
obligated to take care of the religious, cultural, and economic needs of its members,” Ha-
Mizrahi announced on its title page in 1924.62 Such statements differed according to the 
context, but were also an expression of diverging opinions within the Mizrahi itself.  
In their day-to-day struggle Mizrahists shaped much of their outlook through political 
contest, and in particular through their competition with Agudah leaders. On party 
conventions and during election periods, Mizrahists elaborated on their concept of the 
national-religious community and its responsibilities. The picture that emerges when 
reading through political speeches and newspaper articles is not so one of elaborate 
ideological debate, but rather one of the grappling with the question of the function of the 
kehillah in a modern nation state. To be sure, these reports reveal a highly ideological 
language and time and again stress the paramount importance of the religious Zionist 
weltanschauung. One of the significant differences between Agudah perceptions of the 
kehillah and Mizrahists, was the latter’s embracing of cooperation with secularist parties. 
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While Polish Agudists rarely agitated for the formation of separate Jewish communities 
as embodied by southern German Orthodoxy, they nevertheless intended to protect their 
institutions and communities through strict separation from the secularists.  
At stake in their discussions were predominantly questions of community structures 
and issues of organization and leadership. Mizrahist tried to strike a balance between 
their secularist fellows on the one hand, who attacked any religious function and 
authority, and non-Zionist Orthodoxy on the other, who strongly resisted the introduction 
of modern secular elements into the kehillah regime. The kehillah, as Rabbi Isaac Yehuda 
Trunk put it in 1919, should neither be a profane nor an exclusively religious institution, 
but had “to be built on Torah and nation.”63 What he meant by this was that the Mizrahi 
should support religious institutions and education on the one hand, and foster processes 
of modernization and professionalization on the other.64 The state, Mizrahists postulated, 
had to stop interfering so strongly in Jewish internal affairs. The kehillot should be 
allotted direct taxes and given wide-ranging rights and duties. Religious Zionists stressed 
the need for centralization, and demanded that all religious services, such as kosher 
slaughtering, and facilities, such as synagogues and study houses, be placed under the 
control of the kehillah. They sought to replace traditional institutions of charity (tzedaka) 
with modern social welfare. Help for the poor and the sick, they demanded, was to be 
professionalized and based on strict criteria regarding the allocation of funds, rather than 
depend on philanthropic generosity. The communities were “only to support elderly, and 
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sick people, and children, and not become the fulcrum of lazy people and schnorrers.”65 
The kehillah, they demanded, should be in charge of Jewish education and maintain 
schools. Finally, the communities were to help emigrants and fund Jewish settlement in 
Palestine.66 Mizrahists would have liked to see the kehillot as national substructures, and 
less as local and decentralized representative bodies. Polish authorities, however, did not 
allow for a national organization of the kehillot.  
In some instances, Mizrahi thinkers looked back on early modern community 
structures with a certain inclination for romanticization. Such depictions of early modern 
structures appeared generally in articles in which Mizrahists set out to defend the 
religious aspects of Jewish communities against their assault by secularist movements. In 
this context, Mizrahists juxtaposed the commitment of former leaders, who saw in their 
community service “one of the most praiseworthy religious duties,” with the cool 
bureaucratic approach of many present day clerks.67 In addition, the Council of the Four 
Lands, a supra-regional community structure that had existed in the Polish-Lithuanian 
Commonwealth between 1580 and 1764, was invoked to pit early-modern tolerance 
against contemporary Polish authorities that denied the Jews the central organization of 
their kehillot. Yet in general Mizrahists did not aim to reproduce early modern models, 
but instead promoted the adoption of centralized and democratic structures. Often, they 
attacked traditional institutions and leadership forms as ineffective and not appropriate 
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for coping with the challenges of the new era. Their aim was to integrate religious values 
and structures into modern frameworks.  
Mizrahi and Agudah politicians in many cases did not display drastic differences in 
their ideas regarding the range of community activities.68 Their main disagreements lay in 
the question of how these tasks should be handled, and who the appropriate leaders of the 
community were. Mizrahi politicians regularly accused Agudists of a lack of professional 
conduct. Once the latter governed a kehillah, Mizrahists declared, they transformed it into 
a party-affiliated study house (kloys-miflagti). 69  Since both movements represented 
Orthodox Jewry, Mizrahists claimed there to be real chances for agreements on scope and 
function of the communities. Agudah leaders, however, only cared for their own personal 
interests, and intended to appoint their own kin as rabbis, ritual slaughterers, and to other 
religious positions. “In elections they do not care for ideas, but only for posts, […] 
therefore we do not have a common language.70” Such statements can be explained to 
some extend as the denunciation of political opponents during election campaigns. Yet 
concealed under the election bluster lay genuine differences about hierarchies and 
leadership issues within Jewish communities.  
Non-Zionist Orthodoxy looked at plans for the centralization and democratization of 
kehillot with great reservation. On the pages of the Agudah newspaper Der Yud, Rabbi 
Grodzinski from Vilna proclaimed in 1919 that it was not the task of the kehillah “to 
create new [structures], but to put traditional religious affairs in order.” Rabbi Grodzinski 
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was troubled by very similar issues as the leaders of the Mizrahi. In his vision, the Jewish 
community could succeed in reestablishing basic religious institutions and services by 
introducing membership fees.71 Agudah leaders often opposed centralization, as in the 
instance of kosher slaughtering.72 In other cases they supported such processes, albeit in a 
different form than their nationalist opponents. Agudists, for example, also lamented the 
abuse of charity institutions by shnorrers and “professional beggars,” and praised early 
modern community leaders for their devotion and commitment. In their platform from 
1918, they demanded that all charity institutions be centralized within the kehillah. The 
community had to subsidize these facilities. Yet, in contrast to the Mizrahi one, their 
platform did not speak about kehillah “control” over philanthropic structures. This, 
indeed, would have brought traditionalist charity institutions under the supervision of 
community leaders elected by the general public.73 
 In 1920 Meshulem Kaminer74 suggested centralizing charity by taking advantage of 
religious infrastructures. To this purpose, he recommended collecting money in 
synagogues and forwarding it to a central charity office. This office would also gather 
donations and funds from abroad. But instead of distributing it directly to the poor, the 
money would be divided in a fair manner and be returned to the synagogues. The latter, 
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then, would provide for the needy. The main advantage of this system, Kaminer claimed, 
was the intimate atmosphere of the synagogues. Because of the personal contact, local 
communities would know well who was in need of charity and thus could prevent the 
misuse of such funds.75 Kaminer’s suggestion is notable because it puts forward the need 
for an effective and centralized system of social welfare. Yet in contrast to nationalist 
solutions, Kaminer’s suggestion tried to achieve this goal relying solely on religious 
structures. He based his argument on the aspect of familiarity among synagogue 
members, but his suggestion had an additional aspect: it entrenched social welfare in the 
religious sphere. Kaminer did not spell out what would happen with non-observant 
paupers, but it is likely that this kind of system would favor congregation members. It 
would reinforce the significance of prayer houses as social centers of the community and 
raise the power and influence of their authorities. At the same time, it would undermine 
the influence of secular movements but also of religious Zionists, whose claim for 
leadership rested on their social activism.  
Kaminer’s initiative seems to have met with some approval among Orthodox Jewish 
leaders. About a month after he had published his thoughts in the party press, Agudat 
Yisrael leaders organized a meeting of synagogue representatives in Warsaw. According 
to Der Yud, about 200 delegates from 150 synagogues took part in the event. Many rabbis 
and non-affiliated leaders also joined the meeting. In addition, representatives of 
American Jewish relief organizations attended, and even the distinguished Mizrahi leader 
Meir Berlin made an appearance - if only briefly. Kaminer presented his initiative to the 
attendees. According to the report his proposition was well received, not only by the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




locals but also by American representatives.76 The article does not give any background 
information about Berlin’s appearance, but it seems that Kaminer’s initiative has to be 
seen in the context of negotiations taking place during this period between different 
Orthodox leaders about the distribution of American relief funds. Two weeks earlier Der 
Yud had published a short notice informing its readers that Berlin and his fellow 
American Mizrahi leader Baruch Epstein had met with the Gerer Rebbe to obtain the 
Rebbe’s support for the founding of an American relief committee for Eastern European 
Torah institutions (Ezrat Torah). The Gerer Rebe had rejected such plans. He preferred 
that the money be channeled to the many already existing institutions instead. Orthodox 
facilities, he added, had to be careful of external influences.77  
His comment reflects the ambiguity with which Eastern European leaders perceived 
transatlantic philanthropic endeavors. Funds from abroad were urgently needed. Such 
funding, however, challenged existing authority structures by bringing new players into 
the game.78 His rejection of “external influences” indicated a general opposition to 
American Jewish influence on these institutions. Polish leaders from both Mizrahi and 
Agudah occasionally complained about what they perceived as interference of outsiders, 
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77 Ibid. 22.2.1920, 2. The leaders of Agudat Yisrael normally preferred to hold such negotiations behind 
closed doors, and to not inform the press. The publication of this note indicates a heightened need to 
explain their position on these matters and unwillingness to cooperate with Mizrahi politicians.  
78 Philanthropy from abroad helped much to sustain Jewish life in Eastern Europe already during the 
nineteenth century. The transnational influences of these endeavors are just beginning to be investigated. 
During the interwar period, the American relief organization Joint Distribution Committee (JDC) invested 
75 million dollars to reconstruct Poland’s Jewish welfare system. See Rebecca Kobrin, “The Politics of 
Philanthropy: Migration, Emigration, and the Transformation of Jewish Communal Governance in 
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that is non-Polish Jews, into their inner affairs.79 But there was an additional component 
to the Rebbe’s rejection. Already during the war years, Meir Berlin and other leaders had 
established a Mizrahi presence in the United States. In the interwar period, they worked 
to increase the influence of their organization in America. Agudah leaders undertook 
occasional fundraising trips there, but without major successes. Influenced by 
traditionalist skepticism towards secularizing and spiritually contaminating influences of 
the “trefe medine” (literally: non-kosher state), they neglected for a long time to establish 
their organization in the Jewish community that became more and more influential, not 
only in terms of funding.80 The Gerer Rebbe, thus, was certainly also afraid of the 
Mizrahi involvement in channeling American money. Rivalries for funding, as we have 
seen, played a major role in the struggle between the two movements. Agudah leaders 
occupied many of the traditional philanthropic institutions. 81  The creation of new 
institutions endangered their power and influence.    
While often framed in ideological terms, many of the struggles concerned issues of 
political and social organization and structure. Even the question of community funding 
for Zionist institutions and emigration efforts, an issue apparently lying at the core of the 
ideological clashes of the two movements, has to be understood on this background. In 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 In April 1934, for example, the central Mizrahi office in Poland sent a letter to one of the organization’s 
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80 Only in the 1930s did Agudat Yisrael start to build up serious institutions in the US. Its Third World 
Congress in 1937 was the first to have US representatives. See a later propaganda brochure of the US 
branch: Sherer, The Struggle and the Splendor, 39-55.  
81 Some of which were not as “traditional” as the statement of the Gerer Rebbe claimed. Authorities like 
Rabbi Haim Ozer Grodzinski created new institutions themselves, such as the Yeshiva School Council that 
Rabbi Grodzinski established in 1924. The Council and its refutation of Mizrahi leaders repeatedly became 
a source of contention between the two sides; for example during the debates about Rubinstein’s election as 
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many cases, Agudah representatives virulently opposed and condemned Zionist petitions 
to use kehillah money for the funding of settlement work in Palestine. Yet at the same 
time their own platform demanded advancing traditional philanthropy for Palestinian 
Jewry (haluka) and even aid for settlement work.82 In the course of the interwar period, 
they established their own aid institutions for emigration to Palestine. Not the issue of 
support for settlement work seems to have been the decisive factor for their rejection, but 
the question of political gain.  
The difference in approach was also an expression of social discrepancies. The top 
political leadership of the Polish Agudah consisted of wealthy businessmen and 
entrepreneurs, who favored philanthropic approaches. Mizrahi leaders tended to be 
situated differently. While it is hard to narrow down the Polish Mizrahi leadership to a 
specific social stratum, much of the focus of the party activism was on the improvement 
of conditions for the middle class.83 In contrast to the Agudah, the Mizrahi promoted new 
forms of social activism. At the same time, many of its members were strongly opposed 
to any socialist influences and class struggle rhetoric. Both movements had ambiguous 
relations with their workers’ branches, who tended to promote a blending of labor 
ideologies with traditionalist lifestyles. The young generation adopted political activism 
to an extent that worried in particular Agudah leaders. Agudah workers frequently 
clashed with the central leadership about social questions, and reproached the Agudah of 
representing the interests of industrialists and businessmen. At the first world congress, 
worker leaders accused Jewish entrepreneurs of subordinating their halakhic observance 
to their capitalist interests because they refrained from employing Jews not working on 
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the Sabbath. The Agudah’s workers’ movement (PAY) frequently demanded the Agudah 
leadership to press Jewish industrialists to employ Jewish workers.84 These tensions 
became particularly acute during the 1930s. During these years many PAY leaders drew 
near to their religious Zionist peers in Ha-Poel Ha-Mizrahi. The two workers’ movements 
even tried to forge a common trade union in 1936, but the Agudah leadership frustrated 
such plans. Thenceforward, the relationship between PAY and its mother movement 
became ever more antagonistic.   
Polish kehillot suffered from two major problems: One was external. The Polish state 
and its officials sought to confine the scope of the Jewish communities as much as 
possible and constantly searched for ways to cut down their financial support. The other 
problem was internal. Harsh struggles and bitter enmity between the different Jewish 
political movements paralyzed many communities. The two problems exacerbated one 
another, as the Polish administration used inner-Jewish struggles as an excuse to further 
curtail the rights of kehillot.85 In these struggles, the authorities were often held to be in 
favor of non-Zionist Orthodoxy, as nationalist movements seemed to pose the greater 
threat to the state. Zionist and socialist activists usually vociferously demanded Jewish 
group rights, and they often confronted Polish authorities openly. Agudah leaders, on the 
other hand, generally preferred to handle such issues without causing a stir in some kind 
of behind-the-scenes diplomacy. When, for example, a new rabbi was chosen in the city 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84 For the discussion on the world congress, see Der Israelit 17.9.1923, 2. See also Bacon, The Politics of 
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commissions had the right to remove candidates from the elecTorahl role, if theses publicly consecrated the 
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of Głębokie in the Vilna province in 1933, the district administrator favored the hasidic 
candidate. “[…] The increase of hasidic influence at the expense of Mitnageds86 would be 
desirable from the point of view of the state,” he wrote to the governor of the province in 
March 1933, “because Hasids support Orthodoxy, while Mitnageds are closer to 
Zionism.”87 Agudat Yisrael regularly attracted the ire of Zionists and Mizrahists for 
downplaying the national aspects of Jewish group identifications. Mizrahists suspected 
Agudah leaders of being behind some of the Polish interventions into Jewish kehillot.  
Agudists denied any involvement. It is difficult to assess the quality of relations 
between Agudah leaders and Polish authorities. But these relations were more ambiguous 
than their political opponents claimed. The Institute for the Research on Nationality 
Affairs, which closely monitored Zionist and socialist activism, and in particular Bundists 
and the leftwing Zionist organization Poalei Zion, also observed thoroughly the activities 
of Agudists. What is more, the interests of Polish state officials did not always overlapp 
with Agudah concerns. In some instances, such as the modernization and 
professionalization of the Jewish communities (though not centralization), their interests 
seemed closer to those of religious Zionists. Mizrahi demands, for example, that the civil 
registration books be transferred from the rabbi to community officials were in 
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accordance with the aims of the Polish authorities. Agudah leaders, on the other hand, 
opposed this step and postulated to keep the registry in the rabbis’ hand.88 
In 1932 Agudah leaders started publishing a Polish-language paper called Echo 
Żydowskie. The weekly, as an editorial in the first issue announced, was not geared 
towards religious Jewry, but specifically towards non-Jewish Poles. 89  The Polish 
intelligentsia, its author Rabbi Aron Levin stated, did not know much about its Jewish 
neighbors. Its information, he asserted was often skewed; transmitted by Jews who had 
converted to Christianity and who painted a picture full of anti-Semitic stereotypes. Echo 
Żydowskie, he declared, set out to correct this impression. For the next two years, the 
paper advocated the standpoint of Agudat Yisrael in the Polish language. The paper 
informed its readers on the general positions of the movement. Such reports were 
complemented with articles about the Jewish contribution to Polish culture. A recurring 
topic was the question of Jewish communities. The Zionists, several articles claimed, 
intended to destroy the kehillot and the rabbinate. While careful not to disavow the 
concept of national autonomy altogether, many of the authors argued that the kehillot 
were not the right place for the implementation of such plans. These had to stay primarily 
religious institutions.90 Echo Żydowskie, thus, was an attempt of Agudah leaders to 
enhance their standing among the non-Jewish intelligentsia, as well as among the Polish 
authorities, and to promote their ideas about Jewish community structures. This was an 
important part of the Jewish inter-party struggle.  
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Why did Agudists start this attempt in 1932? In the 1930s the Polish authorities grew 
increasingly hostile to Jewish self-government and curtailed Jewish kehillot. In this 
context, Echo Żydowskie can also be read as part of the endeavor to safeguard Jewish 
community structures. Such endeavors notwithstanding, Orthodox relations to the state 
kept deteriorating. In addition, the timing suggests that the newspaper might have been 
geared towards the Jewish youth as well, despite its declaration to the contrary. Taking 
into account the rapid Polonization of Jewish youth during the 1930s, Echo Żydowskie 
might have well been an attempt to reach out to the Agudist youth in the language spoken 
by more and more members of this generation, and to counter their growing antagonism 
to the mother organization.91 
Both Mizrahists and Agudists claimed leadership of the communities and promised to 
ameliorate their situation. Mizrahi adherents did not grow tired of stressing that Jewish 
communities needed a new type of leaders. They harshly attacked the historical alliance 
in many communities in Galicia, in which Hasidim had cooperated with the 
assimilationist movement by thoroughly holding on to religious affairs and leaving civil 
issues to the latter. In the context of the first kehillah elections in the area after the war, 
Ha-Mizrahi published a scathing critique of the community leaders in this area. In 
Galicia, the article claimed, the community elders had “sucked the blood and honor [of 
Jewish communities] like leeches.” 92  Such attacks helped Mizrahists to present 
themselves in turn as the only appropriate leaders. In contrast to those who only cared for 
their own benefit, Mizrahi leaders united the people, and worked for the general good. 
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Ordinary people, they claimed, “followed their Jewish hearts” and soon would discard of 
those leaders. “We hope that finally when the generation arises to build up Palestine, 
leaders in its spirit will rise up as well. And then also the sin of stickling for details and 
pettiness will be defeated, and all forces of the people will unite […].”93  
At the heart of their conflicts lay deep tensions between spiritual authority on the one 
hand, and modern political activism on the other. Both parties struggled with the question 
how to conciliate rigid, hierarchical forms of authority from the realm of Jewish law and 
tradition, with modern ways of political participation and social activism. Their mutual 
struggle helped the two parties to channel these tensions, each in its own way. Mizrahi 
leaders, in good nationalist form, liked to invoke the will of the people. In their 
canvassing they advocated a thorough democratization of the kehillot, and pledged to 
topple the old aristocratic regime (gevirim). The right extent of democratic participation, 
however, was strongly disputed. Not everyone in the Mizrahi trusted “the people” to 
“follow their Jewish heart” and elect the appropriate leaders, as became clear in debates 
such as the one about the question of female enfranchisement.94 Attacks against the 
Agudah and its alleged support for aristocratic regimes helped Mizrahists to gloss over 
such tensions.  
In their election campaigns and leaflets, Mizrahi thinkers bemoaned the fact that the 
Jewish intelligentsia was divided into two antagonistic groups. Since the days of the 
Jewish enlightenment (haskala), they held, one part of the Jewish intelligentsia had 
obtained its knowledge exclusively from a secular background. Either ignoring or already 
having forgotten their entire Jewish heritage, these members of the intelligentsia betrayed 
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their own people. “We have to remember: Nowhere in the whole world, among no other 
nation (uma ve-lashon), exists any intelligentsia as loathsome and traitorous to its own 
people as our intelligentsia today,” Simha Feldman pointedly phrased the Mizrahi 
position during the election campaign of 1936. This statement, while also directed at 
Zionist parties, targeted especially Bundists, who had just decided to participate in 
kehillah elections for the first time. The other part of the Jewish intelligentsia, Feldman 
claimed, had dismissed any secular knowledge and attached value solely to religious 
studies. This polarization, he and his colleagues argued, was one of the major causes for 
the untenable situation of Jewish communities. To solve the situation Mizrahists 
suggested themselves as the appropriate synthesis of religious and secular intelligentsia. 
Downplaying the new aspects of their claims to leadership, they invoked a golden past, in 
which the Jewish intelligentsia had gained its knowledge from both secular and religious 
sources. Mizrahists, this was the message, set out to restore this golden past, and 
therefore were the ideal leaders of the Jewish community.95 In contrast to secularist 
leaders such as Zionists, Bundists, and territorialists on the one hand, and religious 
authorities in the Agudah on the other, Mizrahists represented the synthesis of both 
worlds.  
Agudah leaders, too, invoked some amorphous “will” or “essence” of “the Jewish 
people” to support their claims for leadership. Yet overall they displayed an even more 
ambivalent attitude towards modern concepts of democratic participation and 
representation than their Mizrahi counterparts did. Their platform from 1918, for 
example, demanded that elections for the rabbinate had to be under thorough public 
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control, and meet with approval of all parts of the community. In this statement, 
nonetheless, they were not referring to general elections among the Jewish population, 
but only among men they deemed to be appropriate representatives, such as rabbis, and 
board members of synagogues and study halls.96  
One of their strategies to play down such tensions was to accuse their political 
opponents of destroying the kehillah foundations by bringing in non-Jewish culture and 
leadership models. The Jewish masses, Agudah newspapers liked to assert, would not 
accept Zionist attempts to deplete Judaism of its religious essence. An article 
demonstrating this strategy appeared in December 1920 in Der Yud. Its author claimed 
that the Zionists had adopted various concepts from Jewish culture and bereaved them of 
their original content. The Zionist rallying cry of “taking over the kehillot,” he held, did 
not help fostering national unity, but instead destroyed the communities by inflicting 
conflict and schism upon them. Zionist intents to create a new spiritual center (merkaz 
ruhani), he added, plunged the Jewish people into meaningless and destructive inner 
battles. But Orthodox Jewry would not allow them to simply replace traditional Judaism 
with new concepts of community. This was indirectly an attack on the Mizrahi, as its 
very party name is an acronym for the term “spiritual center.” Pious Jews, the author 
continued, would rightfully object to such a schism. “You are mistaken if you think that 
our people will accept your pseudo-Jewishness.”97 While rhetorically evoking the will of 
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the masses, their self-depiction as a continuation of the traditional alliance between 
distinguished secular leaders and the rabbinic elite contradicted such claims.98 
The kehillot of interwar Poland were a romping place for a great variety of Jewish 
ideologies and testing ground for new forms of politics. Different shades of Zionists, 
Folkists, and from 1936 also Bundists competed for political power and attempted to use 
communal structures as vehicle to advance their social and political ideas and ideologies. 
Within this arena, the competition between Mizrahi and Agudah was of particular 
significance. Both parties competed for the same constituency. The Agudah promoted an 
exclusively religious character of communal institutions. Mizrahists, in contrast, 
advocated for a ‘national-religious’ outlook of the kehillah. Behind this rhetoric lay hard-
bitten leadership struggles, and the question of how to balance power between different 
authorities. Mizrahists were not able to truly challenge the Agudah on the community 
level. Both in the kehillah elections of 1924 and 1931 the Agudah emerged as the 
strongest party with more than 30% of the elected councilmen, while the Mizrahi lagged 
far behind with less than 10%. In 1936, the third and last kehillah elections in interwar 
Poland, the Agudah stayed the strongest party, yet lost much ground to the Bund. With 
socialist forces entering the kehillot, secularist parties gained much strength.99 Orthodox 
parties were alarmed and for a short time it seemed that Agudat Yisrael and the Mizrahi 
would cooperate in a vote-sharing agreement to avert the danger. But this attempt soon 
collapsed. The fact that even in this situation the two movements were not able to team 
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up for the protection of religious institutions stresses the importance of inner-Orthodox 
struggles, and illustrates their poignancy.  
 
Between Mara De’atra and National Leader – The Role of the Rabbi  
The question of the tasks and authority of the rabbi encapsulated the crucial issues in 
both Mizrahi’s and Agudah’s grappling with modern forms of political participation. The 
breakdown of the traditional community leadership during the nineteenth century, and the 
fact that for an increasing number of Jews rabbinic authority played either a minor role or 
had become entirely irrelevant, urged Orthodox thinkers to re-evaluate the societal and 
political functions of the rabbinate. What is more, the rabbinate and traditional role of the 
local rabbi had fallen into a severe crisis, due to the weakness of traditional community 
structures, and the severe socio-economic changes during the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries.100 These developments caused fierce discussions about the role of the 
rabbi in public life and the position he should hold in Polish kehillot. Members of both 
movements negotiated such questions among themselves and through the confrontation 
with their political opponents.  
One of the primary concerns of Mizrahi politicians was the reform of rabbinic 
education. Rabbis, they held, could not be trained merely in religious fields. They also 
had to acquire a strong background in secular knowledge. Fluency in Polish was of 
particular concern, as rabbis had to represent their communities in an effective and 
dignified manner. “A new epoch begins before our very eyes, an era that did not yet 
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occur in our history and especially not here in Poland. The rabbi has to be a leader for his 
kehillah as well, he has to preside over the community, to represent it to the outside 
world, to impact on the education of its youth and so on and so forth,” as an article in Ha-
Mizrahi summarized the party’s position in 1919.101  
To this end, religious Zionists founded their own rabbinic seminary in Warsaw. The 
Tachkemoni Seminary, established in 1920, should educate a religious elite with strong 
appreciation for the national aspects of Judaism.102 In Mizrahi conception, the rabbi was 
not first and foremost a spiritual authority. The Tachkemoni should produce a new type 
of leader, the religious-Zionist rabbi. These rabbis would not only take care of the 
religious needs of their congregants, but also represent the community towards the non-
Jewish world. “Today a rabbi cannot be lopsided,” an article in the Mizrahi press stated 
in 1928, “he must be both the religious as well as the national leader of his 
community.”103 The societal responsibility of these new leaders was a central focus of the 
seminary. Tachkemoni would not necessarily produce the next generation of great Torah 
scholars, but religiously learned and well-educated young men. These, according to Isaac 
Nissenbaum, did not even have to become rabbis, but should enter Jewish society in a 
variety of positions. Agudists, in their press, attacked and ridiculed the Tachkemoni 
Seminary as factory for rabbis that produced leaders on assembly lines, and exported 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
101 Ha-Mizrahi 26.3.1919, 4-5. 
102 On the Tachkemoni seminary and the related Institute for Jewish Studies in Warsaw, see Natalia 
Aleksiun, “Historionim Yehudim ve-ha-Hazon shel Rabbanut mi-Zug Hadash: Beit Midrash le-Rabbanim 
Takhkemoni ve-ha-Makhon le-Mada‘ei ha-Yahadut be-Warsha bein Milkhamot ha-Olam,” in Mi-Breslau 
li-Yerushalayyim. Batei Midrash le-Rabbanim - Pirqei Mehqar ve-Hagut, ed. Gai Miron (Jerusalem, 2009), 
165-202. On religious Zionist education in interwar Poland, see Dov Avron, Hinukh be-Ma’avako: Li-
Demuto shel ha-Hinukh ha-Yehudi ha-Dati-Le’umi be-Polin bein Shetei Milhamot ha-Olam (Jerusalem, 
1987/88). 




them to the whole world.104 The rabbis ordained at the seminary, according to Der Yud, 
knew their sages by heart, “from the first ones (rishoynim) to the last ones (akharoynim), 
from Yehuda Leib Gordon to Sholem Asch.” Traditional yidishkayt however, the article 
stated, was foreign to those “boors” (am ha-arets). 105 Nissenbaum dismissed such 
accusations. In his eyes, the rabbinic position could not be acquired by studying sacred 
texts alone. In his autobiography, he even rejected the description “Bet Midrash for 
Rabbis.”106 The Tachkemoni, thus, was to create its own religious Zionist intelligentsia. 
Underlying the reform projects of religious Zionists was a critical attitude towards 
contemporary rabbis and their public performances. The spiritual elite, voices in the 
Mizrahi press claimed, was obsessing about ridiculous problems like the question of 
kosher brandy for the Passover days, and therefore had lost touch with the actual needs of 
their communities. They cloistered themselves within their four cubits of halakhah and 
did not provide any guidance for the pressing problems of ever radically changing social 
and political realities. “The rabbi abandoned the public space (reshut ha-rabim) and 
entered the private sphere (reshut ha-yahid), shriveled and shrank to an extent that is not 
suitable, and got pushed to deal with only a tiny part of our great Torah, instructing and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
104 The Mizrahi press, in turn, claimed that the yeshiva of Rabbi Meir Shapiro in Lublin was first and 
foremost a grandiose building in order to represent Agudat Yisrael, and had nothing much to do with 
serious education. They accused Agudah students of lacking basic skills because those were not trained in 
secular topics, Di Yudishe Shtime 21.2.1935, 3. Behind such skirmishes was the contentious question of the 
significance of secular studies, but also economic interests. The graduates of those institutions wanted to 
get jobs as rabbis, and their success also depended on the reputation of their yeshiva.  
105 Der Yud 22.12.1927, 2. Yehuda Leib Gordon (1830-1892) was among the most important Hebrew poets 
of the Jewish enlightenment, Sholem Asch (1880-1957) was a secular Yiddish playwright and novelist. In 
Jewish tradition “rishoynim” denotes the generations of sages during the late medieval period, while 
“akharoynim” refers to the leading rabbis and decisors roughly from the sixteenth century to the present. 
The author thus mocked Tachkemoni students for studying secular writers instead of spiritual texts. On 
Gordon see Stanislawski, For Whom Do I Toil. 
106 Yitzhaq Nissenbaum, Alei Kheldi, (Warsaw 1928/29), 341. For a similar evaluation of the seminary by 
one of its students, see the autobiography of the religious Zionist leader Moses Krone. Mosheh Krone, 




guiding merely on matters between God and man,” an article in Ha-Mizrahi alleged in 
February 1919, simultaneously lamenting the state of the rabbinate and reprimanding 
rabbis for their neglect of societal issues.107 Some Mizrahists took their critique of the 
rabbinic elite even further. Not the social and political upheavals of the time pulled Jews 
away from Torah and tradition, they claimed, but the rabbinic elite’s failure to respond to 
the needs of the people. The spiritual elite, they held, was responsible for the rift between 
itself and the people, and thus for the decrease in religious observance and disregard for 
traditional values and lifestyles.108  
Such remarks expressed deep tensions about the place of spiritual authority in modern 
society in general, and in the religious Zionist movement in particular. As Orthodox 
Jews, Mizrahists did not dismiss spiritual authority as such. At the same time, much of 
their reform efforts stressed the importance of community work and the social 
responsibilities of Jewish leaders. This, in turn, led to an ambivalent attitude towards 
purely religious studies and halakhic scholarship. Such studies, they held, had to be 
modernized and effectively put into the service of the community.109 Rabbinic authority, 
they added, had to be centralized and formalized. The great power and influence, for 
example, that admorim exerted over their adherents was the bête noire of many 
Mizrahists.  
Rabbi Zlotnick, one of the fiercest opponents of Hasidism within the movement, 
harshly attacked these leaders during the preparations for the second Polish party 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
107 Ha-Mizrahi 26.2.1919, 7. 
108 Ibid. 10.4.1924, 2-4; Di Yudishe Shtime 2.5.1932, 3; 6.5.1936, 5; 13.5.1936, 4. 
109 The degree to which Mizrahi rabbis should get involved into political work was contested. While some 
demanded the rabbis to take a clear stance and even invest a great amount of their time to further party 
aims, others preferred them to strictly abstain from any political involvement. For details on this discussion 




conference in 1919. He took issue with their negative attitudes towards emigration to 
Palestine and towards the study of the Hebrew langue. Rabbi Zlotnick accused hasidic 
authorities of usurping the Torah and of monopolizing religious power for their own 
interests. He demanded to “free Torah students from the chains of the admorim.” Only 
then, he held, could the knowledge of Torah be strengthened. Rabbi Zlotnick’s attacks 
did not pass without reply. In an answer published a few days later Rabbi Katriel Fishel 
Tchorsh strongly disagreed with Rabbi Zlotnick and accused the latter of leading the 
Mizrahi into war with the admorim. He feared that Rabbi Zlotnick’s attitude would only 
widen the gap between hasidic leaders and the Mizrahi. Those leaders, Rabbi Tchorsh 
argued, were slowly acknowledging the significance of emigration to Palestine. 
Mizrahists should strive to convince them of the truth of Zionist tenets and get them to 
join the movement. Mizrahists should not, however, try to utterly challenge their 
authority. “Do you think that a hasid will confide in his admor in all vital matters of life, 
and only in politics will he turn to [the famous Zionist leader Nahum] Sokolow?,” he 
asked rhetorically, and repudiated any hope that hasidic Jews might adhere to a secular 
Zionist leadership.110  
Personal affinities towards or against the hasidic movement certainly played a role in 
this discussion.111 But at the heart of their dispute stood the question of de-centralized 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
110 The debate between the two in preparation for the second party conference was lead on the pages of the 
party press and is reprinted in Rubinstein, Tenu‘ah be-Idan shel Temurah, 155-169. The early Mizrahi 
press strongly attacked hasidic admorim. In the center of this critique stood the decentralized power of 
these leaders. Mizrahists accused them of abusing their power for narrow group interests. See also Ha-
Mizrahi 13.2.1919, 2-4. On the Mizrahi and Hasidism see also Yitzhaq Alfasi, Ha-Hasidut ve-Shivat 
Tsiyon (Tel Aviv, 1986), 62ff. 
111 Rabbi Katriel Fishel Tchorsh (1895-1979) was among the founders of the Mizrahi youth organization in 
Poland, and involved in the building of local Mizrahi education. In 1933 he moved to Palestine and became 
a rabbi in south Tel Aviv. In 1948, Rabbi Tchorsh founded the Board of Rabbis of Ha-Poel Ha-Mizrahi 
(see Chapter VI). Rabbi Yehuda Leib Zlotnick (1887-1962) served as Rabbi of Gombin and was among the 




religious authority, and how the religious Zionist movement was to grapple with it. Rabbi 
Zlotnick was one of the hardliners in this issue, who wanted to utterly abolish any 
decentralized religious power. In a pamphlet “To the Religious Youth” published just one 
year earlier, he went so far as to demand the exclusion of all those from the Mizrahi, who 
followed any directions by their admor. 112 Rabbi Tchorsh, in contrast, denied the 
feasibility of such an option, and instead sought to integrate hasidic authorities and other 
religious leaders into the Zionist movement.  
Such debates flared up in intervals throughout the interwar period. Many Mizrahi 
adherents were highly critical of spiritual authority and worked to tame and domesticate 
its de-centralized and unchecked character. In some cases, Mizrahists were outright 
hostile towards the scholarly elite. Others yet strongly opposed such attitudes and held 
animosities towards rabbis to be responsible for preventing those from joining the 
Mizrahi ranks. Some strongly condemned the debasement and even hatred of rabbis 
within the movement. 113  Still others blamed the meager rabbinic support of the 
movement on animosities from non-Zionist Orthodoxy. Many rabbis, the argument went, 
were afraid of joining the organization due to worries about their position and standing.114  
Such inner tensions faded into the background as soon as these issues became part of 
the struggle with political opponents. In 1920, for example, when the strongly anti-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
president of the Mizrahi. In 1936 Rabbi Zlotnick went to South Africa. The disagreement between the two 
men regarding Hasidism can also be ascribed to their own religious affiliations. Rabbi Tchorsh came from a 
hasidic family, while Rabbi Zlotnick had been educated at Volozhin Yeshiva, which was one of the 
eminent Lithuanian institutions. Their dispute, however, ran deeper than affirmation of or enmity against 
Hasidism, as it touched upon essential questions of leadership. 
112 Yehuda Zlotnick, Tsu der religyezer yugnt (Warsaw, 1918), 41. 
113 An article bemoaning the hatred of rabbis among Mizrahi members appeared in Die Yudishe Shtime 
23.5.1935, 2,4. Rabbi Amiel was one of the most outspoken critics of such attitudes. He was also the 
strongest advocate for integrating the Mizrahi more tightly into the Orthodox world, and for seeking 
conciliation and mutual cooperation, if not unification, with Agudat Yisrael. See Chapter V. 




religious leader of Polish Zionism, Isaac Gruenbaum, railed against Jewish clericalism, 
and denied rabbis the right to become political representatives in senate and parliament, 
Mizrahists were united in their condemnation of Gruenbaum’s stance.115 But the more 
formative political foe shaping and uniting the Mizrahi in this regard was non-Zionist 
Orthodoxy and in particular Agudat Yisrael. Many Mizrahi leaders regarded the Agudah 
as mere extension of Hasidism into politics and faulted the party of the same mistakes.116 
The two parties did not only become enmeshed in bitter struggles over the meaning and 
significance of spiritual authority, but also competed for rabbinic posts throughout Polish 
cities and shtetls. In their battles for rabbinic positions, adherents of both movements left 
no stone unturned to defeat their competitor, and both sides regularly decried their 
opponents’ methods and accused each other of besmirching the honor of the rabbinic 
office. This office had become highly politicized. The Mizrahi press proudly published 
lists of members with rabbinic ordination. Despite much propaganda efforts, and local 
activism, however, religious Zionists were never able to compete with the Agudah in this 
field on equal footing. 117 
Agudah leaders agreed with Mizrahists that the rabbinic office was in an untenable 
condition. Like their religious Zionist counterparts, they bemoaned the fact that many 
Polish rabbis did not receive sufficient salaries and were forced to take on second jobs, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
115 Ha-Mizrahi 18.11.1920, 4. Earlier in 1920 Gruenbaum had stirred up the Mizrahi press’ wrath when 
claiming to represent the Jewish religion in the Polish senate, see ibid. 5.2.1920, 1-3. 
116 See e.g. according remarks in Ha-Mizrahi 4.10.1923, 7-8. 
117 In 1921, Isaac Nissenbaum estimated the number of rabbis in the movement at 200, which amounts to 
approximately 10% of Polish rabbis. Despite their hopes, they did not succeed in increasing these numbers 
essentially. For numbers in greater detail, see Kaniel, Yomra u-Ma‘as, 214. Kaniel blames increasing 
criticism of rabbis on their unwillingness to join the movement. Such critique, however, was a strong part 
of Mizrahi rhetoric from early on, and in my view inherent to the character of religious Zionist activism 




which in turn led to a neglect of their rabbinic duties.118 Furthermore, Agudists lamented 
cases of corruption or other abuses of the rabbinic office, and denounced the appointment 
of rabbis through the government.119 Yet in contrast to the Mizrahi, Agudah leaders 
intended to strengthen the position of the rabbi. While Mizrahists wished to hand over 
many tasks to an administrative or bureaucratic elite, Agudists opted to leave these in the 
hands of the local rabbi.120 Rather than weakening the rabbi’s position in such a way, 
they advocated to strengthen rabbinic authority by demanding a guaranteed seat on the 
kehillah executive for the local rabbi.121  
Only if Jews returned to study Torah, and the local rabbi once more became the 
central authority and religious desisor (mara de’atra), Agudists asserted, could Jewish 
communities restore their former glory. They declared it their goal to reinstall traditional 
forms of rabbinic office.122 Such a depiction, however, was problematic, as Agudah 
leaders aimed at bestowing rabbis with a degree of authority they had not possessed 
before. Struggling against what they perceived as the “hegemony” of party politicians, 
and in particular against their nationalist opponents in the Orthodox field, Agudists 
worked to strengthen rabbinic authority beyond any historical predecessors. This was 
most clearly expressed in their central rabbinic council, and the promotion of its 
underlying concept of authority, the doctrine of Daat Torah (literally “Knowledge of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
118 Der Yud 22.11.1920, 2 
119 For the problem of rabbis appointed by the government the Rubinstein case, Chapter I.  
120 When, for example, the Warsaw Mizrahi leader Heshel Farbstein demanded in 1930 that the control 
over civic registration books be transferred from the local rabbi to the kehillah, the Agudah press fiercely 
condemned such a venture. DYT 29.1.1930, 4. Similar arguments appeared as early as 1921, Der Yud 
16.12.1921, 4. The Mizrahi, in this regard, was in agreement with the demands by the ZO in its 
memorandum on reform of the kehillot in 1922. See Bacon, Politics of Tradition, 191. 
121 Der Yud, 17.2.1922, 7.  




Torah”). This doctrine held that rabbis had absolute authority in all aspects of life, 
including political and societal matters. Rabbinic authority was to have the final ruling on 
any issue, regardless of which nature. What is more, the rabbinic decisor did not have to 
account for his ruling, or to reveal the source basis for his decision-making process. This 
doctrine, as Gershon Bacon, Lawrence Kaplan and Benjamin Brown have pointed out, 
was to be a counterpoise against the secular leadership of the other parties.123 Agudah 
leaders, in fact, repeatedly announced plans to extend the leadership model of their own 
rabbinic council to Jewish communities all over Poland. The first national conference of 
the Polish Agudah in 1919 adopted resolutions that demanded the formation of rabbinic 
councils in every Jewish kehillah. This council was to consist of the foremost rabbinic 
scholars in the community, and it was to be headed by the local mara de’atra. All local 
assemblies together should elect a national one from their midst.124 Such a model, if 
implemented, would have constituted a severe challenge to the political leadership. In 
combination with the doctrine of Daat Torah, it envisioned the absolute rule of rabbinic 
authority.          
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
123 Al the scholars writing about Daat Torah agree that the doctrine is an Orthodox response to modernity. 
Exactly when and how the doctrine developed, however, is controversial. Gershon Bacon holds it to be a 
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“Da‘at Torah ve-Hevlei Mashiah. Le-She’elat ha-Ideologia shel ‘Agudat Yisra’el’ be-Polin,” Tarbitz 52 
(1983): 497-508. Piekarz, on the other hand, argues that the doctrine existed already in the nineteenth 
century in certain hasidic circles. Piekarz, Hasidut Polin, 81-96. Jacob Katz holds that Daat Torah was 
developed by Hungarian Orthodoxy in response to Reform Judaism during the nineteenth century. Jacob 
Katz, “Da’at Torah — The Unqualified Authority Claimed for Halakhists,” Jewish History 11/1 (1997): 41-
50. Lawrence Kaplan argues that the doctrine only fully flowered outside of hasidic circles in the Israel of 
the 1940s and 1950s. See Lawrence Kaplan, “Daas Torah: A Modern Conception of Rabbinic Authority,” 
in Rabbinic Authority and Personal Autonomy, ed. Moses Sokol (Northvale, NJ/ London, 1992), 1-60; 
Benjamin Brown, on the other hand, hold that the doctrine developed in circles of Lithuanian Orthodoxy. 
For him, Elhanan Wasserman is the “father of the doctrine.” Brown points out that “Daat Torah” was until 
then used in its more conventional meaning, simply referring to the idea that the Torah has the answers to 
any questions arising in life. See Benjamin Brown, “Doqtrinat ‘Da‘at Torah': Sheloshah Shelavim.” in 
Derekh ha-Ruah: Sefer ha-Yovel le-Eliezer Schweid vol.2, ed. Yehuda Amid (Jerusalem 2005), 537-600. 




But these plans and the actual implementation of Daat Torah stayed somewhat 
rudimentary.125 Nevertheless, they constituted important political tools in the struggle 
with political opponents and in particular with religious Zionists. The council of Torah 
sages was seen as a bulwark against the dangers of secularism and processes of 
democratization. Rivalries with the Mizrahi caused Agudah leaders to even more 
adamantly insist on the absolute primacy of spiritual authority. The existence of a 
movement that allowed traditionalist Jews to engage in nationalist activism while at the 
same time staying committed to an observant lifestyle highlighted the urgency of this 
bulwark. This is stressed by the fact that the issue of cooperation with religious Zionists 
was one of the few areas in which the council’s authority stayed unchallenged. No 
agreement on such cooperation could be reached on the international level without the 
consent of this body.126   
Mizrahists condemned Agudah plans for their oligarchical nature and decried the 
unchecked character of rabbinic authority. One of the fiercest opponents of the doctrine 
of Daat Torah was Rabbi Yehuda Leib Zlotnick. Zlotnick, a community rabbi himself, 
not only denied the rabbinic elite any interference in political questions, but also 
challenged their authority to issue strict directives in merely religious questions. He 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
125 The doctrine of Daat Torah only fully came to flower in 1950s Israel, see Kaplan, Daas Torah, 12; Even 
though Wasserman claimed that the spiritual elite did not have to justify its decisions, Brown argues, he 
himself cited often plenty of sources to support his decisions. In the political context, however, this aspect 
was stressed already by the early discussions about the rabbinic council in the Agudah. Brown, Doqtrinat 
‘Da‘at Torah,’ 564-7. See also Chapter II. The national Polish conference of Agudat Yisrael in 1928 had to 
call on the party to finally implement its plans for local rabbinic assemblies, and on the rabbinic council to 
assume its leadership role. Both, as it seems, with only very moderate success. See Der Yud 4.11.1928, 2.  
126 When in 1938 finally the political leadership of Agudat Yisrael and Mizrahi had reached an agreement 
for cooperation, the rabbinic council refused its ratification. See Chapter V. The close connection between 
the development of the doctrine of Daat Torah and the issue of modern social and political activism is 
additionally stressed by the fact that one of the first instances in which Rabbi Wasserman specifically 
invoked the doctrine was in his conflict with the workers’ movement of the Agudah, Po’alei Agudat 
Yisrael, and their support for Zionist attempts to nationalize work in Palestine (avoda ivrit). For 




frequently evoked the will of the masses, and stressed the democratic character of his 
movement. “The Mizrahi will never agree to stand under the guardianship of a ‘council’ 
of individuals, even if they call them ‘great Torah Sages,’” Zlotnick proclaimed on the 
pages of the party press already in January 1919.127 Yet at the same time, Zlotnick liked 
to paint Moses as strong political leader in his sermons and political pamphlets. 
Contrasting his leadership to the political passivity of traditionalist authorities, Zlotnick 
portrayed Moses as the good shepherd, who saved his Jewish flock by carrying the sheep 
on his shoulders out of any hazard zone. Moses, in his depiction, became a strong and 
undisputed leader. If the leader holds the people tightly, Zlotnick declared, it would be 
like Moses’ famous stick that worked wonders, but if he lets it loose it would ran away 
like a snake. The Jews, he held, deserved appropriate representatives, a “Jewish kehillah 
with Jewish leaders!” Individuals, thus, could be strong guardians if their leadership 
rested on political and not on rabbinic authority.128  
Agudah leaders, in response, denied any oligarchical element to their plans. 
Repeatedly, they defended themselves against charges of clericalism.129 In Judaism, they 
contended, religious dignitaries did not constitute their own class like in Christianity, but 
their authority rested solely on learnedness and popular support. The Jewish people, an 
article on the pages of Der Yud declared in 1921, was a kingdom of priests without 
castes, classes, or other social stratification. “Not his position grants the rabbi the power 
to exert influence. His authority is based on his knowledge of the Torah, on his virtues 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
127 Ha-Mizrahi, 1.1.1919, 1.  
128  Yehuda Leib Zlotnick, Religyezer natsyonalizm un tsienizm (Warsaw 1918), 7-9, 18. For his 
interpretation of the snake that becomes a stick working wonders in Moses’ hands, see, idem., Derashot 
likhvod Hannukah (Warsaw, 1919), 12f. See also idem. Moderne droshes (Warsaw, 1928). 




and his character traits.” 130 With such a line of argument, they too invoked the will of the 
people as legitimizing power, if in a very different manner. They contrasted Zionist 
demands for democratic rule with traditional Jewish ways of popular participation. By 
abandoning tradition, Agudists claimed, Zionist politicians unsolicitedly forced their 
leadership upon the Jewish masses. 
For Agudah propagandists, having some of the most distinguished contemporary 
spiritual authorities within their ranks was a crucial tactical advantage over their Mizrahi 
adversaries. Never growing tired of stressing the rabbis’ support for their own 
organization, they challenged the Mizrahi’s legitimacy as Orthodox party, and thus 
turned the rabbis’ support into political capital. When Mizrahi leaders criticized the 
establishment of Agudah’s rabbinic council in the early 1920s, and accused the party of 
separatism, the Polish Agudah press responded virulently. In April 1921 Der Yud 
published a blistering comment on the Mizrahi’s public criticism of the Agudah’s 
rabbinic council. Accusing Torah sages of separatism, in the author’s eyes, was an 
inexcusable offense to their honor. Challenging Jewish authorities in this manner equaled 
an attempt to destroy the very foundations of Judaism. “At last,” the article stated, “the 
Mizrahi has shown its true colors.” Religious Zionists had tried hard to dress up as 
genuinely observant Jews, but their masquerade had fallen off, and it had become clear 
that the Orthodox stream of Zionism was nothing but “a bunch of bad Purim actors 
wearing fake jackets and shtreymels.”131 Hitherto Der Yud had largely ignored the 
Mizrahi in its attacks on Zionist leaders. But in the early 1920s Agudah propagandists 
could not longer ignore the party, due to its political progress and its attempts to win over 
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rabbinic leaders. The fact that their disagreement about the rabbinic council provoked one 
of the first explicit attacks demonstrates the sensitivity of this issue in their mutual 
relations. Rabbinic authority was a trump in the hand of Agudah leaders and they 
willingly deployed it against their main opponents in the Orthodox field. This in turn 
helped tightening the commitment to rabbinic authority in their own ranks, at least when 
it came to public announcements and negotiations.132 Any qualification of the council’s 
authority would have impaired their position in the political game.  
These political struggles penetrated also the professional organization of rabbis, and 
affected efforts to create a central Polish rabbinic association. Established during the 
postwar years, the goal of the rabbinic association was to support Polish rabbis and 
organize these in a nonpartisan forum.133 Such aims notwithstanding conflicts broke out 
soon after the foundation of this body. The Mizrahi press bitterly complained about the 
political alignment of many of the association’s rabbis with Agudat Yisrael, and accused 
the organization of being completely dominated by the latter.134 To counter Agudah 
influences on rabbinic organization in Poland, Mizrahi leaders decided to hold their own 
rabbinic convention. This convention took place in Warsaw in 1923. According to an 
article in the party press, “75 brilliant and great rabbis” participated. The figure 
dominating many speeches and debates of the convention was Heshel Farbstein, a top-tier 
politician of the Polish party branch. In his opening address, Farbstein declared rabbis to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
132 Daat Torah, while being a valuable political tool, was not much effective in the interwar period. 
Frequently party politicians acted without the rabbis’ directions. An important reason for this was the 
limited efficiency of the rabbinic council. See Bacon, Politics of Tradition, 50-57.  
133 The first convention of the rabbinic association took place in January 1921. 
134 On a convention of the council in 1926, its chairman Eliyahu Kirshbraun declared that the council was 
essentially part of the Agudah. Kirshbraun himself was an important Agudah politician. Even though the 
Agudah had a strong standing within the council, however, its leaders were not able to dominate the body. 
This became clear particularly during the 1930s, when other hasidic courts founded their political parties, 




be the preeminent leaders of religious Zionism. Rabbis, he claimed, defined the character 
of the Mizrahi and decided on its path. Farbstein continued his speech with an 
explanation of the rabbis’ function in the movement and their central role as teachers and 
guides of the Jewish youth. Following Farbstein, Isaac Rubinstein spoke about the 
deplorable condition of the rabbinic office. He lamented that this office had become a 
political battlefield and blamed the Agudah for this development. Further speeches about 
the relations of the Mizrahi to other Jewish parties, and about the rabbinic council of 
Agudat Yisrael ensued. Finally, the convention proceeded to adopt several resolutions. In 
these resolutions, the participating rabbis announced their satisfaction with the work of 
the Mizrahi in Poland, and declared that they would not accept the authority of the 
rabbinic council of Agudat Yisrael, scheduled to convene two months later in Vienna. 
Lastly, they announced that they would refrain from establishing their own organization, 
at least temporarily. The rabbis expressed their hopes that such an enterprise could be 
abandoned altogether once the Polish rabbinic association developed from a purely 
Agudah dominated institution into a nonpartisan body. After standing ovations for Heshel 
Farbstein and the collective chanting of the Zionist anthem Hatikva, the convention 
dissolved.135  
The timing of the convention just two months before the Agudah’s council meeting in 
Vienna, and the resolutions against the council’s authority, strongly suggest political 
intentions for the gathering. Contrary to the roles that Farbstein had assigned in his 
opening address, it seemed not so much to be the rabbis leading the party, but rather the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




party politicians leading the rabbis.136 Not everyone agreed with such a strong stress on 
political authority. Farbstein, in fact, was later accused of silencing the rabbis within the 
movement.137 But the significance of rabbinic authority stayed limited. The convention 
itself did not have much of an impact. Mizrahi attempts to organize a separate rabbinic 
assembly soon petered out.  
During the 1930s Mizrahi leaders renewed attempts to establish their own rabbinic 
body.138 In the summer of 1936 religious Zionists announced the foundation of the 
Assembly of Mizrahi Rabbis (AMR) and in the beginning of August the new 
organization held its first official gathering in Warsaw. The directorate of the AMR 
consisted of nine rabbis. Paramount among them was Isaac Rubinstein, who over the 
intervening years had not only become the Chief Rabbi of Vilna, but also the central 
leader of the Mizrahi in Poland. Shortly after its foundation, the AMR began to publish 
its own Rabbinic Hebrew language journal called “Jerusalem.”139 The spirit of the new 
body seemed considerably different from that of the precursory debates in the 1920s. This 
time, no open accusations against Agudat Yisrael and its rabbinic assembly were voiced, 
nor was any resolution against the Agudah’s domination of the Polish rabbinate adopted. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
136  Gershon Bacon has tried to categorize rabbinic leaders in interwar Poland according to their 
involvement in politics. His six categories range from “rabbis strictly opposed to any political activities” 
(like the Belzer Rebbe) to “politicians who happened to be rabbis” (like the Mizrahi leader Simon 
Federbush). It is certainly no coincidence that many Mizrahi leaders fall into the strongly political spectrum 
of his categories (such as “politicians who happened to be rabbis,” or “party functionaries”). See Gershon 
C. Bacon, “Rabbis and Politics, Rabbis in Politics: Different Models within Interwar Polish Jewry,” YIVO 
Annual of Jewish Social Science 20 (1991): 39-59. See also idem., “The New Jewish Politics and the 
Rabbinate in Poland,” in Jewish Religious Leadership: Image and Reality vol. 2, ed. Jack Wertheimer 
(New York, 2004), 447-77. 
137 Simha Bonan Feldman to Meir Berlin, 25.2.1934, in ARK MO151. 
138 The first initiative for such a body seems to have come already in 1933 from the central Polish activist 
Simon Federbush. See Isaac Nissenbaum’s letter to Federbush, in which he promises to discuss this 
suggestion with Maimon and Berlin. Isaac Nissenbaum to Simon Federbush 25.6.1933, in ARZ MO 98. 
139 The report about the first convention of the AMR and its goals was published in the first issue of this 




Instead, the rabbis declared their will to come to an agreement with Agudat Yisrael in 
order to unite all Orthodox Jews in their support for Jewish settlements in Palestine, and 
to strengthen religious observance. Furthermore, they announced their support for the 
Orthodox division of the Jewish National Fund. The Mizrahi head office in Jerusalem 
welcomed the foundation of the new rabbinic association, and sent its blessings. The 
members of the head office expressed their hopes that the new body would not cause 
further strive and cleavages, and urged the members of the AMR to continue participating 
in the general assembly of Polish rabbis.140   
The first attempt to organize Mizrahi affiliated rabbis in 1923 made the impression of 
a protest meeting that was convened to publicly denounce the Agudah’s domination of 
the Polish rabbinic assembly. In 1936, on the other hand, when an assembly of Mizrahi 
rabbis was effectively formed, the tone was different. This time, religious Zionist leaders 
went to great lengths to divert any impression of competition with the official rabbinic 
assembly. What had led to this change in tone? Personalities certainly were an issue. 
While Farbstein had been criticized for sidelining the rabbis during the 1920s, Rubinstein 
was a community rabbi himself. After the settling of conflicts in Vilna, he might have 
been reluctant to openly offend the rabbinic elite. But wider political and societal 
developments hold more explanatory power. The early thirties had witnessed an 
enormous decrease in the public observance of religious traditions in Palestine, and the 
position of Orthodoxy within the new settlements had become tougher.141 On the political 
plane, as well, the 1930s were an important turning point. The founding of a Jewish State 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
140 Letter from the Head office of the Mizrahi in Jerusalem to the AMR, 28.6.37, ARZ, MO126. One of the 
reasons might also have been the leading role that Isaac Rubinstein now took on in this endeavor, as 
opposed to Farbstein’s dominating role in the early 1920s. The character of the change, however, went 
beyond personal differences, as the letter from the international Mizrahi leadership makes clear.  




seemed to become increasingly within reach during these years, and thus the question of 
partition loomed large. Consecutively, among the resolutions of the founding convention 
of the AMR was the demand not to waive Jewish claims on any parts of Palestine 
considered to be pivotal, neither claims on Jerusalem nor on the Negev dessert.142 One 
intention might have been to counter secularism within the ZO, and to strengthen 
Orthodoxy within the framework of an emerging Jewish State. In Poland as well, the 
interwar years witnessed a further decrease in religious observance and thus diminished 
the possible constituencies of both Orthodox parties. At the same time, the two parties 
had developed and shaped their approaches and ideologies. While neither of the two 
opponents succeeded in gathering all Polish rabbis in its ranks, it had become clear that 
the Mizrahi was not able to challenge the Agudah’s strong position in this field. Religious 
Zionists continued to decry the latter’s domination of the central Polish rabbinic 
assembly. When in the early thirties other hasidic courts formed their own political 
movements, 143 Mizrahi leaders and other Zionists initiated cooperation in order to 
struggle Agudah influence. In spite of such efforts, however, the Agudah was able to 
retain its relative sway over Polish rabbis. 
Mizrahi leaders, it seems, were changing their tactics from an open confrontation with 
the Agudah in the rabbinic field to emphasizing their own strengths and concomitant 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
142 Yerushalayyim 1 (August 1936), 1. 
143 In the early thirties, two hasidic courts strongly antagonistic to Gerer Hasidism formed their own 
political movements in Galicia, aiming to challenge the Agudah’s political dominance of the non-Zionist 
Orthodox world. The parties of the two courts, Belz and Alexander, sometimes even entered coalitions with 
the Zionists in order to weaken the Agudah. The party of the Belz Hasidim, Mahzikei Ha-Dat, was able to 
register about 9000 members in the region around Krakow in only a short time, and the Belzer Rebbe, 
Aharon Rokeach, strongly attacked Agudat Yisrael in several speeches. See Sprawozdanie (Apr.-Jun. 
1932), 91, in AAN MSW IV/87; Sprawozdanie (Oct.-Dec. 1931), 102-5, in ibid. MSW IV/87. For the 
strong activities of Mahzikei Ha-Dat and cooperation with Zionists against Agudat Yisrael see the 




offers for cooperation. They declared it their aim to cover the areas that the official Polish 
rabbinic assembly had neglected thus far. But such plans were not uncontroversial. In 
Mai 1935, shortly before the assembly was established, 150 rabbis had signed a public 
declaration of support for the Orthodox division of the JNF.144 This declaration had 
stirred uproar among Orthodox Jews, and was followed by public demonstrations in 
Warsaw and even violence against some of the rabbis, who had signed it. Mizrahi leaders 
had accused the Agudah of deliberately inciting the masses. The Agudah press, in 
response, had denied any share in these excesses, but at the same time had condemned 
the rabbinic declaration harshly and expressed its empathy for public anger.145 The 
AMR’s open support for the Orthodox division of the JNF one year later was pushing 
these contrasts further. In internal correspondences, the AMR declared its hopes that 
appointing 40 “Torah sages” as religious Zionist authorities would convince Orthodox 
Jews and raise the Mizrahi’s reputation “in our country.” 146 The two attempts to 
demonstrate rabbinic support for their party, in fact, seemed to be part of a wider 
campaign among Mizrahists to regain their predominance in a field, into which the 
Agudah was slowly making inroads in the 1930s: emigration and settlement activism in 
Palestine. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
144 The Orthodox division of the JNF was an outcome of negotiations between the Mizrahi and the ZO, and 
part of the consolidation of their relations. Religious Zionists had called for boycott of the fund, because it 
was not willing to demand the public observance of Shabbat on its lands. In 1935 the JNF decided to honor 
this request. The Orthodox division was established to collect money among observant Jews. It advertised 
the Zionist projects in synagogues, on special holiday activities, and in Shabbat societies. With such 
fundraising activities it got in conflict with Agudah fundraising activities. For the turn in Mizrahi-Zionist 
relations leading up to the establishing of the division, see Chapter V. About the division, see also Elichai, 
Ha-Mizrahi u-Tenu‘at Torah ve-Avodahh, 97-104. 
145 The Zionist newspaper Der Moment reported on the events: Der Moment, 15.5.1935, 4. The Agudah 
press also reported and denied any involvement of their own leaders:  DYT, 12.5.1935, 7; DYT, 13.5.1935, 
2; DYT, 15.5.1935, 3. 




Certificates for the Masses? Settlement Activism and Politics of Emigration 
The issue of emigration increasingly occupied Polish Jewry during the 1920s and 30s. 
Like few other areas of interwar Polish-Jewish politics, the question of emigration can 
serve to illustrate the harsh inter-party struggle for adherents. Due to the deteriorating 
political and economic situation, increasing numbers of Jews desired to leave Poland. 
This became especially pronounced in the 1930s, with Jews providing 23% of Polish 
emigration.147 The pressure of the Jewish masses forced party leaders to find solutions. 
With the US practically closing its gates to Eastern European Jews with the immigration 
act of 1924, and few alternatives, Palestine became the major destination for Jews 
seeking to leave Poland - and Poland turned into the main provider of new immigrants to 
the Jewish settlements in Palestine.  
Zionist parties, both secular and religious, read this as proof for the success of their 
political ideology, and strongly promoted immigration of Jews into the area.148 Agudists, 
in contrast, were reluctant to unequivocally promote Jewish emigration to Palestine. To 
be sure, the Polish Agudah did not oppose such emigration in principle. The Gerer Rebbe 
himself, Rabbi Abraham Mordechai Alter, visited Palestine several times during the 
interwar period, and invested in Orthodox settlement there.149 Yet within the ranks of 
Agudah leaders the question of support for emigration to Palestine became the source of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
147 This number more than doubled their ratio of the general Polish population (about 10%). Nearly 60% of 
the Jews leaving Poland between 1931-1938 moved to Palestine. The US and Argentina constituted 
important destinations as well. See Irith Cherniavski, “Aliyat Yehudei Polin be-Shenot ha-Sheloshim shel 
ha-Me’ah ha-20” (PhD diss, Hebrew University, 2010), 63-78; For the impacts of immigration restrictions 
and the tragic fate of Jewish migrants deprived of any legal protection, see Tobias Brinkmann, “Permanent 
Transit: Jewish Migration during the Interwar Period,” in 1929. Mapping the Jewish World, ed. Hasia R. 
Diner/ Gennady Estraikh (New York/ London, 2013), 53-72. 
148 For early debates in the Polish Zionist movements about the importance of emigration to Palestine, see 
Mendelsohn, Zionism in Poland, 223-52. 
149 See Chapter IV. For the changes in hasidic attitudes towards settlement in Palestine after WWI and in 




tensions between a conservative wing that objected to any steps in this direction, and 
leaders who pushed for a stronger involvement of the Agudah in Palestinian affairs, and 
even for cooperation with the Jewish Agency for this purpose. Agudists feared that 
unequivocal support for Jewish emigration to Palestine would make them vulnerable to 
accusations of Zionist aspirations from ultra-conservative Jewish circles, and might lead 
Orthodox Jews to wrong conclusions about the acceptability of Zionist activism.  
Thus, instead of exclusively focusing on Palestine, they intended to build up a general 
network for Jewish emigration. This was to include support for Jewish emigration to 
Palestine, but also to the US and other countries.150 While supporting the right of Jews to 
settle in Palestine, Agudists repeatedly warned against the consequences of unchecked 
immigration. They cautioned not to raise excessive expectations among the Jewish 
population in Europe. If Palestinian leaders were not able to provide new immigrants 
with economic perspectives, they argued, these would fail to be absorbed in the Jewish 
settlements and leave - a phenomenon that indeed was a problem among Jewish 
immigrants in the 1920s.151 In addition, they argued, unchecked Jewish immigration 
would stir fear and hatred among the Arab population. Reconciliation between Jews and 
Arabs, some claimed, could only be reached on religious grounds, and condemned 
inciting nationalist rhetoric.152  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
150 Palestine alone, they claimed, cannot solve the “Jewish question.” Der Yud 19.11.1920, 3; 26.11.1920, 
3. 
151 Ibid. 21.1.1921, 3. In an internal report about the situation of Agudat Yisrael in Palestine, Solomon 
Ehrmann estimated that about 15-20% of the pioneers left Palestine few years after their arrival, and that 
more would leave if they had enough financial means for the journey. See Ehrmann to the executive 
council Agudat Yisrael Germany in Frankfurt a. M. 1922, in CZA Z4/42315. 
152 As for example at the third national conference in 1934, Der Yud 17.1.1934, 4. Among the most severe 
problems for the Arab population, the Agudah press claimed, were the irreligious lifestyles and Marxist 




A further reason for ambivalent public pronouncements about Jewish emigration was 
the pressure of Polish officials, and especially Polish nationalists, who increasingly 
demanded that the Jews leave Poland, especially after the death of Józef Piłsudski in 
1935. “Poland to the Poles,” and “Jews to Palestine” were among the most prominent 
slogans of the Polish right during the 1930s. This in turn led especially Agudah and Bund 
leaders to clearly distance themselves from such endeavors. Zionists, on the other hand, 
were divided about how to deal with the proclamations of Polish nationalists, ranging 
from clear rejections on the one hand, to Zeev Jabotinsky’s famous evacuation plan of 
Polish Jewry on the other. 153  Taken together, these arguments expressed deep 
reservations among Agudists against the political consequences of an unhampered 
support for settlement activism in Palestine.  
When during the mid-1920s and early 1930s other options for Jewish emigration 
became less and less available, Agudists increasingly shifted their focus to Palestine.154 
Already from the early 1920s they defended themselves against attacks of neglecting 
Jewish hopes for a return to Palestine, and invested much time and effort to challenge 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
153 In 1936 Zeev Jabotinsky came up with a plan to evacuate the Jewish population from Poland and to 
settle them in Palestine. The plan was endorsed by the Polish government, but stirred much resistance and 
anger among Jewish leaders. For the efforts of the Polish government to enhance Jewish emigration, see 
Cherniavski, Aliyat Yehudei Polin, 53-56. For the debates among Jewish parties regarding the Polish 
pressure for emigration in the late 1930s, see Emanuel Melzer, No Way Out: The Politics of Polish Jewry 
1935-1939 (Cincinnati, 1997), 131-53. 
154  Polish statisticians pointed out that while Jewish emigration rose vigorously between 1933-35 
(constituting up to 56% of the general emigration in 1936), the increase in numbers was only due to 
emigration to Palestine. See Komitetu dla Zbadania potrzeb gospodarzych ludności żydowskiej w Polsce 
dotyczącem Emigracji żydowskiego, in AAN MSW I/1068. Polish-Jewish emigration to Palestine rose 
drastically during the first half of the 1930s, and peaking in 1935 with about 80% of overall Jewish 
emigration. Due to the situation in Palestine and British immigration policies, however, these numbers fell 
again dramatically in the second half of the 1930s. For a detailed analysis of the significance of Palestine 




what they perceived as Zionist hegemony in these matters.155 In addition, the Agudah 
created its own foundation for settlement activities in Palestine (Keren Ha-Yishuv). 
Complaining about the discrimination of Orthodox Jews through the Zionist authorities in 
charge of emigration to Palestine, Agudists opened their own Palestine offices in Vienna 
and Warsaw. Zionists repudiated reproaches of political bias in emigration issues, but 
Agudah leaders continued to voice their accusations.  
In 1925, Isaac Meir Levin, the central Agudah political leader in Poland and son-in-
law of the Gerer Rebbe, gave an interview to the Jewish Telegraphical Agency in which 
he reiterated these reproaches. “Large numbers of the Jews in Poland are hard hit by the 
present economic crisis and anxious to emigrate to Palestine, and a large proportion of 
those who have already emigrated, are not Zionists,” Levin told the Jewish Telegraphic 
Agency. “They are ordinary Jews,” he continued, “with a love of Palestine and a strong 
attachment to Jewish traditional faith.” But because the persons in charge of the Palestine 
emigration offices were often “purely Zionist party men,” Levin claimed, non-Zionist 
Jews encountered enormous difficulties.156  
 Political success of Jewish parties, in fact, seemed increasingly dependent on their 
ability to provide assistance with emigration and especially the provision of highly 
demanded immigration certificates – certificates that enabled their holders to settle in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
155 See for example the numerous references in the Agudah press to the significance of Palestine in Jewish 
religious thinking, as in the series “The religious Jew and Eretz Yisrael,” Der Yud 17.12.20, 4; 24.12.1920, 
6; 31.12.1920, 3; 7.1.1921; 21.1.1921, 3; 16.1.1921, 2-3; 21.1.1921, 3.For an samples of defense against 
Orthodox “passivity” in Palestinian matters, see: Ibid. 26.4.21, 3; 28.4.21, 3. Agudists also defended 
themselves against Zionist and Mizrahi claims that they would destroy Judaism and endanger Jewish 
settlements in Palestine with separate political endeavors, e.g. Der Yud 11.5.21, 2; 11.5.21, 4. 
156 J.T.A. Bulletin, 30.4.1925. Just a month later, the Agudah leader Tobias Horovitz from Poland 
complained to the Zionist leader Berthold Feiwel about the preference given to members of the Zionist 
parties and Jews active for the JNF, as publicly announced by an article in the Haynt. Tobias Horovitz to 
Dr. Bertrhold Feiwel, London 18.5.1925, in CZA Z4/42205. For the article, see Haynt 8.5.1925, 5. Party 
affiliations and Zionist attitudes indeed played a great role in the distribution of the certificates. See 




British Mandate Palestine. During the mid-1930s, Polish authorities noted a high 
fluctuation among the adherents of Jewish political parties, and related this phenomenon 
to an increased desire for emigration to Palestine.157 These reports convey the impression 
that many Polish Jews - when choosing their party affiliation - were less interested in 
ideological outlooks and rather cared for the ability to provide immigration certificates. If 
parties were unable to deliver such certificates, their political strength suffered. This held 
also true to the Orthodox camp. In the Agudah, the quest for certificates became one of 
the major tensions with its youth branches. On various local and national party meetings, 
the Agudah youth urged its representatives to organize more certificates for those 
members desperately waiting to leave Poland.158 Youth leaders demanded greater efforts 
into the organization of training camps for émigrés, and courses in modern Hebrew.159 
Agudists responded to these tensions by gearing up their fundraising and creating training 
camps for pioneers in several Polish cities and towns.160 
Such efforts, on the other hand, put Agudah leaders into a difficult dilemma: How 
could they support emigration and settlement activities while at the same time assuring 
that the Jewish masses did not understand such activities as affirmation of Zionist 
activism?161 To avoid this impression, Agudah leaders made strong efforts to draw clear 
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158 Sprawozdanie (Apr.-Jun. 1933), 92-93, in ibid. MSW IV/93; Sprawozdanie (Jan.-Mar. 1935), in ibid. 
MSW IV/98; Sprawozdanie (Apr.-Jun. 1935), 66, in ibid. MSW IV/91. 
159 Sprawy Narodowościowy No.1-2 (January-April 1935), 81. The Zionist movement had established a 
wide net of such training camps (hakhshara) in Poland, in which they trained Jews in hard physical labor, 
as well as Hebrew, Jewish history and Palestinian geography. For an analysis of one of the kibbutzim of the 
pioneer movement see: Rona Yona, “A Kibbutz in the Diaspora: The Pioneer Movement in Poland and the 
Klosova Kibbutz,” Journal of Israeli History: Politics, Society, Culture 31/1 (2012): 9-43. 
160 Government reports list camps in Vilna and six other places, Sprawozdanie (Jul.-Sep. 1933), 87, in 
AAN MSW IV/92. 
161 Such tensions are evident in writings and lectures of the time. See e.g. Eretz Jisroel und die Orthodoxie. 




boundaries between their own organization and the Zionist movement. They went to 
great lengths to show Orthodoxy’s traditional concern for Palestine. What is more, they 
labored to assure that all those receiving a certificate through the Agudah would meet 
their religious standards. In 1935 the rabbinic council passed a resolution stating that 
certificates were only to be handed out to émigrés committed to keeping up Jewish 
tradition and observance in Palestine.162  
In order to stress their commitment to Jewish settlement in Palestine, Polish Agudists 
started two attempts during the interwar period to publish newspapers exclusively 
dedicated to “the Land of Yisrael.” Already in 1925 B. Kaminer163 published the Erets 
Yisroel Blat. This was a rather ephemeral endeavor reaching no more than six issues, but 
between 1932-34 a second attempt was made, now simply called Erets Yisroel. In 
contrast to the Blat, which had been cautious in revealing openly its direct link to the 
Agudah, Erets Yisroel displayed the party name on its title page, and contained articles 
from central party politicians as well as direct appeals from party institutions.  
Despite these differences, both papers shared a similar outlook. Both displayed a 
highly positive attitude towards Jewish settlement in Palestine, and proudly reported on 
Jewish achievements and progresses. An article from 1925, for example, painted a highly 
positive picture of daily life in Tel Aviv, in which Jewish policemen directed the traffic, 
and Jewish bootblacks chatted in Hebrew to their customers while wiping off their shoes 
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generation, Meshulem Kaminer (and editor of Der Yud). The fact that he was noted as the publisher of the 
first newspaper concerned exclusively with Palestinian affairs seems to be a further indication that much of 




the “dust of the Diaspora” (goles-shtoyb).164 But both papers also harshly scolded the 
Zionists for their rampant nationalism. Instead of living peacefully with their Arab 
neighbors, nationalist activists heated up the atmosphere and thereby endangered Jewish 
lifes. What is more, the ZO abused its political monopoly and settled only non- and anti-
religious Jews in Palestine. The Agudah, on the other hand, made great efforts to struggle 
against this monopoly and to build up religious structures and life in Palestine. The 
papers also reiterated the Agudah position that its leaders were prepared to cooperate 
with the Zionists, provided that this concerned merely economic matters and the latter 
would give up on their cultural work.165 Only the Agudah, this was the central message, 
could create a lasting community in Palestine in the spirit of Jewish tradition and law.  
The two papers nicely illustrate Agudah tactics concerning Palestine. Agudists aimed 
at demonstrating to Polish Jewry that they were not idle and passive in these issues, and 
at refuting charges of holding separatist positions.166 As Polish Jews during the 1930s 
pressed more and more for emigration due to social and economic hardships, these 
attempts became more pronounced, and they openly associated their party’s name with 
the Erets Yisroel paper. Yet at the same time Agudists had to make sure that this would 
not be interpreted as nationalist activism, both in order to not become vulnerable to 
criticism from their opponents within the camp of non-Zionist Orthodoxy, and to stress 
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negation of the Diaspora.” As should become clear from my argument, I do not agree with such 
conclusions. Rather than being a “Zionist aspect” of the Agudah press, such passages point at the 
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the fundamental difference to their Zionist competitors. This turned out to be a difficult 
tightrope. 
Such efforts were particularly complicated by the Mizrahi. The existence of the 
religious Zionist movement, Agudists held, blurred all boundaries between secular 
Zionism and non-Zionist Orthodoxy. Mizrahi activism and especially the party’s strong 
support of settlement in Palestine were increasingly troublesome to the Agudah. In the 
1930s the movement seemed to lose political ground and adherents to the Mizrahi – 
especially among the youth. Members of Agudah youth groups, as Polish observers noted 
repeatedly during the 1930s, left the movement and entered their Mizrahi competitors 
instead.167 What is more, their Orthodox wing provided the ZO with strong arguments to 
fend off Agudah accusations about the discrimination of religious Jews towards the 
British. In February 1933, for example, Haim Arlosoroff, head of Political Department of 
the Jewish Agency, declared to the British government when approached regarding the 
discrimination of Orthodox pioneers: “Admission under the labour schedule has so far 
been subject to a close scrutiny of the applicant's technical knowledge, physical training 
and experience in the occupation he intends to pursue. An applicant, even if he be an 
orthodox Jew, cannot expect to be granted privileges if he does not comply with the 
standards. […] In conclusion it is desired to point out that, while the Agudath Israel may 
rightly claim that its membership is made up of orthodox Jews, there is within the Zionist 
Organisation the Mizrachi Federation, likewise composed of orthodox Jews who are 
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represented on the Advisory Committees of the Palestine Offices, so that, for that reason 
if for no other, a discrimination against orthodox Jews may be regarded as ruled out.”168  
This situation resulted in uncompromising struggles for immigration certificates. As 
the British officially charged the Zionist Organization with the distribution of these 
certificates, the Mizrahi found itself at an advantage over its competitor at the outset. 
Over time, nonetheless, the Agudah gained ground. Despite not being a member of the 
ZO or the Jewish Agency, Agudists succeeded catching up in the struggle for certificates 
during the 1930s.169 During 1934-1937, for example, they attained about 8 % of the 
certificates given to “pioneers.” With 4528 immigrants entering Palestine as pioneers, 
this was one of the largest categories. During the same period the Mizrahi received 435 
certificates and thus only two percent more than its non-Zionist rival.170 In their internal 
correspondences, Mizrahi leaders showed themselves increasingly irritated by such 
successes of the Agudah.  
One of the ways in which Agudah leaders acquired certificates was through 
educational institutions. Yeshivot in Palestine could request quotas of certificates for new 
students and teachers. These certificates were issued directly by the Mandate 
Government, and did not pass the control of the Jewish Agency. Due to these efforts, 
religious Jews from Europe were able to immigrate. Since most of these institutions were 
in the tight grip of non-Zionist Orthodoxy, the Agudah gained much of the political credit 
for such successes. In early 1932 the Gerer Rebbe together with two top-ranking Polish 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
168 Haim Arlosoroff, Executive of the Jewish Agency, to Chief Secretary of the Government Offices, 
Jerusalem 20.2.1933, in CZA S17/114. 
169 Regarding Agudah demands for more certificates to the Jewish Agency, see Regional Office of Agudat 
Yisrael in Palestine to Jewish Agency, 10.5.1933, in Archives of Agudat Yisrael in Palestine (Hereafter 
AAYP) 88. 




Agudah leaders made an additional journey to Palestine. One of the goals of this trip was 
to ensure the cooperation between religious institutions in Palestine and traditionalist 
emigration organizations in Poland. The central Polish Agudah leader and son-in-law of 
the Gerer Rebbe, Isaac Levin, hailed the trip as successful attempt of “inflaming the love 
for the holy land in the hearts of the Orthodox masses.”171 Mizrahi newspapers, in 
contrast, harshly condemned the endeavor. They decried the hypocrisy of sending the 
Gerer Rebbe and his entourage “on first-class tickets” to Jerusalem in order to “have a 
good cry about the misery of the Jewish masses at the Wailing Wall.” Worse even, in 
their eyes, was the political touch that the trip obtained as propaganda tour for Agudat 
Yisrael.172 In former years the Mizrahi press had displayed less enmity towards the 
Rebbe’s Palestine trips. The fierce critique hints at heightened tensions between the two 
movements in their race for certificates. Agudah competition on this field had to be taken 
seriously now.  
 In the early 1930s Agudah leaders turned to British officials, demanding the 
allocation of certificates directly to their organization, without the detour via the Jewish 
Agency. Such endeavors alarmed Zionist leaders in general, and Mizrahists in particular. 
The Jewish Agency was the organization officially designated for cooperation with the 
British in Palestine, and any concessions to the Agudah regarding the allocation of 
certificates would have strengthened the latter’s claims for recognition as equal partner to 
the ZO.173 In the first years such requests seem to have been partially successful. The 
Agudah opened an office for the emigration of Orthodox Jews to Palestine in Warsaw, 
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172 Die Yudishe Shtime 11.2.1932, 3. 
173 Mizrahi Pioneers Warsaw to Jewish Agency in Jerusalem, 11.9.1932, in AIRRZ 007-100 II. See also: 




and was granted special concessions by the Polish administration and the British Consul 
to deal with emigration requests of its party members. But in 1933 this arrangement came 
to an end and the Zionist Palestine Office henceforth processed the requests of Agudah 
members as well.  
Mizrahists showed themselves relieved.174 And yet, the new agreement assured the 
Agudah six percent of the certificates distributed through the office.175 This development, 
on the flip side, deeply troubled Mizrahi leaders, as they worried about their own party 
quotas. Repeatedly, they reproached their Zionist fellows for not keeping promises to the 
Mizrahi and for allocating more certificates to the Agudah than to their own party.176 
Mizrahi members in many countries, they bemoaned in 1934, complained about the fact 
that Agudists were granted better conditions. This, they argued, endangered not only the 
Mizrahi but the whole Zionist project. “If you found it correct to give the Agudah any 
special rights […],” the Mizrahi center in Jerusalem wrote to the Jewish Agency in 
August 1934, “from a Zionist perspective the same rights but with higher quotas [of 
immigrants] must certainly be granted to our own members.”177 But it was not only the 
General Zionist perspective that worried Mizrahi leaders. The Jewish Agency’s 
negotiations with the Agudah threatened their own party’s position within the ZO, and 
their political successes among Polish Jews. In their struggle for higher quotas of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
174 Meir Berlin to Polish Mizrahi 19.5.1933, in ARZ MO98. The Agudah’s negotiations with the British 
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175 Despite inner disagreements about a deal with the Zionists regarding emigration quotas, Agudah leaders 
came to an agreement with the Jewish Agency. Cherniavski, Aliyat Yehudei Polin, 110; Fund, Perud o-
Hishtatfut, 251. 
176 Mizrahi pioneers in Warsaw to central Mizrahi office in Jerusalem, 6.6.1935, in AIRRZ 007-105 II. 
Moses Reich to World Mizrahi, 15.1.1938, in AIRRZ 007-152 II. 




immigration certificates, in fact, Mizrahists themselves were in much strife with the 
Jewish Agency.178 The negotiations seemed to open the door to an alternative option of 
Zionist-Orthodox cooperation and thus undermined the Mizrahi’s ability to assert its own 
demands. 
Touting for the same constituencies, the Polish branches of the two parties became 
bitter rivals for certificates. This held especially true for certificates allocated on the basis 
of affiliation with religious offices or institutions, such as those granted to religious 
students and rabbis.179 Agudat Yisrael, Mizrahists lamented, was able to acquire more 
certificates for these groups than they themselves were.180 In this context, the question of 
which institution in Poland should be in charge of certificates for rabbis became highly 
politicized. During negotiations between the Jewish Agency, the chief rabbinate in 
Palestine, and the Agudah in 1934, Isaac Gruenbaum proposed the rabbinic association to 
take on this task. The goal of this association, established during the postwar years, was 
to support Polish rabbis and organize them in a nonpartisan forum. The relations between 
Agudat Yisrael and the rabbinic association, however, were fraught with tensions during 
these years.181 Therefore, Agudah representatives suggested assigning this authority to 
the Rabbinic Council of their own party. Mizrahists rejected both suggestions. These 
institutions, they held, were politically biased and therefore unfit. They much rather 
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Jewish Agency was willing to grant them about 15-16%. Polish Mizrahi pioneers to World Mizrahi 
10.6.1934, in AIRRZ 007−102 II. 
179  These certificates were not distributed through the Jewish Agency, but directly by the British 
administration.  
180 World Mizrahi office in Jerusalem to Polish Mizrahi 30.1.1938, in ibid. 007-179 II. 
181 In the first half of the 1930s Agudah representatives encountered harsh opposition within the rabbinic 
assembly in various cases including the question of a centralized ordination of rabbis, and the struggle for 
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preferred their own organizations to perform this task.182 This issue, indeed, might have 
been on the minds of Mizrahists when they decided to establish their own rabbinic 
council two years later. While this was not declared publicly, the struggle for certificates 
was foremost a political one for power and influence.  
Agudah efforts to acquire certificates led to growing tensions within religious Zionist 
circles. Correspondences between different Mizrahi offices both within Poland and 
between the Polish branch and the central office in Jerusalem referred increasingly to 
complaints from rank-and-file members about the leaders’ inability to provide them with 
certificates. Local Mizrahists blamed the national Polish leadership, and those passed the 
blame on to the central office in Jerusalem. High-ranking Mizrahi representatives tried to 
calm the minds of their constituencies. In 1935, the prominent Mizrahi leader, Isaac 
Nissenbaum considered it necessary to publish recommendations for local Mizrahi 
branches how to best deal with members that were upset about not getting one of the 
coveted certificates.183  
But irritations within the party continued to rise. In early 1938, Moses Reich, who 
was in charge of the organization of Mizrahi pioneers in Galicia,184 contacted the central 
party office in Jerusalem. The occasion of his letter was the struggle of Eastern Galician 
farmers for certificates. The Mizrahi, Reich held, had to make the support of these 
religious farmers its priority. Reich cautioned the international leadership to take the 
question of immigration seriously, the issue “that to my mind is today the most important 
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for the Mizrahi and on which depends the implementation of our idea.” Bemoaning the 
bad condition of Mizrahi pioneers, he continued to stress the urgency of this matter. “Due 
to our tiny proportion of category-B certificates, 185  our reputation in the Jewish 
community (tsibur ivri), which today sees everything through the prism of the 
certificates, has decreased. Because the Agudah got great numbers of the certificates, 
even the committed Zionists among religious Jewry start to see us as kind of shlemiel, 
whose way is covered with obstacles.”186 As the one in charge of the pioneers, it was 
Reich’s task to advocate for support of the struggle of Galician farmers. And yet, his 
words reveal a deep unrest within the movement. Religious Zionists, as seen in chapter 
one, based their claims for authority first and foremost on social and political activism, 
including the organization of help and institutions for refugees and emigrants. Agudah 
successes on this field, therefore, could be particularly damaging to their own project.       
Responding to this threat, Mizrahists geared up their own efforts for the acquisition of 
certificates. For one, they tried to increase their share of certificates through negotiations 
with the Jewish Agency. Strengthening Orthodox Jewry convened within the ZO itself, 
they argued, was of vital significance for the movement as a whole. Any additional 
certificates for the Agudah, they demanded, had to be matched with increased quotas for 
Mizrahi emigrants.187 Already in 1933, Mizrahists pointed at the correlation between the 
ability to provide certificates to the masses, and the political strength of their party. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
185 The Mandate Government distributed immigration certificates based on different socio-economic 
categories. Category B was reserved to students and clergy. The Agudah was indeed more successful in 
acquiring certificates of this category (though the numbers in general were very low). In the winter months 
of 1935/36 it acquired 33 and in the summer of 1936 37 certificates, while the Mizrahi was only able to get 
8 certificates of this category during the same period. See Cherniavski, Aliyat Yehudei Polin, 117. 
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187 World Mizrahi to Jewish Agency 12.8.1934, ARZ MO 102. To back their point, they tried to show how 
the Mizrahi’s quota suffered from any certificate given to the Agudah, see e.g. Warsaw Pioneers to Yakov 




Agudah leaders, at the time, were negotiation with American Jewish representatives 
about their support for a joint World Jewish Congress. After having been opposed to such 
an endeavor for many years, they indicated their willingness to join the project under the 
condition that the Americans helped them to receive certificates. Strongly worried about 
these developments, Polish Mizrahi leaders implored their two outstanding international 
leaders, Meir Berlin and Yehuda Maimon, to do anything within their power to prevent 
such an agreement. The Polish Agudah, they pointed out, suffered severe political losses 
from the fact that its leaders were not able to provide the youth with certificates. “We 
have to stress,” the Polish Mizrahi office wrote, “that its inability to acquire certificates is 
decreasing the value and significance of the Agudah among Polish youths […].” 
Therefore, they argued, Mizrahists had to avert the Agudah’s joining of the world 
congress, “if only for the reason that they will not receive even one certificate.”188 This 
was a noteworthy statement, as the Mizrahi had promoted the cooperation of Zionist and 
non-Zionist forces in such a framework for years, and had repeatedly urged Agudists 
publicly to join the project.189 
Moreover, Mizrahi activists engaged in attempts to receive certificates through 
religious institutions and organizations. To this purpose, they sought to tighten their 
cooperation with yeshivot in Palestine, and urged these institutions to demand certificates 
for students from Eastern Europe.190 In addition, Polish Mizrahists advanced plans to 
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demand special quotas for yeshiva students from the Jewish Agency.191 Such endeavors, 
they hoped, would heighten their influence among the students. In 1933, British Mizrahi 
rabbis and the Polish pioneer movement succeeded in receiving a contingent of the 
certificates. “From then on,” Moses Shulvas announced in a short historical overview of 
the religious Zionist workers’ movement in Poland in late 1935, “the alliya of yeshiva 
students was a solid endeavor, headed by the Mizrahi pioneers.”192 In contrast to Shulvas’ 
enthusiastic depiction, successes seem to have stayed limiteds. Throughout the 1930s 
Polish Mizrahists continued to complain bitterly to the international leadership about 
their significant disadvantages vis-à-vis the Agudah on this field.193   
 Lastly, the Polish Mizrahi increased its bids for rabbinic support of its own 
settlement and immigration efforts. It is in this context that we have to understand the 
renewed attempts of establishing its own rabbinic assembly, as well as the harsh conflicts 
about rabbinic support for an Orthodox division of the JNF. As their competition with the 
Agudah for certificates grew stronger, the need to back up the own approach with 
rabbinic support gained in importance.194 The violent responses and harsh condemnations 
from non-Zionist Orthodoxy reveal the mutual awareness of this significance. Beyond 
this, the excesses might not only have been directed against the Mizrahi, but also aimed 
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Mizrahi to Jewish Agency 22.3.1933, in ibid. 007-130 II. Such requests seemed at least partially caused by 
complaints of Mizrahi yeshiva students about being at disadvantage in the distribution of certificates, see 
e.g. David Ben-Zion Bogaywitsz to Torah ve-Avodah Poland 20.9.1934, in ibid. 007-131 II. Warsaw 
Pioneers to Torah ve-Avodah 27.9.1933, in ibid. 007-100 II. 
192 Mosheh Shulvas, Datn un khronik. Tsu der geshikhte fun der “toyre ve-avoyde”-bavegung in poyln 
(Warsaw, October 1935), 68.  
193 Mizrahi Poland to World Mizrahi 16.7.1934, in AIRRZ 007-103 II; Mizrahi Poland to World Mizrahi 
21.3.1937, in ARZ MO 132. 
194 Baruch Gotesdiner noticed that rabbinic support for the JNF had to shake up the very foundations of the 




at silencing voices within the Orthodox camp that called for cooperation with the 
Zionists. The monitoring Polish government authorities indicate major tensions within 
the Agudah in connection with the question of support for the Orthodox division of the 
JNF.195  
This rabbinic support gained high symbolic importance, because it brought together 
the two great battlefields of Orthodox politics during the 1930s - the role of rabbinic 
authority within Orthodox politics on the one hand, and the struggle for the hearts of the 
Jewish masses on the other. It directly touched upon one of the most explosive questions 
among Orthodox parties, namely the tension between spiritual authority on the one hand, 
and social and political activism on the other. Both the Mizrahi and Agudat Yisrael 
witnessed such tensions. While the Agudah tried to dissolve them by strengthening the 
rabbinic leadership, Mizrahists stressed social and political activism and tended to 
downplay the significance of spiritual authority. Seen from this perspective, the rabbinic 
support for the Orthodox division within the JNF directly undermined the Agudah 
approach. These rabbis weakened the significance of strong spiritual authority by 
supporting the emigration efforts and activism of secularist Zionists and Mizrahists.  
The increased focus on Palestine, however, had its price. Dedicating means to the 
field of emigration - both financial ones and manpower - forced them to cut back in other 
areas. Throughout the 1930s, the Polish Agudah was struggling with a lack of sufficient 
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funding, and its leaders debated how to deal with their limited means.196 The Polish 
Mizrahi, as well, suffered from economic hardship, and got into frequent quarrels with 
the international leadership in Jerusalem about the distribution of financial means. Some 
in the international movement objected to investing any money in the Diaspora. The 
Mizrahi, they held, should exclusively focus on settlement work in Palestine, rather than 
engaging in much loathed “Sejm-Zionism.”197 Others stressed the necessity of Zionist 
Gegenwartsarbeit. Diaspora communities, they countered, did not only send money but 
also their sons, and thus brought major sacrifices to the settlement enterprise. In these 
debates it were particularly the Polish leaders, who advocated for the importance of 
investing in the Diaspora.198 Abraham Rubinstein even claimed the work in the kehillot to 
be the main reason for the Mizrahi’s existence.199 Nonetheless, Palestine itself was 
becoming a more and more important arena for Orthodox politics, and increasingly 
decisive for Agudah-Mizrahi contestations. 
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the Mizrahi world convention in October 1928, for example, representatives from Europe, the US and 
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Conflict and Cooperation 
Mizrahists supplemented their struggles for certificates with heightened attacks 
against non-Zionist Orthodoxy and with mockery of Agudist efforts in the field of 
emigration. They accused the Agudah of only engaging in these endeavors for their own 
political benefits, and repeatedly accused non-Zionist Orthodoxy of hypocrisy. While 
Agudah’s Rabbinic Council had decided that only Jews with traditional garb could 
receive certificates, the Mizrahi press claimed, pictures of these immigrants prooved that 
by far not all dressed in such a style. And, the article added, even some of the editors of 
the Agudah newspaper Dos Yudishe Togblatt wore modern garb.200 Such polemics 
challenged the traditionalist self-depiction of Agudat Yisrael, and countered charges of 
the latter against the modern and secular lifestyle of Mizrahists.  
Mutual attacks, indeed, played a crucial role in the inter-party dynamics. Throughout 
the interwar period, the media of both parties spilled much ink on their grappling with the 
respective main opponent in the camp of Orthodox Jewry. The overwhelming majority of 
these articles were barefaced assaults on the adversary. And yet, the party press also 
contained articles dealing with the possibility of mutual cooperation of the two 
antagonists. Although different in style, the two genres fulfilled a similar function. Both 
attacks and offers of cooperation helped the two sides to advertise their cause among the 
masses and to shape and develop their own platforms. In fact, they were not only useful 
weapons against the political enemy, but also served as means to silence critical voices 
within their own ranks. Whenever individuals within either Agudah or Mizrahi pondered 
cooperation or even unification during the 1920s, mutual attacks in the party media were 
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likely to increase. Party propagandists stressed the insurmountable differences between 
the two Orthodox organizations and thereby advanced processes of ideological formation 
and consolidation. 
In November 1919, the high-ranking Mizrahi politician from Warsaw, Heshel 
Farbstein, complained about disunity and strife among Jewish Orthodoxy in Poland. “In 
any normal nation,” Farbstein wrote, “two political parties that are separated by quite 
substantial differences, but at the same time also have much in common, would try to 
reach mutual understanding by focusing on shared values and positions.” Mizrahi and 
Agudat Yisrael, Farbstein argued, had to cooperate for the sake of the welfare of 
Orthodox Jewry. Instead of offering practical suggestions for such cooperation, however, 
Farbstein continued his article by fiercely attacking the Polish branch of Agudat Yisrael, 
and accused it of monopolizing the representation of Jewish Orthodoxy. Agudat Yisrael, 
he held, had had ample opportunities during the war years to witness that their own 
policies stood in contradiction to the interests of the Jewish people. Lacking any 
constructive party program, the Agudah merely existed to attack Zionism. Their assaults 
on the Zionist movement and the Mizrachi, however, were in vain. The Jewish masses, 
and especially the youth, rejected the Agudah and embraced the Mizrahi. Even a 
significant part of the most renowned rabbinic figures, Farbstein claimed, supported the 
religious Zionist cause. Triumphantly, Farbstein ended his article by proclaiming: “The 
future of religious Jewry in Poland and Lithuania belongs to the Mizrahi.”201 
The rhetorical figure that Farbstein employed in these lines would become a well-
established part of religious Zionist discourse in the interwar period. In this trope, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  





Mizrahi politicians called on their counterparts from Agudat Yisrael to cooperate, only to 
conclude a few sentences later that the political approach of the latter was doomed to 
failure and that religious Zionism was the only valid option for Orthodox Jewry. When 
Agudat Yisrael started to openly advocate for Jewish settlement in Palestine shortly after 
the war, and in particular in the heightened struggles for immigration certificates during 
the 1930s, Mizrahists regularly invited the Agudah to cooperate. Finally, they typically 
asserted, Agudat Yisrael had learned its lesson and started to adopt the religious Zionist 
approach. Little by little, Agudists would mend their mistakes and eventually join the 
religious Zionist movement.  
Such rhetoric helped Mizrahi politicians to deal with a fundamental dilemma. In 
official declarations and party propaganda they repeatedly called on the Agudah to be 
active in Palestine and to cooperate with the Zionist Organization. But its actual 
involvement constituted dangerous political competition for the religious Zionist 
approach. What is more, the Agudah’s negotiations with the Jewish Agency threatened 
the Mizrahi’s position within the Zionist Organization, and the allocation of higher 
certificate quotas to Agudah adherents, it was feared, would strengthen the political 
power of the party in Poland.202 The trope, thus, helped the Mizrahi press to declare 
Agudist involvement in Palestine as their own ideological victory, while at the same time 
establishing crucial differences that distinguished the two parties, and elaborating on their 
own approach.  
Such articles were not only directed outwardly, but also towards critiques in the own 
ranks. In the early 1930s Rabbi Avigdor Amiel triggered a major debate within the 
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international movement by openly criticizing the strict affiliation of Mizrahists with 
secular Zionism, and by demanding stronger efforts to place the party thoroughly within 
the camp of Orthodox Jewry.203 Amiel’s comments were answered in the Polish party 
press with similar phrases and arguments. In Di Yudishe Shime the Polish party leader 
Samuel Halevi Brodt204 argued 1931 that the Mizrahi constantly reached out to Agudat 
Yisrael. No party convention passed, Brodt assured, without the demand for mutual 
cooperation. Nevertheless, Agudists did not respond to this proof of goodwill.205 One 
week later Barukh Gotesdiner continued the argument. Brodt, he claimed, had rightly 
pointed out the Mizrahi’s overwhelming willingness for cooperation. But he had omitted 
the most essential point: the fundamental difference in the approaches of the two parties. 
Agudah leaders, he claimed, were hypocrites and only working for the benefit of their 
own party. The historical significance of Zionism and the awakening of the Jewish 
masses, Gotesdiner held, were completely lost on them. Not Mizrahists, but Agudists, 
had to start a process of soul searching. 206  Referring to Agudist omissions and 
stubbornness allowed Brodt and Gotesdiner to dismiss Amiel’s remarks without any 
grappling with the substance of his critique.  
Agudists, in turn, employed similar tropes to fend off Mizrahi accusations of 
separatism, and to silence calls for cooperation between the two parties. The party’s turn 
to an active support for Jewish settlement in Palestine after the war, in fact, did not only 
put the Mizrahi in rhetorical constrains, but the Agudah itself. Polish representatives went 
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204 Rabbi Samuel Halevi Brodt was the rabbi of Lipno, an important Mizrahi leader, and deputy in the 
Polish parliament.  
205 Di Yudishe Shtime 17.12.1931, 1-2. 




to great lengths to ensure that their support for Jewish settlement would not be 
misunderstood as rapprochement with Zionism. Those who demanded cooperation with 
the Mizrahi, an article in Der Yud announced in early 1919, had to press religious 
Zionists to comply with rigorous standards. Mizrahi leaders, the article held, had to put 
up a strong fence between themselves and secular Zionists. In addition, those leaders, 
who had been members of the General Zionists before joining the Mizrahi, had to be 
replaced with actually “observant Jews.” This was a reference to Isaac Nissenbaum and 
Heshel Farbstein, who both had joined the Mizrahi only recently.207 The two were 
arguably the most important religious Zionists at the time and banning them from their 
positions would have weakened the party considerably. Instead of offering substantial 
suggestions for cooperation, the article concluded by asserting that Agudists had finally 
compiled a party program that covered all political needs of Orthodox Jewry. Those 
observant Jews, who had temporarily been in other organizations, such as the Mizrahi, 
would now be able to join the Agudah.208   
When a year later Mizrahi politicians rejected Agudah offers for uniting Orthodox 
education in Palestine, Der Yud again grappled with the question of cooperation. By now, 
the author claimed, even the Mizrahi had accepted the fact that the protection of Torah 
and tradition had to be given first priority. Nevertheless, Mizrahists were not willing to 
work together. Instead, they founded their own schools. “Cannot all Orthodox 
organizations cooperate? Does the Mizrahi have to have other schools than the rest of 
Orthodox Jewry? Are there, God forbid, two Torahs among the Jews?” Rhetorically deft, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
207 The reference to Farbstein and Nissenbaum was no coincidence. Farbstein was regularly attacked in the 
Agudah newspapers. Nissenbaum was one of the fiercest Zionists within the Mizrahi, and opponents 
against cooperation with the Agudah. For Nissenbaum’s Zionist theology, see Schwartz, Eretz ha-
Mamashut ve-ha-Dimyon, 45-61. 




the author depicted Agudat Yisrael as representing Jewish Orthodoxy per se, and the 
Mizrahi as breaking away from its unity, thus turning the tables and accusing religious 
Zionists of separatism, and of dividing Orthodox Jewry. Without stating it directly, the 
author also hinted at tensions between Polish Agudists and their fellows in Great Britain. 
The latter apparently pressed the Polish Agudah to come to terms with its political 
opponent. “Our Orthodox brothers” in Britain, the author responded to such demands, 
should pay closer attention to the deeds and words of the other side, the ones “from open 
Zionists and from those in disguise, dressed up with a little Mizrahi hat.”209 Similar to the 
religious Zionist press, Agudah leaders employed such tropes to demonstrate their own 
willingness to work together and at the same time blame the other side for rendering such 
cooperation impossible.   
To be sure, not all representatives of Orthodox Jewry in interwar Poland saw in the 
issue of mutual cooperation merely a rhetorical weapon for the political struggle. Some 
genuinely voiced their thoughts on the possibility of an Orthodox rapprochement, in 
particular within the ranks of religious Zionists. In the early post-war years, when the two 
sides were still in flux, leaders from both parties recognized leeway for common projects. 
The first Polish Mizrahi congress in 1917 witnessed intense debates about the best 
ideological alignments of the party. Some voices suggested tightening their affiliations 
with non-Zionist Orthodoxy. Others, in contrast, rejected the idea so fiercely that their 
words were not even included in the internal congress minutes.210 Unfortunately, we lack 
similar transcripts from Agudah congresses. But even the polemical party press was 
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sometimes penetrated by voices that saw an honest chance for peace between the two 
movements.211  
This was especially true during the early post-war years, when the boundaries 
between the two movements were still in flux. During these years the Agudah media 
concentrated its attacks mainly on the general Zionist movement, and rarely mentioned 
the Mizrahi specifically. In the early 1920s, this changed, due to the increased electoral 
strength of the religious Zionists, and the hardening of positions. After 1923, only few 
publicly pondered honest cooperation. Now direct confrontations and mutual polemics 
gained in significance. When in the late thirties the two world movements actually 
entered negotiations, these were not announced in the party press. Especially Agudah 
leaders demanded strict confidentiality and were reluctant to release news about 
successes, even when a deal seemed achieved.212 In the Polish context it is the lack of 
cooperation, which is most noticeable. On the local level such cooperation sometimes 
occurred, but in national politics very few instances can be detected.213 And even in those 
rare cases in which the parties came to some tactical agreement in the national Polish 
arena, distrust and suspicion prevailed, and agreements quickly dissolved. 
Meanwhile, leaders from both sides employed similar rhetoric figures in their 
dealings with the political opponent. Both sides depicted themselves as earnestly 
representing the Jewish people, while accusing the other side of pursuing petty party 
interests. Mizrahists at times aspired to adopt the position as broker between Orthodoxy 
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and Zionism,214 but most public announcements clearly aimed at diminishing their 
adversary’s political significance. “We would love to work closely together with Agudat 
Yisrael,” Yehuda Maimon declared in 1923 in the Polish party journal Ha-Mizrahi. 
Instead of reflecting on the details of such cooperation, he continued by itemizing a long 
list of differences between the two parties, and by decrying Agudah policies. He then 
elaborated on the political concepts of religious Zionism. The Mizrahi, Maimon ended, 
stands for “unity and peace, in contrast to the views of the Agudah that calls for 
separatism and disintegration.”215 Mutual conflicts and polemics, but also offers of 
cooperation, gave leaders of both sides the opportunity to sharpen and refine the public 
profile of their own party.  
 
Conclusions 
The deterioration of the kehillot and the concomitant collapse of the traditional 
balance between rabbinic and secular elites within the communities generated harsh 
struggles for power and authority. Religious Zionists intended to adapt Jewish 
communities in Poland to the needs of the modern state with a centralized bureaucracy, 
and a professionalized administration. They aimed at establishing themselves as the 
leaders of this administration. Combining traditional religious observance with modern 
nationalism, they held themselves to be the best representatives of the Jewish community 
as a whole. Religious institutions and leadership were of significance, but had to be 
integrated into modern bureaucratic structures. The largely decentralized and unchecked 
character of spiritual authority hardly fitted such models. This was especially true for 
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Hasidism with its strong regionalism and its strict adherence to individual authorities. 
Religious Zionists worked to tame and subordinate spiritual authority to the needs of the 
modern nation state.  
Agudah leaders, as well, grappled with the challenges of the modern nation state, and 
attempted to come to terms with the dismal situation of Jewish kehillot all over Poland. 
Agudists strongly opposed the newly emerging political leaders of modern mass 
movements. As the political power in modern states was based on democratic vote, they 
had to compete with their nationalist and socialist rivals. At the same time, they stayed 
deeply suspicious towards the political participation of the masses, and favored the strong 
leadership of a selected few, an idea they tried to depict as mere continuation of the 
former power balance between a wealthy elite of secular leaders and the local spiritual 
authority. They feared the innovative and possibly destructive power of modern mass 
politics. Traditional structures and institutions had to be protected from the whims of the 
fickle electorate, so easily influenced by populist politicians. Questions of religious law, 
they held, must not be subjected to democratic voting procedures. The only valid 
authority to decide halakhic questions was the spiritual elite. In their attempt to protect 
traditionalist lifestyles, they declared all and everything to belong to the realm of 
religious law. Nothing, not even the question of political party affiliations, was to be 
excluded from this realm and thus had to be subjected to rabbinic authority.  
Religious Zionists, from this perspective, posed the greatest threat to the Agudist 
project, precisely because they did not dismiss religious observance and institutions 
altogether. Rather than disregarding these structures, Mizrahists struggled to reform and 




control, thereby directly challenging the power base of the spiritual elite. Just how far this 
democratic control should be expanded, this question was highly controversial within 
religious Zionist circles. The political struggle with Agudat Yisrael and the self-
fashioning of Mizrahi leaders as an alternative to the former, however, soothed these 
tensions and helped to get those within the movement the upper hand, who intended to 
strictly confine the authority of the spiritual elite to the realm of ritual and traditions. But 
the Agudah also witnessed inner tensions between authority based on religious structures 
and institutions on the one hand, and political activism on the other. Its political 
competition with the Mizrahi helped to stress the significance of strong rabbinic authority 
also within its own ranks. The dynamics between the two parties are crucial for our 
understanding of modern Orthodox politics. Mizrahists did not only decide to not accept 
the ideological innovation of Daat Torah,216 but actively promoted other forms of 
community leadership and entered into direct competition for authority and power in the 
traditionalist Jewish camp.217 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
216 As pointed out by Asaf Kaniel. Compare Kaniel, “Politiqa Ortodoqsit,” 70. 
217 Even messianic prophecies could serve to advance these struggles for leadership and power. Rabbi 
Elhanan Bunin Wasserman, the foremost representative of Daat Torah in the interwar period, saw Amalek 
at work in modern nationalism and accused the “Religio-Nationalists” of corroding the camp of religious 
Jewry and leading Jews away from redemption. Elhanan Bunin Wasserman, Epoch of the Messiah (Los 
Angeles, 1985), 32; idem. Omer Ani Ma‘asi la-Meleh (Bnei Beraq, 1971). In Isaac Nissenbaum’s thoughts, 
in contrast, national-religious leaders advance the messianic age. See Ytizhak Nissenbaum, Masoret ve-
Herut. Hegionot ve-Rahashei Lev al ha-Yahadut ha-Datit-ha-Le’umit ve-Hishtalshelutah (Warsaw, 1939). 
Bacon stresses that messianic outlooks were common among Orthodox leaders across the different camps 
and reads them as interpretation of the times. I would take this line even further and see messianic writings 






Divisive Land:  
The Effects of Jewish Settlement in Palestine on the 




After World War One Palestine became an increasingly important destination for 
Jewish migration, and Zionist settlement projects enjoyed growing attention within the 
Jewish world. During these years, both Mizrahi and Agudat Yisrael established branches 
in the area. Defying depictions of passivity and indifference towards the developments in 
Palestine, inner-Orthodox conflict and their tripartite relationship with the ZO forced both 
movements to take an increasingly direct role in local and international politics. Thus, 
Palestine came to occupy a central place in Orthodox struggles for power and leadership. 
 Much of the scholarly literature depicts the Palestinian leaders of Agudat Yisrael as 
“extremists” who developed an “ideology of seclusion” during this period, disassociating 
themselves in a sect-like manner from the rest of the Jewish community, and isolating 
themselves even from many of their peers in the world Agudah movement. I do not 
dispute this account of the deeply conservative outlook held by the Palestinian branch of 
the movement, nor the significance of the fierce political struggles within its ranks. But 
by dismissing them as hopelessly divided “extremists,” historians fail to recognize 
important aspects of what these leaders tried to achieve in their escalating confrontations 
with Zionist activists, and the ways in which nationalist and traditionalist elites 




 I take issues with the term “extremists” for two reasons. First, the term is directly 
adopted from the sources. As such it is not a value-free description of historical actors, 
but was part of very the struggles under analysis. Zionist activists labeled those non-
Zionist leaders “extremists” who were not willing to cooperate with them, or who held 
opinions in conflict with their own weltanschauung. Non-Zionist Orthodox leaders were 
aware of these semantics. In their own writings they either rejected the term and in return 
tried to pin it on their Zionist opponents, or attempted to give it a positive spin. More 
generally, the term is problematic in its own right, as it is highly politically charged. 
“Extremists” are those who stand outside or on the very edge of a political spectrum. This 
suggests the existence of a normative center, and assesses political outlooks within the 
framework of this spectrum. While in retrospect this might make sense when assessing 
those struggles from the viewpoint of the Israeli nation state, it limits our ability to take 
into account the open-endedness and undetermined character of historical processes.1 
What is more, without deconstructing such highly charged concepts, scholars are in 
danger of prolonging the very ideological struggles they aim to analyze. To avoid this, I 
will use the term “conservative” in Karl Mannheim’s sense to describe these leaders.2      
The chapter focuses on Orthodox efforts to build up local branches of their 
movements, on their struggle over the religious and ideological outlook of the Jewish 
communities in Palestine, and on their endeavors to install themselves as the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Such a view is most pronouncedly expressed in the work of Joseph Fund, who investigated changing 
Agudah attitudes towards Zionism in order to investigate how the party became part of a political 
consensus necessary for the functioning of the Israeli democratic model. He outlines his perspective in his 
doctorate: Yosef Fund, “Agudat Yisra’el mul ha-Tzyionut ve-Medinat Yisra’el” (PhD diss., Bar-Ilan 
University, 1989).  
2 For a critique of the use of the term “extremism” in the German and European contexts, see Christoph 
Kopke/ Lars Rensmann, “Die Extremismus-Formel. Zur politischen Karriere einer wissenschaftlichen 
Ideologie,“ Blätter für deutsche und Internationale Politik 45, 2000: 1451–1460; Wolfgang Wippermann, 




representatives of Orthodox Jewry in the Palestine of the 1920s. How did the process of 
positioning Mizrahi and Agudat Yisrael in the emerging political landscape affect their 
relations? To answer this question, the chapter explores early political activities in the 
immediate postwar years. It discusses the significance of Orthodox battles over emerging 
community structures in general, and female enfranchisement in particular, and asks how 
these battles helped the two sides to form and develop their outlooks and party platforms. 
In a next step, the chapter considers the tripartite relationship of the two Orthodox 
movements and the ZO, and investigates growing Agudah-Mizrahi political competition 
within this framework. Negotiations between representatives of Agudat Yisrael and the 
Jewish Agency, and discussions about bylaws of the Jewish community in Palestine, 
brought the two Orthodox movements increasingly into conflict. Finally, the chapter 
looks at the ways in which the Zionist-Arab clashes of the late 1920s impacted on intra-
Orthodox dynamics.  
 
The Emergence of the Players   
World War I radically changed the political landscape and the living conditions in the 
Middle East. The Ottoman Empire was crushed, to be replaced by the British, whose rule 
was formalized by the League of the Nations through the British Mandate for Palestine. 
The Mandate, instituted in a resolution at the San Remo conference in April 1920 and 
confirmed by the League of Nations in July 1922, bestowed upon the British the 
administration of the area formerly part of southern Ottoman Syria. Among other things, 
the Mandate commissioned the British to put into effect the Balfour Declaration of 




“national home for the Jewish people” promised by the declaration. This resolution was 
perceived as a tremendous victory for the ZO. For the first time since its establishment in 
1997, the ZO gained international recognition and, importantly, was also named as the 
Jewish organization with which the British liaised and cooperated in Palestine. Zionist 
pioneers, encouraged by these developments, began to build structures and institutions in 
order to fill the “national home” with their own ideas and interpretations. As part of these 
efforts, they attempted to establish a body that would represent the Jewish community in 
Palestine and in November 1918 even went so far as to present their own draft 
“constitution” according to which Palestine would become a Jewish Commonwealth.3   
 The question of religious practice and the role of religious institutions within the 
newly emerging political and societal structures quickly became deeply embattled. 
Religious Zionist activists, concerned about the observance of Jewish law in public life, 
established the first local chapters of the Mizrahi movement in several new Jewish 
settlements, and in Jerusalem. Before the war, Yehuda Leib Maimon, a key member of 
the international movement, had made the first attempts at establishing a Palestinian 
branch, to no avail. This time the initiative came mostly from activists living and working 
in the newly established settlements. Rabbis were involved in the establishment of the 
settlements, but did not take the lead.4 The Mizrahi activists declared their intent to work 
toward the strengthening of religious life in the new settlements, and to integrate 
Orthodoxy into these new frameworks. To this end, Mizrahists tried to gain a foothold in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Moses Burstein, Self-government of the Jews in Palestine Since 1900 (Tel-Aviv, 1934), 65-184; Neil 
Caplan, Palestine Jewry and the Arab Question 1917-1925 (London, 1978), 13-46. 
4 The sources about these early months, however, are scarce, and numbers are uncertain. According to one 
of the local party leaders, Moses Ostrovski, the Jerusalem branch had already 1000 members in the middle 
of 1918, see Mosheh Ostrovski, “Reshit ha-Mizrahi ba-Aretz,” in Sefer ha-Tzyionut ha-Datit: Iyunim, 
Ma’amarim, Reshimot, Te‘udot vol. 1 (Jerusalem, 1977), 372–387. For Maimon’s pre-war endeavors, see 




the traditionalist Jewish settlements, as well, and integrated a small group of young 
activists from Jerusalem into their ranks. The success of this group, however, was 
limited.5 As one of their first political steps, Mizrahi leaders submitted their demands to 
the Zionist committee dealing with the preparations for the establishment of a 
parliamentary assembly of the Jewish community in Palestine. In this document, they 
declared their intent to establish religious Zionist education, to fight for the establishment 
of a juridical system based on Jewish law, and to create public institutions operating in 
agreement with Jewish tradition.6  
By voicing such goals and demands, Mizrahi activists strove to create and shape a 
religious Zionist community and to establish their movement as the political 
representative of this community. As part of this process, Mizrahists labored to re-
organize the rabbinate and to centralize rabbinic authority. At their first national party 
meeting in September 1918, they called for a convention of all rabbis in Palestine. This 
convention took place in the office of the Jerusalem Rabbinate in May 1919. Through the 
conference, the organizers hoped to strengthen the position of the rabbis in the new 
political framework by uniting them in one organization and centralizing rabbinic 
authority. Such an organization would integrate rabbinic authority into the new political 
frameworks and hopefully absorb some of the resistance of Palestinian rabbis to Zionist 
aspirations to gather the Jewish community under the Mizrahist political leadership. But 
such an endeavor was controversial. While the meeting had been under the auspices of 
the Jerusalemite Rabbis Haim Elisher and Zvi Pessach Frank, not all Palestinian rabbinic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Bat-Yehuda, Rabbi Maimon in His Generations, 233. Mosheh Ostrovski, Toledot ha-Mizrahi be-Eretz 
Yisra’el (Jerusalem, 1943), 14. 
6 Ibid., 15. Ostrovski’s account is strongly ideologically tinged, but he lists the major conferences and 




figures were willing to take part in the convention. What is more, even within the ranks 
of those willing to cooperate with the Zionists, the political activists soon got into tension 
with rabbinic authority. Such tensions between different claims for leadership 
characterized and shaped the movement during the following decade.   
More than any other, the question of cooperation with the Zionists polarized the 
leaders of the traditionalist Jewish community in Palestine. Palestinian Jews had 
displayed ambivalent attitudes towards Zionist settlement work since its emergence in the 
second half of the nineteenth century. In the 1880s, traditionalist circles played an 
important role in the early attempts to create farm settlements outside of the established 
Jewish communities. Colonies were founded with the help of money and labor from 
newly arriving immigrants. But not everyone agreed with these activities, and the 
secularism of many immigrants quickly became a major source of contention. In addition, 
the Zionists started competing with traditionalist leaders for Diaspora funds; indeed, 
economics became increasingly important. Traditionalist Jewish settlements relied almost 
exclusively on donations from their observant brethren in Europe. When this system 
collapsed during World War I, the Zionists stepped in, gaining increasing authority 
through the raising of funds. After the war, they tried to translate their newly gained 
political leverage into claims for leadership over the whole Jewish community in 
Palestine. Under British rule, the issue of cooperation with the Zionists and the attitude 
towards the new settlements, the New Yishuv, became a central factor in the shaping of 
ideological positions within the traditionalist community, the Old Yishuv.7 
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Struggling with the severe implications of the war, the relations between different 
groups in the Old Yishuv were laden with tension and enmity. This polarization became 
reinforced by an increasing separation of communal institutions. In August 1919, in the 
midst of these struggles, the most conservative of these forces gathered under the 
“Council of the Ashkenazic Jewish Community of Jerusalem” (henceforth Ashkenazic 
Council) and founded a Palestinian branch of Agudat Yisrael. Similar to the Mizrahi, 
Agudat Yisrael had attempted to establish its first Palestinian chapter before the war. 
Simultaneously with the founding of the World Organization in 1912, an Agudat Yisrael 
Jerusalem office had been launched, with the aim of  “centralizing the Palestinian factors 
into one organized force for the purpose of fostering traditional Judaism." This effort met 
with limited success.8 From its inception, the second attempt at opening a Jerusalem 
office was closely tied to the Ashkenazic Council.  
These ties fit into the modus operandi of the Agudah world movement, which at the 
time was trying to establish itself as an alternative player to the Zionists on the 
international field. One of the central concerns of the World Movement was the 
unification of all Orthodox leaders under one banner. The local conflicts among the 
Jerusalemite leaders might have interfered with such aims, but in many ways resembled 
the struggles within the international movement itself.9 The establishment of the Agudah 
office in Jerusalem was an important step in linking local Orthodoxy to the Jewish world 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Burstein, Self-government of the Jews, 83f. 
9 For the struggles within the Agudah during its founding years, see Chapter II. The Palestinian branch of 
the Agudah, however, held special significance, as any inner conflicts endangered the general movement’s 
position towards the British. In April 1924 the executive committee in Vienna sent a letter to the Agudah 
office in Jerusalem, in which it expressed the need to appear united towards the outside world, while at the 
same time stressing the Agudah principle according to which every branch was independent in its regional 





beyond Jerusalem. From 1922 onwards, the Palestinian branch published a weekly 
newspaper, Kol Yisrael, which informed its readers not only about local news, but also 
about developments in the Orthodox world in general, with specific focus on the 
international Agudah and its chapters in Europe.10 Agudah newspapers in Europe, in turn, 
reported on the latest occurrences in Palestine and gave Palestinian Agudists a platform 
for voicing their views. These newspapers linked the struggles of Old Yishuv leaders to 
the developments within European Orthodoxy and bestowed their endeavors with 
meaning beyond the local sphere.  
An additional similarity to the European arena lay in the Palestinian leaders’ self-
depiction. The conservative forces within the Ashkenazic Council claimed to merely 
defend traditional society against the assaults of secular nationalism and to perpetuate the 
legacy of the Old Yishuv. In dealing with secular Jews, the Old Yishuv leaders found 
themselves in a deep dilemma. On the one hand, they aimed to protect their institutions 
and communities against the economic and political upheavals of the period. On the other 
hand, it became increasingly clear that the new Jewish settlements were more than a 
passing phenomenon and that the Old Yishuv would have to reach a modus vivendi with 
the Zionist institutions. In their interactions with these institutions, they constantly 
negotiated and re-negotiated the boundaries between their own communities and non-
observant Jews. 
At the heart of these debates was a fierce struggle for leadership. Both the Palestinian 
branch and the international Agudah movement strongly opposed the decision of the 
League of Nations to grant the ZO a consulting function in the British Mandate, seeing 
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this appointment as facilitating a Zionist monopoly of the representation of the interests 
of the Jewish community in Palestine.11 In order to challenge the ZO’s monopoly, 
Agudists attempted to foster strong group affiliations among observant Jews and to install 
themselves as the leaders of non-Zionist Orthodoxy. To do so, they set up clear 
organizational and ideological boundaries, building parallel institutions instead of joining 
the Zionist ones. This led to fierce opposition from Zionist leaders, who saw their goal as 
organizing Palestinian Jewry into one single community based on national affiliations. 
Zionists accused Agudat Yisrael of secessionist tendencies and of neglecting its duties 
towards the Jewish community; the latter countered such accusations with attempts to 
redefine and reinterpret these very concepts, and both sides became entrenched in fierce 
polemics over definitions and concepts of community and mutual responsibility.  
The dilemma for these leaders lay in the fact that they aspired to draw clear 
distinctions between their communities and secular Jews, but at the same time could not 
dissociate themselves completely from the latter12 - it was a debate between “Unity or 
Schism,” as per the headline of an article in Kol Yisrael published in 1924. This article 
turned the tables on the Zionists and those within the ranks of the Old Yishuv willing to 
cooperate with them, arguing that although the Zionists emphasized unity, it was in fact 
they who divided the community. Unity, the author insisted, could be achieved if 
observant and non-observant Jews remained two distinct groups and the sovereignty of 
non-Zionist Orthodoxy was preserved. Only this scenario would allow the two groups to 
coexist in mutual respect. The main barriers to unity, in this vision, were the Old Yishuv 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 As the Agudah press stressed time and again. See for example: Der Israelit 8.6.1922, 2; 22.5.1924, 2; 
6.7.1933, 1f; Kol Yisrael 24.4.1925, 2.  




leaders who were willing to cooperate with the Zionists. Once they stopped adopting 
Zionist methods and terminologies, clear boundaries between observant and non-
observant Jews could be drawn, and thus unity could be reinstated.13  
The author’s strong accusations against those willing to accommodate the Zionist 
framework demonstrates that this was not only a struggle against secularists, but also for 
the leadership of Orthodox Jewry itself. Through their harsh stance against the new 
settlements, the leaders of the Ashkenazic Council tried to establish authority over the 
Old Yishuv. In the mid-1920s, as Agudat Yisrael gradually developed into the main non-
Zionist political power, the Mizrahi became the main target of such attacks. This 
ideological contest with religious Zionists was not pronounced during the first years of 
the party’s existence.14 But with the two movements turning into serious rivals both on 
the international plane and in Palestinian affairs in the second half of the 1920s, mutual 
attacks became frequent occurrences.  
Religious Zionism posed a particular threat to alternative Orthodox group formations. 
By advocating and organizing nationalist activism of observant Jews, the movement 
contributed, like no other political party, to the obliteration of distinctions between the 
Zionist Organization and non-Zionist Orthodoxy. The Mizrahi, as several articles in Kol 
Yisrael put it, broke down “all fences and walls,” blurred the form and borders of 
Orthodox Judaism, and thereby lead to its destruction.15 This, in the eyes of some, turned 
religious Zionists into more threatening an enemy than the secularists. Agudat Yisrael 
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14 The founding assembly of Agudat Yisrael in Palestine had called on Mizrahi activists to join their ranks, 
but no such declarations or articles followed in the Agudah press during the first years of its existence. Ha-
Aretz 20.8.1919, 2. 
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might be able to cooperate with the Zionist institutions, Amram Blau proclaimed in 1927, 
“even with their extremists.” Cooperation, however, was impossible, “with people who 
keep Torah and Jewish law privately, and on these grounds act as representatives of 
religious Judaism. Yes, [to cooperation] with clear secularists, yes; no [to cooperation] 
with vague Torah observers, no.”16 To be sure, Amram Blau was among the hardliners 
within the Palestinian Agudah and employed strong language to distinguish himself 
within the party. But the basic outline of his critique was shared widely within the ranks 
of Agudah leaders. Mizrahists, in this view, were dangerous opponents, both as rivals 
within the camp of observant Jewry and because of their efforts to minimize the 
differences between Zionist secularists and non-Zionist Orthodoxy.17 
 Mizrahi papers returned such complements by accusing the Ashkenazic Council and 
Agudat Yisrael of abandoning solidarity with the Jewish people and irresponsible 
separatism. Here, too, the question of degree of cooperation was part of the internal 
conflict between different wings of the party. The representative of the Mizrahi world 
movement in Palestine, Yehuda Leib Maimon, regularly attacked the Agudah in the party 
journal he edited, Ha-Tor. Among other things, he described Agudah’s Palestinian 
leaders as a “gang”, who cared only for the private interests of its members.18 Joshua 
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movement. In contrast, his brother Moses, the most important leader of the Palestinian Agudah, became in 
later years a supporter of cooperation with religious Zionists. For a short overview over the emergence of 
the movement, see Motti Inbari, “The Modesty Campaigns of Rabbi Amram Blau and the Neturei Karta 
Movement, 1938-1974,” Israel Studies 17/1 (2012): 105–129. 
17 Ironically, such an approach paralleled in certain respects early religious Zionist dealings with the ZO, 
and in particular Mizrahi backings of Theodor Herzl against the “Democratic Fraction” during the Uganda 
controversy. See Chapter VI. 




Radler-Feldman,19 on the other side of the political spectrum, was an ardent supporter of 
cooperation between the two parties, and founded his own journal, Ha-Hed, in order to 
unify the different streams of Orthodox political activism. But Radler-Feldman, as well, 
reproached the Agudah for dividing the Jewish people and for disregarding its duties 
towards the public. Agudah’s refusal to join Zionist institutions, in his opinion, was a 
display of disregard for settlement work in Palestine, and therefore was to be seen as 
“indifference without the chance for atonement.”20  
Mizrahi leaders of all shades blamed non-Zionist Orthodoxy for abandoning Jewish 
peoplehood by marking strong boundaries between observant and non-observant Jews 
and by refusing to join Zionist institutions. In addition to the ideological dimensions of 
such reproaches this censure was also representative of the struggle for power and 
authority. A large part of the authority of Mizrahi leaders rested on their community and 
settlement work, most of which was closely tied to Zionist frameworks and funding. In 
this sense, the Agudah’s adamant insistence on clear separation between Orthodoxy and 
Zionist institutions was not merely an ideological obstacle for cooperation between the 
two parties, but directly undercut the Mizrahi’s claims for leadership. The increasing 
ideological contest between the two parties during the mid-1920s attests to the fact that 
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they were steadily establishing themselves as the major players among Palestinian 
Orthodoxy.  
This competitiveness was stimulated by heightened settlement activities and the 
development of communal structures under the British Mandate. Between 1921 and 
1928, the Mandate Government labored to prepare a “constitution of communities” that 
would govern the relations between the various ethnic and religious groups in Palestine. 
A first draft of this “constitution,” authored in 1921, defined all of the Jews of Palestine 
as religious community (Edah Yehudit). It thus delineated the Jewish community on 
ethnic grounds, while at the same time bestowing upon this community a religious 
character and thereby continuing parts of the former Ottoman system. Many in the Old 
Yishuv feared that the constitution of communities would lead to the domination of 
religious institutions by secularist leaders – fears that were heightened by the fact that 
membership in this community would be obligatory for every Jew. In their attempts to 
counter such trends, the members of the Ashkenazic Council tried to unite non-Zionist 
Orthodoxy and to gain group recognition as “Orthodox Jews” (Edah Haredit). The 
Zionists, on the other hand, intending to form all of Palestinian Jewry into one official 
community (Knesset Yisrael), welcomed the general outline of the draft, but decried the 
definition of the community in religious terms. The following years witnessed bitter 
struggles over the structure of the Jewish community in Palestine and the question of 
whether or not secessionist groups had the right to form their own communities.21 The 
formation of communal structures in Palestine, thus, helped in developing and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




institutionalizing the two different approaches, and further deepened the rift between non-
Zionist Orthodoxy and religious Zionists. 
 
Women’s Suffrage  
In the eyes of Orthodox leaders women’s suffrage was one of the key issues in the 
formation of communal structures. Was it permissible to tolerate the political 
participation of women? If so, should women be restricted to voting or should they be 
allowed to become representatives of the Jewish community? The controversy over these 
questions not only occupied Palestinian Jewry during a great part of the 1920s, but the 
Orthodox world at large. The majority of leaders in the Old Yishuv strongly opposed any 
participation of women in the communal affairs of the Jewish settlements. The Mizrahi, 
on the other hand, was in a highly problematic position. Rabbi Abraham Kook, in whom 
many religious Zionists put their hope for a possible mediation between the rabbinic 
world and the New Yishuv, declared early on that he could not support women’s 
suffrage. Among secular Zionists, on the other hand, the right of women to participate 
politically was at this point beyond dispute.22 If Mizrahi leaders held with such rabbinic 
decisions and voted against women’s suffrage, they would place themselves in opposition 
to their partners in the New Yishuv. As a result, for several years the party vacillated 
between the two poles.  
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Within the Mizrahi itself the question of women’s suffrage was highly controversial, 
not only with regards to participation in the communal structures in Palestine, but also in 
the context of the role of women within the party in general. The Polish Mizrahi, the 
largest and most influential national chapter, discussed these issues at length. Here, the 
debates were extended to the question of participation in institutions of the Jewish 
communities. Most of the high-ranking leaders supported women’s active participation in 
the party itself. The question of women taking on representative functions, on the other 
hand, caused significant dissonance within the party.23 Behind these disputes were 
discussions about the correct alignment of the movement and the relations between 
rabbinic authority and political activism. Many of those voicing opposition to women’s 
suffrage based their arguments on halakhic considerations and concerns regarding the 
protection of traditional lifestyles. For example, the rabbi of Kutno, Rabbi Isaac Judah 
Trunk, advocated at a local party convention in April 1919, against granting women the 
passive right to vote, in order “not to breach the fence of modesty.” Rabbi Moses 
Avigdor Amiel, who adamantly endorsed women’s equality within the party, rejected 
women taking on representative positions in Jewish communities for halakhic reasons.24 
Couching arguments about women’s suffrage in such terms placed the question in the 
realm of Jewish law and tradition and thus stressed the authority of rabbis, the authorized 
decisors of Jewish legal issues. This line was most pointedly expressed by the Third 
National Conference of the Mizrahi in Poland, which declared that the issue of women’s 
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rights within the movement itself was to be decided by a rabbinic committee.25  In 
addition, opponents of women’s suffrage within the Mizrahi articulated fears that the 
Mizrahi would remove itself from the camp of Jewish Orthodoxy.  
Such considerations, on the other hand, stood in contradiction to the self-definition of 
the Mizrahi party as promoter of social and political activism. Excluding women from 
political participation seemed ill-suited to a nationalist movement. Some proponents also 
stressed the “duties of the Hebrew people” towards women as mothers and educators. In 
this vain, the rabbi of Włocławek pointed out that women were “the basis of the future 
generation as educators of their sons (sic!)”. Therefore, he continued, the Mizrahi had to 
take care of its next generation and grant women full equality.26 Many of those in favor 
of women’s suffrage followed this line of reasoning.  
Their opponents, on the other hand, stressed the dangers inherent in this activist line 
of thought, and pointed out that political benefits should not be considered more 
important than the protection of tradition. Again it was Rabbi Trunk who most 
acrimoniously argued his point. In debates about the character of Jewish communities in 
1922, he expressed fears that female enfranchisement would lead to assimilation and 
communism. Thus, he concluded, both those in favor of a national-religious character of 
the communities and those supporting a purely national outlook had to reject women’s 
suffrage, lest they risk “sacrificing the communities on the altar of democracy.”27 The 
fronts in these debates were not strictly set, and individual party members argued 
different points at different times. Rabbi Isaac Nissenbaum, the Polish Mizrahi leader, 
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completely reversed his position in the course of the debates.28 Like no other, the issue of 
women’s suffrage symbolized the conflicts within the movement between nationalist 
activism and Orthodox traditionalism. 
In the context of the party, these issues remained largely unresolved. In Palestine, on 
the other hand, clear decisions regarding women’s franchise in the emerging communal 
structures were pressing. The first local party convention in August 1918 had decided 
against women’s franchise. But this ruling met with increasing resistance. While in 
Jerusalem most party leaders were initially opposed to granting women political power, 
outside of the city this trend was reversed.29 Many of the debates in Jerusalem centered 
on the Mizrahi’s relationship with Orthodoxy and the Old Yishuv. Some feared their 
support of women’s suffrage would expose the branch in Jerusalem to agitation and 
attacks from members of the Old Yishuv. Others, in contrast, accused the Zionists of 
intentionally using the issue of women’s suffrage as a political tool to exclude Orthodoxy 
from participation in communal work.30 In this vein, in April 1919, Rabbi Abba Zitron-
Katroni, the community rabbi of Petah Tikwah, complained bitterly in a letter to Yehuda 
Maimon: "It is an open secret that the main intent is to distance Orthodoxy from taking 
part in communal work, and so the national and communal institutions [...] will continue 
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to stay under the control of a handful of secularists monopolists. The Mizrahi will fight 
against such a development with all determination."31  
Caught between two poles, Mizrahi leaders tried to exert influence on the rabbinic 
leadership in Jerusalem. But these attempts failed, and in March 1919 several of the 
rabbinic authorities in favor of cooperation with Zionism published an open letter in 
which they expressed their keen resistance to women’s suffrage. This in turn led to 
increased pressure from the advocates of such rights within the party. Ultimately, the 
second Mizrahi convention in September 1919 decided to ask Rabbi Kook for his verdict. 
Kook, not willing to adjudicate such a question alone, called for a joint meeting of 
Palestinian rabbis. A great majority of the rabbis attending the meeting in April 1920 
strictly opposed giving women franchise and subsequently passed a resolution in this 
vain.  
Mizrahi politicians were outraged. Yehuda Leib Maimon, leader of the Palestinian 
Mizrahi, railed against “fundamentalists” and “extremists” unable to understand the 
significance of the times and accused the rabbis of separatism. In his speech he also 
tackled the issue of rabbinic authority. In questions of Jewish law, Maimon announced, 
the Mizrahi would accept their authority. Yet “in the market place” the rabbis would have 
to accept the authority of the political leadership. Such a position attempted to isolate 
rabbinic authority within the realm of ritual and thus directly contradicted earlier party 
decisions that were deferential to rabbinic authority. Maimon might have expressed this 
line most poignantly, but he was hardly alone.32 Maimon himself worked hard during 
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these months for the establishment of the chief rabbinate. The aim was to create an 
official authority, which would supervise and decided halakhic and spiritual questions, 
and centralize rabbinic authority. Some even hoped that this institution would develop 
into a renewed Sanhedrin.33 The competence of this body and the composition of its 
members were the subject of much controversy. The Mizrahi tried to mediate between the 
opponents of rabbinic authority, and the rabbis themselves. Beyond the mediating 
position of religious Zionists, Maimon saw his activism for the establishment of the chief 
rabbinate as a great opportunity to expand the influence of his own movement.34 
Providing financial and logistical help, Maimon could hope, would establish the 
Mizrahi’s authority over the chief rabbinate. Conflicts over power and authority became 
an integral part of the relations between the two bodies. 
The rabbinic resolution of April 1920 was an important benchmark in the 
development of these relations. As conflicts came to a head, Rabbi Kook ceded and 
reversed his decision regarding the participation of women. From this point on, the 
Palestinian Mizrahi no longer tied its policies in matters of women’s suffrage to rabbinic 
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judgments. For several years, the party continued to vacillate between the two camps, but 
it never again committed its own policy decisions to rabbinic authorities. During the 
following years, Mizrahists continued their attempts at mediating between Zionist and 
non-Zionist Orthodoxy.  
When all efforts at mediation between the sides failed, Mizrahi politicians suggested 
holding a referendum in order to assure the participation of Orthodoxy in the ballots for 
the Second Elected Assembly. This idea stirred up resistance among many rabbinic 
authorities, who strictly opposed referenda about religious questions, insisting on 
maintaining their authority regarding the question of women’s suffrage.35 Several leading 
members of the Jerusalem rabbinate proclaimed their fierce rejection of such a 
referendum on a bulletin that was posted throughout Jerusalem. Outraged by this move, 
the Mizrahi decided to abandon the idea of a referendum and participated in the elections 
to the Second Elected Assembly without preconditions.36 Through the clashes between 
rabbinic and political leadership regarding this key issue, the Mizrahi movement had 
further developed its profile. Party leaders had essentially delimited the role of spiritual 
authority in the party’s political decision processes, sharpened its activist profile, and 
continued to carve out for themselves a position as political representatives of Orthodox 
Jewry within the Zionist settlements.  
Within non-Zionist Orthodoxy, as well, the debates about the franchise for women 
advanced processes of political differentiation and consolidation. Whereas the rabbinic 
leadership of the Old Yishuv was divided about the question of cooperation with Zionist 
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institutions, most of these rabbis were united in their opposition to the female franchise.37 
The question, nonetheless, was how to best prevent women’s suffrage. The Ashkenazic 
Council rejected any possibility of participating in a democratic ballot about such 
questions. Other Old Yishuv leaders intended to participate in Zionist institutions and 
overrule women’s suffrage through an Orthodox majority. To this end, they organized 
themselves in the “Haredi Party.”  This attempt at Orthodox organization failed. The 
Haredi party broke apart within the context of the memorandum proposed by the 
Mizrahi. After considerable back and forth, the Haredi party finally agreed to support this 
step. However, the rabbinic proclamation shortly thereafter left the party in a desperate 
situation. In contrast to the religious Zionists, its members could not operate against the 
open declaration of influential rabbinic authorities from the Old Yishuv. At the same 
time, these politicians could not withdraw their consent to participate in the referendum. 
Consequently, the party dissolved.38 The failure of this early attempt of Orthodox 
political organization can be attributed to the unresolved relations between secular and 
rabbinic leadership and in the party’s lack of political experience. From this point on, the 
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political representatives of non-Zionist Orthodoxy were careful to attune their policies to 
the directions of rabbinic leaders.39 
While Rabbi Kook eventually changed his position and thereby retroactively 
bestowed his approval upon Mizrahi policies, this was not so among non-Zionist 
Orthodoxy, where rabbinic authority prevailed over the initiatives of the political 
leadership. The failure of non-Zionist Orthodoxy to organize politically within the 
official Jewish community (Knesset Yisrael) in the form of the Haredi Party, 
strengthened the opponents of such cooperation -- helping the Jerusalem branch of 
Agudat Yisrael to gain political leverage. Through these debates, Agudat Yisrael and 
Mizrahi consolidated their institutional affiliations and developed into the main players 
on the Palestinian field of Orthodox politics.  
 
Tripartite Relations  
During the 1920s international interest in the Jewish settlements in Palestine grew 
steadily. The Balfour Declaration and the forming of new communal structures under the 
British Mandate created high hopes among European Jews and generated levels of 
immigration that caught even the Zionist movement by surprise. Among Orthodox 
leaders, too, Jewish immigration to Palestine became an increasingly important focus. 
Without question, building a Jewish state in Palestine had been a central feature of the 
Mizrahi ideology from early on. Only after World War One, however, did this translate 
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into actual settlement work.40 Not only did the party establish its first local branches in 
1918, but it also moved its central office to Palestine after the war. During this time 
immigration of religious Zionist activists increased.41  
These issues also gained in importance among non-Zionist Orthodoxy. Rabbi 
Abraham Mordechai Alter, one of the central authorities in the Polish Agudat Yisrael, 
visited Palestine in 1924 and encouraged Orthodox settlement work there.42 Isaac Breuer 
published his work “Das jüdische Nationalheim” in which he grappled with the 
significance of newly emerging structures and settlements. 43  In 1921, the Agudah 
established its own settlement foundation as an alternative to the Zionist funds. Palestine 
became a focal point on the first conference of its world movement 1923 in Vienna.44 
Certainly, much of the impetus of Orthodox leaders to engage with the question of 
settlement work in Palestine was a result of Zionist successes, and the growing popularity 
of immigration to Palestine among European Jews, especially among the younger 
generation. Attempting to counter the influence of Zionism among the Jewish masses, 
these leaders strove to develop their own Orthodox alternatives.  
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42 Alter was the leader of the Ger hasidic dynasty in Góra Kalwaria. On Alter’s attitude towards Jewish 
settlement in Palestine, see Yitzhaq Alfasi, “Rabbi Avraham Mordekhai Alter me-Gur ve-Yahasaw le-
Yishuv Eretz Yisra’el,” in Be-Shvilei ha-Tekhiah: Mehqarim be-Tzyionut ha-Datit, ed. Mordekhai Eli’av 
(Ramat Gan, 1987), 119–131. 
43 Breuer, Jewish National Home.  
44 The conference encouraged the purchase of land, building activities, and economic enterprise. Rabbi 




As tensions heightened regarding the topic of Jewish settlement in Palestine, the ZO 
and the Agudat Yisrael world movement entered into mutual negotiations. Although both 
sides recognized the need for rapprochement and cooperation, they were in conflict over 
Agudat Yisrael’s ambition to establish itself as an equal representative of Jewish interests 
in Palestine. Agudah attempts to enter negotiations in the early 1920s had been rejected 
by the ZO.45 The change of attitude in the ZO in 1925, just five years later, indicated a 
rise in the political significance of Agudat Yisrael. With its growing interest in 
Palestinian affairs, and its first, if unsuccessful, settlement endeavors, the Agudah was 
increasingly encroaching on Zionist turf. The party’s international diplomatic activities 
threatened to endanger the Zionist project. The negotiations between Agudah and ZO 
began roughly one year after Zionist activists had murdered Jacob Israel De Haan, the 
Palestinian politician most strongly associated with Agudah’s attempts to come to an 
independent rapprochement with Arab leaders. The De Haan affair, as Friedman has 
argued, illustrated to Agudat Yisrael the limits of its ability to engage independently in 
diplomatic endeavors, and at the same time demonstrated to the Zionists that they must 
take their opponent’s claims seriously.46 
Following an initial meeting between Haim Weizmann and Pinchas Kohn, president 
of the political executive of the Agudat Yisrael world organization, several high-ranking 
leaders of the ZO and Agudat Yisrael convened in London on May 4 and 5 1925 in order 
to discuss four main issues: the question of purchase of land in Palestine; the distribution 
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of immigration certificates; possible terms for the entry of Agudat Yisrael into the Jewish 
Agency; and the question of community ordinances in Palestine. While the delegates 
reached agreements on the first two points relatively quickly, the latter two issues proved 
to be highly contentious and negotiations advanced slowly.  
The question whether or not Agudat Yisrael would join the Jewish Agency touched 
upon the general issue of cooperation between Zionist and non-Zionist organizations in 
Palestinian affairs. Through the Mandate, the League of Nations had designated the ZO 
as the Jewish agency authorized to cooperate with the British. At the same time, it 
required the ZO "to secure the cooperation of all Jews who are willing to assist in the 
establishment of the Jewish National Home".47 This mandate to secure cooperation, as 
well as the need for additional funds, motivated Weizmann to establish a forum in which 
both Zionists and non-Zionists could work together. Honoring these endeavors, in 1923, 
the delegates of the thirteenth Zionist Congress gave their approval to create an expanded 
Jewish Agency in which non-Zionist individuals and organizations would be represented 
as well. Two years later, the next congress worked out the guidelines for the creation of 
such an agency. Its council was to consist of equal numbers of Zionist delegates and 
representatives from Jewish communities throughout the world. The Jewish Agency, 
delegates decided, should work to foster immigration, buy land as Jewish public property, 
encourage agricultural colonization, and develop the Hebrew language and culture. After 
several years of further negotiations, the Constituent Assembly of the Jewish Agency 
convened in Zurich in August 1929.48  
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As early as 1922, the rabbinic council of Agudat Yisrael had discussed these 
developments and permitted the Agudah’s political leadership to enter negotiations with 
the Zionist institutions.49 To this end, the council had drafted stipulations designed to 
enable the Agudah to cooperate with the Jewish Agency, and, at the same time, maintain 
a clear division between its own institutions and those of the Zionist movement.50  Zionist 
attitudes toward these negotiations were ambivalent. On the one hand, the negotiations 
presented an opportunity to draw political Orthodoxy nearer to the Zionist movement. On 
the other hand, if the Agudah leaders participated, they might exploit the talks to establish 
their authority in Palestinian matters by situating themselves as equally active as the 
Zionist Organization.  
For the Mizrahi in particular, these developments were a mixed blessing. Mizrahi 
politicians regularly accused rabbinic authorities of political passivity and called upon 
non-Zionist Orthodoxy to help settle Palestine. In this respect, the approval of settlement 
efforts by such uncontested authorities as Rabbi Haim Ozer Grodzinski could be seen as 
confirmation of the ideals that the Mizrahi had promoted for many years. Furthermore, 
Mizrahi politicians hoped that the joining of Orthodox Jews would help to strengthen 
their own religious demands. Accordingly, in 1928, Gedalia Bublik, the president of the 
US chapter proclaimed that with an extended Agency the role of religious Zionists would 
gain importance. “The Mizrahi,” he claimed, is bound to become “the central source from 
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which the other sections of Jewry will draw the power of their influence."51 Such positive 
evaluations, as well as the proclamation that Agudists would one day join the Mizrahi, 
seemed mostly rhetorical phrases designed to turn any Orthodox involvement in 
Palestinian affairs into a victory of the religious Zionist idea.52 In reality, Orthodox 
settlement activities authorized by high-ranking rabbinic authorities constituted serious 
political competition. In 1922, when the rabbinic council declared its approval for 
cooperation with the secularists, Mizrahists attacked what they perceived as a 
hypocritical decision and declared that if the Agudah was allowed to cooperate with 
secularists, even more so should the rabbinic world embrace the activism of the 
Mizrahi.53 
Another concern was the possibility that the cooperation between these two 
organizations would weaken the Mizrahi’s position within the framework of the ZO. The 
Mizrahi fulfilled an important role within the organization. Its very existence helped the 
Zionists convince the British that theirs was not a purely secularist movement, but also 
represented the interests of Orthodox Jewry.54 This, in turn, helped Mizrahist to raise 
their own influence. An agreement between ZO and Agudah had the potential to 
undermine this position. An additional aspect of these tripartite relations arose around 
religious observance in public institutions, a highly contentious question within the ZO. 
Mizrahists hoped that an agreement would strengthen the demands of Orthodox Jews 
within the movement. Yet the Agudah approach of drawing clear lines between 
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Orthodoxy and Zionist institutions might at the same time weaken the support of 
religious demands within the New Yishuv.  
Consequently, religious Zionists jealously monitored any official contacts between 
Agudah and ZO. When informed about the meeting between Weizmann and Kohn that 
eventually led to their joining forces, religious Zionists complained bitterly that no 
Mizrahi representative had been invited. The meeting caused great tension within the 
party, as well. The Jewish Telegraphic Agency reported on March 4, 1925, that the 
Mizrahi leadership had decided to exclude the writer Robert Weiss from their 
organization on the grounds that he had acted “contrary to the discipline of the party.” 
Weiss, a prominent writer on Jewish religious matters, notably on Palestine affairs, had 
been active in facilitating the meeting between Kohn and Weizmann. In addition, Weiss 
had been found guilty of “constant collaboration with the Agudist press.”55 Cooperation 
with Agudists had not been reason enough to exclude Weiss in the past. His mediating 
role between Agudat Yisrael and ZO, however, tipped the balance.   
When the conference started in May, further discords arose. During the first 
conference day, the Zionist Executive asked Rabbi Joseph Hertz, the Chief Rabbi of the 
United Kingdom and member of the Mizrahi to represent his party. While initially 
agreeing, Rabbi Hertz rejected this post on the second day after having received a protest 
note by the Polish party chapter. Phillip Mayer, an additional Mizrahist participating in 
the conference declared that he could not take on any representative function. Religious 
Zionists accused the executive of having failed to officially invite Mizrahi 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




representatives.56 The incident had no practical impact on the outcome of the conference, 
but in its aftermath the Polish branch published an open condemnation of the Zionist 
Executive. The Zionist Executive, for its part, requested that the Mizrahi publish a 
disclaimer of what it denoted as false accusations in order not to weaken Zionist positions 
in its negotiations with Agudat Yisrael.57  
It was not by chance that the frictions with the Zionist Executive were triggered by 
protests from Poland. In the largest center of European Jewry, Agudah and Mizrahi were 
enmeshed in bitter political struggles. Polish Zionists of all shades advocated taking a 
harsh line against the Agudah. Negotiations with the ZO, they claimed, would help the 
Orthodox to refurbish their negative image among the masses regarding their inactivity in 
Palestine.58 Such realpolitik considerations resonated well with the overall approach of 
the Zionist Executive, despite differences over this specific event. In their internal 
correspondences, members of this body time and again stressed the influence of the 
negotiations on its image among the Jewish masses and its status before the British 
Mandate Government.59 But by carrying out their conflict with the executive publicly, 
Mizrahi politicians endangered this image. Their decision to do so indicates how 
threatened religious Zionists felt by a rapprochement between the two sides.  
The fourth and final issue on the agenda of the conference - debates over the 
community ordinances - was the most pressing and highlighted the complexity of 
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designating the Jews in Palestine as one cohesive community. The British approach of 
defining the Jews as a religious community, while treating them effectively as an ethnic 
or national group, reinforced the conflicts between Zionist activism and the authority 
structures of the Old Yishuv. In order to define the Jews of Palestine as a religious 
community, the British realized, they had to acknowledge the significance of religious 
institutions. To this end, they strengthened the influence of the chief rabbinate within 
Knesset Yisrael. At the same time, the Agudah was able to negotiate the possibility of 
opting out of the official Jewish community. Individuals would be granted the right to do 
so, if they felt discriminated against their religious freedom. But those who quit Knesset 
Yisrael were not allowed to found their own alternative communities.60  
By integrating the discussions about the community ordinances into negotiations 
between the world movements, the London Conference raised these conflicts from the 
level of local Palestinian politics into the international arena. On the Zionist side, this 
caused internal differences. In the aftermath of the conference, the National Council 
stated that it refused to continue participating in the negotiations with Agudat Yisrael, 
apparently because its members perceived of these as encroaching upon their 
competency. In their view, the community ordinances were a matter of Palestinian 
politics alone, and thus stood under the sole authority of the National Council. The 
Zionist Executive tried to bring the representatives of the National Council back to the 
negotiating table in order not to endanger Zionist positions. In a letter to the council, 
members of the Executive claimed that the negotiations were of purely “non-committal” 
character and that no “essential principle” had been yielded. Even if the negotiations 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




failed, the letter continued, it could only strengthen the Zionist position “by proving our 
good will.” The members of the executive, as the letter illustrates, were afraid of further 
“Dehans,” that is “those extremist elements among the Agudah, who seek to use every 
available weapon to weaken the position of the Zionist Organization in the eyes of the 
Mandatory Government and the League of Nations.” In London and Vienna, they hoped 
to have better chances to come to an agreement, as there were “far more favorable 
prospects of making some progress with the representatives of the Agudah […] than at 
Jerusalem, where the extremist tendency of the Agudah is notorious.”61 
The letter reveals the increased significance the ZO attributed to Agudat Yisrael in 
Palestinian affairs. It also points at Zionist hopes that they would be able to fare better 
with the world movement than with the “extremist elements” of the Palestinian Agudah. 
With respect to the community ordinances, nonetheless, these hopes turned out to be in 
vain. At the London Conference, Agudah representatives once again repeated their 
position that the Jewish community in Palestine had to be governed exclusively by 
Jewish law. Simultaneously they admitted that this was becoming ever more unlikely. 
Therefore the delegates suggested two alternative scenarios: either Jewish Orthodoxy 
should be granted the freedom of secession from the official community, as Agudat 
Yisrael had demanded earlier, or religious matters should be completely excluded from 
the community ordinances. In the latter case, Agudah representatives added, the scope of 
the ordinances was to be limited “to communal affairs of a strictly secular character 
alone” and religious bodies should be free in regard to their organization and the conduct 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




of their affairs.62 Taking the Agudah proposal seriously would have demanded a search 
for ways of detaching religious institutions as much as possible from the newly emerging 
political frameworks; or, to put matters differently, to separate religion and state. To be 
sure, Agudah representatives refrained from specifying the details of the terms of such a 
separation, which would have required a clear distinction between “religious matters” and 
“communal affairs of strictly secular character.” Not only would such an endeavor have 
been extremely difficult and controversial, but also in many ways at odds with the project 
of Agudat Yisrael, the formation of a community exclusively governed by Jewish law.63  
Despite such modifications, it is worth pointing out the most outspoken opponents to 
this suggestion came from the Mizrahi. Their party, in fact, had struggled to change the 
dominantly secular outlook of the community ordinances from the first day. Contrary to 
the suggestion of Agudah leaders, the Mizrahi strove to tie religious institutions and 
authorities as firmly as possible to the future Jewish state. The strengthening of the chief 
rabbinate and other religious institutions can be seen as a success of these efforts.64 In this 
respect, the goals of the two organizations were diametrically opposed.65 Consequently, 
Yehuda Maimon claimed in the aftermath of the negotiations that an agreement between 
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Agudah and the ZO on this point would have caused the destruction of Judaism, as the 
suggestions for community ordinances made by Agudah delegates would have 
endangered the unity of Palestinian Jewry.66 In London, such a calamity could be averted. 
Towards the end of the negotiations the Zionists rejected any Agudah proposals, plainly 
stating that the “official scheme left sufficient elbow-room for all shades of religious 
sections.”67 
The London conference ended without any mutual agreement regarding the 
community ordinances. Agudah and ZO agreed on establishing a joint commission in 
order to solve the contentious issues,68 but these aims never materialized. Nor did the two 
sides make noteworthy progress in the question of the Jewish Agency. Their debates 
continued through the next year, yet to no avail. But even without agreement on these 
two issues, the negotiations constituted an important turning point. Agudat Yisrael, as the 
conference proved, was increasingly involved in Palestinian affairs, and had become a 
force to be reckoned with. It was also the first time that Agudat Yisrael and the ZO were 
contemplating cooperation on the highest political level. First accords were reached in the 
question of land purchase in Palestine and the distribution of immigration certificates.  
These developments were deeply unsettling for Mizrahi leaders. In a meeting of the 
World Mizrahi Movement a few months later in Vienna, the London conference sparked 
frantic debate about the Mizrahi’s position within the Zionist movement. Yehuda 
Maimon, in his presentation, bemoaned that the ZO would ignore the Mizrahi 
completely: “In religious matters,” he claimed, “they negotiate with Agudat Yisrael, and 
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in economic ones with the Labor Party.” The discussion following Maimon’s paper 
revealed deep conflicts about the Mizrahi’s position in the tripartite relationship with 
Agudat Yisrael and the ZO, and the role of religion in the movement’s ideology.69 One 
year later, the movement’s world conference in Amsterdam adopted a resolution 
protesting alleged tactics of the Zionist Executive to downplay the Mizrahi in its petitions 
to the League of Nations. The same conference called on the movement’s international 
leadership to resume negotiations with Agudat Yisrael about the unification of Orthodox 
Jewry.70 In 1927, Mizrahi politicians left the Zionist Executive in order to protest the fact 
that their religious demands had not been acknowledged. From the seats of opposition, 
they witnessed the continuation of talks between the Zionist Executive and Agudat 
Yisrael.71 Some Mizrahi propagandists wanted to declare Agudah-Zionist rapprochement 
as strengthening religious Zionism. Factually, however, these negotiations advanced 
political alternatives to the model promoted by the Mizrahi, and endangered the latter’s 
position within the Zionist movement. The tripartite relations with the ZO and the 
opening of Orthodox-Zionist negotiations on the international level thus further fueled 
power struggles between Agudah and Mizrahi leaders, and contributed to the growing rift 
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Cooperation on Grounds of Separation 
In July 1927, the British Government published its final draft of the official “Bylaws 
of Knesset Yisrael,” which came into force on January 1, 1928. The bylaws by and large 
confirmed Zionist expectations, with one important exception: On the basis of religious 
freedom they granted the right to opt out of the official Jewish community to anyone 
chosing to do so. Contrary to earlier drafts, the bylaws allowed those opting out to 
establish alternative communities.72 Agudah leaders depicted this stipulation as their 
political victory. Yet despite such partial victory, they held the bylaws to be perilous to 
Orthodox Jewry. In order to stress this danger, they declared January 1 1928 a day of 
mourning and fasting, and organized public demonstrations at the Western Wall.73  
At its national conference in August 1928, the Palestinian branch thanked the British 
Government and the League of Nations for granting this option. Yet the delegates voiced 
also demands for further arrangements to protect the autonomy of non-Zionist 
Orthodoxy. Additionally they called on all Orthodox Jews to leave Knesset Yisrael and 
obliged any member of Agudat Yisrael to take this step. Their aim was the unification of 
non-Zionist Orthodoxy in the Edah Haredit. About 13.000 male Jews left the official 
Jewish community.74 Agudat Yisrael was perceived to have gained ground in its struggle 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 The National Council and Agudat Yisrael were involved in fierce struggles around this question. Thus, 
for example, Palestinian Agudists accused the National Council to impose unnecessary bureaucratic 
obstacles so that everyone who already had officially left Knesset Yisrael, had to fill yet another form in 
1928. See Regional Office of Agudat Yisrael in Palestine to Jacob Rosenheim, 27.12.1928, in AAYP 127. 
73 Kol Yisrael 30.12.1927, 1. See also Burstein, Self-government of the Jews, 170. This was not the first 
time Agudat Yisrael called on its adherents to demonstrate at the Western Wall in this context. On July 22 
Year about 250-300 Jews demonstrated and prayed there under the aegis of Rabbi Sonnenfeld in response 
to the National Council’s domination of Orthodox Jewry. Such traditionalist activism can be seen as a 
means of fostering Orthodox groupness. See the report from July 23, 1926, in CZA S25/510. 
74 The exact number was highly controversial due to its political significance. The British government 
estimated in 1933, that in Jerusalem about 10,000 Jewish males had left Knesset Yisrael, which it 




to establish an alternative to Zionist group affiliations. Although it was not able to gather 
all rabbinic authorities of the Old Yishuv under its banner, most of those leaders opted 
out of Knesset Yisrael. While they might not have shared the Agudah’s ideology, their 
opting out helped increase the rift between Knesset Yisrael and non-Zionist Orthodoxy.75 
Important rabbinic authorities in the Diaspora complimented Palestinian Orthodoxy and 
Agudat Yisrael on their success.76  
Rabbi Abraham Jacob Halevi Horovitz, 77  who had been part of the Agudah 
delegation in London, reported in detail on the Orthodox position regarding the 
community ordinances. The Agudah delegation, according to his words, had suggested 
that the Jewish National Council recognize Orthodox Jewry as an independent group 
(edah). The council had denied Orthodox Jewry this recognition, but the community 
ordinances helped the Agudah to foster such group formations. Consequently, many of 
the conference debates focused on issues of group organization and on the establishing of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Ibid. J1/3315. This number matches the assessment of Agudah politician Moses Blau from earlier years, 
see Friedman, Hevrah va-Dat, 209. 
75 In addition to the Ashkenazic members of the chief rabbinate, Rabbis Frank and Bernstein, and Sephardic 
Chief Rabbi Jacob Meir, threatened to leave Knesset Yisrael if several clauses of the bylaws were not 
changed. He wrote a strong protest note together with Rabbi Sonnenfeld, the ACC, and other Ashkenazic 
authorities. See Der Israelit 16.8.1928, 8; 23.8.1928, 2f. The movement leaders in Europe were aware that 
Agudat Yisrael was not able to gather all of the rabbinic authorities in Palestine under its umbrella, and 
called on the rabbinical authorities in Europe to help prevent the fissure of Palestinian Orthodoxy into 
many groups. Ibid. 8.9.1927, 2f.  
76 Among these were also rabbis not affiliated with the movement, such as the head of the dynasty of Belz 
Hasidim, Rabbi Ahron Rockeach. See ibid. 23.2.1928, 3f. The Palestine office had made efforts to obtain 
international support, and in particular approached rabbinical authorities in Europe. Regional Office of 
Agudat Yisrael in Palestine to Central Office of Agudat Yisrael for Palestine in Frankfurt a. M. 3.8.1927, in 
AAYP 144; Regional Office of Agudat Yisrael in Palestine to Isaac Breuer 17.8.1927, in ibid. 72; Regional 
Office of Agudat Yisrael in Palestine to Jacob Rosenheim, 17.8.1927, in ibid. 73. That this was not only the 
ideology of some “extremists” is corroborated by the fact that even Rabbi Kook pondered to support the 
right to form external communities at some point during the discussions. See Regional Office of Agudat 
Yisrael in Palestine to the Executive of Agudat Yisrael in Frankfurt 11.11.1925, in ibid. 85.    
77 Abraham Jacob Halevi Horovitz (1863-1942) studied in different yeshivot and later became the rabbi of 
Probużna in Eastern Galicia. After the death of Rabbi Meir Shapiro, Rabbi Horovitz became the dean of the 




the Edah Haredit outside of Jerusalem. In addition, the Palestinian branch called on the 
Agudah center to put more money into Orthodox settling activities.78  
Religious Zionists also welcomed the publication of the official bylaws for the Jewish 
community. Mizrahi activists had been highly involved in many of the debates about the 
final draft of the ordinances, and were satisfied with the overall outcome. The one major 
fault religious Zionists found with the statutes was precisely the point celebrated by their 
Agudist counterparts: the option to leave the official community on grounds of freedom 
of faith. Mizrahists strongly condemned any “secessionists” opting out of Knesset Yisrael 
and demanded that the British increase the barriers for such steps.79 Mizrahi leader Moses 
Ostrovski announced on bills posted throughout Jerusalem that Rabbi Kook had 
prohibited leaving the official community and accused Agudat Yisrael of excluding itself 
from the Jewish collective (klal yisrael) by doing so.80 At the same time, Mizrahi 
politicians made a last attempt at raising the issue of women’s franchise in the Elected 
Assembly, demanding that women be given the right to vote, but not to serve as elected 
officials.81 Through such a step, Mizrahists hoped to prevent members of the Old Yishuv 
from leaving Knesset Yisrael, and to thereby isolate those who did leave. But this motion 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 One of the delegates, Joseph Fetter, presented on the situation of Orthodoxy in Tel Aviv. In this city, he 
stated regretfully, they had not yet succeeded in organizing Orthodox Jews as Edah Haredit. See the 
coverage of the conference in: Kol Yisrael 10.8.1928, 3f; 17.8.1928, 2-4; 31.8.1928, 3f; 7.9.1928, 3f; 
12.10.1928, 3f; 26.10.1928, 3. During the 1930s the Agudah witnessed harsh debates about the membership 
condition to opt out of Knesset Yisrael. Many of the new immigrants from Europe were economically tied 
to the New Yishuv and therefore refused to opt out. Tel Aviv became a center for those groups in the 
Agudah, which increasingly fell into conflict with the politics of the Jerusalem branch. The Jerusalem 
office informed the international leadership about these developments and requested the rabbinical council 
to issue a halakhic ruling on this question. Regional Office of Agudat Yisrael in Palestine to Executive of 
Agudat Yisrael, 16.8.1933, in AAYP 57. 
79 Ha-Tor mentioned several small problems with the bylaws, but was mostly upset by the possibility to opt 
out and certain economical incentives to do so since this meant that one did not have to pay taxes to the 
official community. See Ha-Tor 5.8.1927, 2; 13.1.1928, 1; 20.1.1928, 1. 
80 As bitterly noted by Der Israelit 7.3.1929, 1. 




was quickly defeated, and the community ordinances furthered dissent and polarization 
between the national-religious camp and non-Zionist Orthodoxy. 
Ironically, in April 1927, during the same period in which the community ordinances 
exacerbated the institutional separation of the two communities, Agudist and Zionist 
politicians in Palestine began cooperating over elections of the Jerusalem city council. 
Due to citizenship requirements, only a few of the city’s Jewish inhabitants were allowed 
to vote. Regarding the elections, the Agudah had to decide whether to support one of the 
Arab parties, or to side with the Zionists. For several reasons the Agudah opted to call for 
temporary cooperation with the latter. Zionist reactions to the Agudah’s decision were 
ambivalent. While Zionists were interested in a common block of all of Jerusalem Jewry, 
such cooperation would also validate Agudah claims that Palestinian Jewry did not 
necessarily have to be organized as one unified community. After initially rejecting the 
proposal to cooperate, the Zionists accepted and promised Agudat Yisrael one quarter of 
the Jewish city council representatives.  
For the Agudah, as well, this election initiative was a mixed blessing. The elections 
symbolized a change in the movement’s potential for cooperation with Arab parties. 
Jewish and Arab nationalists increased their mutual hostilities and, as these conflicts 
intensified, the leeway for non-nationalist approaches decreased steadily. At the same 
time, the agreement allowed the movement to protect non-Zionist Orthodoxy as an 
independent group formation and to work together with the Zionists as equals. Kol 
Yisrael celebrated the cooperation as a “good lesson for all Jewish groups interested in 
unity.” The elections, in the author’s eyes, could teach Zionists volumes about creating 




Zionist brethren to give up their hegemonic aspirations over all internal matters,” he 
declared victoriously.82 Needless to say, this approach of cooperation on the grounds of 
separation was a thorn in the side of the Mizrahi.83 An article in Ha-Tor accused the 
Agudah of having cooperated purely for tactical reasons. Agudists, the author demanded, 
should strive for real unification, rather than unity for the sake of immediate political 
benefit. “If you recognize your religious-national duty,” the author asked, “…why did 
you detach yourself from the wonderful public and political work of the Zionist 
Organization?”84  
Nationalist clashes came to a head in the years 1928 and 1929, when riots broke out 
in Jerusalem, Hebron, and Safed. Among the main victims of these clashes were the 
members of the Old Yishuv, who were concentrated in these areas and were often 
directly exposed to the violence. The first riots in 1928 were triggered by an incident at 
the Western Wall on the Day of Atonement. Prior to World War I, the Ottomans strove to 
establish and observe a status quo with regard to the Western Wall, in order to avoid 
conflicts. The Muslim community was officially in possession of the area, but Jews had 
the right to pray at the Western Wall undisturbed at any time. After the War, the British 
endeavored to maintain this status quo, but soon ran into problems over discrepancies 
between legal regulations and accepted practice. Officially, Jews were forbidden to bring 
in religious paraphernalia, such as chairs for the elderly and screens to separate men and 
women during prayer. The Muslim officials feared that the use of such paraphernalia 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82 Kol Yisrael 6.5.1927, 2. 
83 For a detailed analysis of the cooperation and its significance see: Friedman, Hevrah va-Dat, 285-296. It 
is certainly no coincidence that this cooperation later became part of the propaganda wars between Agudah 
and Mizrahi. In 1935 the Israelit claimed that Menachem Ussishkin at the time had recommended this 
cooperation as exemplary to the Mizrahi, which itself had refrained from taking part in the elections, Der 
Israelit 28.11.1935, 1/3-6. 




would turn the area in front of the wall into a permanent synagogue. Practically, however, 
the British had not interfered with the Jews bringing such paraphernalia to the Wall 
during the High Holidays – a practice that had already been in place under Ottoman 
rule.85  
Both Zionist and Arab leaders had used the Western Wall as a site for their nationalist 
claims for many years because of its highly symbolic significance. Zionists had made 
several attempts at buying the area in front of the Western Wall and called upon Jews to 
obtain surrounding property. Postcards and pictures showing the Temple Mount were an 
integral part of Zionist propaganda, in some cases even depicting the Temple itself. Such 
propaganda fanned the rumors among Muslims in the region that Jews were plotting to 
gain ownership of Islamic sites. On the Arab side, Haj Amin al-Husseini,86 the Grand 
Mufti of Jerusalem, hoped to defend his position as national leader and worked to 
advance the city’s spiritual significance for Islam. Stressing religion, the mufti hoped, 
would internationalize the conflict by mobilizing Muslims from other areas. At the center 
of his platform was the restoration of al-Haram ash-Sharif. These building activities, in 
turn, aroused Jewish fears and led to complaints regarding violations of the status quo. 
On both sides political rivals used the site for internal struggles. In trying to surpass each 
other in presenting themselves as true patriots, these politicians fueled Arab-Zionist 
contestation.87 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85 Except for one incident in 1925, when the British officer in charge had removed chairs on the Day of 
Atonement, see Der Israelit 22.10.1925, 2f.  
86 Haj Amin al-Husseini (1897-1974) was an Arab nationalist and Muslim leader, and among the harshest 
opponents of Zionism. He was appointed Grand Mufti of Jerusalem in 1921, and stayed an important 
Palestinian leader until the 1960s, when he was sidelined by the PLO. Al-Husseini was a controversial 
figure, and strongly attacked for his collaboration with the Nazis during WWII.  
87 Hillel Cohen, 1929. Shnat ha-Efes be-Sikhsukh ha-Yehudi-Aravi (Jerusalem, 2013); Gudrun Krämer, 




On the eve of the Day of Atonement 1928, Jewish worshipers brought in a screen to 
separate men and women. The Supreme Muslim Council, the body in charge of Muslim 
community affairs and headed by Amin al-Husaini, immediately complained to the 
British authorities. The British officer in charge requested that the Jewish worshippers 
remove the screen, but they refused to do so. Consequently, the officer himself removed 
the screen by force, causing great upset. This incident triggered a fierce response from the 
international Jewish community. Leading members of the Jewish National Council called 
on the British Mandate Government to protect the rights of Jewish worshippers and stated 
Jewish claims to the area in front of the Western Wall.88 Reactions from the Arab side 
followed and eventually the incident led to a wave of riots and violence. The British were 
ultimately able to appease the parties and the violence stopped, but over the course of the 
following year, agitators on both sides would keep the fire of unrest smoldering.  
In August 1929, the Jewish Revisionist movement used the ninth of Av, the Jewish 
holiday commemorating the destruction of the first and second temples, for nationalist 
demonstrations. On this day, about 300 persons marched to the Western Wall, waving 
flags, singing the Zionist anthem Hatikwah, and claiming the wall as the national 
property of the Jewish people. Subsequently, rumors about an alleged Jewish plan to 
attack Al-Aqsa Mosque spread among the Muslim population. On August 23, thousands 
of Muslim worshippers poured into the city for Friday prayers. After the prayers, an 
angry mob started attacking Jewish residents in the neighboring quarters and the violence 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2002), 254-277; Mary Ellen Lundsten, “Wall Politics: Zionist and Palestinian Strategies in Jerusalem, 
1928,” Journal of Palestine Studies (1978): 3–27; Benny Morris, Righteous Victims: A History of the 
Zionist-Arab Conflict, 1881-1999 (New York, 1999), 111-120; Tom Segev, One Palestine, Complete: Jews 
and Arabs Under the British Mandate, (New York, 2000), 295-327.  
88 See e.g. letter exchange between the Palestinian Agudah and the National Council, 21.10.28 and 
30.10.28, in CZA J1/330; Letter of the Zionist Organization to the general secretary of the League of 




soon spread to Hebron and Safed, and later across the entire country. The riots lasted 
nearly one week and had a devastating impact on the Jewish community, leaving 
hundreds dead and wounded, and the Jewish community in Hebron destroyed.89 In the 
aftermath of the riots, the British set up an investigative commission (“Shaw 
Commission”) to identify the causes and culprits, and to reach conclusive decisions 
regarding the disputes over the holy sites in Jerusalem. In the end, the Commission 
decided to maintain the status quo and to raise the presence of the British military 
personnel in the area to prevent conflicts.  
The conflicts about the Western Wall put local and international leaders of Agudat 
Yisrael in a delicate position. They strongly opposed Zionist attempts to capitalize on 
religious yearnings for their nationalist ends. But the riots hit their constituencies the 
hardest. Although directed against the Zionists, in many cases the Arab mob had focused 
its attacks on the unarmed and defenseless members of the Old Yishuv. The British army 
had been unable to protect themand many of the Palestinian leaders of the movement 
were deeply disturbed by the brutal violence.90  At the great conference of the world 
Agudah movement in 1929, Moses Blau reported about the violent attacks bitterly, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89 Based on a report of the “Commission on Palestine Disturbances of August 1929”, the literature lists 133 
deaths among Jews, and 116 on the Arab side, as well as 339 wounded Jews and no less than 232 wounded 
Arabs. See Krämer, Geschichte Palästinas, 272; Morris, Righteous Victims, 116; Segev, One Palestine, 
327. 
90 According to Friedman, Agudah leaders understood that only the Jewish Haganah militia had prevented 
further victimization in Jerusalem. Friedman, Hevrah va-Dat, 316. Morris sees the riots as important 
turning point, in which the Zionists decided to strongly expand the Haganah. Morris, Righteous Victims, 
118ff. Anita Shapira describes the riots as “crossroads in respect to cooperation between Jews and Arabs,” 
in which many ties of everyday life were severed. The Zionists reacted not by shifting to open revenge or 
military activities, but by calling for increased settlement activity. Anita Shapira, Land and Power: The 
Zionist Resort to Force, 1881-1948 (Stanford, 1999), 176. It is worth pointing out that Moses Blau made 
similar arguments during the great conference of the world Agudah movement. See Die Kenessio Gedaulo 
der Agudas Jisroel-Weltorganisation (Frankfurt am Main, 1929), 21. Hillel Cohen reads the year 1929 as 
“year zero” of the conflict between Jews and Arabs, as it showed Palestinian Arabs that there was more 





voicing strong feelings against the Arab attackers. Yet in the same breath Blau scolded 
Zionist provocations and called on Jewish Orthodoxy to show greater support for Jewish 
life in Palestine - without provocations and hatred towards Arabs.91 The escalation of 
violence and the fusion of religious and nationalist elements rendered impossible any 
attempts to keep non-Zionist Orthodoxy out of the conflict.  
On the other side of the table, the Zionist leadership also displayed ambivalent 
feelings towards cooperation with the Agudah in matters of the Western Wall. As the 
official Jewish representatives before the Mandate Government, handling such issues was 
exclusively reserved for the Zionist Organization, and they were reluctant to give the 
Agudah a say in these matters. But banning non-Zionist Orthodoxy from representation 
in debates about such a central religious site would have been a major affront, and Zionist 
leaders were afraid of independent Agudah campaigns. Among the fiercest opponents of 
an Agudah involvement in the negotiations with the Mandate Government were the 
representatives of the Mizrahi. Such participation, they feared, would damage the 
position of the chief rabbinate, and strengthen the separatist tendencies of Agudat 
Yisrael.92 In other words, Mizrahi politicians suspected that the incident could serve the 
Agudah to consolidate its position as an alternative player to religious Zionism. 
In November 1928, a few months after the first incidents, Moses Blau, the leader of 
Agudat Yisrael in Palestine, approached the National Council and suggested the 
establishment of a joint commission in order to formulate and defend common Jewish 
claims to the holy sites. After some hesitation, the National Council agreed and the two 
sides set up regular meetings. The initial letters of the commission reveal Agudah 
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concerns regarding maintaining its sovereignty vis-à-vis the National Council. In this 
respect, the international leadership of Agudat Yisrael shared the concerns of its 
Palestinian colleagues.93 The right of non-Zionist Orthodoxy to form its own autonomous 
community, and the relations between Edah Haredit and Knesset Yisrael were a constant 
concern of the joint committee.  
Zionist leaders took the opportunity to attack Palestinian Agudists for leaving the 
official Jewish community. Moses Blau and his colleagues tried to counter such attacks 
by criticizing the blending of religious and national elements in the community 
ordinances. In the Diaspora, Blau commented, the concept of “edah” described religious 
and regional differences. In its official use in Palestine, in contrast, the term had a strong 
national connotation. Blau suggested dissolving these tensions by organizing the Jewish 
community on purely national terms, while defining each Knesset Yisrael and non-Zionist 
Orthodoxy as edah. Both, he suggested, should be on equal footing, having their own 
religious freedom and representation. Together, they would form the nation. Blau found a 
model for his concept in his immediate environment. While Christian and Muslim Arabs 
of Palestine constituted two religious communities (edot), they still strove to form one 
nation.94 Such a scheme, Blau contended, could work for the Jewish community as well. 
Blau’s comparison had obvious flaws, since Christians and Muslims did not share the 
same relations as Knesset Yisrael and non-Zionist Orthodoxy. Such flaws 
notwithstanding, it highlights the difficulty of balancing the tensions between religious 
and national affiliations, inherent in the opposing concepts of Zionists and non-Zionist 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93 Before approaching the National Council, the Palestinian Agudah had asked the international leadership 
for permission and got detailed instructions under which conditions they would be allowed to cooperate 
with the Zionists. See Blau’s letter to the National Council from 14.11.28, in CZA, J1/330. 




Orthodoxy. What is more, it illustrates Agudist efforts to find viable alternatives to 
nationalist group formations, efforts that should not merely be dismissed as “extremist.” 
The first and most outspoken objection to Blau’s suggestion came from Moses 
Ostrovski, a leading member of the Palestinian Mizrahi movement. Ostrovski dismissed 
the Agudah suggestion of establishing the Jewish community on mere secular terms, and 
attacked the idea of separating religious from national affiliations. He vehemently refused 
to change the community ordinances in such a way, indicating that enough religious 
autonomy had already been granted. Joshua Thon, the Galician Zionist leader, 
condemned the idea of two different peoples or edot as grave sin, because, as he claimed, 
this would comprise the national-religious unity of Judaism.95  
Later, the Mizrahi press pointed at the crucial role that religious Zionists had played 
during the negotiations. Had it not been for the Mizrahi delegates, an article in the Polish 
party paper Dos Yudishe Lebn claimed, the increasingly left-wing Zionist leadership 
might have accepted the proposal of Agudat Yisrael. The elimination of religious 
influence from the official Jewish community would have accommodated their 
ideological outlook. Dos Yudishe Lebn continued its report by citing the General Zionist 
press, which widely argued that it would be easier for Haim Weizmann to reach an 
agreement with Agudat Yisrael than the Mizrahi about these issues.96 In their relations 
towards secular Zionists, as the incident demonstrated, the positions of the two Orthodox 
parties positions became more and more contentious. The alignment of Agudat Yisrael 
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with non-observant forces in the ZO seemed an increasingly dangerous alternative to 
religious Zionism.97  
Palestinian Agudists, for their part, fueled the flames of competition. Mizrahi 
politicians had demanded from the Zionist Executive to appoint their organization as the 
one that would lead negotiations with Agudat Yisrael regarding its entry into the Jewish 
Agency. Kol Yisrael reacted to this news with a caustic article about the Mizrahi, 
authored by Haim Yisrael Eiss.98 Eiss was a leading member of the world movement, 
distinguished for his grim enmity against cooperation with secularists. Yet his time Eiss 
attacked the Mizrahi instead of its secularist fellows. The party, he claimed, had tried to 
play many roles during the years of its existence. Dressed in traditionalist Jewish garb, 
Mizrahists had spearheaded the Zionist struggle against Orthodox Judaism. They had also 
presented themselves to the British Government as “the bigger organization of Orthodox 
Judaism,” thereby supporting Zionist claims to leadership over the whole Jewish 
community. Now, Eiss asserted, the Mizrahi had become “a pimp, who offered his 
services to the ZO." Mizrahists had tried to persuade both ZO and the Rabbinic Council 
of Agudat Yisrael that they were the best mediator to bring about an agreement between 
Orthodox Jewry and the Jewish Agency. But, he concluded, both bodies knew that they 
were better off negotiating directly and without paying charges to the religious Zionist 
pimp.99 Eiss provided a particularly scathing comment on the growing rivalries between 
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Mizrahi and Agudah. He was without doubt one of the hard-liners. More moderate voices 
remained largely silent during these days.  
The commission did not reach any conclusions about the appropriate relations 
between Knesset Yisrael and non-Zionist Orthodoxy. And yet, cooperation between 
Agudat Yisrael and the National Council regarding the Western Wall constituted a 
mutual recognition of each side’s claims to represent parts of the Jewish population in 
Palestine.100 In this respect, Agudah joining the committee placed religious Zionists in a 
difficult position. In August 1929, the Mizrahi stepped out of its seats in the opposition 
and returned to the Zionist Executive at the sixteenth World Zionist Congress. Two issues 
drove this decision. The first was the official creation of the Jewish Agency; Mizrahi 
leaders welcomed the cooperation with non-Zionist forces, but also sought to safeguard 
their influence within the changing balance of powers. Agudat Yisrael had not joined the 
agency, albeit debates about its integration were reemerging in this context. The second 
major issue on the Mizrahi agenda was the Western Wall. In its platform to the Congress, 
the party urged the British Mandate Government to advance the building of a Jewish 
national home and requested that the Zionist Executive take a more pro-active stance, 
insisting on Jewish claims to the Western Wall. The Zionist Executive’s position towards 
the Mandate Government, the platform held, was too acquiescent and accommodating. 
Consequently, it called on the movement’s leaders “to remove the religious and national 
affront to us which is becoming increasingly greater from day to day at the Western Wall, 
owing to the partiality against our demands by the government."101  
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At the Congress itself, the Polish Mizrahi leader Heshel Farbstein rejected the name 
“Palestine,” and demanded “a Land of Yisrael, which, according to the words of Dr. 
Weizmann, should be as Jewish as England is English.” He refused to tolerate any 
instructions from outsiders on how the Jews should deal with the Arabic population, and 
dubbed the resuming of Muslim building near the Western Wall area as “spiritual 
pogroms.”102 One of the most belligerent Mizrachists on this issue was Yehuda Maimon. 
When the riots of 1929 began a few weeks after the congress, Maimon published a 
furious lead article in Ha-Tor. Under the title “The Blood Shall be a Sign” Maimon 
acrimoniously attacked the British for failing to protect their Jewish subjects. “The 
blood,” he held, “shall be a sign of the covenant between us and the land, […] a sign of 
remembrance for us and our sons that the land will be ours,” as well as “a sign of shame 
and a stain of disgrace upon the integrity and justice of the British government.” While in 
Ukraine and Russia putting the guilty on trial would be enough to appease the Jews, this 
was not the case in Palestine. The Jewish national home, Maimon demanded, had to be 
built immediately. “Whoever governs the land, it is ours and will be ours.” Concluding 
the article, Maimon stressed the Jews’ preparedness for battle by drawing a line from the 
Hasmoneans, the Jewish leaders who had adamantly fought against the Romans, to the 
present situation: “And the blood shall be a sign – that the descendants of the 
Hasmoneans did not perish.”103  
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Maimon was a political hard-liner, but his uncompromising stance toward Palestinian 
Arabs reflected the dominant view of the party in those days.104 Emotionally charged 
articles like this one certainly helped propel his agenda. Beyond internal party conflicts, 
Maimon’s uncompromising stance on the Western Wall also influenced the Mizrahi’s 
position within the Zionist movement and among Orthodox Jews. Taking a hard line 
approach on the Western Wall allowed Mizrahists to establish themselves as the 
guardians of the holy sites and thus helped strengthening their claims to leadership. 
For the Agudah, especially its Palestinian wing, such statements highlighted some of 
the most problematic aspects of cooperation with the Zionist movement. Despite shock 
over the cruelty of their Arab attackers and a growing disillusionment with the ability of 
the British to protect the members of the Old Yishuv, Agudah leaders anxiously avoided 
any steps that might lead to an escalation of the violence. In addition, the provocations of 
Zionist agitators fanned inner-party opposition toward cooperation with the Mizrahi. 
Agudah newspapers tried to maintain a delicate balance between giving expression to 
feelings of anger and grief on the one hand, and preventing the translation of those 
feelings into new hostilities, on the other. In newspaper articles and during negotiations 
with the National Council, Agudists accused Zionist activists of issuing excessive 
demands and provocations that were likely to further fuel the flames of conflict. After the 
first incidents in 1928, for example, the National Council decided to organize 
demonstrations to express the outrage of the Jewish community in Palestine. Some of the 
leaders of the council made remarks about the unacceptable condition in which the Arab 
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occupants would maintain the holy sites and called for the removal of the houses in front 
of the Western Wall. Others demanded that the adjacent area be transferred to its sole 
legitimate owner, the Jewish people.105  
Agudah politicians answered these populist remarks with attacks on Zionist leaders, 
accusing them of inciting the masses for their own political benefit. Jews, who had never 
shown any interest in the Western Wall, they bemoaned, now appointed themselves as 
the site’s greatest defenders. But aggressive Zionist politics would only harm the Jewish 
cause. In order to counter the escalatory tactics of populists on both sides, the Agudah 
pressed for the moderation of Jewish demands. The joint committee, they insisted, should 
strive to help calm the situation and restore the status quo. The Jews should 
unequivocally announce that they were not disputing Arab claims to ownership, but 
merely demanding the protection of their right to pray at the Western Wall at any time.106  
The Mizrahi was conspicuously absent in such Agudah attacks on the Zionist 
leadership. While dealing with the religious Zionist approach at length when repudiating 
any possibility of union between the two parties, Agudists rarely distinguished between 
observant and non-observant Zionists regarding the Western Wall incidents. Instead, they 
simply denoted all Zionists as “secularists” (hafashim). Agudah leaders tried to establish 
their authority over the Western Wall by denying the Zionist’s genuine interest in the 
issue. While the Western Wall was of highest importance to Orthodox (non-Zionist) 
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Jews, with its stones being “constantly wet of their tears and the kisses of their lips,” to 
the Zionists it was of national significance alone.107 The existence of religious Zionism 
was difficult to reconcile with this line of argument.  
In the background of these inner-Jewish struggles stood deep disagreements about the 
significance of religious concepts and sites. Most Agudists were reluctant to translate 
religious concepts into earthly claims of ownership and sovereignty. Zionists, on the 
other hand, adopted and secularized such concepts for their national movement. The 
Mizrahi welcomed the adoption of religious sites and concepts for the national idea, but 
strongly rejected their secularization. These disputes were not merely about detached 
theological concepts, but expressed concrete struggles for power and authority. The sides 
fought about the question of whether the incidents at the Western Wall constituted a 
religious or a political matter, and which authorities would be the appropriate ones to 
negotiate with the British regarding these incidents. Agudah media regularly accused the 
National Council of turning the Western Wall from a religious into a national and 
political issue, and demanded the appointment of rabbinic authorities to lead the 
negotiations.108 Despite their inabilities to reach a common definition of what exactly 
constituted ‘religious’ as opposed to ‘political’ questions, in December 1928, the 
National Council and Agudah finally agreed upon a compromise assuring that neither of 
the sides could overrule the other on contested issues. The National Council hoped that 
this agreement would keep Agudists from acting on their own on the Western Wall issue. 
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At the same time the council’s members were not willing to demand the same from 
leaders of the ZO.109 
A year passed without any progress but instead the emergence of new tensions and a 
worsening of the Jewish position. Critics within non-Zionist Orthodoxy urged the 
Agudah leadership to return to pursuing independent politics. Instead of tolerating 
ongoing Zionist provocations and excessive demands, they claimed, Agudists should 
declare that Jews respected the holy places of Islam, thereby relieving some pressure 
from the British mediators. In November 1929, Rabbi Joseph Haim Sonnenfeld, the 
rabbinic authority of Agudat Yisrael’s Palestinian wing, issued an appeal to both Jews 
and Arabs for peace, in which he reassured the Muslim world that Jews did not plan to 
rebuild the temple. Referring to Zionist protests, he warned: “The old building blocks are 
holy, but even holier are Jewish lives. Therefore be careful with demonstrations and 
demands!”110  
In January 1930, the British Government with the approval of the League of Nations, 
appointed an international investigative commission "to determine the rights and claims 
of Muslims and Jews in connection with the Western or Wailing Wall".111 Under pressure 
from the critics within its own camp, the Agudah delegation demanded that it testify to 
the commission. Representatives of the ZO, concerned that this delegation would accuse 
not only the Mufti but also Zionist activists, yielded to Agudah pressure and declared 
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their willingness to treat the Western Wall incidents as an exclusively religious issue.112 
Zionist leaders suggested sending a rabbinic delegation to the international commission, 
consisting of the two chief rabbis, Rabbi Abraham Kook and Rabbi Jacob Meir, as well 
as Rabbi Sonnenfeld. After coming to an agreement, the rabbinic delegation, as well as a 
delegation of politicians of Agudat Yisrael and the National Council, testified at the 
commission in July 1930.113  
The joint rabbinic delegation was seen as a considerable achievement in the struggle 
of Agudat Yisrael to establish Orthodox sovereignty, in large part because it set Rabbi 
Sonnenfeld on equal footing with the chief rabbis of Knesset Yisrael. Consequently, the 
Palestinian Mizrahi observed the development with great suspicion. Anxiously defending 
their party’s status within the Zionist movement, Mizrahi leaders continued sending their 
demands to the National Council. They jealously monitored any concessions made to the 
Agudah and insisted that there be an equal number of Agudah and Mizrahi 
representatives. In addition, Mizrahists took great care to ensure that the chief rabbinate 
would not be placed at a disadvantage to non-Zionist rabbinic authorities.  
The parties grew even further divided with the release of the results of the British 
Shaw commission investigating the riots of 1929. The commission concluded that Arab 
attacks were motivated by deep anxieties about Jewish domination and ordered a stop to 
the immigration of Jews to Palestine. Deeply concerned about such a development, the 
National Council decided to go on strike. Hesitating at first, Agudat Yisrael eventually 
agreed to join the strike. This step provoked critique within the movement, and further 
strengthened inner opposition to close cooperation with the Zionists. Pinchas Kohn, for 
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example, promoted the re-interpretation of the Balfour Declaration by turning the 
promise of a “national home” into a statement about the support of Jewish religious 
culture in Palestine, and openly defied any politicization of the Western Wall by the 
Zionists.114  
Within the Mizrahi, by contrast, the hard-liner approach of Yehuda Maimon grew 
more pronounced during these months. Faced with concerns about the movement’s 
position vis-à-vis the Agudah, Mizrahi leaders revealed themselves as increasingly 
obsessed with ownership issues regarding the Western Wall. Repeatedly they warned the 
National Council not to concede any Jewish rights to the Muslim side: “The Western 
Wall,” Moses Ostrovski wrote in June 1930, “(…) is the property of the Hebrew Nation 
(uma ivrit) for all generations and times.”  His words reflected a distinctively nationalist 
interpretation of the site.115 Mizrahists seemed anxious that the dominant positions within 
the Zionist movement were more in tune with Agudah demands than with their own.116 
Indeed, the Jewish delegations to the League of Nation’s Commission did not mention 
the question of Jewish ownership over the Western Wall.117 The dynamics of the 
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negotiations between the National Council and Agudat Yisrael, and the heightening of 
Muslim-Jewish tensions, had pushed the two Orthodox movements further apart.118 
Rivalries about the representation of Orthodoxy in the issue of the Western Wall 
continued even after the rabbinic delegation returned. Both Agudat Yisrael and the chief 
rabbinate boycotted the next meeting with the National Council in August because they 
had been permitted fewer representatives than they had demanded.119 A few days later, 
the Mizrahi called on the National Council to not concede any rights to the Muslims and 
to have the negotiations lead by rabbis, first and foremost, by Chief Rabbis Kook and 
Meir.120 The Auguda for its part increased the pressure on the National Council by 
resuming its own attempts at diplomacy with the British. In August, a delegation under 
Rabbi Sonnenfeld met with the British High Commissioner, Sir Stuart Davis. Rabbis 
Sonnenfeld, and Jungreis, as well as the Palestinian leader Moses Blau laid out their 
movement’s attitudes regarding the Western Wall. Despite having temporarily refrained 
from own political initiative, they assured Sir Davis that non-Zionist Orthodoxy still 
demanded appropriate political representation.121 Simultaneously, the Polish Agudah 
press announced that Jews had survived thousands of years lacking three of the four 
temple walls. Hence, they would continue to exist without the fourth, and should 
concentrate their forces on genuinely important issues.122  
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Yet leeway for independent Orthodox endeavors proved to be limited. In its final 
report, the international commission concluded that the area was Muslim property; Jews 
should have free access for the purpose of prayer, but they were not allowed to bring in 
objects like screens or other paraphernalia for the service.123 Throughout the 1930s, 
Jewish youngsters - mostly members of the Revisionist movement - provoked the British 
police by deliberately transgressing regulations and blowing the traditional ram’s horn 
(shofar) at the end of the Day of Atonement. Agudah newspapers repeatedly condemned 
the provocations of these “national firebrands,” who abused religious sites for their 
political demonstrations and invited much greater dangers than any “so-called religious 
zealots” ever could.124 
The escalation of Zionist-Arab conflicts surrounding the Western Wall in the late ‘20s 
restricted the flexibility of Agudat Yisrael to act outside of a national-Jewish framework. 
At the same time Agudists established their movement as the representative of non-
Zionist Orthodoxy with regards to both the Jewish National Council and the international 
community. The movement’s rabbinic authorities were the only ones from the Old 
Yishuv to have a say in the negotiations with the British. While the Palestinian Agudah 
during this period successfully pushed institutional separation between non-Zionist 
Orthodoxy and Knesset Yisrael, it also undertook the first attempts at cooperation. Their 
goal of creating two sovereign communities that would cooperate on equal footing was 
never reached. Even without this success, however, the Agudah unsettled the Mizrahi and 
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forced the party to defend its position within the ZO, thereby influencing its policies and 
ideological positions. 
Throughout the 1920s, the Mizrahi had sharpened its activist profile and emerged as 
one of the harshest and most dangerous opponents of strong Orthodox group loyalties, 
while the Palestinian Agudat Yisrael had established itself as the first and foremost 
promoter of such group affiliations. During this time, the Agudah also became 
increasingly involved in Jewish communal affairs. The dynamics of mutual competition, 
and the tripartite relationship with the ZO had shaped the institutional and ideological 
affiliations of the two movements considerably. The growing interest in Eretz Yisrael, the 
Land of Yisrael, did not unite Orthodoxy. Rather then helping to overcome partisanship, 
as some had hoped, involvement in the newly emerging communal structures in Palestine 
served to establish and distinguish different political approaches, and exacerbated 















Winds of Change?  




From the early days of their existence, both movements engaged in mutual 
conversations about possible methods of cooperation. Several suggestions for joint 
projects were advanced in the years between the foundation of Agudat Yisrael in 1912 
and its first world congress in 1923. In this period, the two movements were not yet 
settled, and their organizational outlooks and party platforms were still greatly in flux. 
Early debates between them reflected these realities; discussions were affected by 
insecurities on both sides about questions of ideological differences and organizational 
borders, and suffered from a lack of clarity regarding the scope of any planned 
cooperation. If cooperation was achieved, the hard-liners on both sides had to fear that 
the differences between the two movements might get blurred. The issue of fusion, 
indeed, loomed large in many ideological writings. Propagandists felt compelled to 
justify the existence of two Orthodox political parties. Their own movement’s outlook, 
they held, was the only valid one, and therefore had to persist. The other side would 
eventually recognize the futility of its approach and dissolve. Such thinking strongly 
permeated early negotiations. Even proponents of cooperation often pronounced the 




claimed in this vein in 1920, “should abandon its organization, if necessary, and join 
Agudat Yisrael, because the program of the latter comprises the one of the former […].”1   
These debates came largely to an end after the First World Congress of Agudat 
Yisrael in August 1923. Throughout the 1920s, Agudat Yisrael and Mizrahi developed 
and distinguished their outlooks and platforms and consolidated their movements. During 
these years, neither of the two sides seriously considered returning to the negotiating 
table. In the 1930s, however, political developments and the socio-economic situation of 
Jews in Europe and Palestine prompted leaders from both movements to take up the idea 
of Orthodox cooperation again. When top-tier politicians of both parties finally came 
together in 1938 in Paris, frameworks had dramatically changed, and the talks assumed a 
different tone and quality from their precursors in the decades before.  
The next two chapters investigate various attempts of international Orthodox leaders 
to negotiate different forms of cooperation throughout the 1930s. This chapter sets its 
focus on discussions about an Orthodox world congress in 1934, and Chapter VI 
examines agreements between the leaders of the two movements in the late 1930s. Both 
Monty Penkower and Zeev Bauer see the debates around an Orthodox world congress 
mainly as an attempt by Mizrahi leaders to reach out to their Agudah counterparts that 
failed due to the rejection of the latter.2 In contrast, I analyze the debates from 1934 and 
their significance in the context of the wider framework of Jewish politics concerning 
Palestine, and ask about their impact on the formation of two clearly defined Orthodox 
political camps.   
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Which Way? Mizrahi Debates about Organizational Affiliations 
In the early 1930s, the international Mizrahi movement witnessed deep inner 
tensions. Due to vigorous secular Jewish immigration, the public observance of religious 
traditions in Palestine deteriorated gravely during this period. Mizrahists repeatedly 
attempted to push their demands for religious observance in Zionist institutions and the 
new Jewish settlements, but without much success. The party’s position within the ZO 
seemed to weaken during these years, and Mizrahi leaders fiercely debated the question 
of how to deal with the situation. Discussions about their affiliation with the ZO in 
particular put much strain on religious Zionists and threatened to tear the movement 
apart.   
 Against this backdrop, in 1933 Rabbi Moses Avigdor Amiel,3 the Chief Rabbi of 
Antwerp and longstanding Mizrahi leader, grappled critically with the outlook and 
affiliations of his movement at the world congress of his movement in Cracow. His 
speech, that was intended as a wake-up call for his own movement, was later published as 
a small booklet in Warsaw under the title “The ideological Essence of the Mizrahi.”4 
Amiel, in this speech, demanded that Mizrahists start a process of soul-searching and 
consider undertaking extensive changes in their movement’s outlook and affiliations. 
Alarmed by the strong secularizing processes of the last decades, and in particular by the 
high proportion of secular Jews in the Jewish settlements in Palestine, he bemoaned the 
“Copernican Revolution” that Zionism had carried out by redirecting Judaism from its 
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moved to Palestine and became the chief rabbi of Tel Aviv. 




primary attachment to God and Torah away to an exclusive focus on the Land of Yisrael.5 
Zionism, Amiel held, assimilated Jewish group affiliations to those of other nations, and 
thus divided Judaism into “national” and “religious” aspects. By essentially accepting this 
compartmentalization, he reproachfully noted, Mizrahists helped advancing processes of 
secularization. Instead of pursuing their historical goal of drawing secular Zionists nearer 
to observant lifestyles and tenets, he argued, Mizrahists themselves had become more and 
more influenced by the latter. Their youth, Amiel lamented, were increasingly Zionist, 
but less and less observant.  
The Mizrahi itself, in Amiel’s opinion, served only as fig leaf for the ZO. Due to the 
Mizrahi’s affiliation with the ZO, the latter could claim to represent all Jews, and not 
only secular ones. Secular Zionists, however, did not accept the Mizrahi’s demands for 
public observance of tradition and religious commandments in turn. Clearly reflecting the 
current tensions within the religious Zionist movement, Amiel urged his fellows to 
rethink the situation. In addition, he showed himself deeply worried about the shifting of 
power within the ZO. He could see common ground for cooperation between the Mizrahi 
and the General Zionists. But during the early thirties, the latter lost their power little by 
little to labor Zionism. “If we have something in common with the General Zionists, who 
at least pretend to not oppose Torah and religion,” Amiel asked, “what do we share with 
the leftists, who declare open war on the sanctity of the Jews and hold a Jew living in sin 
to be the real Jew (she davqa yisra'el she-hote yisra’el hu)?”6  
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Amiel complemented his critique of the Mizrahi’s position within the ZO with a 
review of the movement’s relations to Agudat Yisrael. These relations, he suggested, 
were of crucial significance for his movement’s outlook. Amiel found it highly 
unfortunate that many identified the only raison d'être of the Mizrahi in its struggle 
against the Agudah. This struggle had taken center stage and Mizrahists had mostly 
abandoned any other goals. Thus, the revision of these relations was Amiel’s great 
concern. While preoccupied mainly with his own movement, Amiel did not spare the 
Agudah from critique. Many Agudists as well, he held, had made it their exclusive aim to 
battle the Mizrahi. Even worse to his mind, the Agudah still neglected its support for 
Jewish settlements, and left religious Zionists alone in their struggle to build up Orthodox 
structures and life in Palestine. It was not enough, he claimed, to establish a solid base in 
Poland. Palestine was gaining in significance and was increasingly influencing Jewish 
life in the Diaspora.  
Therefore, Amiel urged Agudah and Mizrahi to join forces. He admonished 
Orthodoxy to learn from the labor movement, and to forge cooperation outside of the 
framework of the ZO. “If there is a ‘League for a Working Eretz Yisrael,’” Amiel asked, 
“why can there be no ‘League for an Observant Eretz Yisrael (Eretz Yisrael Torani),’ or 
‘League for a Holy Eretz Yisrael’?”7 To this end, he urged his fellow Mizrahists to 
reconsider their tight affiliation with the ZO. To be sure, Amiel did not demand that the 
Mizrahi distance itself from the Zionist movement altogether, but he opted for a 
loosening of the organizational framework. Instead of the current union, Amiel thought, 
the Mizrahi should create a political federation with the ZO that would leave both 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




movements as independent bodies. This, in turn, would allow the Mizrahi to work 
together with the Agudah in one organization. 
While Amiel made it clear that he wanted the Mizrahi to stay a separate Orthodox 
party with its own ideology and organizational framework, his suggestion came 
dangerously close to what Agudists had demanded in the past. His words reflected the 
changes that Orthodox politics had undergone since the time of the foundation of the 
Mizrahi. The ZO, he argued, had long ago revoked its neutrality towards matters of 
religion and observance. Instead, the movement had become a secularizing force, and the 
Mizrahi had followed suit. In this spirit, Amiel reproached his colleagues for not having 
supported the Agudah some years earlier in its negotiations regarding cooperation with 
the ZO. In the late 1920s, Agudists had expressed their willingness to join the Jewish 
Agency on condition that their educational system could stay sovereign from the Zionist 
one. The Zionists, however, had rejected this request. “And finally, when we could have 
been the determining factor and won over the Agudah for the upbuilding of Eretz 
Yisrael,” Amiel reckoned, “we completely forgot the purpose of our creation […], and 
went hand in hand with the secularists (hafashim) in these matters in order to expel the 
Agudah from the general public.”8 
Amiel, here, seemed to hint at some of the ironies of the historical processes at work. 
The approach that the Agudah developed in its dealings with the ZO during the 1920s 
was akin to what religious Zionists had set out to achieve through the foundation of their 
movement in 1902. Agudists suggested cooperation with Zionists that would allow for 
bringing Orthodox Jews to Palestine and for working together with secularists, but would 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




keep organizational frameworks clearly separated and would safeguard the sovereignty of 
Orthodox communities. To be sure, Agudists did not draw nearer to religious Zionist 
tenets. Neither, for ideological reasons, did they intend to cooperate with secular Jews, 
nor make the establishing of a Jewish State their aim. What is more, their movement 
witnessed strong tensions regarding any concessions to the Zionists. On practical terms, 
however, their way of dealing with the Zionist movement bore a certain resemblance to 
earlier Mizrahi struggles around the cultural question. Mizrahists, on the other hand, had 
abandoned their former demands for Zionist neutrality vis-à-vis religious issues. Such 
neutrality had long been revoked, as Amiel correctly observed.  
Finally, Amiel expressed deep discomfort about attitudes that had developed towards 
Torah scholars and rabbinic authorities. Mizrahists, he asserted, had forgotten about the 
exceptional position that rabbinic authority enjoyed in Judaism. While democracy and 
equal rights were important values, Mizrahists could not disregard rabbinic authority. 
There were many observant Jews in the ranks of the movement, but spiritual authority 
was missing. “[…] Only a few chosen ones among every generation”, he wrote, “are able 
to grasp the Torah in its entirety. We too, are lacking the spirit of the Torah.”9 This 
statement, as well, resonated with Agudah critics of modern politics, and challenged the 
very basis of religious Zionist self-conceptions.  
Amiel’s words displayed deep misgivings with the secularization processes taking 
place in Palestine and the Jewish Diaspora, as well as with the changing political 
situation and not least with the route that his movement had taken. This was not the first 
time that he expressed criticism about the state of the Zionist movement in general, and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




of its observant wing in particular. During the early 1920s, Amiel had repeatedly raised 
doubts about the Mizrahi’s ideological program and organizational affiliations. In 1923, 
for example, at the party’s world conference in the Czechoslovakian city of Karlovy 
Vary, Amiel had demanded that his movement undergo a severe process of soul-
searching, and grant more influence to rabbinic authority. He had lamented growing 
tensions between Orthodox Jews and secularist Zionists. The ZO, he had held, could not 
remain alone in its striving to erect Jewish settlements in Palestine, but had to find a way 
to integrate non-Zionists into its endeavors. Therefore, he had urged the Mizrahi to 
campaign for the convening of a Jewish world congress. The historical declaration of the 
First Zionist Congress in Basel from 1897, he had hoped, could soon be changed and 
“Zionism” would be substituted with “the whole Jewish people” so that the statement 
would read: “The whole Jewish people aims at establishing a publicly and legally assured 
home in Palestine.”10 Zionism, for Amiel, was not in itself the purpose, but only a means 
to a greater end. 
In 1932 circumstances had changed and Amiel’s critique assumed a quality somewhat 
different from his former remarks. In the early 1920s, the Mizrahi had been in the 
ascendant, with a strong standing within the ZO and high hopes of gaining further 
influence. A decade later, on the other hand, the Mizrahi was in a severe crisis, and 
Amiel’s call for a revision of the movement’s ideology and affiliations reflected this 
situation. This time, his speech launched a debate that would occupy the party for weeks 
and months to come. Several participants commented on Amiel’s critique during the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 His critique can be found in the reports on the conference in Jüdische Rundschau 14.8.1923, 1-5; Ha-
Mizrahi 27.9.1923, 9. For other examples from this period, see Ha-Mizrahi 14.5.1919, 33-38; 9.7.1919, 3-
5; 23.7.1919, 3f; 28.8.1919, 4f; 10.9.1919, 5f; 23.9.1919, 5f; 11.5.1922, 1f; 25.5.1922, 2f; 8.6.1922, 3f; 




conference itself. While many of them agreed that the Mizrahi had to find a way to better 
assert its religious demands within the ZO, most speakers fiercely rejected the extent of 
Amiel’s critique, and blamed the alarming state of religious life in Palestine solely on the 
separatism of non-Zionist Orthodoxy. Mizrahists, they claimed, had always reached out 
to Agudat Yisrael, but the latter had frequently rejected their offers.  
Most outspokenly, Isaac Nissenbaum and Yehuda Maimon both strongly disclaimed 
any possibility of quitting the organizational framework of the ZO. Nissenbaum advanced 
practical reasons against leaving the Zionist Organization when he noted that such a step 
would not help Orthodoxy due to a fixed ratio of distribution of votes in the Jewish 
Agency. In this body, Zionists and non-Zionists both had a predetermined share of votes. 
Therefore, leaving the ZO and bringing the Agudah into the Jewish Agency would not 
achieve an Orthodox majority. Speaking up as well, Yehuda Maimon dismissed any 
critique of the Mizrahi’s ideology. While he thanked Amiel for his reflections on the 
principles of the party platform, he deemed them incorrect. The Mizrahi, to his mind, had 
a profound program, which strove for much more than building up a safe haven for Jews 
in Palestine. To Amiel’s request for a soul-searching process, Maimon replied that 
religious Zionist ideology was not a failure. On the contrary, the Mizrahi approach was so 
successful that it had an impact on many in the Agudah as well. Even the Gerer Rebbe, 
Maimon emphasized in typical Mizrahi rhetoric, now campaigned for settlement 
activities in Palestine.11 At the same time, he supported Amiel’s call for a renewal of the 
Mizrahi’s efforts at working together with non-Zionist Orthodoxy, and in particular with 
Agudat Yisrael. To this purpose, he suggested convening a world congress of Jewish 
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Orthodoxy in Jerusalem. The attendees of the Krakow conference enthusiastically 
accepted his suggestion.12  
 
Forward Escape - Mizrahi Efforts for a Joint Haredi Congress 
Maimon’s suggestion was a clever move. The idea of a world congress helped to 
unite all Mizrahists behind one goal, and at the same time shifted attention away from 
Amiel’s demands for a process of soul-searching.13 What is more, the proposal deflected 
Amiel’s concerns about the Mizrahi’s tight affiliations with the ZO. The central focus 
was now on the issue of uniting Orthodox leaders in one congress under the aegis of the 
Mizrahi. In addition to approving Maimon’s proposal, the conference “expressed its 
fiercest protest against the attempts of a certain group in Palestine to create its own 
communities and rabbinate,” a resolution that was seen by some in the Agudah as a direct 
challenge to its Palestine policies, and casted doubt on the sincerity of Mizrahists’ 
intentions.14  
Following the congress, the central office of the movement in Jerusalem published a 
proclamation that called on all Orthodox Jews to join the Mizrahi in its endeavor to 
convene a world congress.15 Furthermore, the office wrote to the executive of the World 
Agudah. A few weeks later Jacob Rosenheim responded to their request, thanking 
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Mizrahi leaders and informing them that the executive of his movement would 
thoroughly examine the proposal. In January 1934, the Mizrahi office received an official 
answer. The Agudah executive, the letter stated, had seriously pondered the proposal. In 
addition to debating among their political leaders, they had also submitted a copy for 
review to the movement’s rabbinic assembly. Agudah authorities, however, held their 
participation in such a congress to be impossible, as long as the Mizrahi would not leave 
the ZO. “We are concerned,” they wrote, “that the convening of an Orthodox congress at 
this time in the holy city of Jerusalem is likely not to bring unity, but to deepen schism; 
that it will not lead to the sanctification of God’s name, but to its profanation.”16 The 
letter conveyed the fears of Agudah leaders about tensions within their own ranks, but 
also about conflicts that their participation might cause with the Orthodox world at large. 
As it later turned out, Polish Agudists in particular had raised concerns about such a 
congress. During these years, the Polish branch was encountering increased opposition 
within the camp of non-Zionist Orthodoxy, and publicly displayed cooperation with the 
Mizrahi would have been likely to hurt its reputation.17  
The two sides continued to correspond throughout the next months, but without much 
progress. Agudists kept insisting that the Mizrahi had to leave the ZO before the two 
could reach any cooperation on substantial matters. Amiel’s speech was published in 
1934 as a separate brochure, which must have further fueled Agudah leaders’ hopes that 
religious Zionists would eventually do so. Amiel later bitterly remarked that while 
Agudists had widely welcomed his call to loosen the Mizrahi’s ties with the ZO, his own 
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fellow party members had fiercely attacked his ideas.18 His suggestion of launching some 
kind of Orthodox Jewish Agency, in fact, resembled Agudah attempts to counter 
secularist influences by building up Orthodox equivalents to Zionist institutions.19  
Agudist intransigence was further reinforced by the inner tensions that the Mizrahi 
witnessed during this period, and the party’s rising conflicts with the labor movement. In 
1933, Mizrahists had left the Zionist executive in support of Zeev Jabotinsky’s 
Revisionist Party and in protest against the religious situation in the Zionist settlements in 
Palestine. Their conflicts with the ZO finally came to a head during the summer of 1934. 
Mizrahists kept demanding that the Zionist movement officially commit to enforcing 
public observance of Jewish holidays and adherence to Jewish dietary laws in its 
institutions. In spring 1934, the Labor Party adopted several resolutions on religious 
observance including the declaration that public kitchens had to adhere to Jewish dietary 
laws, in order to appease its observant partners. Mizrahists, although welcoming the step, 
did not hold these resolutions to be sufficient. When no further progress was achieved, 
they left the National Council in Palestine in July 1934. Der Israelit joyfully celebrated 
the Mizrahi’s move and expected religious Zionists to soon enter Agudah ranks.20 Until 
the Mizrahi finally rejoined the National Council one year later, Agudah leaders 
entertained hopes that these differences would lead to a final split of the Zionist 
movement. Even more alarming were the fissures these developments caused within the 
Mizrahi itself. While most of the movement’s chapters sided with their executive, some 
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Palestinian activists under the leadership of Moses Ostrovski, as well as the Mizrahi’s 
German and Dutch branches, seceded from the main movement in order to rejoin the 
National Council under the name “Veteran Mizrahi.” For several months, rancorous 
conflicts raged in the Mizrahi press and among its leaders and activists.21  
These developments certainly confirmed Agudists in their hard line towards requests 
for cooperation. Mizrahists, in the meantime, widely advertised their attempts to convene 
a world congress of Jewish Orthodoxy. Such advertising served several purposes. For 
one, publicity helped Mizrahists demonstrate their active involvement in easing the plight 
of the Jewish masses. It also challenged their secular Zionist fellows, and sent a clear 
message: if the latter would not meet Mizrahi demands for public observance of religious 
precepts, there was a political alternative to the party’s remaining in the ZO.22 Moreover, 
such public announcements exerted pressure on Agudah leaders. Only shortly after their 
first letter exchange in February 1934, Yehuda Maimon’s Ha-Tor published a scathing 
comment on the rejection of the Mizrahi’s offer. Agudists, the article’s author, Eliyahu 
Inselbukh,23 announced, had yet another time refused to overcome differences with their 
religious Zionist colleagues. Inselbukh continued by listing former attempts that Mizrahi 
politicians had undertaken to bring about peace between the two movements. Considering 
the fact that Agudists had done nearly nothing for the settlement project in Palestine, he 
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concluded, their rejection of the world congress was absurd. But Inselbuch felt confident 
that they would eventually mend their ways and cooperate with the Mizrahi.24 
Throughout the period of negotiations, the party media published articles with a 
similar message. Such articles allowed religious Zionists to demonstrate their 
commitment to negotiations and compromise, and to simultaneously make clear that any 
failure of such attempts was to be blamed exclusively on Agudists. The significance of 
such publicity could not be taken lightly in a period during which the youth, especially, 
increasingly reproached Agudah leaders for their passivity in Palestinian affairs, often 
leaving their organization to join the local Mizrahi branch.25 Maimon further increased 
public pressure by getting the rabbinic councils of Lithuania and the US involved, both of 
which were outspoken adherents of Orthodox cooperation.26 Agudists, accordingly, did 
not reject the Mizrahi’s offer entirely. Instead, they suggested holding talks on a much 
smaller scale - between top-tier leaders - and proposed cooperation in “isolated fields” of 
uncontroversial matters, such as the joint struggle for the observance of the Sabbath and 
the improvement in conditions for the training of physical laborers. They also demanded 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Ha-Tor 9.2.1934, 5f. 
25 As Polish officials observed during this period. See Chapter III. 
26 The Lithuanian Rabbinate was traditionally a strong supporter of Mizrahi-Agudah rapprochement. One 
of its representatives, Rabbi Abraham Dov-Ber Kahana-Shapira, had during the early 1920s already 
attempted to mediate between the two sides. Yehuda Maimon requested the Lithuanians’ support during a 
propaganda trip in winter 1934. Despite the Agudah’s request for confidentiality, this was published in ibid. 
16.2.1934, 12; 4.5.1934, 11f. As the Agudah had neglected US Jewry, the rabbinate there was strongly 
supportive of the Mizrahi, and answered Maimon’s inquiry about the option of participating in an Orthodox 
Congress positively. See Letter of Orthodox Rabbinate in the US and Canada (NY) to World Mizrahi 
Office, Jerusalem, 18.1.1934, in ARZ MO 1934 A-B. Bauer assumes that the Mizrahi tried to gain this 
support “to prepare the hearts” for a joint congress, but the publication of such attempts in the Mizrahi 
press rather attests to propagandistic purposes. Such an interpretation is also supported by the fact that the 
US Mizrahi later published a speech by Kahan-Shapira in which he unequivocally blamed the Agudah for 
missing Orthodox cooperation in order to struggle against the latter’s attempts to gain a foothold in the new 
world. Compare Bauer, Ha-Yahasim ha-Penimiim, 75-77. For Kahana-Shapira’s speech, see Ver iz shuldig 
in dem perud tsvishn Mizrahi un Agudat Yisrael?  (New York 1937-38). For the political context of the 
leaflet, see also Chapter VI. For a booklet in a similar style that claimed “to enlighten” the Jews about the 
real character of the Agudah, when the party tried to establish institutions in Tel Aviv during the 1940s, see 




strict confidentiality. Public debates about these matters, they held, would not help to 
advance the cause of Orthodox Jewry.27  
Mizrahi leaders agreed to start negotiating on a smaller scale, but demanded to 
incorporate discussions about common support of religious institutions and education, as 
well as about the joint nomination of rabbis and ritual slaughterers. “For the 
strengthening of spiritual matters,” they held, “we have to work together in disregard of 
any party differences.”28 The inclusion of these fields, of course, was not nearly as 
uncontroversial as Mizrahists claimed. Both the question of education and the nomination 
of rabbis and ritual slaughterers were deeply entrenched in political and economic power 
struggles. Unsurprisingly, then, Agudah leaders refused to debate these additional fields.  
After some back and forth, representatives of the international movements finally met 
in Jerusalem to explore possibilities of cooperation. But the meeting mostly confirmed 
their differences. The Polish Agudah leader Isaac Levin suggested uniting all Orthodox 
Jewry in one organization instead of discussing individual matters. His Palestinian 
colleague Moses Blau agreed, and once more stressed the futility of cooperation with the 
Mizrahi under current circumstances. His words echoed Agudists’ fears about the 
blurring of borders between Orthodox Jewry and secular Zionism. “It will deleteriously 
affect our children,” Blau announced, “if they see us unite with Jews who go hand-in-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 The Central Council of the international Agudah voted at its assembly in June 1934 in Warsaw against 
the world congress, but allowed for cooperation in individual cases. The meeting illustrated the different 
attitudes towards cooperation. While the German leaders were more favorable towards such cooperation, 
the Poles largely rejected it because of fierce struggles between the two Polish branches. Hungarian leaders 
saw in Mizrahists the “most dangerous enemies of rabbinical authority and seducers of Orthodox youth.” 
See reports in Der Israelit 7.6.1934, 1-8; 21.6.1934, 5f. The Agudah Executive finally answered the 
Mizrahi’s letter in July 1934. See Agudah Executive to World Mizrahi Office in Jerusalem, 5.7.1934, in 
ARZ MO 99. 




hand with secularists. I sum up: If it is possible to discuss merger, it is worthwhile 
talking. If not, it is desirable to leave the Agudah in its purity.”  
Mizrahi leaders refused to discuss the disbanding of existing organizations, and 
repeated their intention to convene a world congress of Orthodox Jewry. Daniel Sirkis, a 
Polish-born leader of Ha-Poel Ha-Mizrahi who had immigrated to Palestine in the 1920s, 
agitated for the common organization of observant workers in Palestine. Heshel 
Farbstein, the former eminent Polish Mizrahi leader, who had by then also moved to 
Jerusalem, called on both parties to join forces in their struggles for immigration 
certificates in order to increase the number of observant immigrants. Lastly, Meir Berlin 
attacked the Agudah for claiming a monopoly on educational institutions and in particular 
yeshivot. Only a world congress, he declared, could help solve the most pressing 
problems. "A joint assembly will, perhaps, deleteriously affect the Agudah,” he argued,” 
“but it will have a good influence on religious Jewry as a whole.” Concluding the 
conversation, both sides agreed that cooperation for strengthening religious life in 
specific matters was possible, and expressed their intention to continue the dialogue. 
Somewhat foreshadowing the failure of such endeavors, however, the meeting ended 
with squabbles in which each side accused the other of vilifying its political opponent in 
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Contact between individual representatives continued. And yet, these attempts soon 
petered out. The next international Mizrahi conference in August 1935 still mandated the 
party’s executive to work towards “cooperation between all parts of Orthodoxy,” but its 
participants refrained from defining particular projects.30 The party conference, in fact, 
heralded a crucial turning point in the history of the movement. Its purpose was to 
prevent a final split of the party’s different organizations, and to prepare the Mizrahi for 
the upcoming Nineteenth Zionist Congress in Lucerne. Both goals were accomplished.  
Moses Ostrovski and his fellows in the Veteran Mizrahi faction re-entered the party 
and promised to assist in returning the German and Dutch branches to the movement’s 
ranks also. In matters concerning the ZO, the conference obliged its representatives for 
the Zionist Congress to take an uncompromising line against the “religious anarchy in 
Eretz Yisrael,” and “to require the Zionist organization ultimately and with adequate 
guarantees” to meet the Mizrahi’s religious concerns. Mizrahists demanded the 
observance of Sabbath and holidays on all of the estates of the Jewish National Fund and 
in the training camps for pioneers in the Diaspora. In addition, all public kitchens were to 
adhere to Jewish dietary laws. If the Zionist Congress did not approve these requests, the 
resolution threatened somewhat fuzzily, Mizrahists would “consider far-reaching 
steps.”31 One week later, Zionist leaders from all over the world gathered in Lucerne. 
Due to further pressure from religious Zionists, the congress indeed approved the party’s 
demands, and representatives of the Mizrahi re-entered the Zionist executive after one 
year of absence. Effectively, the congress helped to draw religious and labor Zionists 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  





closer together, and sealed a historic alliance between the two movements that would last 
for many decades.32  
The nineteenth Zionist Congress was an important landmark. Mizrahists had 
maneuvered their organization through a critical period. They overcame a severe crisis 
and averted the movement’s split. Their re-entry into Zionist institutions also prevented a 
rapprochement between Agudat Yisrael and the National Council, who during the early 
summer months of 1935 had started to re-negotiate the question of separate Orthodox 
kehillot in Palestine.33 The episode of the world congress helped to smooth tensions 
within the Mizrahi, and furthered ideological consolidation. During the winter months of 
1934-1935, Amiel continued advocating for ideological and organizational reorientation, 
and published a detailed response to his critics, in particular Yehuda Maimon.34 Not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32  For the debates at the congress, see Stenographisches Protokoll der Verhandlungen des XIX. 
Zionistenkongresses und der vierten Tagung der Jewish Agency für Palästina (Vienna/London 1935). Der 
Israelit attacked Mizrahi tactics of “passive resistance” and doubted that the resolutions would ever be 
implemented. See Der Israelit 5.9.1935, 3f. See also Darkenu 29.8.1935, 1. Polish Mizrahi leaders also 
appeared skeptical, but celebrated the unification of all Mizrahi groups. See the articles in Di Yudishe 
Shtime 16.10.1935, 1f. For an exploration of aspects of that historical alliance, see Eliezer Don-Yehiya, 
“Shituf ve-Qonfliqt bein Mahanot Politiim: Ha-Mahane ha-Dati ve-Tenuat ha-Avoda ve-Mashber ha-Hinuh 
be-Yisra’el” (PhD diss., Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 1977). The congress shattered also any hopes of 
an alliance between the Mizrahi and the Revisionists, that some hard-liners might have hold, see Hayyim 
Genizi, “Nisiyonot le-Shituf Pe‘ula be-Mahane ha-Yamin bein Shetei Milhomot ha-Olam,” in Dat u-
mahteret be-Eretz Yisra’el be-Tekufat ha-Mandat, ed. idem (Tel Aviv, 1995), 133-35; Idem. “Bein ha-
Mizrahi le-Revizyionistim, 1925-1939,” Bar-Ilan 20-21 (1982): 271-86. 
33 See reports in Der Israelit 27.6.1935, 1,3-5; Kol Yisrael 13.5.1935, 1. In Ha-Tor, Yehuda Maimon 
fiercely attacked the “love relationship” between the labor movement and Agudat Yisrael concerning the 
question of religion. He correctly perceived that their rapprochement would be detrimental to the Mizrahi 
and its position in Palestine. See Ha-Tor 17.5.1935, 3. Mizrahists came to an agreement with their partners 
from the labor party that stipulated the establishment of separate religious community institutions (moetza 
datit) in addition to the civil communities. 
34 See his essay “Shuv al ha-Yesodot ha-Ideologiim shel ha-Mizrahi” in ibid. 10.8.1934, 3-5; 17.8.1934, 3f; 
24.8.1934, 3f; 23.9.1934, 4-6; 12.10.1934, 4-6; 19.10.1934, 6-9; 16.11.1934, 2-3; 30.11.1934, 3-5; 





without justification, it seems, did he accuse Maimon of using the negotiations with 
Agudat Yisrael merely in order to impose pressure on the ZO.35  
Ironically, the only one showing himself willing to engage with Amiel’s critique in a 
constructive way was the Agudah leader Isaac Breuer. Breuer himself underwent major 
transformations during these years. In Germany he had been one of the harshest 
opponents of cooperation with the Mizrahi. After immigrating to Palestine in 1936, 
however, Breuer became involved in the struggles of observant workers and soon 
established himself as leader of the Agudah’s workers’ movement (PAY). As such, he 
became a strong promoter of cooperation between the two labor organizations.36 Breuer 
grappled with Amiel’s thoughts in an essay first published in the pages of Der Israelit in 
October 1934, and later reprinted as a pamphlet under the title “The Tragedy of the 
Mizrahi.”37 Unsurprisingly, he agreed that the Mizrahi had to change its ways. Going 
beyond party political rhetoric, however, Breuer celebrated Amiel’s words as the 
“Mizrahi’s ideological emancipation from Zionism,” and detected the chance for true 
cooperation between the two sides. He did not spare his own party from critique, and 
reproached non-Zionist Orthodoxy for having neglected Eretz Yisrael and its significance 
for the historical development of the Jewish people. Amiel, he hoped, would convince his 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 For Maimon, Amiel declared in the pages of Ha-Tor, the congress is only a means to a Zionist end. In 
this case, however, Amiel preferred that the Orthodox Congress never convene. Such a congress, Amiel 
held, would be only valid if the participants would authoritatively decide the future of Orthodox politics. 
See ibid. 23.2.1934, 3-5; 2.3.1934, 4f; 23.3.1934, 3f; 6.4.1934, 3f. For debates about separate Orthodox 
kehillot in Palestine see Chapter IV. 
36 During debates about Amiel’s speech, some expressed their hope that Amiel and Breuer would be able to 
bring about true cooperation between the two movements. See, for example, a contribution to the debate in 
the Austrian paper Jüdische Zeitschrift Misrachi, 1.11.1934, 1. 
37  Isaac Breuer, Die Tragik des Misrachi (Frankfurt a. M., 1936). Der Israelit published Breuer’s 
contribution as a series under the same title starting with Der Israelit, 5.10.1934, 1, 3-6. Breuer continued 
his efforts. For later criticism of Agudat Yisrael and his attempts to bring Agudat Yisrael and Mizrahi 




camp of the centrality of the Torah, and he himself would call the attention of his side to 
the importance of the holy land. Then the two organizations could strive to form a true 
Orthodox union. Despite such enthusiastic words, Breuer did not want to get overly 
optimistic. “Would Agudah and Mizrahi not be able to work together already today?” 
Breuer asked. “This,” he answered his own question, “depends on the echo that Amiel’s 
paper evokes in the Mizrahi camp.” Orthodox Zionism, Breuer found to be resonating in 
Amiel’s words, was a contradiction in terms.38  
The echo that Breuer had hoped for, however, failed to materialize. Amiel himself 
welcomed this contribution. But what Breuer described was not only “the tragedy of the 
Mizrahi,” Amiel objected, it was “the tragedy of Orthodoxy in general.”39  Amiel 
reproached Agudists for requiring the Mizrahi to leave the ZO. At the same time, he 
continued to blame his own party for tying its fate so tightly to Zionists frameworks, and 
kept promoting his idea of a political federation with the ZO. Such a federation, he 
argued, would grant Mizrahists more independence. Amiel’s aim was to launch an honest 
discussion in Orthodox circles about their relations with secular Zionists. He hoped for a 
willingness to seriously re-think these relations beyond party platforms and 
organizational boundaries. Against his hopes, such discussion did not take place. At the 
party conference in August 1935, Amiel undertook a last attempt to foster soul-searching 
processes and fiercely reprimanded the Veteran Mizrahi for transferring the Torah’s 
authority to the Zionist Organization. But Ostrovski appeased his party fellows by 
announcing his faction’s compliance with party discipline in all matters vis-à-vis the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Breuer, Die Tragik des Misrachi, 23. 




ZO.40 The conference not only marked the end of efforts to convene a world congress of 
Jewish Orthodoxy, but also coincided with the abating of the discussions launched by 
Amiel’s critical reflections two years before.  
The debates within religious Zionist circles and their negotiations with representatives 
from Agudat Yisrael reflected the structures and outlooks of the two movements. 
Mizrahists, whose strength lay in social and political activism, strove to organize a great 
political event with much publicity. Such a congress would have sent a strong message 
defying reproaches of an alleged Orthodox passivity, and highlighting their involvement 
in attempts to ameliorate the plight of the Jewish masses. Organizing a convention with 
some of the highest spiritual authorities under the aegis of the Mizrahi, furthermore, 
would have helped the party to gain recognition in the camp of Orthodox Jewry. After all, 
the strong resistance among many important religious leaders was still one of the party’s 
major strategic disadvantages vis-à-vis Agudat Yisrael.   
This, on the other hand, was one of the Agudah’s major concerns. Cooperation with 
religious Zionists was a highly contested issue among the different branches, and many 
Orthodox leaders from Poland, Hungary, and other countries perceived Mizrahists as the 
“most dangerous enemies of rabbinic authority and seducers of Orthodox youth,”41 
potentially even more harmful than their secularist fellows. Therefore, they fiercely 
rejected any rapprochement between the two parties. Cooperation with religious Zionists, 
especially in the form of media spectacles such as a world congress, was prone to lead to 
major tensions and even schism. What is more, Agudah leaders worried about the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 A short summary of the debates can be found in Der Israelit, 22.8.1935, 10. 
41 Hungarian leaders commented on the Mizrahi in this vein at an assembly of the Central Council of the 




younger generation. The youth, they repeatedly remarked, could confuse limited 
cooperation with formal recognition of Zionist activism. “Especially in a moment of 
strong enthusiasm for Eretz Yisrael,” a commentator in Der Israelit pointed out in 1934, 
“can we only avert the danger of spiritual contagion […] by drawing clear lines.”42 Seen 
from this angle, it was not ideological differences that barred Agudat Yisrael from 
cooperation, but rather the weakness of distinctive outlooks, and fears that ideologies and 
platforms might get blurred all too easily. Outright rejection of the Mizrahi offer, on the 
other hand, would have furnished the latter with a fit occasion to accuse non-Zionist 
Orthodoxy of passivity and separatism. Therefore, they suggested limited cooperation in 
individual cases.  
It would be wrong, however, to simply dismiss the negotiations of the mid-1930s. 
Despite their eventual collapse, these negotiations marked an important stage of the 
movements’ development and their inter-party relations. For the first time in over a 
decade, high-ranking politicians of both sides met to discuss possible fields of 
cooperation. While no agreement was achieved, the talks were a first step towards such 
endeavors, and prepared the grounds for future negotiations. The dynamics between the 
two parties helped the Mizrahists to overcome their inner crisis and to find their position 
within the changing landscape of Zionist politics. Frictions within the Mizrahi had raised 
hopes among the party’s opponents for its disintegration and eventual collapse. But to the 
contrary, Agudah leaders’ strict insistence on the Mizrahi leaving the ZO helped to 
reunite different factions within the religious Zionist movement. The party’s alliance with 
labor Zionism further consolidated its ranks and frustrated aspirations for a merger with 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




the Agudah. Later negotiations would widely refrain from raising such issues, and in the 
following years the Mizrahi did not witness debates of comparable scope about its Zionist 
affiliations. The supporters of the Mizrahi’s strict affiliation with the ZO had prevailed. 
Most members saw their participation in the Zionist Organization as a goal itself, and not 
just as a means to an end, as Meir Berlin later pointed out on a joint meeting with Agudah 
leaders.43 
The Agudah, as well, faced deep organizational and ideological challenges during the 
mid-1930s, in particular with regard to its relations to the new Jewish settlements and 
political structures in Palestine. It was in Palestine itself that the debates found some 
resonance, and seemed to herald future changes. Here, the question of Orthodox 
cooperation revealed frictions within the ranks of Agudah leaders, reflecting wider 
political and socio-economic developments. During these years, the Palestinian Agudah 
witnessed the formation of two discrete centers: the old-established elite of traditionalist 
Jewry mostly based in Jerusalem on one hand, and leaders of the new immigrants from 
Europe on the other. Isaac Breuer now headed the latter. For socio-economic reasons, the 
new immigrants were highly dependent on Zionist structures and institutions, and Breuer 
developed a philosophy that allowed them to integrate into these environments while at 
the same time staying committed to non-Zionist Orthodox group formations.44 Although 
the Amiel debate had not led to the radical changes within the Mizrahi that Breuer had 
hoped for, he welcomed the call for cooperation, and initiated a meeting between 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 Zikhron Devarim me-ha-Pegishah bein ha-Merkaz ha-Olami shel ha-Mizrahi u-vein ha-Mishlahat shel 
“Agudat Yisra’el.” in ARZ MO112-23.   
44 In this context, the question of whether Agudah members had to leave Knesset Yisrael was one of the 
most contentious ones. Fewer and fewer of the new immigrants were willing to do so, while representatives 
of the Old Yishuv kept insisting this to be a crucial requirement for membership in the party. In the 1940s, 
finally, the Agudah had to abandon this policy. Friedman, Hevrah va-Dat, 350-53. For the transformations 




Palestinian leaders of both movements, which eventually took place in August 1936. 
This, as Meir Berlin rightly observed at the meeting itself, was a significant novelty, as 
now the initiative not only came from within the Agudah camp itself, but from a man 
“who in his attitude towards the Mizrahi until a few months earlier held to the principle 
that anything emanating from the impure is impure itself (“kol ha-yotze me-ha-tameh 
tameh”).”45 Breuer’s great antagonist became Moses Blau, the eminent political leader of 
the Old Yishuv. Deeply concerned about the appeal of Zionist organizations to workers 
and youth, Blau strictly opposed cooperation with the Mizrahi. The meeting reflected 
these tensions and remained largely without results. Nevertheless, Breuer did not despair. 
He continued his path and pushed for cooperation between the two labor movements and 
a joint workers’ union.    
The tensions between Blau and Breuer were part of wider clashes between the 
established Agudah leadership and its youth and workers’ branches. These, as we have 
seen, transcended the Palestinian arena. The Polish Agudah youth, desiring to leave the 
country, reproached its leadership for not working hard enough to obtain more 
certificates allowing their holders to settle in Palestine. In Germany, young Agudists 
came up with the idea of a “Third Yishuv,” an alternative that would combine the 
activism of Zionist settlements with the strict adherence to religious traditions and 
authority of non-Zionist Orthodoxy.46 In 1935, Der Israeli printed the “open word by a 
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See for example the programmatic article of its editor. Fred Lustig, “Noar Agudathi und Erez Jisrael ,” 
Hajischuw Haschlischi. Blatt der agudistisch-chaluzischen Jugend (Juli 1934), 1-6. See also the two 




young Agudist.” In this article, the anonymous author called on the Agudah leadership to 
overcome the movement’s “splendid isolation, which after all is not so splendid.” He 
demanded that Agudists find ways to strengthen their diplomatic relations with other 
parties, in particular with religious Zionists. While supporting their insistence on the strict 
exclusion of cultural-religious issues from any proposed cooperation, and placing the 
main share of the blame on the Zionists, the author rebuked Agudah leaders for not 
having done enough themselves to improve mutual relations. Agudists’ ability to attract 
German Jews and in particular the youth, he argued, depended in great parts on the 
progress of their involvement in Palestine. “Above all,” he wrote, “we want to beat in to 
world Jewry that Agudat Yisrael is not some kind of hederism, but realistic and vibrant 
Judaism.”47  
Many Jewish political movements witnessed such generational tensions. In the case 
of Agudat Yisrael, these frictions went beyond mere disagreements about the degree of 
involvement in Palestinian settlement efforts. Here, an important additional dimension 
was the question of political activism and the assertion of rabbinic authority. The youth, 
and in particular the Palestinian branch of the Agudah workers’ movement (PAY), 
increasingly came into conflict with the rigid - and in their eyes inflexible - hierarchical 
structures of the political decision making process. In a similar manner to their peers in 
the Mizrahi, they reproached rabbinic authorities for not dealing appropriately with the 
practical needs of their settling activities.  
One example of how these tensions manifested themselves during the 1930s revolved 
around the question of “Hebrew labor.” The term had become a buzzword for a campaign 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




of the labor Zionist trade union (Histadrut) that aimed at removing Arab workers from 
Jewish worksites and plantations.48  Agudah workers, in dire need of employment, 
supported the Zionist nationalization of labor as appropriate political activism. The 
rabbinic leadership, in contrast, with Rabbi Elchonon Wassermann leading the way, 
harshly rejected such attempts. When in May 1934 PAY members got involved with 
attempts of labor Zionists to prevent Jewish farmers from employing Arab laborers on 
their Orange plantations, Rabbi Wasserman reprimanded the Agudah workers for their 
endeavors. Strikes and boycotts, he argued, were not legitimate means for Jewish workers 
in labor conflicts. A few weeks later, Rabbi Wasserman called on Agudah leaders “not to 
listen too strongly to the street” regarding the question of Palestine activism. Through 
such remarks, Rabbi Wasserman attempted to assert rabbinic authority over the workers. 
Rabbinic leaders in the Agudah were generally quite uncomfortable with the concept of 
“Hebrew labor” and condemned its overly nationalist outlook. Instead of fueling ethnic 
tensions through nationalist concepts, they held, Jews should observe Jewish traditions. If 
they ate kosher meat, for example, they automatically supported Jewish labor without 
offending their Arab neighbors.49  
In 1936, the Agudah’s labor wing reached an agreement with its religious Zionist 
peers organized in Ha-Poel Ha-Mizrahi. Hoping to establish a joint trade union for 
observant workers in Palestine, PAY representatives requested the approval of the 
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49 PAY leaders countered that Jewish workers were not able to compete with their Arab peers, and therefore 
they had to support the concept of “Hebrew labor.” Der Israelit 24.5.1934, 3f. 7.6.1934, 1-8. For further 
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Agudah leadership. But their hopes were frustrated when the rabbinic assembly barred 
PAY from entering such a union with Mizrahi workers.50 Notwithstanding the defeat of 
their suggestion, the PAY leadership continued their struggle for cooperation with their 
Mizrahi peers. These tensions afflicted Agudat Yisrael throughout the 1930s and 40s. 
Despite their conflicts, PAY workers never completely abandoned Agudah frameworks. 
More importantly, they never rejected the rabbinic council as final decision-making 
authority. Subordination to rabbinic directives remained their main and most distinctive 
difference from their Zionist peers. But as economic pressures continued to mount, 
Orthodox immigrants resigned less and less from the official Jewish community in 
Palestine, until ultimately the Agudah had to waive this stipulation of its membership 
statutes. 51  These developments altered Agudist encounters with the ZO, and also 
influenced the inner-Orthodox dialogue. The debates about a world congress in the early 
1930s were the first indication of a new epoch of Orthodox relations. For the next two 
decades, Mizrahi and Agudah leaders would negotiate their relations under quite different 
terms than they had in the 1920s.  
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On April 4, 1938, eight top-ranking political leaders of Agudat Yisrael and the 
religious Zionist movement met in the Ambassador Hotel in the center of Paris. For two 
whole days, Jacob Rosenheim, Moses Blau, Isaac Breuer, and Solomon Ehrman from the 
political executive of the Agudah discussed extensively with their counterparts from the 
Mizrahi, Meir Berlin, Zeev Gold, Samuel Brodt and Zalman Shragai. Meir Berlin, in his 
opening words to the meeting, emphasized its immense historical significance, and 
claimed that “great parts of the Jewish people” were “looking forward to hearing its 
decisions.” The result of the debates at the Ambassador Hotel was an official agreement 
of cooperation in several fields important to Orthodox Jewry. Agudah and Mizrahi 
representatives agreed to arrange common activities in support of religious education and 
services to the beleaguered Jewish masses in Europe, support joint endeavors for the 
strengthening of religious life and the immigration of observant Jews to Palestine, and 
combine efforts to secure the religious character of an anticipated Jewish state. Several 
committees were designated to work out the exact details of their cooperation during the 
next month. The agreement would ultimately be submitted for ratification to the 
Mizrahi’s presidium and the Agudah’s Council of Torah Sages. The meeting itself, and 
the consent of leading politicians to joint campaigns, was unprecedented in the history of 




rapprochement. The Paris convention, many concurred, was a major success for 
Orthodox Jewry, and could serve as the foundation for further-reaching agreements in the 
future. 
What had caused these dramatic changes? Had leaders on both sides finally overcome 
decades of mutual enmity and political struggle? The immediate occasion of their 
endeavors, leaders from both sides pointed out, was the harsh plight of European Jewry, 
and the state of religious observance and institutions in Europe and Palestine. During 
their discussions, moreover, it became clear that Orthodox leaders across the spectrum 
worried about the situation of Judaism in a largely secular future Jewish state. With rising 
tensions in Palestine and with British efforts to partition the area, the founding of a 
Jewish state seemed increasingly within sight, and the need to avert imminent danger 
more and more urgent. The problems of Orthodox Jewry, all sides agreed, were pressing.  
And yet, the high hopes that the representatives pinned on their agreement in Paris 
were quickly shattered. The following months witnessed strong diplomatic efforts and 
much to and fro on both sides. Despite ratification of the agreement by the Mizrahi 
presidium, and the involvement of high spiritual authorities, the agreement did not come 
about, as it was not ratified by the Agudah’s rabbinic council. Some did not give in and 
negotiated an alternative agreement with a limited focus on joint fundraising in Western 
European countries. But with strong opponents - this time mostly on the side of the 
Mizrahi - those endeavors fell through as well.   
Earlier scholarship investigated the reasons for the negotiations’ failure and asked 
who was to blame for the lost opportunity. But even if the effort had been successful, it is 




War II started just a few months after the final breakdown of the negotiations, and even at 
the time, some of the leaders involved questioned the actual impact of the agreements. 
Others did not deny the validity of such doubts, but stressed the symbolic significance of 
united Orthodox campaigns.1 Exactly what kind of symbolic value such agreements 
would have had, however, is uncertain. When Mizrahi and Agudat Yisrael finally came 
together in a political alliance during the early years of Israeli statehood, this unity 
appeared more like an emergency association than real rapprochement. Rather than 
drawing closer together, during those years Orthodoxy divided into two clearly 
distinguished camps, with Mizrahi and Agudah as their major political representatives:  
the camp of modern or national Orthodox Jews on the one hand, and that of ultra-
Orthodoxy on the other.  
Their ultimate collapse notwithstanding, the negotiations during the late 1930s are of 
great significance for the history of Orthodox politics. This chapter investigates as to 
what they indicate about the development of the two parties and their mutual relations. 
Do these negotiations denote a new stage of inter-party dynamics, or are they merely a 
continuation of earlier debates and struggles? What is their significance for the process of 
ideological and organizational consolidation of the two movements? And, how did the 
tripartite relationship of Agudat Yisrael, Mizrahi, and the Zionist Organization play into 
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Paris and London: Two Agreements, Few Results 
In late July 1937, Mizrahi representatives from Europe, Palestine, and the United 
States met in Zurich for the fourteenth World Congress of their movement. Similar to 
earlier occasions of this kind, the congress participants mandated that the political 
executive of their movement make any possible effort for the unification of Orthodox 
Jewry in its struggle for the good of the Jewish settlements in Palestine and the 
strengthening of religious institutions and life worldwide.2 Subsequently, Meir Berlin 
contacted Jacob Rosenheim shortly after the congress, and suggested that leaders of both 
movements meet to contemplate options of cooperation. 3  Berlin’s letter arrived 
fortuitously, as Agudat Yisrael had scheduled its Third World Congress just two weeks 
later. At the congress, Rosenheim delivered Berlin’s blessings together with the 
suggestion for a meeting. The message raised a cheer and was widely approved.4  
The way in which events unfolded seemed to indicate a new willingness for mutual 
rapprochement on both sides. The immediate and positive response of Agudah leaders to 
Berlin’s suggestion was the most evident expression of such changes. Berlin’s inquiry 
itself also conveyed a different spirit than earlier discussions of an Orthodox world 
congress. This time, Mizrahists contacted their Agudah colleagues without strident media 
campaigns, and offered a small meeting, which, in accordance with Agudah requests, 
they intended to keep highly confidential. The letter exchange that followed slightly 
dampened hopes, as it was marred by struggles over an appropriate meeting place, and by 
an undertone that revealed much resentment and distrust. But after some to and fro, both 
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sides eventually agreed to convene on April 4 and 5 of 1938 in the Ambassador Hotel in 
the center of Paris. 
In Paris itself, the atmosphere was friendly. Meir Berlin welcomed everybody 
warmly, and staked out the fields on which he hoped to reach mutual agreement. Over the 
course of the following two days, the participating leaders intensely debated about a joint 
struggle for the observance of Jewish law and holidays, concerted efforts for the 
furthering of religious education, and a common support for religious settlements in Eretz 
Yisrael. In their discussions, both sides demonstrated much goodwill and mutual 
sympathies. Despite this, however, disagreements and frictions remained pronounced. 
Berlin and his Mizrahi colleague Zeev Gold emphasized the significance of their 
meeting, and claimed that the Jewish masses placed great hopes on an agreement between 
the two Orthodox parties. Jacob Rosenheim, on the other hand, was careful not to fuel 
expectations. In his first contribution, Rosenheim made it clear that the meeting was 
merely of a private character. Neither he nor his colleagues were authorized to make 
binding commitments. The ultimate power of decision, Agudah leaders repeatedly 
announced during the meeting, lay in the hands of their rabbinic assembly. 
 All sides emphasized the importance of cooperation for the improvement of religious 
life and institutions in Palestine and worldwide. These institutions were in a desperate 
state of affairs. But just where and how cooperation could be reached was a highly 
contentious issue. Some were convinced that the two movements had to start their 
common efforts in Palestine. Cooperation there, they hoped, would lead to changes in the 
attitude of Diaspora leaders as well, and demonstrate the benefits of such endeavors. 




good example, they claimed, would Palestinian leaders follow suit. Interestingly enough, 
the dividing lines in these debates went across both camps. A particular concern of the 
meeting’s attendees was the situation of the rabbinate in Poland. The Polish rabbinate, 
everyone agreed, was in an utterly devastating condition, and Orthodox leaders needed to 
work together to restore the office its dignity. But this lay in the authority of the Polish 
branches, and the convention could merely declare its concerns and communicate them to 
local party leaders.  
Despite these controversies and many more unresolved issues, the participants 
eventually signed an agreement. Both sides arranged to organize a meeting of the deans 
of Eastern European yeshivot in Vilna in order to discuss ways to improve the economic 
situation of these institutions. In addition, they declared their intention to carry out joint 
activities for the fostering of the observance of Jewish law among the masses, and to 
struggle against processes of secularization. Furthermore, they agreed to unite their 
efforts regarding the struggle for religious rights in the anticipated Jewish state. In the 
future, the two movements should appear only together at discussions with the ZO or at 
hearings before the British regarding their demands for a religious constitution -- and not 
separately. Finally, the eight men arranged to search for cooperation in support of 
religious settlements in Palestine. Joint committees were to be set up, which would work 
out the details of these agreements. Both sides would submit the accord to their highest 
party councils for ratification.5  
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In the aftermath of the conference, Mizrahi and Agudah media published articles 
informing their readers about the negotiations and their historical results. Mizrahi papers 
showed enthusiasm and celebrated the agreement as a great success for Orthodox Jewry 
in general, and for their movement in particular.6 “Could anyone be so blind,” Meir 
Berlin asked rhetorically in an interview with Di Yudishe Shtime, “not to see the great 
success that national-religious Jewry attained through this agreement?”7 Additionally, 
Mizrahists announced the agreement in public speeches, much to the frustration of their 
Agudah colleagues, who disapproved of such propagandistic use before its final 
ratification.8  
Agudist organs, in contrast, were reluctant to display enthusiasm. The only exception 
to this was the media close to Agudah’s labor wing, which hailed the conference as a 
great victory for observant workers.9 Der Israelit, on the other hand, informed its readers 
about the events and the details of the agreement in a matter-of-fact tone. A month later, 
Jacob Rosenheim even felt compelled to publish an article that tried to dampen the great 
hopes raised by overly enthusiastic statements in other papers, and reminded its readers 
of the requirement of ratification through the rabbinic council.10 The paper of the 
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Agudah’s Polish branch, Dos Yudishe Togblat, as well as the Jerusalem-based Palestinian 
organ, Kol Yisrael, kept their coverage to a minimum. Dos Yudishe Togblat published a 
short note immediately after the meeting. Then, two weeks later, the Togblat addressed 
the topic again, denying the agreement’s significance and denominating cooperation for 
securing the basic conditions of religious life in the future Jewish state as the only 
relevant point. The editors of Kol Yisrael, finally, did not make any mention of the events 
at all during the weeks immediately following the conference. Only on April 28 did the 
paper print a short notice about the article in Dos Yudishe Togblat and its claims about 
the limitations of the agreement. Two weeks later, Kol Yisrael notified its readers that the 
Agudah leadership in London wished to correct wrong impressions conveyed by non-
Agudist (read: Mizrahi) papers. The most likely point to be implemented, the author held, 
was a united religious front, in case a Jewish state should become reality. All of the other 
resolutions made in Paris were highly controversial. But, the paper assured its readers, the 
Agudah leadership did anything within its ability to broker between the different 
positions.11  
In the meantime, on the diplomatic level things got murky. As soon as the details of 
the agreement became known, the deans of the great Eastern European yeshivot 
announced their rejection of cooperation for the benefit of their institutions - to avoid, as 
they claimed, the interference of political parties in their affairs. The Mizrahi’s presidium 
ratified the agreement quickly,12 but it became clear that it would be difficult to obtain the 
official approval of the Agudah’s Council of Torah Sages. Rabbi Ozer Grodzinski, 
himself a member of the council and in favor of an agreement, went to great lengths to 
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convince his colleagues. Jacob Rosenheim stayed in close contact with Mizrahi leaders, 
and assured them that he and Grodzinski worked hard to render cooperation possible. His 
tone, nonetheless, was pessimistic. In accordance with the articles published in Kol 
Yisrael and Dos Yudishe Tagblat, he informed his Mizrahi contacts about the rather small 
chance of ratification - the only exception being a united religious front in the struggles 
for the constitution of the future Jewish state.13  
Palestinian Mizrahist Zalman Shragai, who at the time was touring Poland on behalf 
of his movement, met with Agudah leader Isaac Levin in Warsaw. He hoped to assure 
Levin’s support for the Paris accords, but the latter was skeptical. Levin harshly criticized 
the Mizrahi, and accused the party’s media of reporting on the agreement solely for the 
purpose of political propaganda. Even so, he assured Shragai that the Polish Agudah was 
willing to join forces in order to secure Orthodox interests in Palestine, and to strengthen 
religious life in the Diaspora. He also indicated that approval of joint support efforts for 
religious workers might be possible.14 Shragai reported on his encounter with Levin to 
Jacob Rosenheim. In his response to Shragai, Rosenheim veered between hope and 
despair. On the one hand, Rosenheim expressed his hopes that the Agudah’s rabbinic 
council would approve parts of the agreement, even if not its entirety. On the other hand, 
he informed Shragai that Polish Agudists had urged their leadership to avoid any steps 
conveying the impression that Agudah and Mizrahi would enter a political federation. All 
sides had to make it perfectly clear that this was nothing but a onetime cooperation. 
Furthermore, Rosenheim endorsed Isaac Levin’s censure of the media, and argued that 
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precipitant coverage of the accords had harmed their chances of success. “The 
publication of the Paris agreement,” Rosenheim wrote, “has stirred hopes in a completely 
unnecessary manner; hopes that were objectively not justified. […] You might recall,” he 
continued, “that I have been opposed to their publication from the beginning, and I feel 
sorry that I yielded in this point to my own friends [this is most probably Isaac Breuer, 
DM], as well as to yours.”15  
Rabbi Grodzinski did not give in to such challenges, continuing his efforts to secure 
cooperation between the two movements. He even came up with the draft of an 
alternative agreement to increase the likelihood of support. In late June, Rosenheim could 
report to Shragai on limited success of Rabbi Grodzinki’s endeavors. The latter had 
gotten “30 personages from Warsaw” to agree on a draft that would enable Agudat Yisral 
and Mizrahi to work together “on manifold fields.” This draft, Rosenheim and Grodzinksi 
hoped, would find a majority within the rabbinic council. Shragai, pleased about the 
news, thanked the two for laboring tirelessly to reach a compromise.16 After these letter 
exchanges, however, negotiations between the different Agudah leaders came to a 
standstill.17 Months later, Mizrahi leaders complained that the rabbinic council still had 
not announced its decision. As turned out, although quite a few of the council members 
supported the agreement, it would be impossible to attain approval from everyone. The 
two major opponents of any cooperation with religious Zionists were Rabbi Abraham 
Mordechai Alter, the Gerer Rebbe, and the spiritual authority of the Old Yishuv in 
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17 In part, this had to do with the deteriorating health of Rabbi Grodzinski, as Jacob Rosenheim told Meir 
Berlin in reply to the latter’s complaint that the Mizrahi had not gotten any answer in months. See Din ve-
Heshbon ha-Merkaz ha-Olami shel ha-Mizrahi le-Ve‘idah ha-Olamit ha-15’ be-Genevah, 6.8.-13.8.1939, 




Jerusalem, Rabbi Joseph Zvi Dushinski. Although in the minority, these were two 
weighty authorities who could simply not be outvoted.18   
In the meantime, some political leaders started to explore alternative options. In 
November 1938, Zalman Shragai visited Paris. During this visit he met with Solomon 
Ehrman from Agudat Yisrael. Attempting to break the deadlock, the two came up with 
three areas they held to be particularly urgent. These were the support of emigrants from 
Nazi Germany, religious services for new immigrants to the United States, and financial 
support for the struggle of Orthodox laborers in Palestine. Ehrman reported on his 
conversation with Shragai to Jacob Rosenheim and Meir Berlin, and urged that Mizrahi 
and Agudat Yisrael should seriously consider cooperation in such matters. These 
suggestions, Ehrman hoped, could “be arranged without more ado, and without the final 
ratification of our Paris agreements.” Religious services should be provided in such a 
manner that ideological strife was averted. Ehrman and Shragai suggested they limit 
activities to Western Europe and the US, thus excluding the very centers of the 
movements’ political struggle, Poland and Palestine.19 It is unclear whether Rosenheim 
and Berlin considered this proposition, but it soon turned out that Shragai and Ehrman 
were not the only ones looking for alternatives.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 The Gerer Rebbe’s resistance, to be sure, was not against religious settlement endeavors in Palestine. He 
himself was a great supporter of such projects and had traveled there several times throughout the interwar 
period. His concerns, as he had pointed out various times in the past, pertained to the youth. In Poland, as 
we have seen, the Agudah was severely concerned about losing its younger generation to Mizrahi and 
secular Zionism. Rabbi Dushinski, on the other hand, was the spiritual authority of the Old Yishuv in 
Jerusalem. During the 1930s, the conservative forces from the Old Yishuv increasingly experienced tension 
with the new immigrants from Poland, who, due to socio-economic reasons, were forced to work closely 
with Zionist institutions and were therefore opposed to leaving the official Jewish community, Knesset 
Yisrael. Here, too, workers and youth organizations played an important role. See below. 




During the winter months of 1938-1939, Moses Blau advanced the idea of a joint 
fundraising campaign in England. Similar to Ehrman and Shragai’s approach, his 
suggestion aimed to exclude any contentious topics, and focused on countries in which 
the ideological struggle was less severe. The collected funds would be divided evenly, 
and every side was to dispose of its shares independently.20 Blau, who was visiting 
London at the time, submitted his proposition to Meir Berlin. Subsequently, both parties 
contemplated Blau’s idea. In a reversal of their positions, the suggestion met with consent 
among Agudah leaders, but most religious Zionists were opposed. The Mizrahi’s 
executive in Jerusalem did not approve the proposal. In return, Blau threatened to run the 
fundraising campaign without the involvement of religious Zionists. At this point, Berlin 
asserted his prestige and power as the central leader of the Mizrahi, and signed the 
agreement together with Jacob Rosenheim - despite an additional rejection from his 
colleagues in Jerusalem.21  
In the accord, signed on February 21, 1939, the two sides agreed to launch joint 
fundraising campaigns. The resulting revenues were to be divided in equal parts and 
transferred to their respective Palestine funds - Mizrahi’s Keren Eretz Yisrael and Keren 
Ha-Yishuv of Agudat Yisrael. The fundraising would be conducted in England, Holland, 
France, Belgium and Switzerland “with the consent of local territorial organizations.” 
Neither of the two sides was to carry out independent fundraising for its institutions in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Jacob Rosenheim to Meir Berlin, 22.1.1939, in ibid. MO151. 
21 Unfortunately the central office of the World Mizrahi Movement in Jerusalem rejected my request to see 
the protocols of the executive’s meetings dating from these years. “The history of the Mizrahi,” its 
administrative director Benjamin Touati told me in a phone inquiry, “is irrelevant.” Therefore I am relying 
here on Zeev Bauer’s account of the events. Bauer got access to the protocols before Touati became 
administrative director. According to Bauer, many of the Mizrahi leaders voiced doubts about the 
truthfulness of the proposition and suspected that Agudists merely intended to improve their position and 





Palestine until the campaign came to a close, scheduled for the end of the current Jewish 
year (5698) in September 1939.22   
The campaign was to start in London, where both sides gathered for a first meeting on 
March 8. The participating representatives of both world movements, as well as their 
English branches, arranged the details for joint endeavors in the country. The campaign 
seemed to start well. In other countries, by contrast, the picture did not look quite as 
bright. Only a few days later, the local Agudah branches in Switzerland, Holland, and 
Belgium announced their refusal to conduct fundraising efforts with their Mizrahi 
colleagues. To make things worse, Isaac Breuer protested against not having been 
involved in his function as head of the Agudah’s fund Keren Ha-Yishuv, and demanded 
more influence on the conduct of the campaign.  
Despite these setbacks, Rosenheim and Blau were determined to carry on with the 
agreement, in England if nowhere else. But their Mizrahi contacts suddenly appeared less 
convinced. Struggles broke out in London regarding the nomination of treasurers. 
Rosenheim and Berlin had agreed that each side would nominate one treasurer. English 
Mizrahists, now, were not willing to accept the Agudah’s decision to choose its British 
leader, Harry Goodman. 23  Tense letter exchanges between Rosenheim and Berlin 
followed, but despite several attempts by the former to resolve the deadlock, they could 
not reach a compromise. Finally, during the last days of June 1939, Rosenheim informed 
Berlin that the Agudah’s rabbinic council had voted against ratification of the Paris 
agreements. Mizrahi representatives, in response, canceled the joint fundraising 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Agreement between the Agudat Yisrael World Organization and the Mizrachi World Organization, 
21.2.1939, cited after its English translation in ARZ MO155. 
23 Harry Aron Goodman (1899-1961) was a British businessman and Agudah leader from London. Inter 




arrangements.24 The efforts of the two Orthodox movements to join forces had reached a 
dead end.        
 
The Negotiations and their Dynamics 
The negotiations in Paris and London raise a host of questions regarding the involved 
political dynamics. In order to unravel some of these questions, I will now turn to an in-
depth analysis of the major issues and debates. To begin with, what had caused such 
dramatic changes to the inter-party dynamics and brought together high-ranking 
representatives of both sides? Many calls for cooperation and mutual rapprochement 
expressed the urgency of easing the economic and religious situation of the Jewish 
masses. Such appeals, however, are not enough to explain the timing of the negotiations. 
After all, the unprecedented destruction and the ineffable suffering that European and 
Palestinian Jewries experienced during World War I had not generated comparable 
debates.25 Beyond that, the Polish and Palestinian branches - the countries specifically 
mentioned as the most urgent in need of action - turned out to have some of the most 
resilient opponents among their members. The London agreements, as we have seen, 
specifically aimed at excluding these branches from any active involvement. 
 To gain a better understanding of why Mizrahi and Agudah leaders were willing to 
enter negotiations during these years, we have take into consideration the dynamics of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Much of the correspondence between Rosenheim and Berlin can be found in ARZ MO 155. The file also 
contains the Summary of Correspondence and Relevant Documents in connection with the proposed 
Mizrahi-Agudah Agreement, Mizrahi Federation of Gt. Britain and Ireland, July 1939. For the negative 
news about the rejection of the rabbinic council see Jacob Rosenheim to Meir Berlin, 28.5.1939, in ibid. 
MO 155. For a report about the Mizrahi’s cancellation of the London treaty, see Betzalel Bidziński  to 
Mizrahi Swiss, 13.6.1937, in ibid. MO161.  
25 Only after the war had leaders of both sides met, and even these discussions had not reached a similar 




political competition, and questions of ideological and organizational developments. The 
talks in Paris and London were qualitatively different from the debates about a world 
congress of Orthodoxy a few years earlier. Religious Zionists had made considerable 
progress since their crisis of the early 1930s, and consolidated their organization. To be 
sure, tensions between the different branches and wings persisted, but their polarization 
had been greatly reduced, and no one raised questions anymore about fundamental 
principles and affiliations in the way that Rabbi Moses Avigdor Amiel had done in 1933-
1934. The Mizrahi had made the transition from an era of General Zionist dominance in 
the ZO to a period shaped by the hegemonic position of the labor movement.  
And yet, it would be wrong to overestimate the strength and condition of the Mizrahi. 
The situation of religious institutions and life in Palestine was deteriorating throughout 
the 1930s, and Labor Zionists appeared reluctant to implement their earlier promises to 
enforce traditional dietary restrictions in workers’ kitchens and the public observance of 
Jewish holidays.26 What is more, the second half of the 1930s witnessed the renewal of 
discussions about the Agudah’s entrance into the Jewish Agency, and increasing efforts 
towards matter-of-fact cooperation between non-Zionist Orthodoxy and the Zionist 
movement. Negotiations between Agudah and ZO, as we have seen in the previous 
chapters, were a mixed blessing for religious Zionists, as an increased Orthodox 
representation in Zionist frameworks might have the potential to help Mizrahists advance 
their religious demands, but at the same time could threaten their position within the ZO. 
Concerns of that matter became of particular urgency when the British started to 
contemplate the partition of Palestine to pacify the increasingly tense and violent 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Among other things, complaints from all over the Jewish settlements in Palestine to central Mizrahi 
leaders in Jerusalem about the public violation of the Sabbath strongly increased during the second half of 




situation in 1936. British attempts to end their Mandate in Palestine caused a stir among 
Jewish leaders, who set out to fiercely debate appropriate responses, as well as the 
outlook and constitution of a future Jewish state.   
 The situation of Judaism in a largely secular future Jewish state was a major concern 
of Orthodox representatives across the spectrum. Agudah leaders, as well, had to consider 
the consequences of British ventures. Agudist attempts to develop strategies for the 
protection of their communities in changing political realities, however, were 
complicated by rising tensions between the different wings in Palestine itself, as well as 
on the international level.27 Beyond that, it became increasingly clear to both Agudah and 
Mizrahi leaders during the 1930s that neither of their movements was able to gain 
political hegemony over all parts of Jewish Orthodoxy. In the years 1938-1939, no side 
expressed serious hopes for a merger, and press articles, such as those prevalent in earlier 
years about the eventual dissolving of the political opponent, were notably absent from 
their media. Even the demand that Mizrahists must leave the ZO as a precondition for any 
cooperation could be heard only rarely. In the few instances in which Agudah leaders 
actually voiced such a claim, it appeared to fill only a rhetorical purpose, and had little 
impact on the course of debates.  
These developments seemed to open the possibility of rapprochement and 
cooperation, if on a limited scale. When representatives of both sides met in Paris, the 
mutual dynamics on both national and international levels influenced their debates. Such 
dynamics became most clearly pronounced in three of the debated areas: financial help 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




for Eastern European yeshivot, Orthodox diplomatic activities regarding a future Jewish 
state, and the situation of religious Jewry in Palestine.  
 
The Politics of Education: Yeshiva Deans and the Paris Agreement 
The first issue under discussion in Paris was the question of education, in particular 
the situation of Eastern European yeshivot. Everyone agreed that these institutions were 
in dire need of support. Mizrahi representatives urged attendees to act immediately and to 
strive together for the acquisition of financial means. Rosenheim and Blau, in contrast, 
were reluctant, and insisted that no decision could be made without contacting the 
yeshiva deans first. Rosenheim called into question whether the deans would agree to 
take part in such an endeavor at all, as they strictly resisted any dependence on political 
parties. Blau emphatically cautioned against publishing any resolution on the topic before 
consulting the deans themselves. But Berlin brushed aside such concerns and argued that 
Mizrahi and Agudah had to enter a federation for the support of Torah studies regardless 
of the deans’ attitude. Support for such endeavors, he claimed, was suppressed in the 
yeshivot, “but the religious masses have both the will and the faith in this possibility.” 
Eastern European yeshivot, in fact, constituted a thorny issue. They were important 
centers of traditionalist education, and as such played a major role in the ideological 
struggles among Orthodox Jews. Above all, the deans based their authority and social 
standing on the yeshivot. Therefore, they objected to any interference into their 
institutions.28 By stressing the concept of the “will of the masses,” Berlin indirectly 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Even Rabbi Ozer Grodzinkski denied any possibility that the yeshivot might be supported by joint 
Mizrahi-Agudah funds because he feared political influence on the institutions, see his letter of 1938 to the 




challenged such authority.29 Despite Rosenheim’s and Blau’s qualms, the two sides 
eventually agreed to organize a conference of the yeshiva deans in Vilna.30  
But the deans, as Rosenheim had correctly predicted, declined the suggestion with a 
reference to their independence from any political parties. Mizrahists took this to be a 
rejection of their own movement, as many of the deans had taken part in the Agudah 
World Congress in Marienbad one year earlier. The deans’ concerns certainly had some 
substance to them. A widely propagated and celebrated agreement between two parties 
connoted indeed a further politicization of such financial support.31 It is safe to assume 
that tensions and conflicts about the use of the funds would have accompanied financial 
support, and the institutions might have been subjected to more public and political 
scrutiny. Nevertheless, Mizrahi suspicions about the political bias of the deans are hard to 
dismiss completely. The Vilna region was one of the hot spots of conflict and political 
tensions between the two parties. As the spiritual center of Eastern European Jews, or the 
“Jerusalem of Lithuania,” the city itself held high symbolic significance. The city had 
witnessed bitter struggles about the rabbinate only a few years earlier. It was in Vilna that 
Rabbi Abraham Rubinstein had offended some of the greatest spiritual authorities 
worldwide by taking on the title Chief Rabbi, thus leaving highly accomplished scholars 
like Rabbi Ozer Grodzinski with mere “adjunct” positions (podrabiny). That conflict had 
been settled by now, with Rabbi Rubinstein embracing the representative and 
administrational aspects of his position, and Rabbi Grodzinski as the accepted spiritual 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Additionally, fundraising served various purposes beyond its mere financial aspects. See Chapter I and II. 
30 Protoqol mi-ha-Yeshivah ha-Meshutefet bein ha-Agudah ve-ha-Mizrahi be-Yom 4.4.1938 be-Malon 
Ambasador be-Paris, in AIRRZ 001 – 495. 
31 Even well-meaning Mizrahists had to admit in private correspondence that the gaps between Agudat 
Yisrael and the Mizrahi were too big for the sides to work together on educational questions. See, for 
example, the letter of the Mizrahist and Rabbi from Fulda, Dr. L. Cahn, to the accomplished Zionist leader 




authority. Nevertheless, tensions between the two sides did not abate. The Yeshiva 
Schools Council, founded and headed by Rabbi Grodzinki, was deeply hostile to religious 
Zionism.32 It is hardly surprising then that, despite his general support of cooperation, 
Rabbi Grodzinksi was highly suspicious of joint fundraising efforts for Eastern European 
yeshivot. 
As it turned out, a few weeks later Polish Mizrahists condemned the resolution, as 
well. Religious Zionist leaders from Poland fiercely reproached their colleagues for 
having made a decision on what they considered to be inner-Polish affairs without 
consulting them first. Abraham Rubinstein, backed by his colleague Isaac Nissenbaum, 
declared that the Polish Mizrahi would not participate in the conference if it took place in 
Vilna, and demanded to relocate the event to Jerusalem. Rubinstein was anxious about 
his own position if a meeting of the great Eastern European rabbinic authorities were to 
take place in Vilna.33  
Thus, the question of joint fundraising for Eastern European yeshivot highlighted 
many of the tensions between the two sides, as well as within the movements themselves: 
tensions around the highly politicized question of education, conflicts between rabbinic 
authority and political activism, and issues of the allocation of competencies between 
different branches within the movements. Unfortunately, the protocols of the Paris 
convention do not depict every detail of the discussions, and it is hard to reconstruct the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 The Wa’ad Hayeshivot was founded in 1924 in Grodno in order to preserve Eastern European yeshivot. It 
stood under the guidance of Rabbis Haim Ozer Grodzinski and Israel Meir Kagan. The organization 
supported a network of 70 yeshivot. Much of its organizational work is documented in YIVO Archives; 
Records of the Wa’ad Hayeshivot (Vilna, Poland); RG 25.  
33 Isaac Nissenbaum to Mizrahi Executive, 15.5.1938, in ARZ MO147. See also Isaac Nissenbaum to Zeev 
Gold, 28.6.1938, in ibid. MO162. Nissenbaum advanced ideological reasons, and argued that the meeting 
had to take place in Jerusalem. It is hard to know, however, if this was a serious suggestion, as for 




way in which the delegates agreed on this resolution. Considering the multitude of doubts 
and tensions concerning this issue already raised during the conference itself, however, it 
questionable how seriously the participants actually anticipated its ratification. To be 
sure, despite Rubinstein’s refusal to hold the meeting in Vilna, religious Zionists could 
hope for considerable political gain from such endeavors. The yeshiva deans, had they 
accepted financial support, could hardly have continued to “preach hatred against the 
Mizrahi,”34 as some in the movement insinuated, and enmity in these institutions against 
religious Zionism would have been considerably soothed. Given this background, on the 
other hand, the consent of the deans appears to have been even less likely, and Agudah 




Concerns about their public reputations, indeed, were governing much of the politics 
around the Paris and London accords, and constituted a further central element of their 
inter-party dynamics. Such considerations played a decisive role at all stages of the 
agreements. Some months after the first contact between Meir Berlin and Jacob 
Rosenheim, the Agudah executive met in Vienna. At this meeting in January 1938, 
worries about Palestine took center stage. In Vienna, Isaac Levin admitted that his 
movement had done too little for the Jewish settlements in Palestine, and urged his 
colleagues to increase their efforts in this regard. “Providence (hashgoho),” he held, 
“literally chases us with whiplashes to Eretz Jisroel. The Jewish People is in great 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 As Nissenbaum claimed in his letter to the Mizrahi Executive, see Isaac Nissenbaum to Mizrahi 




danger. The only salvation,” he concluded, “is Agudas Jisroel.” Notwithstanding this 
appeal, when the debate turned to the Mizrahi’s inquiry for negotiations, Levin showed 
himself skeptical. After Jacob Rosenheim’s finished his report on the inquiry, Levin 
immediately contested its sincerity. The Mizrahi, he feared, was not genuinely interested 
in cooperation. Religious Zionists, in his view, merely intended to draw political profit 
from the negotiations.35  
Levin voiced his accusations against the backdrop of heightened political struggles in 
the United States. The Agudah, during these years, tried to gain a foothold in the growing 
Orthodox community there. Mizrahists, who already had established themselves in 
American-Jewish politics, attempted to thwart such plans. To this purpose, the American 
Mizrahi in 1935 published a speech that the rabbi of Kovno, Rabbi Abraham Dov-Ber 
Kahana-Shapira,36 had delivered at a local Mizrahi conference in the early 1920s. In this 
speech, Rabbi Kahana-Shapiro had reported on his attempts to arbitrate between the two 
parties in the immediate postwar years. Rabbi Shapiro attested to the willingness of 
Mizrahists to approach the other side, and blamed Agudists for blocking any such 
attempt. The pamphlet, entitled “Who is guilty of the schism between Mizrahi and 
Agudat Yisrael?,”37 was apparently distributed with the intention of harming the Agudah 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Protokoll der Sitzung des Wa‘ad Ha-Poel der Agudas Jisrael in Wien vom 12.-16. Januar 1938 unter 
dem Vorsitz des Herrn Präsidenten Jacob Rosenheim, in Archives of Agudath Yisrael of America 
(following: AAYA) BB47. 
36 Rabbi Abraham Dover Kahane-Shapira (1870-1943) was a widely acknowledged spiritual authority. 
Born in the city of Kobryn, he became the Chief Rabbi of Kovno in 1923, and later on the last Chief Rabbi 
of Lithuania before World War II. The Lithuanian Rabbinate was known to be a strong supporter of 
Mizrahi-Agudah rapprochement. 
37 Kahane-Shapira, Ver iz shuldig. The booklet attests to the heightened significance of the Aguda in the 
US. A pamphlet about the Mizrahi and its aims from 1929, on the other hand, does not even mention the 
Orthodox opponent (in stark contrast to Mizrahi propaganda literature from Europe that during those years 
could not do without a clear depiction of the differences between the two parties). See Yehuda Leib 




by accusing its leaders of stubbornly rejecting any rapprochement between the two sides. 
Levin, consequently, suspected Berlin’s inquiry of serving similar purposes.  
Rabbi Aharon Kotler,38 who also attended the conference, accorded with Levin’s 
suspicions about Mizrahi intentions. But in contrast to Levin, Rabbi Kotler concluded 
that the Agudah could not dare to reject the offer. Any such rejection, he argued, would 
severely harm their branch in the United States. Even Jacob Rosenheim, who vis-a-vis his 
Mizrahi contacts mostly appeared as a staunch supporter of rapprochement, showed 
himself pessimistic. All great spiritual authorities, with the exception of Rabbi Ozer 
Grodzinski, he maintained, objected to any cooperation. Rabbi Elchonon Wassermann, in 
particular, had voiced his fierce resistance to their working together for the benefit of the 
yeshivot, because he feared the Mizrahi’s influence on these institutions. Concluding the 
discussion, Rosenheim noted that if negotiations were held, they should focus mainly on 
the question of a Jewish state, and touch upon other issues only in passing. “But I do not 
believe,” Rosenheim ended, “that they will lead to any tangible results.” Not a single 
voice came out in clear favor of the negotiations.39 Much of the rationale behind the 
Agudah decision to enter such negotiations, the meeting in Vienna illustrates, was 
influenced by considerations regarding the party’s public image.  
Agudists were not the only ones worried about their reputation. Throughout the 
negotiations, their Mizrahi counterparts displayed very similar concerns and intents. 
These emerged first during their early letter exchanges. Meir Berlin, in his 
correspondence with Isaac Levin and Jacob Rosenheim, was highly sensitive towards the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Rabbi Aharon Kotler (1891-1962) was the dean of the Yeshiva of Slutsk, and an important Lithuanian 
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selection of an appropriate meeting place. He turned down Levin’s suggestion to meet in 
Warsaw, “because a meeting there will not stay confidential,” and only belatedly replied 
to the subsequent Agudah proposition of meeting in Vienna. Levin had suggested Vienna 
because Agudah leaders gathered in the city for the convention of their executive in 
January 1938. Berlin responded to Levin’s suggestion only after the meeting had already 
passed. He repudiated Levin’s offer and insisted that their conference could not just be 
attached to a party convention. Both sides should have to make an extra effort.40 Berlin 
and Levin continued their back and forth until finally Paris was set as appropriate 
meeting place. Berlin, in this exchange, demonstrated religious Zionists’ concerns about 
Agudists not taking the negotiations seriously. Mizrahists were anxious not to appear as 
currying favor with the Agudah. Thus, when the latter’s rabbinic council delayed the 
ratification of the Paris agreements, some Mizrahists concluded that they had done their 
bit and should resist any further negotiations because “the Jewish world would consider 
this to be a flattery of he Agudah.”41  
  Both sides were afraid to come out as passive or resisting mutual rapprochement. 
When, in May of 1938, Jacob Rosenheim informed the Palestinian Mizrahist Zalman 
Shragai about his doubts as to whether or not the Agudah’s rabbinic council would ratify 
the agreement, the latter requested that his party’s executive take action. “I have the 
feeling that they want to duck out of the cooperation,” Shragai wrote to Meir Berlin, “but 
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there is a lot of pressure from the masses and I think that we should raise this pressure by 
publishing articles in the press and by postulating the unity of religious Jewry.”42  
Shragai’s comments can serve to shed light on the different policies of the two party’s 
press organs. The Mizrahi media was quick to publish news on the Paris accords. In their 
articles, they hailed the agreements as a great victory for Orthodox Jewry in general, and 
for their party in particular. Just one day after the Mizrahi presidium ratified the Paris 
agreement, the Palestinian Mizrahi paper Ha-Tzofe reported the news on their title page.43 
Such press releases were to increase pressure on the Agudah, and to raise hopes among 
the Jewish masses, which apparently cared less for the intricate differences of the parties’ 
ideologies than for the prospect of an improvement of their material and spiritual 
situation. Mizrahists, as we have seen, frequently stressed the will of the masses, and 
hoped to win them over to their cause.44 Agudists were also concerned about gaining 
strong support for their movement. At the same time, they were wary of modern mass 
politics. Moreover, populist comments in the press were bound to raise the suspicions of 
the spiritual leadership against any cooperation with the Zionists. Therefore, they 
attached great importance to confidentiality, and were careful to dampen hopes raised by 
what they perceived as overly enthusiastic coverage in their opponent’s press.  
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44 The Agudah press, as we have seen earlier, tried to counter enthusiastic Mizrahi press releases by 
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Similar dynamics and power struggles led to the final collapse of negotiations in June 
1939. In their joint fundraising efforts in England, two treasurers were to be nominated, 
one for each side. English Mizrahists nominated their treasurer, but did not consent to the 
Agudah’s choice. In the letter exchange with Meir Berlin that followed, Jacob Rosenheim 
tried to reach a compromise allowing the two sides to carry out the joint campaign. Since 
the English Mizrahi was not willing to accept the Agudah’s choice, he suggested 
nominating one treasurer instead of two separate ones, an independent and impartial 
person not affiliated with either party.45 The English Mizrahi, on the other hand, insisted 
that Agudat Yisrael had to nominate an alternate candidate, and referred to a 
“gentleman’s agreement,” that Berlin and Rosenheim allegedly had made regarding these 
matters. When Rosenheim contacted Berlin, he expressed his suspicion that English 
Mizrahists were not actually interested in the implementation of the London accords. 
Berlin harshly disputed such assumptions, and reproached his correspondent for not 
keeping to their arrangements. He complained that the Agudah, once again, did 
everything to frustrate their mutual efforts for cooperation, and accused the Swiss, 
Belgian, and Dutch Agudah chapters of violating the settlement. This, as Rosenheim 
rightly pointed out in his answer, was factually not correct, as the agreement explicitly 
stated that each national chapter had to agree to the conduct of joint fundraising 
campaigns.46  
Berlin, without doubt, knew this. What, then, motivated his uncompromising stance? 
Among Mizrahi leaders, the London accords had been highly unpopular from the very 
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first time Moses Blau had brought up the idea. Only a small minority saw in these 
agreements an actual opportunity to bring the two sides closer together. Most Mizrahists 
decried their limited dimension, and suspected Agudists to merely seek economic gain. 
Religious Zionists were highly aware of the central significance that fundraising had for 
the success of a political movement. Just one year earlier, in January 1938, they had made 
strong efforts to professionalize their own fundraising in Poland, and started to set up an 
extra board exclusively dealing with such matters. Palestinian Mizrahi leader Elimelech 
Neufeld47 had toured the area to advertise their efforts, and to recruit activists and rabbis 
for active help and support. Zeev Gold, communicating with the Polish leader Isaac 
Nissenbaum about these efforts, stressed the immense importance of the Mizrahi’s 
Palestine fund, Keren Eretz Yisrael, and called on his Polish colleagues to turn the Jewish 
holiday of Shavuot into a fixed date for fundraising activities specifically for this fund. 
The holiday during which Jews celebrated God’s giving of the Torah to Israel, he pointed 
out, was the ideal occasion for such activities. Shavuot was the only holiday, he added, on 
which the Jewish National Fund did “not have a monopoly yet,” and stressed that the 
Zionist Organization owed its strength to its successful fundraising.48  
In such matters, Mizrahists had a clear advantage over their Agudist opponents due to 
their tighter organization, their unequivocal embrace of social and political activism, and 
their affiliation with the Zionist movement. In the early winter months of 1939, Meir 
Berlin was in regular contact with the Polish Mizrahi leader Simha Feldman. Feldman, 
reporting to Berlin on the situation in Poland, painted a bleak picture of the local branch 
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and its leaders. In his description, Feldman excoriated virtually all of the great Mizrahi 
leaders in his country. The movement, he concluded, was in an abysmal condition. But 
even in this bleakest of assessments, the Mizrahi still fared much better than its non-
Zionist counterpart. Feldman interpreted Blau’s suggestion for joint fundraising as a sign 
of the Agudah’s weakness. Breuer’s attempts to collect money for the Keren Ha-Yishuv 
had been completely unsuccessful. Blau’s suggestion, Feldman believed, was simply an 
attempt to better their situation, to learn from Mizrahists and to gain from their 
connections and networks. Religious Zionists should not allow this to happen. In 
addition, such a joint campaign would also expose the Mizrahi’s shortcomings to 
Agudists. “Why,” Feldman concluded, “would we reveal to them that we, too, have an 
Achilles’ heel?”49  
Throughout the spring of 1939, opposition within the Mizrahi to an agreement on 
common fundraising efforts continued to mount. In particular, Mizrahists from England 
and Switzerland expressed their enmity to such frameworks. A few days before Berlin 
cancelled the deal, he received an angry letter from Zurich. In this letter, Swiss Mizrahi 
leaders expressed their utter rejection of any cooperation with the local Agudah branch, 
and strictly disputed any positive side of the agreement. “We cannot conceal,” the 
enraged Swiss leaders finished, “that this affair has shaken our confidence in the Mizrahi 
executive.”50 British leaders made similar dismissive comments about local cooperation. 
Their branch, they reported to Berlin, had already begun to collect funds for the Palestine 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 Feldman, in his letters, fiercely criticized many of the former presidents of his movement in Poland. 
Farbstein’s strong personality, he held, had inhibited other leaders from growing. Brodt had not been a 
good president. Although wise, he had not been a man of action. Finally, Isaac Nissenbaum had been too 
isolated. Simha Feldman to Meir Berlin, 30.1.1939; 1.3.1939, in ibid. MO151. 
50  Mizrahi Swiss to Mizrahi Executive Jerusalem, 26.5.1939, Betzalel Bidziński to Mizrahi Swiss, 




endeavors of their movement, and was not willing to share them with a political 
opponent. In April they had held a party meeting to determine their approach. “Actually,” 
they told Berlin forthrightly, “at the meeting every member was in favour of seeking a 
method by which we could conveniently get out of the agreement.”51 They found this 
convenient method in the quarrels over the appointment of an Agudah treasurer. 
Rosenheim’s suspicions, thus, were well-founded, despite Berlin’s assertion of the 
contrary. Even more convenient, in August 1939 the Mizrahi could present, in its official 
report on the negotiations, the definite culprit for the failure of the agreement. “We thus 
see, that not even their rabbinic council decides, but John Doe [ploni ve-almoni]. We 
have made any effort - and maybe even more - in order to reach unity. If this to our 
deepest regret did not materialize, the blame is definitely not on our side.”52   
 The concerns both parties displayed about their public image helped to bring 
Mizrahists and Agudists to the negotiating table in the first place. The strong persistence 
of such concerns, however, increasingly impeded negotiations. Religious Zionists seemed 
to keep the upper hand in this respect throughout much of the Paris negotiations. The 
final ratification of the Paris agreement, indeed, would have been a great success for their 
movement, as they would have gained the symbolic recognition of many of the highest 
spiritual authorities of the time. The value of such recognition was immense. Even Simha 
Feldman, in the formerly mentioned letter exchange with Berlin, was willing to surrender 
his strict objection even to the London accords if this would grant the Mizrahi’s work 
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“rabbinic certification” (hekhsher).53 But the London treaty had a limited focus, and was 
confined to Western Europe. For these reasons, the accords would not have granted the 
Mizrahi such hekhsher. The price Mizrahists had to pay in this set-up was much higher, 
and, as most of them concluded, not worth paying. Since they did not want to appear as 
backing out, however, they had to find an excuse for ending the arrangement. Agudists, 
to the contrary, were reluctant to work together with their opponents on sensitive 
religious issues. Even more problematic to them was the fact that their cooperation could 
be read as recognition of Zionist activism. Restricting such cooperation to funding 
campaigns, on the other hand, was a way of enjoying the benefits without paying such a 
high price.     
 
Partition Plans 
One of the most pressing issues spurring negotiations was the situation in Palestine. 
During the mid-1930s, tensions among the population in Palestine rose dramatically, 
peaking in an uprising of the Arab population in 1936 against both the Zionists and 
British rule. The situation urged the British to search for solutions to the problem of the 
political future of Palestine and its populations. In November 1936, the British sent a 
royal commission headed by Lord William Peel to investigate the reasons for the 
uprising. After months of investigation, the Peel Commission issued its final report in 
July 1937. In the report, the commission recommended partition of Palestine, and the 
creation of two states. To implement these recommendations, in February 1938 the 
British appointed a Palestine Partition Commission (“Woodhead Commission”) that was 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




to negotiate the terms for such an endeavor with Jewish and Arab leaders. For the first 
time since the formation of the Zionist movement, the creation of a Jewish state seemed 
within reach.  
In the light of such developments, Orthodox leaders found themselves grappling with 
urgent problems. The most vexing issues were the proposed partition plan, and the status 
of religious traditions and institutions in a future state. Within the ranks of Agudah 
leaders, the question of how to deal with the possibility of the emergence of a secular 
Jewish state was highly contentious. Attitudes ranged from a fierce opposition to any 
Jewish state and an acrid condemnation of secular leaders on one side of the spectrum, to 
willingness for cooperation with the Zionists and even a modest enthusiasm for the 
prospects of an emerging state on the other.  
These discussions reached their peak at the Third World Congress of Agudat Yisrael 
in the Czechoslovakian city of Mariánské Lázně in August 1937. Here, fiercely anti-
Zionist stances like those of Rabbi Elhanan Wasserman54 and more moderate fears about 
the oppression of Orthodox Jewry in a secular state clashed with those, who supported 
the creation of a state and favored an active struggle for Orthodox rights within the new 
political structures. Despite such contrasts, the congress reached a compromise that did 
not yield any ideological objections, and at the same time allowed political leaders to act 
on changing realities. In the period that followed, it was especially the Palestinian leaders 
who increasingly took a pragmatic line towards the question of statehood, in order to 
secure Orthodox group rights. The urgency to deal with the question of statehood was 
expressed by Jacob Rosenheim in a letter to Moses Blau from November 1937: “We have 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




to principally get clear about the question if […] the provisional government that will 
have to be formed should include all Jewish parties, that is also Agudat Yisrael; in other 
words, if, from a religious point of view, we are authorized or even obliged to join such a 
government. This would be the only way to have at least the slightest chance to reach 
certain commitments to Jewish law in the emerging political system.”55 
In the issue of partition as well, Agudah leaders gradually developed a matter-of-fact 
approach. “The Land of Yisrael,” the congress proclaimed, “is indivisible, because God 
determined its borders.”56 No Orthodox leader, indeed, could give up this tenet. The 
rabbinic leadership, however, and in particular Rabbi Ozer Grodzinski, increasingly 
embraced an approach that allowed for political compromise, while not disposing of 
theological tenets. Grodzinski came to the conclusion that Jewish assent to partition 
essentially did not violate Jewish law. Divine rights of messianic times, of course, were 
not to be surrendered, but Jews could temporarily make do with parts of Eretz Yisrael, 
especially when such compromise helped save Jewish lives.57  
Throughout the 1930s, Agudah politicians of all shades kept stressing that despite 
their tense relations, Jewish politicians should spare no effort to reach reconciliation with 
the Arab leadership and population. Repeatedly, they reproached Zionist leaders for 
being obsessed with the idea of a state to such a degree that they disregarded any other 
solution that might grant Jews the possibility of immigrating to Palestine without 
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limitation, thereby easing the lot of European Jewry. Jewish politicians, they postulated, 
should stop building Zionist castles in the clouds, and turn to realpolitik. “It is better,” an 
article in Der Israelit announced in July 1937, “to actually be able to settle one million 
Jews than to demand territories for three million.”58 In addition to the Arab question, 
Agudah leaders continued to take issue with Zionist claims of representing the whole 
Jewish community in Palestine. To counter such claims, they submitted their own 
memorandum to the Peel commission in November 1936. In this memorandum, they 
demanded the recognition and protection of Orthodox group rights in Palestine.59 In 
1937, the Agudah leadership further increased diplomatic pressure on the Zionists. 
Together with the leader of the Revisionist movement, Zeev Jabotinsky, Jacob 
Rosenheim wrote a letter to Haim Weizmann in which the two leaders called for a round 
table conference of the three organizations to reach a joint approach “of all pro-
Palestinian world Jewry, regardless of their affiliation.” The Agudah and the Revisionist 
movement, of course, stood in stark ideological antagonism. Despite such differences, the 
joint letter conveyed, they might unite in their struggle to force the ZO to grant them their 
share in the political representation of Palestinian Jewry.60  
Such threats and tensions notwithstanding, Agudat Yisrael and the ZO continued 
throughout the 1930s with their attempts to find common ground for working together 
within the framework of the Jewish Agency. The two organizations achieved their first 
breakthrough in 1933, with an agreement on cooperation on matters of Jewish 
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immigration. 61  Mizrahists displayed ambivalent attitudes towards such cooperation. 
While continuing to publicly propagate the Agudah’s joining of the Jewish Agency 
during the 1930s, as they already had in the late 1920s,62 in their private correspondence 
Mizrahi leaders often made highly skeptical and even dismissive comments. Heshel 
Farbstein was regularly appointed the Mizrahi’s representative in Agudah-Zionist 
negotiations. When in 1930 Farbstein announced that he would not be able to participate 
in negotiations with Agudat Yisrael, his fellow Mizrahist and member of the Central 
Office of the ZO, Lazarus Barth, responded in a somewhat irritated manner. “The 
cancelation of Farbstein was noteworthy,” Barth jotted down in a note to the Palestine 
Executive, “not only did he deem it impossible to leave Poland with reference to the 
political circumstances there, but he also saw himself unable to present an alternate.”63 
Later on, Barth informed Farbstein of the Agudah’s decision not to engage in 
negotiations. Farbstein did not share Barth’s frustration with how things had developed. 
“I, personally,” Farbstein wrote, “would have felt very uneasy if they had decided to 
participate in the Jewish Agency, and I regard their negative resolution a successful result 
for us. I am of the opinion that they should be left alone, and that we should not enter into 
any negotiations with them. Their entry into the Jewish Agency would benefit our 
movement neither materially nor spiritually. We have no need of the Agudah to be our 
supervisor of Kashrut.”64 
In the late 1930s, rapprochement between Agudat Yisrael and the ZO threatened to 
harm the clout of religious Zionists to enforce their religious demands. If Agudah and ZO 
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agreed to keep religious matters out of the constitution of the emerging state, their own 
aims would be thwarted. While the Agudah seemed to set its sails on a pragmatic course 
regarding questions of partition and state, the Mizrahi leadership increasingly clung to 
dogmatic and uncompromising positions. The dominance of such attitudes grew, among 
other things, out of the struggle for hegemony in the camp of Orthodox Jewry.  
 In November 1936, representatives of the Jewish Agency repeatedly met with 
Agudah leaders for discussion of an appropriate Jewish response to the suggestion of the 
British Peel commission to grant political parity to Jews and Arabs. At these meetings, 
Mizrahi representatives clashed with the Palestinian Agudah leader Moses Blau. During 
their discussions, Mizrahists harshly refuted any possibility of giving equal rights to the 
Arab population of Palestine. “As a religious Jew,” Yehuda Maimon argued, “I can by no 
means agree that Arabs will receive political equality.”65 Continuing his point, Maimon 
claimed that Jews were absolutely forbidden to admit other nations to having a share in 
the land. His colleagues in the Mizrahi executive supported this dogmatic stance, and, 
during one of the following sessions, Elimelech Neufeld threatened that the Mizrahi 
would withdraw its representative from the Jewish Agency, should the agency accept the 
suggestion of parity. At yet another meeting with leaders of all Jewish parties, Zeev Gold 
came out with a harsh attack on the British proposal. “[…] As the representative of 
Orthodox Jewry,” Gold remarked in this context, “we can under no circumstances agree 
to such a suggestion.”66  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  






Instead of acknowledging the issue of parity between Jews and Arabs as a political 
one, Mizrahists turned it into a question of religious affiliation, and thereby established 
their movement as the political representative of all Orthodox Jews. Such a dogmatic 
position seemed mostly directed against Agudat Yisrael. Thus, in addition to actual 
ideological differences, this stance can be explained out of the inter-movement 
competition. Blau, as the Mizrahi internal correspondence later reported angrily, reacted 
dismissively. Allegedly, during Gold’s speech Blau whispered into the ear of the Zionist 
leader Menachem Ussishkin that such a position would “not reflect the attitude of the 
Torah, but is utter heresy (divrei minut).” While trying to mitigate his words at a later 
meeting between the leaders of both movements, Blau nevertheless kept to such a line. 
“[…] Do you really believe,” Blau replied when approached about his words to 
Ussishkin, “that the national movement has any connection to our future redemption? 
Eretz Yisrael is to date an Arab country, and when we have the opportunity to receive 
political equality - if only the Arabs shall agree - then we have to welcome this [political 
parity] with open arms.” Any goals beyond that, Blau concluded, had to be left to the 
Messiah.67  
These tensions further increased, when shortly thereafter Haim Weizmann expressed 
sympathies for ideas of political parity. Mizrahi leaders, highly alerted by Weizmann’s 
statement, met with the Zionist leader, and reiterated their claim that the idea of political 
parity would transgress basic religious principles, and that therefore Orthodox Jews had 
to reject the proposal. “We really believe that the Zionist movement is a divine 
phenomenon. And its president, when being called before the governmental commission, 





has to stress that he is God’s emissary (shliha de-idan ve-shliha de-rakhmana), and that it 
is strictly forbidden to him to do anything against the Torah or to act against God’s 
promise, which was voiced by his prophets.”  When Weizmann countered by claiming 
that “some rabbi told him exactly the opposite,” Mizrahi leaders became furious, 
reproached the ZO harshly for not having implemented any of its promises regarding 
their religious demands, and threatened to leave the organization. Weizmann, apparently 
embarrassed by the accusations, backed down and told his interlocutors that he would not 
mention parity vis-à-vis the British commission on his own, but only refer to the issue if 
confronted with it directly.68    
The Mizrahi, under the leadership of Yehuda Maimon, increasingly adopted 
uncompromising positions. Time and again, party officials denied any possibility of 
political parity between Jews and Arabs, and spoke out against partition of the land, 
invoking the Torah and religious tenets as their sole authority. Support from halakhic 
decisors for their political hard-line, however, was rather weak. Most rabbinic authorities 
addressing the matter held that there was no halakhic prohibition against accepting 
political partition. Even Chief Rabbi Herzog had to agree with his rabbinic colleagues in 
the Agudah on this point. But Rabbi Herzog chose to not publish his halakhic opinion. 
Only behind the closed doors of the Woodhead Commission, as well as at a meeting of 
the Mizrahi central committee, did he voice this stance. Publicly, Rabbi Herzog preferred 
to express his political opinion on the matter instead. Together with his colleague, 
Sephardic Chief Rabbi Jacob Meir, Rabbi Herzog issued a bill that was posted throughout 





Jerusalem. On this bill, the two Chief Rabbis expressed maximalist positions, and called 
on Jews to resist partition.69  
Whatever the Chief Rabbis’ motives for their campaign, in the religious Zionist camp 
once again halakhic considerations were put aside and political activism carried the day. 
In December 1937, a reduced number of members of the Mizrahi’s central committee 
gathered in Jerusalem. The participants were deeply concerned about the political 
developments and approved a resolution that protested against the “damage” that “well-
known non-Zionist circles” had inflicted upon the national cause. The Mizrahi, they 
postulated, had to make sure that Jews would not give up any land. In addition, the 
participants demanded that religious Zionists had to take part in any official delegation in 
which the Agudah was represented as well. Discussions at the meeting made clear the 
extent to which Mizrahists saw themselves placed under fire by recent developments and 
Agudist positions. “We have to be the extremists of the extremists,” Meir Berlin 
announced. “We have to come out against any renunciation of parts of the Land of 
Yisrael until the last moment in the name of Orthodox Judaism. I don't see any other part 
of Orthodox Judaism that will do so.” Rabbi Herzog, present as well, clarified that from a 
religious point of view Jews were allowed to agree to partition if forced to by the British. 
But, he added, “I hope and pray that partition will not be implemented.”70  
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Despite increasing polarization of their ideological positions, in Paris the two sides 
consented to unify efforts regarding their struggle for religious rights. Their agreement 
stipulated that henceforth neither of the two would appear individually at meetings of the 
ZO or hearings before British commissions, were these to touch upon the role of religion 
in the constitution of the emerging state. From a religious Zionist point of view, this 
resolution was great progress, as it reduced the possibility of separate arrangements 
between Agudat Yisrael and the ZO or the British that could endanger Mizrahi positions 
and approaches. It seems less evident why Agudah leaders agreed to include this 
resolution. That they did so might indicate a heightened awareness of the urgency of 
Orthodox cooperation regarding basic religious demands to the future state. Since their 
agreement did not get approved, the resolution was never implemented. In fact, even 
during the months in which the ratification of the Paris agreement was still pending, 
neither side acted upon it.    
The tripartite relations and their dynamics drove the Mizrahi into confrontation with 
the Jewish Agency. Party leaders increasingly stepped out of Zionist frameworks and 
acted independently towards the British. The Peel Commission eventually abandoned 
political parity and embraced the idea of partition. In April 1938, the British sent an 
additional commission to probe the chances for implementation of the Peel suggestions.71 
Mizrahists, despite their support for the Paris agreement, sent in their own memorandum 
to the Woodhead Commission, requesting to be heard separately. The memorandum took 
a hard-line towards the Arabs and claimed exclusive rights of the Jews for the whole of 
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Eretz Yisrael, “also the parts beyond the Jordan river.” 72  In addition, Mizrahists 
demanded that Knesset Yisrael be the only acknowledged religious body for Jews and 
rejected any separate religious group formations. The separation of nation and church, 
they held, was impossible. Their appearance before the commission in July 1938 
confirmed these points.73  
Agudah leaders, not abiding by the Paris resolution either, presented their own 
requests for religious autonomy before the Woodhead Commission. Confronted with 
such conflicting demands, the British asked the Jewish Agency for its position on the 
matter. The head of the Jewish Agency, David Ben-Gurion, responded by offering 
“freedom of conscience and religion,” and suggested that any Jewish group should be 
allowed to organize according to its own needs and concepts.74 Mizrahists, put on high 
alert by Ben-Gurion’s suggestion, made an additional appearance before the Woodhead 
Commission in September 1938. This time they sent their party leader Meir Berlin in the 
company of the acknowledged rabbinic authorities Ashkenazic Chief Rabbi Isaac Herzog 
and the Chief Rabbi of the United Kingdom, Joseph Hertz. “We received information,” 
Rabbi Herzog commenced the delegation’s statement, “that the Commission had 
addressed a certain question to the Jewish Agency. […] The question,” he continued, 
“was that a certain section, a small section, a small minority of Palestine Jews refused to 
become part and parcel of the religious body which unites all Palestine Jewry into one 
Organisation, Knesset Yisrael.” Rabbi Herzog vehemently denied such an option. After 
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elaborating on the question why separation between state and church was impossible, and 
arguing that the constitution of the state would have to be based on halakhah, Rabbi 
Herzog addressed the issue of Agudat Yisrael. “I am sorry,” he declared, “that the Jewish 
Agency here did not know that we are in negotiations with the Agudah in Jerusalem; that 
the Mizrahi with my knowledge and consent were negotiating with them for a settlement 
and I think a settlement is quite possible.” The conflicts in Palestine, Herzog claimed, 
could be resolved in similar ways to which such issues had been handled in the UK. “I do 
not see any reason,” he ended his remarks on Agudat Yisrael, “why this could not be 
done in Palestine. If you give us a chance and do not tie our hands it will be done.” In the 
discussion that followed, the Mizrahi delegation systematically played down the size and 
achievements of Agudat Yisrael in Palestine, and denied their communities any 
autonomy in religious matters.75 Thus, vis-à-vis the British religious Zionists did not only 
trivialize the significance of Agudat Yisrael, but also utilized their mutual negotiations to 
counter the latter’s distinct demands.  
After Peel and Woodhead, the British officially abandoned any plans of partition. The 
Arab Revolt flared up again, and violence returned as a daily occurrence. The Zionists 
increasingly abandoned their policies of “restraint,” and discussed more militant forms of 
response. In February 1939, the British called on all sides to convene in St. James Palace 
in London. In their search for solutions, they resumed considering some form of political 
parity. The Arab delegation refused to take part in joint meetings, and Colonial Secretary 
Malcolm McDonald decided to receive separate delegations. The Mizrahi leadership, 
being firmly opposed to models of political parity, rejected any Jewish participation in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  





the talks at St. James Palace. Not heeding such objections, the Jewish Agency decided to 
send an official Jewish delegation. In contrast to their Mizrahi opponents, Agudah leaders 
agreed to join. Religious Zionists, in turn, found themselves in a quagmire. Their policy 
of non-compliance with the British left them without a voice in the negotiations, while 
Agudat Yisrael and secularist Zionists each had the opportunity to elaborate on their 
viewpoints. If the Mizrahi was not included, but the Agudah had an official 
representative joining, the Palestinian leader Betzalel Bidziński76 warned, this would be 
“a public slap in our face.”77 After some discussion, therefore, Mizrahists gave in and 
joined as well. The quarrels, however, continued. Religious Zionists now insisted on 
being assigned the same status as their Agudah counterparts. At the same time, they came 
increasingly into conflict with the rest of the Jewish Agency’s representatives, as the 
majority did not support their political hard-line. Finally, these dynamics drove 
Mizrahists to quit the Jewish Agency’s delegation. Yet again they decided to send their 
own, separate delegation to appear before the British. The tripartite dynamics during the 
late 1930s brought the Mizrahi increasingly in tensions with their secularist partners, 
while many Agudah demands seemed easier to reconcile with the dominant voices within 
the Jewish Agency. Agudah-Zionist relations threatened to undermine the Mizrahi’s 
demands. 
These developments did not lack a certain historical irony. The more Agudat Yisrael 
steered a course that seemed to resemble early religious Zionist attitudes toward 
cooperation with the ZO, the more problematic and difficult became the stance of 
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religious Zionists in this tripartite relationship. Secular Zionists were divided on the 
question of partition. While David Ben Gurion and others were willing to agree to 
partition as an interim stage with the option of later extensions of territory in mind, an 
opposition formed under Menachem Ussishkin, fiercely opposing such compromise. 
Mizrahists, due to their strict refusal to accept any surrendering of Jewish rights to the 
whole territory of the historical Land of Yisrael, embraced Ussishkin’s position. This was 
radically different from early Mizrahi politics under Rabbi Isaac Jacob Reines, who in the 
Uganda controversy had sided with the pragmatic course of Theodor Herzl.78 Many 
Agudah leaders, in contrast, took pragmatic positions towards both partition and political 
parity. Their concern for Jews in Europe, as well as about the progress of Zionist 
settlements in Palestine, increasingly caused them to embrace political compromise.  
The Paris Accords aimed to soothe the polarizing effects of these dynamics. But 
neither of the sides abided by its agreement not to appear individually before the ZO or 
the British, and the accord’s impact remained limited. While their political and 
ideological rivalries grew more and more pronounced, the late 1930s also witnessed the 
first harbingers of future cooperation. The possibility of statehood urged both sides to 
consider strategies to ensure protection of religious services and institutions vis-à-vis a 
secular majority. In this context, several, mostly Palestine-based, leaders from both 
movements came together in a committee. They met multiple times throughout this 
period to contemplate minimum demands that they might agree upon. The committee did 
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not come to a full understanding. But despite Mizrahi opposition to religious “minority 
rights,” and fears about Agudist intentions of erecting a “religious ghetto,” the terms of a 
minimal consensus for the protection of religious services and institutions slowly 
crystallized during their discussions.79  
Both sides seemed to gradually reach an understanding that with the foundation of a 
state, the terms of their political rivalries would change drastically. While withdrawal 
from the official Jewish community was a realistic option, withdrawal from a nation state 
was less so. What is more, the framework of a nation state would dissolve some of the 
tension created by the fact that Knesset Yisrael was defined as a religious community, but 
based on ethnic terms. In a nation state, any Jewish communities would be automatically 
religious in character. The influence of secular Jews on religious communities and 
institutions would still be an issue, but the nature and extent of such influence would 
change. In later years, the founding of the state would foster polarization among 
Agudists, eventually splitting the movement between those who reconciled themselves to 
the new political realities and others who resisted any cooperation with secular Jewish 
authorities. The joint committee elicited such polarization when the spiritual authority of 
the Old Yishuv in Jerusalem, Rabbi Joseph Zvi Dushinski, barred Agudah leaders from 
participation. Not surprisingly, Isaac Breuer condemned Dushinski’s prohibition. The 
talks were halted, but after an intermission of several months they resumed.  
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Less predictable than Breuer’s reaction was Moses Blau’s commitment to the 
committee’s meetings. Blau, as the eminent political leader of the Old Yishuv in 
Jerusalem, was much more suspicious of cooperation with Zionists than Breuer. During 
these years, however, Blau increasingly took a pragmatic approach towards the question 
of statehood. Breuer and Blau each penned their own drafts of a constitution for the 
future state. Both drafts demanded that the constitution be strictly based on Jewish law. 
But both also left leeway for pragmatic solutions if there was no majority for rooting the 
constitution firmly in halakhah.80 Not only did Blau continue to participate in the 
committee meetings with the Mizrahi despite the objections of Rabbi Dushinski, he also 
displayed more willingness to compromise than he had on earlier occasions.81 In July 
1938, he declared that Agudists could refrain from calling for separate communities in 
negotiations about the constitution, and support the more extensive religious demands of 
the Mizrahi. The Agudah, Jacob Rosenheim later stated in discussion with Meir Berlin as 
well, would be willing to back the Mizrahi’s more extensive demands for tying the state 
to religious conceptions and institutions. Yet if those demands fell through, Mizrahists 
would support the minimalist line of Agudat Yisrael to guarantee the functioning of 
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religious institutions.82 The two sides did not further pursue this line, but despite their 
collapse, the talks for the first time opened up the real possibility of a common front for 
basic religious demands vis-à-vis secularist Zionists.  
  The St. James Conference in London did not yield success, and in May 1939, the 
British issued a White Paper, which officially abandoned partition and promoted an 
independent Palestine to be governed by both Arabs and Jews in proportion to their 
numbers. Simultaneously, the British White Paper strictly limited Jewish immigration, 
and restricted the rights of Jews to buy land. The White Paper curtailed Jewish rights so 
radically that it united all of the Jewish parties in their opposition to its policies. For the 
time being, the bleak political situation took the momentum out of debates about 
statehood and partition.83 
 
Beyond Failure: The Significance of the Paris and London Agreements  
Notwithstanding their outcome, the Paris and London agreements hold an important 
place in the history of Jewish Orthodox politics. Leaders of both Agudat Yisrael and 
Mizrahi came to accept their inability to establish their own movement as the sole 
political force in the Orthodox camp. While remaining fierce opponents, each side had to 
acknowledge that the other would not join their own ranks or simply dissolve. At the start 
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of their negotiations in the Parisian Ambassador Hotel, the Polish Mizrahi leader Samuel 
Brodt openly admitted this fact, and urged both movements to cooperate lest they tear 
each other apart.84   
We lose sight of such dynamics when we merely focus on the agreements’ failure. 
Even the question of who is to be blamed for the failure of the agreements is not easily 
determined. Neither side, as we have seen, was willing to give up its political and 
organizational advantages. Agudists were anxious of blurring the boundaries between 
their organization and Zionist activism, and of granting the Mizrahi indirectly the 
approval from their rabbinic authorities. Mizrahists, on the other hand, were afraid that 
the Agudah could benefit from their fundraising activism and organizational know-how. 
It is correct that the tensions between different centers and leaders within the Agudah 
tended to complicate negotiations with religious Zionists. But these tensions did not 
always impact negatively on the willingness of Agudists to engage in negotiations with 
religious Zionists. Much is to be said, for example, that Moses Blau’s initiative for the 
London agreement was at least partly spurred by his rivalry with Isaac Breuer. In January 
1938, Blau and Breuer clashed over the question of the distribution of money that had 
been collected in Poland for the Agudah’s Keren Ha-Yishuv. Blau’s Kol Yisrael 
published an article that accused Breuer of having used all of the revenues exclusively for 
the Agudah’s workers’ movement, despite their having been designated for Agudist work 
in Palestine more generally. Breuer, outraged by the article, threatened to resign from all 
of his offices unless Blau published a retraction and publicly apologized to him. These 
conflicts came to a head at the convention of the Agudah executive in Vienna in January 
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1938. Only through strong pressure from other party leaders and fierce debates did the 
two men eventually agree to settle the conflict, but neither of them was willing to restore 
his cooperation in good faith.85  
Their relationship stayed chilly. Personal enmities and competition for power and 
leadership fueled such confrontations. In addition, such disputes were grounded in their 
positions - Breuer as the head of the workers’ movement and Blau as the political leader 
of the Old Yishuv in Jerusalem. The distribution of funds was a central part of these 
roles, and therefore of their conflict. Thus, their rivalry might help to explain Blau’s 
motivations to promote joint fundraising with the Mizrahi. The fact that the London 
agreement came about through Blau’s initiative and insistence seems odd at first, as Blau 
was one of the fiercest critics of any cooperation with religious Zionists. Through his 
initiative, he might have hoped to increase his access to Agudah funds and gain ground 
vis-a-vis his competitor Breuer. And indeed, from the very moment Blau started to 
promote joint fundraising, Breuer made sure to assert his authority over such issues. He 
repeatedly insisted on his leading role as the head of the Palestine fund. In the 
negotiations with Mizrahists about joint fundraising campaigns, Breuer did not keep his 
disdain for Blau a secret. When, for example, asked by Zeev Gold how Blau could 
negotiate with Ben Gurion in London, while Agudat Yisrael reproached the Mizrahi 
regularly for its cooperation with secularists, Breuer responded dismissively: “Moses 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85 Protokoll der Sitzung des Wa‘ad Ha-Poel der Agudas Jisrael, in AAYA BB47. These rivalries might 
have also been the reason for the two to issue different proposals for a constitution of the future state within 




Blau,” he claimed, “is no Agudist, just a politician.” He then continued his statement by 
contrasting Blau’s fickle character with his own ideological steadfastness.86  
Breuer himself had tried to advance alternative proposals to the Paris agreement just a 
few months before Blau’s initiative. In August 1938, Breuer published his memorandum 
for a “united haredi front,” in which he called on the “devout Orthodox” to join forces 
within a movement. His aim was to convince the masses in Palestine of the necessity for 
a Torah state, not “by force, but by means of spiritual propaganda.” Shortly thereafter, he 
approached Meir Berlin with the suggestion of establishing a “Covenant of the Faithful” 
(Brit Emunim). Breuer, who had been instrumental in bringing about negotiations 
between the two workers’ movements in 1936, envisioned the creation of an Orthodox 
mass movement. This movement, he hoped, would complement Agudat Yisrael and the 
Mizrahi, but not replace them. “[…] Inasmuch as these organizations [Mizrahi and 
Agudah, D.M.] will act with all their strength to further their unique doctrines,” Breuer 
wrote, Brit Emunim “will confidently take care of the functions that are mutual to all 
devout Orthodox, without any fear of blurring the differences, which cannot be denied.”87 
Despite Berlin’s basic appreciation of Breuer’s idea, however, their negotiations did not 
yield any results, as the former feared the competition of a mass movement for the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86 Zeev Gold to Meir Berlin 16.3.1939, in ARZ MO151. Already earlier in the negotiations with the 
Mizrahi, Breuer had made highly dismissive remarks about Blau and Kol Yisrael, for example in June 
1935, when Kol Yisrael had published a negative article about the Paris agreement. See Yedi‘ot Penimiot 
6.5.1938, in ibid. MO 140. Their rivalries grew ever more acrid during these years. Blau, for example, had 
sent out letters to important Agudah leaders, in which he accused Breuer of destroying the Jerusalem 
branch of Agudat Yisrael. Breuer, in response, ranted against such defamatory letters. The incident could 
only be resolved through rabbinic mediation. See Moses Blau to Jacob Rosenheim, 6.10.1937, in AAYP 
22f; Jacob Rosenheim to Moses Blau, 16.11.1937, in ibid. 197.  
87 Monty Penkower published an English translation of Breuer’s memorandum among other documents as 
an attachment to his article about Agudah-Mizrahi cooperation. I cite from his translation. See Penkower, 
Lost Opportunity, 251. See also Natanael Katzburg, “’Brit Emunim,’ Tokhnit shel Tenu‘ah Datit-Ruhanit 
be-Shilhei Shenot ha-Sheloshim.” In Bi-Shvilei ha-Tehiyyah: Mehqarim ba-Tzyionut ha-Datit vol.2, ed. 




Mizrahi, and advocated to keep the Covenant of the Faithful a small elite organization 
instead. “In the end I gave up this plan,” Breuer noted in his autobiography, “much to the 
satisfaction of certain circles in the Agudah,” referring among others to his main 
opponent, Moses Blau.88 Their rivalry, it seems, pushed both to advocate for alternative 
agreements with religious Zionists.  
The negotiations from the late 1930s are significant as they indicate an important 
stage of organizational and ideological consolidation of both sides. What is more, 
Agudah and Mizrahi leaders came to the conclusion that they would not be able to boot 
their opponent out of the tripartite relationship with the ZO. In their willingness to 
negotiate, both movements implicitly admitted to this fact, thereby indirectly 
acknowledging each other. This, then, was an early recognition of two different camps, 
both of which could legitimately claim to represent parts of Orthodox Jewry. These 
camps, it became clear, would not merge. Substantial matters divided them. At the same 
time, the negotiations carved out matters that were common to both camps. These would 
later become the basis for cooperation between Agudat Yisrael and Mizrahi and for the 
historical agreements with the ZO that made the foundation of the State of Israel in 1948 
possible.  
 
Aftermath: Parting Ways  
In January 1940, Agudat Yisrael in Palestine reached an agreement with the Zionist 
National Council about its support for the Yishuv’s Emergency Tax Campaign (mas 
herum) that all Jews in the area were to pay.89 At the time the Jewish settlements in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88 Breuer, Mein Weg, 208. 
89 Much of the willingness to cooperate with the Jewish Agency was due to pressure from the workers’ 




Palestine suffered severe hardships due to the war in Europe and the unstable situation in 
the Middle East. Cooperation in this matter was a further important step towards Agudist-
Zionist rapprochement. In this context, Kol Yisrael published an article grappling with the 
agreement and its significance for Palestinian Jewish politics. “Many ask,” the author 
stated, “[…] why it is easier for the Agudah to cooperate with the secularists and their 
institutions than with the leaders of the Mizrahi. These naive inquirers,” he claimed, “ do 
not feel the fine, but prominent difference that exists between the two modes of 
cooperation. They do not understand that it is easy to speak openly with an adversary, 
whose tendencies and aims one clearly knows. […] It is very hard, on the other hand, to 
meet someone, who seems like a friend, but in fact is an extreme opponent, and causes 
you to fail on every step.”90  
With these words, the author of the article restated an approach that some Agudists 
had been promoting since the late 1920s. Orthodox leaders could cooperate with 
secularists in political and economic matters by strictly separating their communities and 
protecting them from the cultural influences of the former. The Mizrahi, by softening 
these borders, was a threat to non-Zionist Orthodoxy. Despite many drastic upheavals, 
despite the British White Paper and the outbreak of World War II, the author conveyed, 
the Agudah had remained true to itself and there would be no dramatic changes.  
But history rarely advances as evenly and linearly as party ideologues like to claim. 
True, the two political camps had been well established by 1940, and continued 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
refugees, Palestinian leaders informed Jacob Rosenheim about such backgrounds. See Regional Office of 
Agudat Yisrael in Palestine to Jacob Rosenheim, 27.9.1939, in AAYP 66. Importantly, the agreement from 
January 1940 particularly excluded any cooperation of Agudat Yisrael with the national funds. This had 
been a precondition of party leaders, as the funds supported cultural endeavors. See Regional Office of 
Agudat Yisrael in Palestine to Jacob Rosenheim, 15.10.1939, in AAYP 94.  




throughout the next decade to compete for adherents among Orthodox Jews, as well as 
within the tripartite relationship with the ZO. Notwithstanding important historical 
continuities, the 1940s also witnessed radical changes on the field of Orthodox politics. 
The war forced Agudists to cooperate with Zionist institutions to a much higher degree 
than they had been willing to before its outbreak. The Agudah had to reconsider its 
policies on different levels. For example, fewer and fewer immigrants left the official 
Jewish community. In June 1941, a national convention of Agudat Yisrael debated 
abolishing the stipulation forcing anyone with the intention of joining the party to quit 
Knesset Yisrael. The resolution, as the religious Zionist newspaper Ha-Tzofe noted with 
deep satisfaction, was passed with a great majority.91 Even stern opponents of statehood 
like Jacob Rosenheim did not want to undertake any steps that would threaten the Zionist 
project. “Personally I hold such a state to be a calamity,” Rosenheim wrote to Isaac Levin 
in December 1942, “not only for religious reasons, but also for purely political ones, 
because its foundation will lead us into deadly wars with all the Arab peoples.” Despite 
his personal opinion, Rosenheim was convinced that Agudah leaders should not do 
anything “to fight the Zionist demand for a Jewish state, neither publicly nor behind the 
scenes.” Agudat Yisrael, he concluded, could not risk sabotaging any help to “our 
oppressed people.”92 The destruction of European Jewry deprived traditionalist parties of 
their constituencies and of many of their leaders. Palestine became the most important 
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center of Orthodox Judaism. With the immigration of Jacob Rosenheim and others, the 
US as well developed into a vital arena of Mizrahi-Agudah contestation.     
In certain ways, the war brought leaders of both sides closer together, as they shared 
strong concerns for the rescue of Orthodox Jews from Europe, in particular rabbis and 
yeshiva students. But even these mutual concerns did not resolve their tensions. In 
February 1943, a group of about 1,000 Jewish children, who had escaped from Poland via 
a route leading them through Iran, arrived in Palestine. The “Teheran children” became a 
case of great contention among the political parties, as each of them wanted to claim as 
many children as possible for absorption through its partisan educational institutions. In 
its struggle with Mizrahists for the contingent of children designated to religious 
institutions, the political weakness of Agudat Yisrael became glaringly clear.93 Mutual 
Orthodox perceptions and attitudes remained ambivalent. In 1946, the Agudah again 
engaged in negotiations with the Zionists regarding its entry into the Jewish Agency. 
Religious Zionists opposed such a step, as they feared a weakening of their own position. 
Only once it became clear that the Agudah’s participation in the Jewish Agency would 
not endanger their own status did they start to embrace this possibility more 
enthusiastically. Now they even began to support Agudists in their effort to receive an 
increased share of immigration certificates.94  
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attacked this distribution. In September 1943, 106 additional children arrived. To keep the peace within the 
Jewish settlements, this time 62 went to Mizrahi schools and 28 to Agudah institutions. What is more, the 
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Holocaust, see Hayyim Shalem, ʻEt La‘asot le-Hatzalat Yisra’el: Agudat Yisra’el be-Eretz Yisra’el le-
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94 The Agudah was promised 10% instead of the 6% it had received hitherto. According to Moses Shertok, 
this was to prevent the organization’s opposition to the Jewish Agency’s hegemony in questions of 




After the war, leaders of non-Zionist Orthodoxy were excoriated for their reluctance 
to support Jewish immigration to Palestine in the 1920s and 30s. What is more, the 
Agudah was missing a proper leadership. Isaac Breuer and Moses Blau, two of its 
eminent political leaders, passed away in 1946. The party’s rabbinical council convened 
only sporadically and abstained from taking a clear stance towards the question of 
statehood. Politically weak, Agudists were not able to capitalize on tensions between the 
Mizrahi and its secularist fellows within the ZO, as they had before the war. The Jewish 
Agency’s post-war contacts with the Agudah, indeed, seem to not have caused open 
dissonance with the Mizrahi. In June 1947, the World Movement of Agudat Yisrael in 
Jerusalem received a letter from the Executive Jewish Agency. In the letter, the executive 
assured Agudah leaders that the concerns of traditionalist Jewry would be taken seriously 
if a state were established. This state, they stressed, would have the Sabbath as its official 
day of rest, and the Jewish Agency would “use all means required to ensure that every 
state kitchen intended for Jews will have kosher food.” The Jewish Agency would also 
attempt to solve the concerns of Orthodox Jews about marital affairs and to guarantee 
autonomy of education. The letter was signed by David Ben-Gurion, Isaac Gruenbaum, 
as well as by Yehuda Leib Maimon.  
The letter did not have a binding character, but laid down the basics of inter-
communal relations and the role of Judaism in the future state. One year later, in May 
1948, the National Council, headed by the Mizrahi leader Zerah Varhaftig, confirmed the 
validity of Mandatory laws concerning marriage and divorce and all other areas under the 
authority of the Chief Rabbinate, as well as under the authority of local rabbis and 




Provisional Council of State announced Shabbat would become the official day of rest, 
and that the state would abide by Jewish holidays. These arrangements later became 
known as the Status Quo Agreement.95  
The religious Zionist camp, as well, witnessed severe changes during the 1940s. Their 
workers organized in Ha-Poel Ha-Mizrahi, who had considerably gained in strength 
already in the 1930s, now turned into the strongest force within the camp. Among these 
workers, the religious Zionists’ emphasis on political activism and animosity against 
strong rabbinical authority was the most pronounced. Several Mizrahi leaders and Chief 
Rabbi Herzog voiced their opposition to partition in 1947, but in contrast to 1937, they 
did not send their own separate delegation to the British. Great parts of the leadership of 
Ha-Poel Ha-Mizrahi, now the most powerful religious Zionist faction, espoused partition. 
The horrors of the war and the destruction of European Jewry had left their imprint.96 To 
be sure, strife about the role of religion in the emerging state was still of significance. 
Such strife, however, did not essentially challenge the cooperation between Mizrahists 
and secular Zionists within the ZO.  
In the wake of the proclamation of a Jewish state, Mizrahi, Ha-Poel Ha-Mizrahi, 
Agudat Yisrael and Poalei Agudat Yisrael signed an agreement in November 1948 
settling their cooperation within a United Religious Front. The agreement determined that 
the four parties would run together in the elections for the Constituent Assembly in 
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January 1949, in order to safeguard religious rights within the new state. Consequently, 
some within the Mizrahi declared themselves the ideological victors, and demanded that 
Agudat Yisrael merge with their movement. These claims, however, seemed merely 
rhetorical. Their actual cooperation stayed fragile and limited to the minimal demands 
that Agudists had voiced during negotiations in the 1930s. The United Religious Front 
did not advance any common vision. It broke apart only two years later, and the parties 
ran independently in elections for the second Israeli Knesset in July 1951.97  
During the 1950s, the gap between the two Orthodox camps significantly widened. 
The 1940s had already witnessed the delineation of a clear ultra-Orthodox98 society in 
Palestine. In the 1950s, this development was accelerated.99 While social networks and 
ties certainly were not cut off completely, religious Zionists and ultra-Orthodox Jews 
differed more and more in garb and language, as well as in contradicting value systems 
and cultural norms, in particular those regarding the role of women in public life. 
Politically, the final parting of ways came with conflicts surrounding the launching of a 
compulsory national service for observant women. During the early 1950s, the Israeli 
government’s attempts to introduce mandatory military service for young women raised a 
storm of Orthodox indignation. Discussions about female conscription bore a 
resemblance to conflicts about women’s enfranchisement 30 years earlier, as they seemed 
to manifest the same deep rifts separating the sides. In 1949, Prime Minister David Ben-
Gurion had exempted religious women from the military when it became clear that ultra-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
97 On the United Religious Front in detail, see Bauer, Ha-Yahasim ha-Penimiim , 273-306. 
98 The term “ultra-Orthodox” is problematic for many reasons. Not only are there inaccuracies with the 
term “Orthodox,” which I pointed out at the beginning of this dissertation, the prefix “ultra” carries 
negative connotations as in “excessive” or “extreme.” Notwithstanding these problems, I have decided to 
use the term here in order to stress the emergence of two distinct groups out of Orthodox or “Haredi” 
Jewry.  




Orthodox rabbinic authorities, as well as the Chief Rabbi, fiercely rejected their 
conscription.  
But in 1951, the government discussed introducing an amendment to the law 
requiring those observant women who enjoyed exemption from the military service to do 
an alternative national service. Ultra-Orthodox authorities vehemently opposed this 
amendment. When Ben-Gurion erected a committee in August 1952 to debate legislative 
guidelines regarding national service for observant women, the Council of Torah Sages 
instructed all Orthodox ministers to resign from the government. Agudat Yisrael and 
PAY yielded to the rabbinic directive. The religious Zionist camp, on the other hand, did 
not comply. An encounter between the eminent authority of the time, Rabbi Avraham 
Yeshaya Karelitz (Hazon Ish), and the two government members of the religious Zionist 
camp, Zerah Wahrhaftig and Moses Haim Shapira,100 followed. The Hazon Ish had 
declared voting for the law to be halakhically prohibited. Asked for the sources of his 
ruling, he claimed the prohibition to be laid down in the fifth volume of the Shulhan 
Arukh. The Shulhan Arukh is the most widely consulted code of Jewish law. It consists of 
four volumes. With such a statement, the Hazon Ish made it clear that he did not intend to 
disclose the sources on which he had based his ruling. Wahrhaftig and Shapira, in 
contrast, asserted they had the backing of Chief Rabbi Herzog. Like his ultra-Orthodox 
colleagues, Rabbi Herzog had publicly condemned the national service. In contrast to the 
former, however, he had not issued a halakhic prohibition. Instead of instructing the 
politicians on how to vote, Rabbi Herzog rather reluctantly and somewhat nebulously 
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told them “not to cause the dissolution of the coalition by their vote.” On August 26, the 
government, with the votes of religious Zionist members, passed the law that introduced 
a compulsory national service for religious women. Subsequently, the religious Zionist 
and the ultra-Orthodox camps went separate ways.101  
There was a deep symbolism in this encounter. The question of rabbinic authority had 
been a central point of contention for decades. Like no other, the Hazon Ish embodied 
powerful rabbinic authority and the maturing of the doctrine of Daat Torah. The debates 
about women’s national service were its political apex. The Hazon Ish’s reply to 
Wahrhaftig and Shapira summed up the essence of Daat Torah in a nutshell: not only did 
he insist that the politicians yield to rabbinic directive, he also claimed to base it on 
sources not accessible to anyone else, thus rendering it incontestable. In the Agudah 
camp, the influence of political leadership hit rock bottom. Among religious Zionists, in 
contrast, the political leadership took the initiative, in the absence of a clear halakhic 
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 In their investigation of Orthodoxy and Zionism, scholars have tended to stress 
the influences of secular Zionism on Agudat Yisrael, and neglected inner-Orthodox 
rivalries. Throughout this dissertation, in contrast, I have argued that the relations 
between Agudat Yisrael and the religious Zionist movement were highly significant for 
the formation and molding of the two sides. The movements did not represent two 
disjointed, autonomous Orthodox approaches to modern politics: their emergence and 
development were intimately interconnected. After its founding in Vilna in 1902, the 
Mizrahi became a vehicle for a range of social and political activism, helping its 
adherents to formulate and develop their claims for authority within Jewish communities 
in Europe and Palestine. When compared to secularist parties, the Mizrahi’s political 
successes were moderate. In Poland, in terms of size and elector success they lagged 
behind their main Orthodox opponent as well. Nevertheless, religious Zionists posed a 
significant challenge to non-Zionist Orthodoxy; many in the Agudah considered them 
even worse a threat than their secularist counterparts. Mizrahi activism endangered their 
attempts to foster strictly separate Orthodox group formations. What is more, religious 
Zionists promoted their own claims for authority within the camp of Orthodox Jewry, and 
thereby competed with Agudat Yisrael within its own fold. Finally, having the Mizrahi in 





Reacting to socio-economic changes, the disintegration of Jewish communities in 
East-Central Europe, and the emerging Jewish mass movements, traditionalist leaders 
began their own attempts to organize politically during the last decades of the nineteenth 
and the early years of the twentieth centuries. While their organizational efforts had 
various contexts and backgrounds, the growing activities of the Zionist movement in 
European communities soon became a central concern for these elites. In particular, they 
were troubled by the inroads the Zionist movement was making into traditionalist circles. 
The proper response to such challenges was controversially debated. Strife over the best 
handling of the Zionist challenge, and in particular its religious wing, played a 
determining role throughout these years. The founding of the Agudah, in turn, advanced 
the consolidation of the Mizrahi. Not only did it expand the field of Orthodox politics, it 
also stimulated the activist line within the Mizrahi as those advocating a stronger 
affiliation with non-Zionist Orthodoxy left the party.  
Tensions between more traditional forms of rabbinic authority and modern political 
activism plagued both movements. Their mutual struggles helped adherents to dissolve 
such tensions and to develop and shape their own approaches. In the founding debates of 
Agudat Yisrael, frictions with religious Zionists benefited the more conservative forces in 
their endeavor to advance concepts of strong rabbinic authority (Chapter II). In early 
1920s Palestine, on the other hand, advocates for the strengthening of the activist spirit of 
the Mizrahi prevailed in the debates about women enfranchisement to a large extent due 
to increasing conflicts with non-Zionist Orthodoxy and the local branch of Agudat 




On both sides, the balance between political domain and spiritual jurisdiction was 
consistently renegotiated. Tensions concerning this balance mounted within the workers’ 
and youth branches of Agudat Yisrael and Mizrahi, both of which rebelled against the 
central leadership of their movements. Thus, the literature on the Agudah’s labor branch 
tends to depict the workers as quasi Zionists.1 They engaged in settlement activism, were 
fond of the new Hebrew culture, pushed for cooperation with their Zionist counterparts 
and even the Zionist trade union (Histadrut), and in the 1940s settled on land belonging 
to the Jewish National Fund - an act that contradicted policies long held to be central for 
Agudist self-conceptions. This raises the question as to what distinguished PAY from the 
Mizrahi workers’ movement. It might have been better for them to simply join Ha-Poel 
Ha-Mizrahi, which was politically stronger and controlled greater financial means. But 
despite their activism and increasing tensions with the Agudah mother movement, the 
workers never rejected the primacy of rabbinic authority. Even when conflicts with the 
political leadership of the Agudah effectively led to a split in the late 1940s, PAY 
continued to formally accept the Council of Torah Sages.2 This was a major difference 
from religious Zionists. The question of the place of rabbinic authority stayed the 
ultimate dividing line between the two movements. 
The issue of spiritual authority affords an important angle for the analysis of the 
impact of modernity on religious traditions and institutions. But the case of religious 
Zionism also illustrates that one should be careful not to draw too clear a line of a linear 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 By way of example, Friedman writes: “Poalei Agudat Yisrael were the Zionist modern marker of Agudat 
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progress of secularization in periods of decreasing rabbinic authority. Mizrahists worked 
to modernize and rationalize religion, and to adapt it to the nation state. Orthodox Jewry, 
they argued, had to cooperate with secularists and to modernize its institutions. The 
nationalization of religion was to help unitize and tame the unwieldy character of 
religious leadership. Many in the Mizrahi agitated against strong regionalism and the 
undemocratic character of spiritual authority. At the same time, these leaders opted to 
work within a party defining itself as religious. They did not switch to one of the 
secularist parties, and despite their tight alliance with the latter, struggled to 
institutionalize Orthodoxy within the emerging state. While they did promote processes 
of internal secularization, the sphere of religious organization cannot be plainly separated 
from political or national questions in the Jewish case. As much as some of them might 
have wished to, Mizrahists did not, and in fact could not, neatly confine spiritual 
authority to the realm of ritual when basing their political claims on traditional concepts. 
Such tensions, to be sure, did not only arise between different forms of leadership, but 
also within the dealings of individual leaders. Chief Rabbi Herzog, for example, chose to 
set political considerations above his halakhic ruling when publicly agitating against the 
partition of Palestine in 1937. Again in 1953, he put aside his halakhic concerns when 
advising Mizrahi politicians not to endanger political alliances over the issue of national 
service. Thus, rather than merely tracing the increase or decline of spiritual authority, this 
dissertation has investigated tensions with other types of authority. 
After their parting of ways, each camp continued to witness conflicts concerning the 
balance of political and rabbinical leadership. Despite the predominance of rabbinic 




1950s. Mass demonstrations and even political violence made their entrance into the 
ultra-Orthodox world. Such activism, strongly criticized by the rabbinic leadership, 
helped Naturei Karta, the fiercely anti-Zionist breakaway of Agudat Yisrael, gain in 
importance. In the religious Zionist camp as well, these conflicts continued to be a 
significant factor. In 1948, Rabbi Katriel Fishel Tchorsh from Ha-Poel Ha-Mizrahi 
founded the Board of Rabbis, an institution that was to give spiritual advice to the party 
leadership. Under Rabbi Tchorsh, the board continuously clashed with the political 
leadership over questions of competence.3 The relations of the religious Zionist parties 
with the Chief Rabbinate remained fraught with tensions as well. Interestingly, the 
rabbinical impact in this area grew after 1948. While Mizrahists had shaken off any 
authority of the Chief Rabbis over political decisions during the interwar period, in the 
1950s and 60s the party leaders did not reject their rulings, at least not openly.4 The 
significance of the dynamics between rabbinic authority and political activism in the 
great messianic turn of the religious Zionist camp during the 1960s and 1970s has yet to 
be explored.  
History rarely progresses linearly, but is unpredictable and contingent. This holds true 
for the history of Orthodox politics, as well. No straightforward line leads from the first 
religious thinkers pondering mass immigration to Palestine to the foundation of the 
Mizrahi and through the first decades of the movement’s existence. By the time the 
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Mizrahi was founded, many of those who had been involved with Hovevei Zion had left 
the Zionist movement, as the atmosphere grew increasingly polarized between secularist 
Zionists and Orthodoxy. While some joined the Mizrahi, others continued their activities 
in alternative frameworks such as Rabbi Lerner’s Moriah organization.5 Many Moriah 
members and other former supporters of Hovevei Zion later became active in Agudat 
Yisrael. As the two movements developed throughout the 1920s and 30s, most of the 
leading Mizrahists increasingly abandoned the pragmatism of their movement’s founder, 
Rabbi Reines. What is more, they became more and more involved in battles over the 
outlook of the emerging society and political structures in Palestine. Agudist strategies to 
foster strict separation from secularist institutions, while at the same time increasing their 
search for viable ways of cooperation with the Zionist movement, bore a certain 
resemblance to early Mizrahi approaches.  
Such shifts can be explained by mutual competition and the relations between Agudat 
Yisrael, the Mizrahi, and the ZO. Agudah-Mizrahi relations were not a mere subchapter 
of the former’s dealings with Zionism, as is often assumed. To the contrary, the dynamics 
between the two Orthodox parties were of high significance for the formation and 
development of clear positions and agendas in the movements. Agudist attitudes towards 
the Mizrahi did not simply parallel, but were significantly different from those towards 
the secularist parts of the movement, and in fact often complicated the former’s relations 
with the ZO. In the late 1920s and early 1930s, the two movements became bitter rivals 
in an intricate net of tripartite relations, as both parties advanced competing visions of 
how to cooperate with the secularist camp. Within this triangle, the contestation with the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




Mizrahi hardened Agudist positions on strict boundaries between their communities and 
non-observant Jews. Agudist involvement in Palestine, on the other hand, was among the 
factors that coaxed Mizrahists into their historic alliance with the labor Zionists in 1935. 
During the time of the Peel Commission in 1936-1937, finally, Agudah-Mizrahi 
competition stimulated religious Zionists to embrace dogmatic positions on the question 
of partition.  
Both sides were deeply affected by their mutual struggles, and adapted to the 
constantly changing structures of political opportunities. Rather than searching for 
ideological explanations, this dissertation set its focus on political dynamics and tactics. 
Positive depictions of Tel Aviv by the Polish Agudah press, and other comments of party 
leaders that could be interpreted as “nationalist” or “Zionist” have to be carefully 
contextualized within the dynamics of political competition. Agudists tried to counter 
what they perceived as Zionist hegemony in Palestine, and competed with the ZO for 
adherents and resources. Mutual media coverage of Agudat Yisrael and Mizrahi consisted 
in large parts of mutual polemics on the one hand, and calls for unity and cooperation on 
the other. Both genres helped ideologues to fashion and mold their own movement’s 
approaches, and to silence critics within their own ranks. Through mutual polemics, party 
propagandists stressed the insurmountable differences between the two Orthodox 
organizations and thereby advanced processes of ideological formation and consolidation. 
What is more, such articles were essential tools in the struggle for the hearts of observant 
Jews, as they afforded the opportunity to sharpen and refine the public profile of one’s 
party. Open calls for cooperation allowed leaders to demonstrate their own side’s 




blame their opponent for rendering such endeavors impossible. This rhetoric helped 
Mizrahi politicians deal with a fundamental dilemma. In official declarations and party 
propaganda they repeatedly called on the Agudah to get active in Palestine and to 
cooperate with the Zionist Organization. Its actual involvement, however, constituted 
dangerous political competition for the religious Zionist approach. Agudists, on the other 
hand, used such polemics to prevent ordinary Jews from mistakenly taking their 
involvement in Palestine as an endorsement of Zionist activism. In interwar Poland this 
was all the more important, as Polish Jews seemed to care less about the niceties of party 
ideologies than social and political changes, and their chances of obtaining one of the 
much-coveted immigration certificates to Palestine.  
Going beyond press polemics, during the 1930s leaders of both sides repeatedly met 
to discuss possible modes of cooperation. These exploratory talks fulfilled many of the 
same functions as the media coverage. They signaled to the public that the two parties 
were actively promoting the cause of Orthodox unity, while at the same time raising their 
own hopes of gaining a strategic advantage. Agudists could benefit from Mizrahi 
activism and fundraising. Mizrahists, on the other hand, hoped to gain rabbinical 
approval through cooperation with the Agudah. Concern for their public image brought 
the two sides together. None of the leaders wanted to be perceived as blocking attempts at 
Orthodox cooperation. Ultimately, such concerns also led to the collapse of their 
negotiations, as both sides were afraid of granting their opponent legitimacy, thus giving 
the other side a competitive edge.  
As can be gleaned from these encounters, their rivalry carried not only threats, but 




Orthodox camp, and threatened the Mizrahi’s position within the ZO. But paradoxically, 
the existence of an independent Orthodox political organization could also help 
strengthen the Mizrahi position vis-à-vis the Zionist Organization. The Agudah illustrated 
to the Zionists that organized Orthodoxy had become a force to be reckoned with and that 
they had better take seriously the demands of Orthodox activists within their own ranks. 
It also raised the value of having a group of Orthodox activists within their organization. 
When the Agudah challenged the Zionists’ ability to represent Orthodox Jewry before the 
British Mandate Government, the latter could point to the Mizrahi. In Zionist apologetics, 
the Mizrahi proved that Orthodox Jewry also was in favor of building up a nation state in 
Palestine. For Agudists, the benefits of having an Orthodox rival were less palpable. 
Nevertheless, the moderate parts of the movement came to see in the Mizrahi a potential 
ally in assuring the protection of basic religious rights, once the founding of a state 
became a tangible option. These deep ambiguities pervaded their negotiations in the late 
1930s, as both sides investigated possible roads of cooperation while keeping their eyes 
trained on the political risks and benefits for their own movement. The scholarship on 
party and movement histories, as the example of Mizrahi-Agudah contestation 
illuminates, can gain from carefully analyzing inter-movement dynamics in order to 
better understand political developments and processes of ideological formation and 
radicalization.   
The history of the relations between the two movements until 1948 can be divided 
into three periods. From the founding of Agudat Yisrael until its First World Congress in 
1923, ideological and organizational boundaries were largely in flux, and a merger 




developed and shaped their own approach through mutual struggle and polemics. Finally, 
the consolidation of the two approaches led to renewed negotiations during the 1930s. 
These negotiations symbolized the formation of two distinct political camps within 
Orthodox Judaism, two camps that now competed not only for the hearts of Orthodox 
Jews but also within the framework of the tripartite relationship with the ZO. These 
negotiations reached their peak with the formation of a United Religious Front in 1948. 
The destruction of European Jewry and the foundation of the Israeli State in many ways 
radically altered the arena for Orthodox contestation. Yet despite many changes and 
transformed political opportunity structures, the cooperation of the two sides within the 
United Religious Front also displayed continuities. Ultimately, the two sides had 
established themselves as distinct camps.  
The struggles between the two Orthodox movements were not carried out in a 
vacuum, but integrated into and influenced by their European and Palestinian 
environments and frameworks. Mizrahists were ethno-entrepreneurs emerging on the 
scene at a time when old structures faltered. Much like their German, Czech, Polish, and 
other peers, they challenged established authorities and advanced claims for authority 
through their social and political activism. What is more, both movements operated in 
structures influenced and shaped by their Christian and Muslim environments. In Poland, 
both Mizrahists and Agudists had to accommodate with the structures created by national 
authorities, and to frame their requests according to the terms of the minority debates. In 
Palestine, many of the political and religious institutions were still built on structures 
created during the Ottoman period. And even new ones, such as the Chief Rabbinate, 




by defining all of the Jews of Palestine as a religious community. Thus de facto they 
delineated the Jewish community on ethnic grounds, while at the same time bestowing 
upon this community a religious character and thereby continuing parts of the former 
Ottoman system. Even though non-Zionist Orthodoxy battled hard against what they 
perceived as “Zionist hegemony,” by favoring Zionist political structures the British 
system helped to further nationalize the population. In making their demands vis-à-vis the 
British, both Agudah and Mizrahi leaders blended religious metaphysical levels with 
national political ones. “The entire holy land,” Simha Feldman drafted a Mizrahi report to 
the Peel Commission in 1937, “is given through divine ruling and international human 
law to the sons of Israel, and therefore it is called Eretz Yisrael.”6   
The blending of religious and national loyalties also permeated debates about political 
alignments. Here, for example, frictions came to the forefront during the early 1930s, 
when Mizrahists debated their alliances with the Orthodox and the Zionist camps 
(Chapter V). Some Palestinian Agudists, on the other hand, in the early 1920s pondered 
severing their affiliations with secular Jews completely, at least on a political level, and 
promoted the integration of Jews as a religious group into an Arab state. Attempts to deny 
national group formations any relevance in the political sphere, however, were rendered 
impossible due to escalating conflicts between Zionists and Arab nationalists in the late 
1920s (Chapter IV). While such radical options became off limits to mainstream 
Agudists, tension between religious and national affiliations kept flaring up throughout 
the decades, in particular in the movement’s clashes with religious Zionists.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




Within the political struggle, nationalism fulfilled several functions for religious 
Zionists. Couching claims for Jewish group rights in nationalist terms, Mizrahists hoped, 
would strengthen these claims in the international arena and towards non-Jewish 
authorities. Defining the Jews as a nation, Mizrahi activists further argued, would prevent 
the dissolving of Jewish group formations (which they termed “assimilation”). While it 
helped by demarcating Jews more clearly from their non-Jewish environments, 
nationalism aimed to flatten inner-Jewish differences and allowed the Mizrahi to work 
closely together with non-observant Jews. Finally, Zionists created new institutional 
frameworks that helped Mizrahi activists voice their claims to leadership and diminish 
the political influence of the spiritual elite.  
By focusing on the dynamics between Agudat Yisrael and the religious Zionist 
movement, this dissertation has tried to contribute to Jewish and Israeli history. Conflicts 
over questions of authority and leadership helped to shape two distinct camps within 
Jewish Orthodoxy. These camps reached their final form only in the 1950s, under the 
specific conditions of the Israeli state and its institutions. But far from beginning a 
completely new chapter in Jewish history, Israeli realities were in various ways a 
continuation of processes that had commenced in nineteenth and early twentieth century 
Europe. The developments in Palestine had their own distinct features, but at the same 
time also displayed many similarities to the European arena. What is more, European 
immigrants and party leaders influenced and shaped Palestinian structures and politics. 
The situation in Palestine, in turn, impacted European realities, not only through media 




struggles within Poland, for example, by way of leverage gained through the ability to 
provide immigration certificates to Palestine. 
Investigating political conflicts among Orthodox Jews can also contribute to the field 
of nationalism studies. The case of Mizrahi-Agudah contestation illustrates the blending 
of religious and national affiliations, and the tensions that resulted therefrom. Such 
tensions were present in many nationalist struggles. The question of spiritual authority 
provides a prism through which one can study these tensions and conflicts.  
Finally, this dissertation argued that the encounter of religion and religious activists 
with modernity in its various aspects cannot exclusively be understood as a conflict 
between religious actors and secularists, but has to be complemented with an 
investigation of struggles within the religious camp itself. Such conflicts, indeed, were 
not unique to Jewish Orthodoxy during the first half of the twentieth century, but 
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